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In attempting to assess the nature of the relationship 
between the Army and Air Force during the interwar years, 
it has been found appropriate to divide the work into three 
parts. 
The first part deals with the years up to 1926, during 
which time the Air Force fought and won for itself an 
independent role both at home and overseas. The Air Ministry's 
case for a separate existence is examined, as is the validity 
of the Army's opposition to a third service. 
The struggle for power in the policing and defence of 
mandates and colonial territories in the Middle and Far East 
provides the subject matter for the second part. In tracing 
the course of this power struggle, no detailed attempt has 
been made to evaluate the military effectiveness of air 
control. The main concern here has been to show the effects 
that this struggle had upon the development of interservice 
cooperation at the tactical level. 
The final part of the work studies the diverging roles 
of the two services and the repercussions that this divergence 
had upon relations during the 1930s. In this period, the 
effects of rearmament upon interservice cooperation are 
examined, together with the doctrine of limited liability and 
the policy of strategic bombing upon which it was essentially 
based. 
For the most part, this study of'Army-Air Force relations 
has been confined to Staff and Ministerial levels, but the 
opinion of junior officers and civilian experts has been 
sought on specific issues. 
Whilst it is not possible to apportion blame precisely 
for the antagonism which so often served to divide the two 
departments, this study would suggest that the Army's case 
in this troubled relationship has not always received the 
measure of understanding and support to which it is entitled. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In tracing the course of the relationship between the Army and 
the Air Force during the interwar years, two factors of particular 
significance emerge. Firstly, one is struck by both the intensity 
and the extent of the rivalry between the two departments. Roskill 
has described the conflict over the control of naval aviation as 
"one of the greatest controversies of the interwar years". 
I 
Deserving of no less a description and with equal if not more 
important consequences was the "paper and political battle" 
2 
which 
raged so ferociously between the Army and the Air Force in the 
early 1920s, smouldered with varying degrees of intensity for the 
next fifteen years, and then burst into flames with renewed vigour 
just a few weeks before the outbreak of the Second World War. 
In the immediate postwar years in particular, the Army 
launched frequent and bitter attacks upon the integrity of the new 
fledgeling force and upon every attempt it made to carve out for 
itself a viable and enduring role in both imperial policing and 
home defence. Of this period Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor 
was later to write: 
... the fact is that during the formative 
years we were literally battling for the 
life of the RAF against the forces of 
military reaction. 3 
In the matter of imperial policing, the WO struggled to 
prevent the adoption of air control in the mandate of Mesopotamia 
and, when their efforts failed, continued a running battle to 
regain command in this and other Middle East territories where the 
Air Force had been granted control. Opposition was no less severe 
in the realm of home defence, where Air Ministry demands for an 
independent air striking force were challenged both as to the 
necessity and strength of such a force. In the eyes of the WO the 
major task of the Air Force was to assist the Army on the field 
of battle. 
1. Stephen Roskill, Hankey, Man of Secrets, Vol. II, p. 107. 
2. Sir Philip Joubert, The Third Service, p. 72. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/6]4, Some Personal Reflections 
by Sir John Slessor, September 1964, p. 6. 
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The width and intensity of such opposition are not generally 
appreciated. As a result - and this is the second major factor to 
emerge from this study - the Army's case in this interservice 
struggle has largely gone by default. This is understandable, for 
in this particular instance history has been singularly unkind to 
the Army. The ultimate success of the RAF in World War II and the 
undisputed place that the Air Force has come to hold as one of the 
nation's fighting services have tended to discredit in toto the 
Army's distant battles against an independent air arm. In this 
respect, hindsight has proved a liability rather than a benefit. 
In dealing with this subject, therefore, one is tempted to 
dismiss the Army's opposition as "destructive and retrogressive"' 
or, at best, to give it a brief mention within a general account 
of the more dramatic struggle being waged at that time between the 
Air Force and the Navy. Yet, in the context of its time, such 
opposition can be readily understood and, in some cases, clearly 
justified. This is not to suggest that the WO and the General 
Staff were without blame. One can readily sympathise with the view 
advanced by one critic that, in these interwar years, the Army had 
need of an "emetic" to get rid of its old ideas. 2 Nevertheless, a 
closer study of the relations between these two departments does 
reveal that the Army's case has much to commend it and that a new 
balance needs to be struck between the arguments which served to 
divide these two fighting services in this fitful period of peace 
between the two great wars. 
The Army Council accepted in principle the formation of an 
independent Air Force at a Cabinet meeting in August 1917, when the 
second report of the Smuts' Committee on air organisation and home 
defence was under consideration. As the future was to reveal, it 
was an act which, as far as the senior Services were concerned, was 
taken in haste and repented at leisure. Even though the CIGS, 
General Sir William Robertson, had earlier stated that he accepted 
1. Norman Macmillan, Sefton Brancker, p. 254 
2. Sir William Joynson Hicks, MP, speaking at the 
Air Conference held at the Guildhall, London, 
14 October 1920. See The Aeroplane, Vol. XIX, 
27 October 1920, p. 714. Sir William was then 









the need for a separate Air Force, ' it would appear that the WO as 
a whole saw this need as simply a makeshift war-time expedient 
which had no-future beyond the ending of hostilities. Furthermore, 
the Army Council's formal acceptance of a third Service was on the 
firm understanding that Army interests were to be fully safeguarded 
as regards both training and materiel. Indeed, Robertson only 
agreed to withdraw an amendment to the Committee's recommendations 
after he had been assured that the War Office would be responsible 
for laying down the aircraft requirements of the Army and. that, in 
the words of the report, "the closest attention should be given to 
the special requirements of the Navy and Army". 2 
Similar concern for the needs of the Army once the Royal 
Flying Corps had been granted its own wings was voiced by Field 
Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the C-in-C British Armies in France. In 
a letter to the GIGS on the 15th September, Haig wrote: 
... there is room for doubt whether 
coordination under the new scheme will not 
be even more difficult than under the old 
and whether the Air Ministry, claiming to 
be the supreme authority on aerial questions, 
... may not override military opinion as to 
military requirements. 3 
But Haig's remarks, coming as they did from battle HQ, went much 
further than those of his Chief. The Air Service, he claimed, was 
as much a part of the Army as were the infantry, artillery and 
cavalry. The new situation would make for difficulties of command 
where it most mattered - on the battlefield. It was too much to 
expect that the relationship between a commander of the Army on 
the one hand and "attached" units on the other, could ever be 
quite the same as if those units belonged to the Army and thus 
looked to the other arms as their comrades, and to the Army 
authorities as their true masters. There was need, he argued, 
1. Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, Soldiers and 
Statesmen, Vol. II, p. 17. (letter dated 9 July 1917). 
2. Cab 23/3, War Cabinet, 223rd Meeting, 21i August 1917. 
The amendment read: "The Air Ministry shall from time 
to time attach to the Navy and the Army such air units 
as are deemed necessary by the Admiralty and War Office 
respectively for naval or military operations etc. " 
3. Cab 21+/26, War Cabinet, GT 2058. 
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for a much fuller and clearer definition of the powers of military 
commanders in regard to air units placed at their disposal than 
that provided by the report. 
Haig questioned, too, the value of independent air action. He 
could not accept that, in the near future at least, the destruction 
of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale was likely to 
become, in the words of the report, "the principal operations of 
war to which the older forms of military and naval operations may 
become secondary and subordinate". 
' 
Such caution was in marked contrast to the confidence of the 
air enthusiast. A short time afterwards, the Editor of Flight 
Magazine wrote: 
... it is easy to foresee the time when the armies shall have ceased to exist 
except as the hewers of wood and the 
drawers of water for the Air Service and 
the latter will have the whole business 
of fighting to itself. 2 
It was exaggeration of this kind which was to account for much of 
the Army's hostility towards the new Service throughout the 
interwar years. 
Once the RAF was formed in April 1918, the Air Council became 
the scene of further clashes on the question of air priority.. At 
the Council's meeting on the 15th July, Major General Ellington 
expressed doubts as to whether the programme of aircraft 
development then under discussion was not based on the principle 
that a decision in war might be obtained by an air offensive for 
which the Independent Air Force was to be developed. In his view, 
a decision would be reached by offensive action on the part of the 
Army. The detachment of aircraft from the Army to the IAF required 
to be carefully watched lest the result should be a weakening of 
the Army's offensive power. In subsequent discussion it was indeed 
disclosed that the latest development programme implied a reduction 
of 14 squadrons of fighting machines allotted to the Army and that 
there were grounds for the view that the allocation of strength to 
1. Cab 24/26, War Cabinet, GT 2058. 
2. Flight Magazine, Vol. X, 4 April'1918, p. 358. 
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the IAF was "on the liberal side". ' 
The following month, General Sir Henry Wilson, recently 
appointed GIGS, claimed that the Air Ministry's proposals fell 
short of Army requirements by 24 squadrons and that the bulk of 
this reduction, some 19 squadrons, was at the expense of the 
British armies in France. -This reduction appeared to be for the 
benefit of the IAF despite the fact that all recent experience had 
shown the value of direct cooperation by the RAF in the ground 
battle. "However important the operations of the IAF may be, " he 
wrote in his note, "I must emphasise the vital necessity of 
subordinating them to the requirements of the Army when critical 
military operations are in progress. " 
z 
Such fears concerning the allocation of aircraft to direct 
cooperation with the Army appear to be justified, and were not to 
be allayed over the years. Nor, at this stage, were they confined 
to Army officers. Major General Sir John Salmond complained 
bitterly about the number of bombers being allocated to strategic 
bombing. The war, he argued, would be won on the Western Front; 
his Command should be receiving every plane available. 
3 Lord 
Trenchard himself, then General commanding the IAF, is on record 
as recognising severe limitations on the part to be played'by his 
Force at this time and, indeed, of being opposed to its very 
formation for fear that it would be to the detriment of the field 
forces. 4 With Trenchard, however, the motives determining his 
attitude appear to have been more complex and may well have 
stemmed basically from a determination to keep the new Air Force 
out of the Army's clutches. Whilst he favoured the bombing of 
Germany, 5 he feared that the creation of an Independent Force to 
do this work might well jeopardise the very existence of a 
1. Air 6/13, Air Council, 39th Meeting, 15 July 1918. 
2. Cab 2+/61, War Cabinet, GT 5495, Note by CIGS, 
24 August 1918. 
3. John Laffin, Swifter than Eagles, p. 130. Unless 
otherwise stated, all references to Salmond in 
this work refer to Sir John Salmond. 
4. Trenchard Papers, CI/10/3, Private Diary, 11 November 
1918: "Thus the Independent Force comes to an end. A 
more gigantic waste of effort and personnel there has 
never been in any war. " 
5. Ibid., 13 July 1918: ".. the bombing of Germany is 
now a necessity. " 
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separate air service. Some years later he told the RAF's official 
historian, H. A. Jones: 
My view was that if you split your air 
service into tuppeny ha'penny parts, you 
would soon have the Army requesting control 
of their part. .. Had they seen my command growing, as it must have grown, they would 
have said, ".. What can you know about 
running the air forces which are working 
on our immediate front and are definitely 
and solely for our use? You have got your 
part, let us have ours. " It was for that 
reason and for that reason alone that I 
objected to dispersing the Air Force. ' 
This point of view is partly borne out by a diary entry made by 
Trenchard in June 1918 in which he argues that a divided Air Force 
would "do a lot of harm and that spirit will shortly spread from 
HQ to Squadrons". 2 
If such were indeed the true motives of the man destined to 
take charge of the country's airpower the following year and to 
shape its development for a decade, then such deep-seated fears 
must go a long way to account for the Air Staff's relentless 
efforts to keep the Air Force in one piece long after the 
" independence of the new arm had been assured. But the sheer 
severity of the interservice rivalry which broke out when war came 
to an end and the battle over peacetime establishments began 
cannot be explained away by the motives of one man. The coming of 
airpower meant not only a new weapon on the battlefield, but an 
extension of the battlefield itself. In essence, the long and 
bitter conflict between the two services was the product of a 
fundamental change - the impact of a third dimension upon the 
keeping of peace and the waging of war. 
1. Air 8/179, Interview with Lord Trenchard. Dictated 
notes by H. A. Jones on Policy of the Independent Air 
Force, 11 April 1934. See also conversation between 
Liddell Hart and Trenchard in which Trenchard refers 
to his interview with Jones and states that he 
objected strongly to the IAF because it infringed the 
idea that the air was all one. He regarded it essential 
that the Air Force should be universal, supplying 
contingents for military and naval use as well as for 
their own operations. See Liddell Hart Papers, 
11/1935/86,27 June 1935. 




THE SURVIVAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1918-1926 
Chapter 1 
The Growth of Army Opposition to a Third Service 
November 1918 - May 1922 
14 
With the coming of peace in November 1918, the Air Ministry 
could spare little thought as to how it might or might not share 
its diverse responsibilities. The first concern of the newly formed 
Air Force was to survive as a force at all. The Air Ministry set its 
sights high. A week before the Armistice the Air Council proposed a 
postwar Air Force of no less than 348 squadrons - an actual increase 
of 154 squadrons, the majority of which was to expand the air fleet 
required for home defence and the provision of a striking force. ' 
A month later the CAS, Major General F. H. Sykes, submitted a memo 
to the Cabinet on the. airpower requirements of the Empire. Even at 
this early stage, the Air Ministry was laying claim to the two 
fundamental tenets of its future role - the need for an independent 
striking force and the right of the Air Force to a place in 
imperial policing and defence. The Air Force, claimed Sykes, must 
be the first line of defence of the British Empire. In any future 
war, however near or distant, the existence of the nation would 
depend largely upon airpower. Furthermore, in the matter of 
imperial defence, certain Middle East states offered considerable 
scope for police work. 2 
Amid the euphoria of peace, however, such wild claims and 
predictions rang strangely hollow. They prompted no response from 
the WO - already burdened with a string of operations around the 
globe - and the Cabinet was not impressed. The scheme was virtually 
"stillborn". Indeed, even the most ardent of air enthusiasts, C. G. 
Grey, spoke out against an all-embracing Air Force. The naval, 
army and independent branches of the air service must be kept 
distinctly separate, he maintained, "so as to ensure competition 
in efficiency between the three". 
3 By the beginning of 1919, the 
Secretary of State for the RAF, Lord Weir, was admitting to his 
Cabinet colleagues that despite the good case made out for a very 
strong postwar Air Force, a balance had to be struck between how 
much the country should spend and how much the country could spend. ' 
In the event, what the country did spend was meagre by comparison. 
1. Air 6/13, Air Council, 57th Meeting, 4 November 1918. 
2. Cab 24/71, GT 6477,9 December 1918. 
3. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XVI, 5 March 1919, p. 939. 
4. Cab 2I/72/2, GT 6591,3 January 1919. 
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Comforted by the Ten Year Rule, the government of the day was 
prepared to run down the establishment and equipment of the Air 
Force to just one tenth of its wartime size. With the replacement 
of Lord Weir by Mr. Winston Churchill a week later, the 
disintegration of the Air Force began. ' Reductions were put in hand 
which were to cut back the force to 251 squadrons and less than 
27,000 officers and men. 2 In a matter of months the Force was to be 
left with "a picturesque new uniform and an incorrigibly unsound 
view of its capabilities". 3 
Even the prospect of such drastic reductions was not sufficient, 
however, to mollify concern in some Army quarters. By mid-1919 the 
real and potential effects of a separate Air Force upon the limited 
funds available brought-protest from the Army. In a letter to his 
Secretary of State, the Quartermaster General complained bitterly 
of the tendency on the part of the Air Ministry to set up their own 
administrative services for all purposes. He wrote: 
The Air Force when it comes down out of the sky 
must clearly have its territorial requirements 
provided for by the Army. ... this separation, which has been growing in strength during the 
last few months, is wrong in principle and 
wasteful in practice. 4 
The QMG's remarks, retorted the new CAS in a note to his own 
political chief, were apparently based on the assumption that the 
Air Force existed entirely for cooperation with the Army. It had to 
be accepted by both the parent services that the Air Force must be 
allowed to work out its own salvation as an independent force and 
not as an appendage of either the Army or the Navy. It had to be 
borne in mind that the Army charged the Air Force for all services 
rendered, and that this made the difference in cost practically 
negligible. 5 
1. For a time chart showing the periods of office of the 
Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of the two Services, 
1919-1939, see Appendix to this work, p. 311. 
2. Andrew Boyle, Trenchard, p. 354, and Brooke-Popham 
Papers, VII/22. 
3. Basil Collier, Heavenly Adventurer: Sefton Brancker 
and the Dawn of British Aviation, p. 159. 
4. Air 8/2, Part V, QMG to Secretary of State for War, 
25 July 1919. 
5. Ibid., Trenchard to Secretary of State RAF, 30 July 1919. 
- --. 
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In its endeavour to work out its own salvation, the Air Force 
found a staunch ally in Winston Churchill. Appointed joint 
Secretary of State for War and the RAF on the clear understanding 
from the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, that the Air Ministry was not 
to be kept as a separate department, ' he set his sights on giving 
the new service a chance to survive. A man "obsessed with the 
immediate", 2 it would appear that he was motivated more by the need 
for economy and the political recognition he would gain by its 
achievement than by any profound belief in independent airpower at 
that time.; Whatever his true motives, however, the assistance he 
rendered to the new service must be regarded as life-saving. The 
Air Force, he stated on taking office, stood alone and midway 
between the land and sea services. Where they clashed, it ruled. 
Given superior thinking power and knowledge, it must obtain the 
primary place in the general concept of war policy. In the meantime 
the first duty of the RAF was to garrison the British Empire. 
' } 
In a flurry of memoranda towards the end of the year, Minister 
and Chief of Staff outlined the future role of the new service as 
they saw it. Trenchard, anxious to find some essential job of work r 
with which to justify the very existence of his depleted Force, 
argued that whilst the day was still distant when the Air Force 
would play a predominant role in European warfare, as far as 
policing overseas was concerned, it was quite capable of carrying 
out small operations more economically and more expeditiously than 
troops acting on the ground. In these early blueprints, it must be 
noted, Trenchard clearly held out the promise of separate air arms 
for the two older services. It was a promise he was not to keep. 
1. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath, p. 52. 
2. Robert Rhodes James, Churchill, A Study in Failure, p. 13l. 
3. See letter to Lloyd George, 29 December 1918, in which 
Churchill states, "aeroplanes will never be a substitute 
for armies and can only be a valuable accessory .. 
", 
Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, p. 361. 
4. Martin Gilbert, 'Winston Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 197. 
5. Trenchard Papers, CII/l/4, Memo by CAS, 14 August 1919. 
Major General Sir Hugh Trenchard was appointed CAS 
31 March 1919. He became AVM on 4 August 1919 and 
was promoted AM a week later. 
ýk 
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In his White Paper of December 1919, he envisaged small but 
specially trained portions of the RAF "probably becoming, in the 
future, an arm of the older services". 
' No guarantee was given, 
however, and Trenchard was later to admit that the statement was 
"a sop to the jealousy of the older services". 2 It was to become 
evident by the battle he was to wage against both senior services 
that he was determined to keep the RAF one and indivisible. In the 
meantime, Churchill argued that the Air Force was not merely a 
means of conveyance, but a force capable of influencing profoundly 
the strategy of the future. 
3 Together with the CAS he began to 
hammer out a scheme based on aeroplanes, armoured cars and local 
levies whereby the control of the-vast new mandated territory of 
Mesopotamia could be transferred from the WO to the Air Ministry. 
Thus by early December, when Churchill presented to both 
Houses a scheme for the permanent organisation of the RAF, the 
paper work for the new service appeared to offer some promise of a 
more settled future. 4 But Parliament proved unreceptive to the 
ambitions of the new arm, and the scheme - now publicly spelt out 
in some detail - only served to fan the smouldering doubts and 
fears long harboured by the Army and Navy. It was at this juncture 
in fact, as Slessor was later to point out, that the rivalry 
between the new and old services burst into flames and "the struggle 
for money began". 5 As one authority was to put it, after two years 
of peace, "the warlike instincts" of the service departments began 
to find an outlet in interdepartmental strife. 6 
At a meeting between the three Chiefs of Staff held in 
December the growing animosity towards the continued existence of 
a third service was clearly revealed - if one is to believe 
Trenchard's account. 7 An appeal for twelve months truce in which to 
allow the RAF to prove its worth or fall by the wayside was 
1. Cmd. 1+67,19 December 1919 (PRO: ZHC 1/8109, p. 8119). 
2. H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, 
p. 63. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/1, Memo by Secretary of State for 
Air to Cabinet, 21 October 1919. 
4+. Cmd. 467,19 December 1919. 
5. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/644, Some Personal Reflections by 
Sir John Slessor, p. 7. 
6. Lord Thomson, Air Facts and Problems, p. 43. 
7. Boyle, op. cit., pp. 31+9-50. 
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grudgingly conceded by Admiral Beatty. Field Marshal Sir Henry 
Wilson would promise'nothing and wrote in his diary a few weeks 
later: 
Trenchard to see me this morning. He is 
in desperation about the Air Service, he 
can neither get the officers nor the men. 
Of course this separate Air Service is 
hopeless. 
Six days later, at a further meeting between the Chiefs of Staff, 
Trenchard was bluntly told by both his colleagues that a third 
service was not a "workable proposition". 
2 In February the CIGS 
sent a letter to the Air Ministry to put the Air Force in its 
proper place. It explained that, whilst the Army Council shared 
the Air Council's enthusiasm as to the future role of the RAF - 
particularly as it promised to lighten the heavy burden then being 
borne by the military forces - the problem in the first instance 
was "the practical conduct of warlike operations at the present 
time". For the moment it was the Army which formed the principal 
instrument of warfare on land, and the aerial forces must act in 
an auxiliary capacity. - 
In the same month, however, the Editor of Flight Magazine 
launched a bitter attack upon the Army leadership. In the very near 
future, he claimed, the only fighting factors that would count 
would be the armies and navies that flew. He continued: 
Mr. Churchill and his "brass hat" friends 
have been brought up among foot soldiers 
and horse soldiers. They cannot understand 
the air soldier, his method of fighting, 
and his command of all war in the future. 
They are angry and are trying to suppress 
what they cannot understand. 4 
One of the major causes of friction at this time was 
Trenchard's serious lack of manpower. During the drastic reductions 
made in the establishment, many capable officers, faced with 
dwindling prospects, had left the service. A suggestion that the 
1. Wilson Diary, 2 January 1920. 
2. Ibid., 8 January 1920. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/1/22, WO to Air Ministry, 
21 February 1920. 
4. Flight Magazine, Vol. XII, 12 February 1920, p. 169. 
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WO should loan the Air Service some 300 to 400 officers was 
scornfully received by the CIGS. "The sooner the Air Force crashes 
the better, " Wilson wrote in his diary, "It is a wicked waste of 
money as run at present. "' Three days later he went across to the 
Admiralty to discuss the matter with Lord Beatty and found him 
"very hostile to the proposal". 2 Both began to cast covetous eyes 
upon that portion of the Defence Vote which had slipped from their 
grasp under the stresses and strains of war. 
The following month, at a meeting of the CID, Churchill 
prophesied that the air service was destined to grow and that in 
the future it would be necessary to curtail the functions of both 
the Navy and Army. 3 On the same day he wrote a strong letter of 
protest to Wilson following a WO complaint that the Air Force was 
not strong enough to meet Army needs. When the Air Force attempted 
to strengthen themselves, he pointed out, the Army Council objected. 
He was at a loss to know what he (Wilson) wanted done. ' The General 
Staff had second thoughts. In October, Lt. General Sir Philip 
Chetwode informed a meeting at the Guildhall that the Army was 
supplying the officers required by the RAF. At the same time, he 
stressed the need for more interservice training. 5 
But such training was not likely to loom large in the eyes of 
the Air Staff. By the end of the year Trenchard had drastically 
updated his earlier views concerning the importance of the Air 
Service as a war-winning instrument. What, he asked a meeting of 
the CID, was the most serious menace to the Empire at that time? 
Was it the danger of invasion; the danger to the country's 
waterborne commerce; or was it, perhaps, the danger of air attack 
1. Wilson Diary, 7 May 1920. 
2. Ibid., 10 May 1920. Two days earlier, however, 
Wilson had written to his Secretary of State, 
"... we should of course wish to help in every 
way we can. We propose to write to the Air 
Ministry to this effect. " See Trenchard Papers, 
11/27/46. 
3. Cab 2/3, CID 133rd Meeting, 29 June 1920. 
4. Wilson Papers, 18c/1, Churchill to Wilson, 
29 June 1920. 
5. The Aeroplane, Vol. XIX, 27 October 1920, p. 711. 
The meeting was held on 11+ October. Chetwode was 
appointed DCIGS at the end of the month. 
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the moment war had been declared? I The Committee was left in no 
doubt as to Trenchard's answer. In March the following year in a 
memo to the CID the Air Staff went further and, in the opinion of 
the WO and Admiralty, too far. The Air Force, it claimed, was the 
first defence against invasion from the sea and the only defence 
against invasion from the air. Furthermore, encouraged by the 
recent success of air operations in Somaliland, the memo claimed 
that there were responsibilities assigned to the Army which the 
Air Service was already technically capable of undertaking. The 
efficacy of the RAF as an independent arm should be put to the test 
in such territories as Mesopotamia, Transjordan and the Indian 
Frontier. 2 
Such confidence in the present and future capabilities of the 
air arm was not shared by some sections of public opinion, however. 
When Churchill gave up the dual office of Secretary of State for 
War and Air in February, a Times editorial dismissed his rule at 
the Air Ministry as "inadequate". British flying, it maintained, 
was almost down to its last gasp. "From its attenuated frame the 
soul has all but departed. "3 
Nor was the Army slow to react. The Air Staff paper, 
circulated at a CID meeting early in May, 4 provoked a scathing 
attack by the General Staff upon the purpose and integrity of the 
RAF. Understandably alarmed by the growing immensity of the Air 
Ministry's claims, particularly with reference to the Army's 
sacred preserves along the Indian Frontier, the CIGS revealed the 
width and depth of military feeling against the third Service. The 
Air Force, stated Wilson in a memo to the CID, was pursuing a 
separatist policy in every respect, strategically, administratively 
and socially. Such separatism was inimical to effective cooperation 
and, by duplication of staffs, extremely wasteful. It was conceded 
that aircraft could in some circumstances replace other military 
arms. The reconnaissance task of the cavalry, for example, could 
often be more effectively performed by aircraft, and bombing, 
1. Cab 2/3, CID 134th Meeting, 14 December 1920. 
2. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 135-C, March 1921. 
3. The Times, Editorial, 5 April 1921. 
4. Cab 2/3, CID 137th Meeting, 6 May 1921. 
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whilst lacking in precision, could replace the fire of long range 
guns, but this did not justify a separate organism. As regards the 
controlling of uncivilised or partly uncivilised countries, the 
Air Force had not yet made good its claim. Here again, the value 
of aircraft lay in tactical cooperation with ground forces. Whilst 
the General Staff had agreed to the proposals of the Cairo 
Conference in order to give an opportunity for the RAF to experiment, 
the WO remained "frankly agnostic in respect of the Air Ministry's 
creed". Furthermore, argued the General Staff, defence against air 
raids was only one item in a large problem of home defence. 
Aircraft might play a most active part in such defence, but the 
supply and protection of their HQ, depots and communications were 
military responsibilities. In any case, it was inconceivable that 
airpower alone could force the surrender of a nation, even if its 
power were enhanced one hundred fold. Though London might be laid 
in ruins, final victory could only be won by the enemy's army 
occupying the country or by means of a successful sea blockade. ' 
The reply by the Air Staff came in a further memo to the CID 
that same month. The General Staff were living in the past, claimed 
Trenchard. Future war would be a conflict of nations and not purely 
a contest between armies and fleets. Nor were the Army correct in 
their assertions concerning imperial policing. The Air Staff could 
rightly point out that the only reason why air control was being 
introduced in certain countries was because the cost of military 
occupation had proved prohibitive. As to the question of the Army's 
role in the supply and protection of ground installations, the Air 
Staff argued that if such an assertion were taken to its logical 
conclusion, the General Staff would be able to claim command of 
naval vessels simply because they were responsible for the defence 
of such naval bases as Hong Kong and Malta. Complaints concerning 
difficulties of command also testified to ignorance on the part of 
the General Staff. The Air Staff fully agreed that the Army should 
have control of air forces allotted to tactical cooperation. It was 
only when aircraft were used as a primary arm that the necessity 
for air control was claimed. 2 
1. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 139-C, 26 May 1921. 
2. Ibid., 141-C, May 1921. 
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This welter of argument and counter argument came before a 
meeting of the CID in June and, not surprisingly, resulted in 
deadlock. All that could be agreed was that the views of the WO 
and the Air Ministry were too divergent to admit of any conclusions 
being accepted unanimously on the subject of the future role of the 
Air Force in imperial defence. ' At the Committee's next meeting, 
fý 
"1 
Mr. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, undertook to write a 
paper on the subject in the hope that this might assist in reaching 
an agreement. 2 
Meanwhile, the Air Staff continued to prepare the way for an 
expansion of what Trenchard called "the central force", that fleet 
of aircraft allotted to home defence as a means of counter- 
offensive. Whilst admitting that there was no immediate danger, the 
Air Ministry warned that "the bolt from the blue" would become a 
real possibility once France or any other continental power had to 
be reckoned with as a potential enemy. 3 "The frocks, " bemoaned 
Wilson in a letter to General Lord Rawlinson, C-in-C India, "go 
on their way squandering millions and millions on an Air Force 1t 
which gets steadily worse and ... out of touch with both soldiers 
and sailors as time goes on. " 4 
Two weeks later one of these "frocks", Mr. Balfour, in his 
promised paper to the CID, gave the GIGS further cause for concern. 
The General Staff, he declared, were apt to minimise the military 
effects on the country by air raids successfully carried out on a 
large scale. He felt that the Air Force must be autonomous in 
matters of administration and education and that, in the case of 
air defence, the Army and Navy must play a secondary role. On the 
question of an independent-Air Force he wrote: 
I am convinced that any attempt to reduce the 
new force to an inferior position will 
seriously hamper its vigorous development and 
put us at a serious disadvantage compared 
with nations who, for whatever reason, have 
abandoned rivalry at sea and desire to 
1. Cab 2/3, CID 142nd Meeting, 17 June 1921. 
2. Ibid., 143rd Meeting, 22 July 1921. 
3. Air 5/166, Air Ministry Memorandum, June 1921. 
4+. Wilson Papers, l3e/l, Wilson to Rawlinson, 12 July 1921. 
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explore to the utmost the new weapon 
whose edge cannot be completely turned 
by the hostile superiority in fleets 
or armies. ' 
The Air Staff were delighted with the paper. An Air Ministry 
note to AVM Sir John Salmond, AOC Inland Area, viewed the report 
as "remarkably satisfactory" and "a very long step in the right 
direction". 2 In fact, Balfour's verdict might well have been 
anticipated. During the war he had, indeed, been a strong opponent 
of the idea of a separate Air Force, 3 but later, at the Versailles 
Conference, he had voiced deep concern about the frightful 
potential of airpower. 4 As a convert to the potentiality of 
strategic bombing he was not likely to cast aside the very means by 
which the nation could develop a deterrent or counter-offensive 
capability. 
Not surprisingly, the General Staff were "reluctantly obliged 
to disagree" with Balfour's conclusions (as was the Admiralty). Mr. 
Balfour, they claimed, viewed the problem through "the rarified 
atmosphere of speculative theory" whereas the General Staff were 
confined to "the bedrock of stubborn facts". One of these 
"stubborn facts", they pointed out, was that Army personnel"in 
AA defences outnumbered that of the RAF by 20 to 1. It was the 
combination of gunfire, searchlights and aeroplanes which was 
essential for effective defence of the air. Indeed, out of the 
1,737 planes which had attempted to intercept the attacking 
aircraft in the last two years of the war, 91.7% had never seen 
the enemy. Was it not possible, too, that before aerial attack had 
reached the gigantic proportions suggested by the Air Ministry, 
science might have devised a correspondingly effective antidote? 
Turning to the question of "savage warfare", the General Staff 
resorted to a line of argument which, whilst not wholly justified 
by events, was highly emotive and certain to bring them support 
from outside as well as inside military circles. The method of air 
1. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 149-C, 26 July 1921. 
2. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/143/1,17 August 1921. 
3. See Blanche E. C. Dugdale, James Arthur Balfour, Vol. II, 
p. 158, and Boyle, op. cit., p. 398. 
4. Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide Rule, p. 180. 
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control in these circumstances, they contended, was merely a means 
of propaganda or an instrument of terrorism. It was indiscriminate 
and wanting in precision and, as a consequence, resulted in the 
bombing of women and children. Furthermore, in Mesopotamia, where 
air control was to be attempted, the whole fabric of the scheme 
was based on the action of military forces. Arab levies and the 
Arab Army totalled 9,500 compared with some 2,900 RAF personnel. 
The General Staff insisted that they wished to see the new 
science of the air exploited to the full, but its growth should be 
fostered "on practical and wholesome lines". If grafted on the 
well-established and war-proven stocks of the older services, the 
young shoots of the RAF would draw increasing strength and 
nourishment. What was required, concluded the memo, was as much 
Air Force and as little Air Ministry as the country could afford, 
and this could only be achieved by a searching enquiry into the 
financial effects entailed in having a separate Air Force. ' 
This memo, severely criticising as it did the two major roles 
claimed by the Air Ministry, and calling into question as it did 
the integrity of the new Service in managing its own affairs, 
provoked a strong note of protest from Trenchard to his Minister. 
Referring to Wilson he wrote: 
... one cannot argue with an Army officer 
who cannot see beyond the walls of his 
office, who cannot realise the value of 
mechanical appliances in substitution of 
manpower; who thinks in mere masses of 
men, who has no conception of the value 
of speed and time ... 
The General Staff, he warned, were out to stop any increase in 
squadrons by transplanting the Air Force into "the inhospitable 
soil of the General Staff's nursery garden". 
2 
However, in a minute to his political chief, Captain F. E. 
Guest, circulated to the CID on the 18th October, Trenchard simply 
stated that he was not prepared to indulge in "these unprofitable 
1. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 150-C, 28 September 1921. The 
Admiralty added their support the following month. 
Ibid., CID Paper 153-C, 7 October 1921. 
2. Air 9/5, Folio 6, CAS to Secretary of State for Air, 
September 1921. 
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paper polemics". Confining himself to the General Staff's call for 
a searching enquiry, he welcomed the proposal provided that it 
embraced all three Services. This, he countered, would reveal the 
economy to be gained by transferring to the Air Ministry certain 
WO functions. It was time that one left the "ruts of an obsolete 
dogmatism". ' 
In fact, the'opportunity for the Air Ministry to show what 
savings could be achieved was already at hand in the shape of the 
Geddes Committee, appointed early in August with the task of 
reducing Government. expenditure by some HO million a year. The 
Committee, the instrument of the Government's campaign against 
waste, would most certainly have turned its attention to defence 
spending in the course of its investigation, but the interservice 
disputes within the CID, centred as they were around accusations of 
. ý' financial extravagance, undoubtedly ensured a more searching 
enquiry than was originally intended. The wisdom of the General 
Staff in bringing so strong a spotlight to bear upon Service 
finances and, more to the point, in linking this enquiry to the 
whole matter of Air Force independence, is open to question, 
particularly so soon after the Balfour findings. 2 On the other 
hand, it certainly gave the WO a further opportunity to argue that 
the most effective and economical use could not be made of the Air 
Arm so long as the personnel concerned were controlled by another 
Ministry. To a Committee bent on drastic reductions in expenditure, 
the extra costs involved in the overlapping of services between 
the Air Force and the Army appeared, on the face of it, attractive 
growth for the Geddes axe. 
The Air Ministry, however, could point to more tangible 
evidence in the way of savings. They could claim, with some 
justification, that the operations in Somaliland in February 1920, 
based as they had been on a method of air control, had achieved 
success for an outlay of £36,000, a fraction of the cost envisaged 
1. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 151-C, 18 October 1921. 
2. Roskill feels strongly that for Beatty, who had 
openly supported Wilson's claims of RAF extravagance, 
it was a misconceived move. See Stephen Roskill, 
Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. I, p. 267. 
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by the WO. ' In Mesopotamia, too, an Army scheme involving two 
divisions at an annual cost of some E20 million was shortly to be 
replaced by a system of air control estimated to cost but a 
quarter of that sum. 
In advancing the merits of their scheme in Mesopotamia, the 
Air Ministry received firm support from the Colonial Office. In a 
letter to the Geddes Committee in October, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, who, only a few months earlier 
had been largely instrumental in getting the scheme off the ground, 
testified to the large economies to be made by the RAF in the 
Middle East Mandate. The Army, he contended, was prone to show the 
limitations of airpower and to adhere to more traditional and 
expensive methods of control. He claimed that to keep the new arm, 
with its measureless possibilities, in perpetual thraldom would be 
to rob it of its most important developments. 2 
But the strongest weapon in the Air Ministry's arsenal - and 
one which had played the predominant part in convincing both Smuts 
and Balfour of the need for a separate service - was the 
development of airpower as a primary means to counter air attack 
from a hostile European neighbour. In this the Air Ministry was 
assisted by the current concern being shown over the overwhelming 
superiority of the French Air Force. In this context above all, 
argued the Air Staff, the Army underrated and misunderstood the 
potentialities of the air service as an independent arm. It saw 
no further than its own limited horizon. Reversion of the Air Force 
to the two older services would mean that the "birthright of air 
supremacy" would be, thrown away. 
3 To supporters of the air cause, 
this last point presented a very real danger. Trenchard, for 
example, feared that without independence the Air Force would never 
be anything more than Army scouts, artillery observers and short 
range bombers. ' Slessor is convinced that if the RAF had been split 
1. The extent of RAF success in Somaliland is open to 
question. See this work, pp. 35-h+0. 
2. Air 8/2, Part IV, Churchill to Geddes Committee, 
24 October 1921. 
3. Ibid., Notes by Air Staff on the Main Policy Observations 
by Committee on National Expenditure, 19 October 1921. 
4. C. G. Grey, A History of the Air Ministry, p. 185. 
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up after the First World War it would have suffered the fate of 
the Tank Corps. ' 
In a timely paper to the, CID at the end of October, the Air 
F, Staff returned to the threat of air attack, spelling out more 
precisely the dangers to which, in their estimation, the country 
might be exposed. The air offensive in the future, they warned, 
X would be a sustained attack day after day, night after night. 
Herein lay the greatest danger to the nation, and it could only be 
countered by carrying the war into the enemy's homeland in order 
to force him onto a defensive role? Duly impressed, the CID 
agreed in November that a special committee should be appointed 
to go fully into the question of Britain's vulnerability to air 
3 attack. 
Sensing the need to counter the Air Staff's emphasis upon a 
facet of airpower doctrine in which neither of the two senior 
services could claim a part, Wilson decided to seek more radical 
support from the Navy. He had a meeting with the Deputy CNS, 
Vice Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, early in November and, according to 
his diary, gained his full support in a scheme to share the Air 
Force between them, leaving a civil Air Minister or Under- 
Secretary to work under the Board of Trade. 4 Then a few days later 
in a speech at Amiens, where he had gone to unveil a memorial to 
men of the Ulster Division, he launched a fierce attack upon 
bombing as a weapon of war. Soldiers, he claimed, did not like it; 
they much preferred to fight matters out for themselves. Then, 
with the Washington Conference clearly in mind, he asked those who 
governed the actions of the world to consider whether it would not 
be better to limit aeroplanes rather than submarines. The 
development of the aeroplane was the development of a means of 
killing women and children. 5 
1. Marshal of the RAF, Sir John Slessor, The Central 
Blue, p. 146. 
2. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 156-C, 31 October 1921. 
3. Cab 2/3, CID 148th Meeting, 9 November 1921. 
4. Wilson Diary, 8 November 1921. 
5. The Daily Telegraph, 21 November 1921. 
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Trenchard was furious at what he considered to be a public 
expression of disagreement with the Government's avowed belief 
that the effective limitation of aerial armaments was impracticable. 
In a statement sent to the Secretary of State for Air for 
circulation to the Cabinet, he complained bitterly that from the 
beginning of 1919 the Field Marshal had consistently shown 
implacable animosity towards the Air Force, both in public and 
private. The speech was only a phase in a protracted campaign 
against the Air Force, a campaign in which he was prepared to use 
any and every weapon upon which he could lay his hands and to 
snatch at every pretext for criticising the new service. The 
letter concluded: 
How much easier our task would have been 
and would be in the future if the older 
Services had always said, "How can we 
help you? " instead of saying, "How can 
we destroy you? "' 
An editorial in The Aeroplane gave the matter a more public 
airing. To drag the bombing of women and children into the speech 
as an argument against building an adequate air fleet for self 
defence, wrote the Editor, was "a piece of nonconformist hypocrisy 
worthy of an Ulsterman preaching to an Ulster audience". 
2 
Wilson, shown a draft of the statement by his Minister, sent 
a letter of apology to Trenchard in which he alleged that he had 
been misquoted. "I had not dreamt, " he wrote, "that my remarks 
could be twisted by any friend or enemy into an attack on the Air 
Ministry. " 3Trenchard accepted the apology with commendable good 
grace. 
4 Not so the Editor of The Aeroplane. He called for the 
resignation of the CIGS for the good of both the Air Force and 
the Army. 5 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/163, Trenchard to Secretary 
of State for Air, 24 November 1921. 
2. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vo1. XXI, 7 December 1921, 
p. 558. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/163, Wilson to Trenchard, 
25 November 1921. 
4. Ibid., Trenchard to Wilson, 26 November 1921. 




The full conclusions of the Geddes report became known early 
in 1922. Despite agitation in the Press alleging "Chaos in the Air 
Force", ' the Committee rejected the allegations made by the General 
Staff and, indeed, complimented the Air Ministry upon the economy 
it exercised in its administration. Nevertheless, a reduction of 
£51 million was recommended in the Air Estimates for 1922-23. In 
addition, a reduction of 8J squadrons was proposed, to be taken 
- significantly - from units allocated to the Army and Navy. As 
far as relations between the Services were concerned, the report 
considered that the answer lay in the establishment of a Ministry 
of Defence, and thus came out in favour of a unified Air Service 
both as a substitute for certain land and sea forces and as an 
organisation capable of working out developments which might 
"revolutionise methods of attack and defence" in the foreseeable 
future. 3 
The cuts in aircraft strength were strongly opposed by the Air 
Ministry. They regarded such a reduction as a "doubtful and 
dangerous form of economy" at a time when the Air Force was being 
asked to take over increasing responsibility. 
' But though the 
efficiency of the Force might be impaired, it had survived: its 
role as a separate, distinct force had again been recognised. 
There ran through the report "almost as a guiding thread", as one 
observer put it, the realisation of the future importance of the 
RAF. 5 
Wilson wrote to General Lord Rawlinson at the end of January 
1922: "You ask what has happened to the independent air force. 
1. Pall Mall Gazette, 5 January 1922. 
2. As far as the Army was concerned, the Committee 
recommended a reduction of 50,000 officers and 
men out of 217,500 (exclusive of 71,500 British 
troops serving in India). See Peter Dennis, 
Decision by Default, p. 12. Wilson termed the 
report "fantastic, crude and inaccurate". See 
Wilson Diary, 22 December 1921. 
3. Cmd. 1581,14 December 1921. 
1+. Air 19/111, Comments of Air Ministry on Report 
of Geddes Committee, para, 4. 
5. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XIV, 
16 February 1922, p. 95. 
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As Winston presumably drafted Eric Geddes' report on the air so the 
air remains as a separate ministry. "' The allegation appears 
unlikely. However, the following month a Cabinet Committee chaired 
by Churchill was set up to review the findings of the Geddes 
Committee and came out against any further cuts as far as the Air 
estimates were concerned. 
2 
Undeterred, the WO lost no time in returning to the attack. 
The Army chiefs were anxious and determined to force the matter to 
Cabinet level. Early in February, seizing on the fact that the 
Geddes Committee had referred to the serious overlapping and 
duplication within the three services, the WO made an all out take- 
over bid. In a memo to the CID, the Secretary of State for War, 
Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, proposed the outright transfer of 
the military functions of the Air Ministry to the WO. The problem 
could best be solved, he argued, by making the WO responsible for 
the functions of military advice and administration then performed 
by the Air Ministry. To ensure, however, that the views of the Air 
Service were adequately represented, he proposed that the CAS 
should be a Deputy CIGS with a seat on the Army Council. He claimed 
that merely by transferring certain common services to the WO - 
those of intelligence, discipline, medical care, transport, supply, 
contracts and chaplains - there would be an immediate saving of 
Ili million and that further savings would be made in subsequent 
years. He also forecast a saving of £333,000 a year by spreading 
the work of the Air Ministry over the WO and Admiralty. 
Quite apart from such savings, however, the Minister felt that 
real progress in military aviation would be greater if the friction 
inevitable between the older and newer services were replaced by 
"an undivided responsibility and single control". The war had 
proved in principle that cooperation between the Army and the Air 
Force was vital and that in order to achieve this the air units 
had, without exception, to be under the military commander in chief. 3 
1. Wilson Papers, 13f/35, Wilson to Rawlinson, 
31 January 1922. 
2. Cab 24/132, CP 3692 and CP 3692A, February 1922. 










As on the previous occasion, the Air Ministry would not be 
drawn into a long argument with the WO. "I do not know that this 
perpetual controversy is good for either of the Services or that 
it leads to anything but discord, " wrote Guest in a memo to the 
CID. The Secretary of State for War, he said, ignored the opinions 
expressed by the Geddes Committee. Nor had he mentioned the fact 
that the principle of a separate air service had been accepted by 
the WO when the formation of the RAF was under discussion. Guest 
concluded: 
... economies are more likely to result from willing and sympathetic cooperation 
between the three services than from 
conditions brought about by these constant 
efforts to create friction and discord by 
advocating the abolition of the Air 
Ministry whenever an opportunity presents 
itself. 
The Admiralty, also faced with the necessity of making drastic 
cuts in their estimates, joined the WO in their attacks on the Air 
Force. Unlike the Army, however, and contrary to the understanding 
reached earlier between Wilson and Keyes, the Sea Lords took what 
might be regarded as a more realistic view. They sought not the 
abolition of the Air Ministry as a whole, but the right to supply 
and administer their own Air Service. 2 
At a cabinet meeting early in March the whole question was 
aired once more. The Secretary of State for War complained that he 
had had great difficulty in obtaining a few aeroplanes to take 
part in experimental tactical exercises that year. If the Air Force 
were regarded as one of the military arms, like the cavalry and 
artillery, such difficulties would be avoided. For his part, the 
Secretary of State for Air urged that a firm decision in favour of 
a separate Air Service should be given by the Cabinet. Only then 
would friction between the Services diminish and the coordination 
of their activities be made easier. 3 
An essay in the RUSI Journal at this time followed the same 
1. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 161-C, 11 February 1922. 
2. Ibid., Paper 160-C, 6 February 1922. 
3. Cab 23/29, Cabinet Meeting 16(22), 8 March 1922. 
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line of argument. Written by a young Air Force officer, it claimed 
that the best use of airpower could only be made when it was in the 
hands of those who, by making a study of its application, understood 
its value and its limitations. ' 
At a Cabinet meeting in mid-March it was decided, despite 
continued opposition from both the Army and the Navy, that the 
principles formulated by Lord Balfour should be approved and that 
a sub-committee should be appointed to enquire into the existing 
system of naval and air cooperation. On the vexed question of a 
separate Air Ministry, however, the Cabinet were not prepared to 
"lay down a policy for all time". 
2 The following day in the House 
of Commons, Mr Austen Chamberlain announced the Cabinet's decision 
in a speech which has been called the Magna Carta of the Air Force. 
3 
The Government, stated the Lord Privy Seal, was convinced that in 
the future the greatest danger to the country might well be from 
the action of air forces rather than of naval and military forces. 
He referred also to the growing success of the Air Force in 
carrying out independent action in Mesopotamia and continued: 
If the air service were reabsorbed by the 
Navy and Army, this aspect of the service 
to be rendered by the Air Force would 
inevitably be relegated to the background .4 
The decision of the Government to confine the enquiry to naval 
and air cooperation was taken because it was felt that at that time 
there was not likely to be any need for a further committee of 
enquiry with regard to the Army. 
s This was not a view shared by the 
new CIGS, General Lord Cavan. At a meeting of the Army Council at 
the end of May, he suggested that the terms of reference of the 
proposed sub-committee should be extended to cover the system of 
military and air cooperation. He argued that the need for such 
1. Flight Lieutenant C. J. Mackay, "The Influence in the 
Future of Aircraft upon the Problems of Imperial 
Defence", RUSI Journal, Vol. LXVII, May 1922, p. 285- 
2. Cab 23/29, Cabinet Meeting 18(22), 15 March 1922. 
3. Grey, op. cit., p. 187. 
4+. Air 9/5, Minute 23,16 March 1922. 
5. Cab 23/29, Cabinet Meeting 18(22), 15 March 1922. 
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an examination was at least as important and certainly more 
immediate, if only because the Army was more likely than the Navy 
to be engaged in a campaign overseas in the near future. The 
Secretary of State felt, however, that it would be wise to accept 
the Balfour findings for the present. ' 
The Army Council did not have long to wait before 
circumstances favoured a fresh attack upon the Air Ministry. The 
fall of Lloyd George's Coalition Government towards the end of the 
year and the return of a Conservative Government bent on still 
greater economy was to provide the WO with ample opportunity for 
renewed attacks upon a Service whose future, whilst more settled, 
was by no means assured. Bonar Law fought and won the election on 
the theme of tranquillity. Events were to prove that it was not 
a term which could be in any way applied to the interservice 
relations during his period of office or that of his successor. 
The Cabinet's decision to retain a separate Air Ministry was 
influenced, as Chamberlain implied, by a desire to put the Air. 
Force scheme into operation in Mesopotamia. The inauguration of 
this scheme was planned for October and much saving in cost was 
anticipated. A further factor influencing government policy at that 
time was the growing air menace from France. At the very same 
cabinet meeting at which the Balfour recommendations had been 
accepted, a vast new programme in French long range bombers had 
been brought to the notice of Ministers .2 
It was upon these very two factors - the ability to police 
imperial possessions as efficiently but more cheaply than the Army, 
and the unique ability to defend the nation from aerial attack by 
means of a retaliatory strike force - that the continuation of a 
separate Air Ministry and Air Force was to depend. Having warded 
off for the time being, at least, persistent attacks by the senior 
Services, the Air Ministry had now to prove that the separate 
existence so hardly won was justified in both spheres. In 
attempting to do so, they were once more to come up against 
sustained opposition from the WO. 
1. WO 163/28, Army Council 303rd Meeting, 30 May 1922. 
Cavan was appointed CIGS on 19 February 1922. 
2. Cab 23/29, Cabinet Meeting 18(22), 15 March 1922. 
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Air Force Claims to Substitution: 
Somaliland and Mesopotamia 




From a military point of view, justification for the 
introduction of air control in Mesopotamia was based largely upon 
the alleged success of air operations in Somaliland in the early 
part of 1920. "Alleged", because the success of that campaign, in 
which a flight of aircraft and a small number of ground troops 
effectively destroyed the power of the Mad Mullah, was itself 
a matter of bitter controversy. between the two services as to the 
merits of their respective contributions. 
When the experiment was proposed in late 1919 at the 
instigation of Sir Geoffrey Archer, the then Governor of British 
Somaliland, the Army opposed the scheme. Indeed, from the start 
of the crisis the WO showed a marked reluctance to become 
involved in yet another imperial venture. At a meeting held at 
the Colonial Office in August, the WO, with bitter memories of 
past campaigns in this Protectorate, saw the situation in 
traditional terms - the sending of a large expeditionary force. 
Based on an on-the-spot report by Major General Sir Reginald 
Hoskins, the General Staff representative, Colonel Nugent, urged 
that action be postponed until the manpower and shipping situation 
was less acute. ' Shortages there certainly were. Of this period 
Churchill was later to write: 
It was very strange to watch the vast 
shrinkage of our military power, while at 
the same time the increase of danger and 
hostility in almost every quarter could 
be so plainly discerned. 2 
For the General Staff, the overriding concern was that the 
air control scheme, virtually untested, would fail and that the 
Army, desperately short of fighting units though they were, would 
be called upon to carry out a rescue operation in extremely 
unfavourable circumstances. Wilson told Trenchard at this time, 
"I shall be asked when it's too late to rescue your aeroplanes 
and clear up the mess. That will mean not the two or three 
divisions I want now, but perhaps double the number - and a lot of 
1. Air 9/12, Air Control, 1920-1933, 
Folio 4+. 
2. Churchill, op. cit., p. 371. 
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unnecessary alarm and expense. "' However, when assurance was 
given that no such rescue operation would be called for, the CIGS 
was quite prepared to let the RAF do their worst. He wrote in his 
diary early in December 1919: 
This morning Winston, Trenchard, Amery 
and I had a meeting about the coming 
campaign in Somaliland to be. conducted 
by the CO and by the Air Ministry. I 
had put in a strong objection but this 
afternoon both Amery and Trenchard said 
that under no conceivable circumstances 
would they ask me for any troops. IZ 
withdrew my objections and gave my blessing. 
Following the success of the operations, the Air Ministry 
naturally made extensive use of the part played by the air to 
further their case for substitution. They laid particular stress 
upon the moral effect of the new arm, claiming that air attacks 
on the Mullah's hutments and stock in the Medisha area on the 
" 21st, 22nd and 23rd January had forced the Mullah out of his 
northern strongholds of Medisha. and Jid Ali and into the waiting 
hands of the ground troops. 3 In his account of the operations 
E 1. dated 26th February, the RAF Commander, Group Captain R. Gordon, 
emphasised the utter demoralisation caused by the suddenness of 
the air attack, claiming that Medisha and Jid Ali had been 
abandoned almost immediately after the aerial attacks, whilst 
Baran Fort, a much weaker fortress, had only fallen to the King's 
African Rifles when surrounded and heavily bombarded, and not 
until the last defender had been killed. 4 An editorial in The 
Aeroplane went further. Such a victory, it claimed, anticipated 
the "degradation of the infantryman from being the first line of 
attack to the position of amere 'mopper up"'. 5 The magazine 
Flight was similarly impressed, regarding the operation as 
1. Boyle, op. cit., p. 367. L. S. Amery was Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies 1919-21. 
2. Wilson Diary, 2 December 1919. 
3. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XVIII, 25 February 
1920, p. 399, speaks of a small mixed force being 
"only there to clear up the mess made by the RAF". 
4+. Hollinghurst Papers, AC 73/23/30,26 February 1920. 
5. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XVIII, 25 February 
1920, p. 1+00 . 
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"the first decisive war in the air". ' 
Those at ground level, however, took a very different point 
of view. In a report dated 30th March, the Commander of the 
Somali Field Force, Colonel H. L. Ismay, complained that the Air 
Ministry seriously restricted the movement of his forces in the 
opening stages of the campaign and that, as a result, his most 
advanced troops were 70 miles from the-main Dervish force on the 
first day of the aerial bombardment. As a consequence, not only 
were they too distant to take the best advantage of the results 
of the aerial attack, but they were also unable to benefit from 
close observation and reconnaissance of the situation which then 
developed. Whilst paying glowing tribute to the work of the RAF 
and the assistance they rendered, the report argued that, once 
the Army was given permission to advance, the close vicinity of 
the troops on the ground was the immediate cause of the Dervishes' 
break out towards the south. Ismay wrote: 
I consider that combined operations 
from the start would have given me a 
far better opportunity of taking the 
best advantage of the results achieved 
by the RAF. 
Furthermore, the report claimed that the Dervishes had been 
constantly weakening over a long period. Since the winter of 
1914-15, when the Mullah had lost control of the Hunao district, 
many of his men had been lost in small skirmishes with other 
tribes, in battles with the security forces, and by a steady 
drain of desertion. A decrease-in ammunition supply had also very 
materially contributed towards the weakening of his fighting 
power. Ismay concluded: 
I consider therefore that the operations 
of the past six years, though of 
necessity of a strategic defensive 
character, have played an important and 
unostentatious part in the collapse of 
the Dervish power ... which has been 
completed in the operations just concluded. Z 
1. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XII, 
26 February 1920, p. 226. 




In his contemporary account of the operations, the 
Secretary of Somaliland, Mr. Douglas Jardine, also gave more 
prominence to the part played by ground forces, citing in 
particular the march of the Camel Corps in pursuit of the Mullah 
from Jid All to the southern border of the Protectorate. He 
substantiated Ismay's arguments, too, by claiming that it was no 
exaggeration to say that since 1913 the Mullah had lost five- 
sixths of his following in action, by desertion, or at the hands 
of the executioner. ' The importance of the pursuit by the Camel 
Corps was also stressed by Lord Rawlinson. Commenting on the 
Salmond Report, he claimed that if it had not been for this 
pursuit a decisive conclusion to the operations could not have 
been reached . Likewise Major General Walter Kirke, the DCGS in 
India, writing on a proposal for air control on the North West 
Frontier in 1926, maintained that the campaign in Somaliland was 
in no sense an "independent air operation". In fact, aircraft 
were used according to the normal ideas of'cooperation with ground 
troops. 3 
Further support for the Army's contribution was voiced in 
1930 when, in response to a speech by Lord Trenchard in the House 
of Lords, a letter to The Times took the former CAS to task for 
giving the impression that the final destruction of the Mullah 
was due to the RAF alone. The writer, C. M. French, argued that 
the operations of early 1920 were but the last phase in six years 
of "constant, tireless reconnaissance and patient examination 
of prisoners and deserters". The bombing doubtless alarmed and 
demoralised the Mullah and his followers, but did them no serious 
damage. The letter continued: 
The final blow was struck by the Camel 
Corps in the course of their magnificent 
pursuit, during which the enemy was 
completely scattered and many of the 
principal fighting men captured, while 
the Mullah himself was driven out of 
the territory without followers and 
1. Ismay Papers, III/1/78, July 1920. 
2. Air 9/27, Section 2, Memo by Lord Rawlinson 
on Sir John Salmond's Report, Undated. 
3. Air 5/413, para. 21+a, 16 May 1926. 
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with a ruined presige. I 
But of the two services in the dispute, the Air Force case 
received official recognition. Sir Geoffrey Archer, who had 
himself urged that aircraft should be used, reported that the 
credit was "primarily due to the RAF who were the main instrument 
of attack and the decisive factor". 2 The Secretary of State for 
War, Winston Churchill, told the House of Commons that the RAF had 
achieved more than his department had been able to achieve in one 
expedition before the war at an expense that would have been six 
or seven million pounds in current money terms. 3 It is clear that 
the impression made upon Churchill by this action, plus the 
enormous cost of the Army's campaign in Mesopotamia during that 
same year, contributed greatly to his support of air control as a 
means of policing certain parts of the Empire. ' Indeed, the 
operation was hardly over before he was instructing the CAS to 
prepare a plan for the air control of Mesopotamia which would 
provide for the maintenance of internal security. 5 
Such weighty support notwithstanding, the Army could rightly 
argue that the limited operations in Somaliland had in. no way 
provided sufficient evidence to justify the adoption of such a 
1. Is may Papers, III/1/85, The Times, 16 April 1930. 
Attempts to obtain further information concerning 
the identity of C. M. French proved unsuccessful. 
The greatest airing of the controversy came in 
1962, however, with the publication of Boyle's 
biography of Lord Trenchard. Boyle's account of 
the Somaliland campaign in 1920, giving as it did 
the entire credit of the operation to the work of 
the RAF, prompted strong protest from Lord Ismay, 
among others. In a letter to Sir Colin Coote of 
The Daily Telegraph (9 April 1962) he claimed that 
the operation had been "somewhat of a hoax on the 
part of the Air Ministry.. ". See Ismay Papers, 
111/1/89/1, and letters to The Daily Telegraph, 
13,21 and 27 April, and lk May 1962. 
2. Supplement to The London Gazette, 1 November 1920. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 10/1930/99, Article by Liddell 
Hart entitled "Air Control in-Practice". 
23 May 1930. 
11. In 1920/21 nearly £30 million was spent on military 
expeditions in Mesopotamia, and a further £20 
million for the current year. See Gilbert, op. cit., 
p. 516. 




scheme in the much larger and more unsettled area of Mesopotamia. 
Nor, it could be pointed out, had air attack proved all that it 
had been cracked up to be. Of the six aircraft which had set off 
to attack Medisha at the opening of the campaign, one had been 
forced to land, four had failed to locate the target, and only 
one had completed the mission. The first bomb dropped did, in 
fact, singe the Mullah's clothing but, as Ismay later asserted, 
"to have deduced any lessons from such an amazing fluke would 
have been foolish". ' Furthermore, the action in Somaliland, 
judged by any standards, had been a minor campaign and aroused 
such little public interest that, at the time, no concern was 
shown to enquire more fully into the facts. At the commencement 
of the troubles, Sir Geoffrey Archer had himself advised the 
Colonial Office that the Mullah's fortunes had reached such a low 
ebb that victory could be quickly won by sending two battalions 
of the King's African Rifles and a few aeroplanes to augment the 
local forces. 2 Amery too, speaking in the House of Commons in 
March 1920, had referred to the operation as being of "the very 
smallest size". 3 
It is against this background, then, that the Government's 
decision to introduce an air control scheme in Mesopotamia - 
and the Army's consequent opposition to such a scheme - must be 
seen and judged. It was not so much. the military feasibility of 
the scheme as the cash savings it promised to bring, which 
commended itself to a Government bent on economy at almost any 
price. ' The Cabinet, impressed with what Amery termed "the, 
cheapest war in history", 
5 
was willing to snatch at any straw that 
appeared to offer some promise of saving. Thus it was that the 
very financial stringency which had decimated the RAF, reduced it 
to a skeleton of its-war-time self, and threatened to destroy it 
1. The Memoirs of Lord Ismay, p-31. °. ' 
2. Article by Sir Geoffrey Archer, 
The Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1962. 
3. Ismay Papers, III/1/75, and Hansard, 
(HC5s), Vol. 126, No. 21, Cols. 1212-1211. 
4. A Times Editorial of 6 November 1920 deplored 
"the waste which still marks WO outlay at a 
time when. the nation is financially embarrassed". 
5. L. S. Amery, My Political Life, Vol. II, p. 202. 
41 
altogether, was now to prove a major reason for its very 
salvation. 
The basic idea behind the air scheme was to use the 
flexibility of the new arm to avoid the maintenance of widely 
scattered Army garrisons with their costly base organisations and 
highly vulnerable lines of communication. The RAF planned to 
concentrate their forces - made up of aircraft, armoured cars and 
a small number of imperial and local troops - into three base 
areas. From these areas the remote control of the vast territory 
would be exercised by the maintenance of auxiliary aerodromes 
throughout the country, a number of river gunboats, an efficient 
intelligence system, and the extensive use of wireless 
communication. In this way, it was argued, full use would be made 
of the inherent flexibility of airpower and, as the Editor of 
Flight Magazine explained, airpower would be seen for the first 
time in its "proper perspective". I In addition to substantial 
saving in cost, the scheme would prove the value of the RAF in 
substitution for the other fighting services. 
To the WO, this scheme on the cheap was little short of 
courting disaster. Wilson wrote in his diary at the beginning of 
May: 
... Winston, regardless of safety and hoping that any disaster may come after 
he has left office, is trying to gain 
credit and make a name by saving money. 
He certainly won't do so with my 
approval nor without a clear definition 
from the Cabinet of those who must bear 
the responsibility. 2 
Four days later, in a memo to the Cabinet, the General Staff 
pointed out that there was a real danger that the Government's 
policy in the Middle East would "outrun our military resources". 
Two courses were open to it. It could retain existing garrisons, 
make units up to strength and take on further responsibilities in 
1. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XII, 26 February 
1920, p. 228. For an outline of the preliminary 
scheme see Air Staff Paper of 12 March 1920, 
Item 15, Cab 1/29. 
2. Wilson Diary, 1 May 1920. 
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the area or, alternatively, it could reduce the areas for which 
the Government was responsible and thus allow a gradual reduction 
in the strength of the garrisons. ' 
Later that month Lt. General Sir Aylmer Haldane, C-in-C 
Mesopotamia, came out strongly against the air scheme. In a 
letter to the WO, he claimed that the Air Ministry did not fully 
understand the political conditions pertaining in Mesopotamia. To 
withdraw political officers from their present posts and to 
substitute frequent, even daily visits by these officers in 
aeroplanes would be a "retrograde step". On the military aspect, 
he considered that a considerable time would have to elapse 
before local levies could be sufficiently trained to replace 
regular detachments. If the scheme were to be adopted, then he 
proposed an addition of three Indian battalions, one cavalry 
regiment, and twelve tanks to ensure that isolated posts were 
adequately defended. Nor did he consider that aeroplanes and 
armoured cars would be of sufficient value in broken country such 
as existed on the banks of the Euphrates. For operations in such 
terrain a mounted force was necessary. There was a real danger 
too, he maintained, that once the scheme had been introduced the 
civil government would pay'less attention to road construction. 
In view of the possibility of external aggression - which did not 
come within the scope of the air control - roads might prove of 
vital importance for future military operations. 
2 
This letter, a copy of which was sent to AVM Sir Geoffrey 
Salmond, AOC Middle East Area, was followed up the next month 
by a General Staff memo to the Cabinet advocating a withdrawal 
on all fronts to within areas covered by existing railheads. It 
was felt that, from a military point of view, such action would 
not greatly affect the situation strategically. There would be 
a central striking force with outposts at the head of the main 
communications in the occupied territory. 3 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, Memo by CIGS, 
5 May 1920. 
2. Air 20/526, Haldane to WO, 28 May 1920. 
References to Haldane throughout this 
work refer to Sir Aylmer Haldane. 
3. Cab 24/107, CP 1469,12 June 1920. 
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Such proposals were immediately countered by the CAS. The 
Air Force scheme, he stated, did not propose to undertake 
punitive expeditions other than with light armoured cars, 
batteries and aircraft. It was based on an entirely different 
conception in which large numbers of ground forces were not 
required. One either took the risk that the proposed scheme 
entailed, or one continued to pay to hold the country by force of 
arms with a large garrison with probably no more chance of 
success in maintaining peace than with the much larger garrison 
there at present. ' 
In November came stronger criticism of the ideas embodied in 
the air control scheme. In a note to the WO, Haldane pointed out 
that for bombing and observation purposes aircraft would have to 
fly at low altitudes and that in hilly country this would be 
"undesirable and may be disastrous". Aircraft as an auxiliary to 
troops on the ground were of great value, but as a primary force 
they did not have the qualities which would enable them to bring 
into subjection tribes who were in revolt. 2 Haldane reiterated 
these views in a letter to Wilson the following month, and added: 
I am as anxious as anyone can be to reduce 
the force here. No one could want to pass 
a long time in this country. But until 
Arab troops are raised and are efficient 
and even then they may not keep out an 
invader, I see no prospect of any 
reductions here. 
In support of this opinion, Haldane enclosed a memo from Major 
General G. A. T. Sanders, commanding 17th Division. Referring to 
the recent widespread insurrection throughout the country, the 
General claimed that it was the successive defeats and heavy 
losses inflicted on the insurgent forces by ground troops which 
caused the rapid surrender in October and November. Aeroplanes by 
themselves would never have accomplished that task even if they 
had been employed in greater numbers than was the case. He wrote: 
1. Cab 24/107, CAS to Cabinet in reply to CP 1469. 
In July 1920 the strength of the British garrison 
was over 120,000 men, of whom 60,000 were 
combatants. See Thomson, op. cit., p. 76. 
2. Air 8/34, Haldane to W0,25 November 1920. 
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I have nothing but admiration and thanks 
for the excellent and devoted service 
rendered by the RAF throughout our 
present arduous operations. But I desire 
to emphasise that this insurrection 
extending over so large an area, could 
never have been crushed except by the 
employment of our troops in strength, 
and that by themselves the RAF could not 
have achieved this result. ' 
The General Staff's attitude to the situation in Mesopotamia 
must be seen in the light of the larger policy of imperial 
retrenchment. Wilson's view, as expressed in a letter to Haldane 
at this time, was that the territories of Constantinople, 
Palestine, all of Persia and the greater part of Mesopotamia were 
"ridiculous extravagances"; the nation did not have the money and 
the Army did not have the men for such commitments. With the 
state of the world as it was - with troubles in Poland, Germany, 
Russia and Ireland - the best policy was to withdraw as quickly as 
possible from any area that cost money and which was not absolutely 
vital to the safety of the Empire. 2 In the New Year he wrote again 
to Haldane. "You and I, " he warned, "have to look primarily to the 
safety of our own men and we cannot therefore unduly gamble on the 
sufficiency and efficiency of the Arab force raised in the 
scrabling (sic) and hasty manner ... I cannot believe that Arab 
levies raised between now and the next hot weather will be worth 
anything from the military point of view and a bad check or a 
military disaster would be infinitely more expensive in the end 
than a little over insurance. " 3A few days later Haldane wrote to 
Churchill, ' the Colonial Secretary designate, to inform him that 
if chaos were to be avoided there could be no reduction in his 
forces .y 
It is clear by this stage, however, that Churchill had 
rejected a military occupation on the grand scale. He favoured 
1. Wilson Papers, 55/7, Haldane to Wilson, 15 December 1920. 
2. Ibid., letter Wilson to Haldane, 28 December 1920, 
enclosed in letter Wilson to tongreve, Folio 6. 
3. Ibid., 55/6, Wilson to Haldane, 7 January 1921. 
4. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 514, letter dated 13 January 1921. 
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either a withdrawal to Basra or the introduction of the air 
scheme. Early in January he sent a telegram to the High 
Commissioner in Mesopotamia, Sir Percy Cox, warning him that 
unless the country could be governed more cheaply, "retirement 
and contraction to the coastal zone" was inevitable. ' The 
following week he informed Cox that the country was furious at 
the present rate of expenditure, "no part of which was more 
assailed than money spent in Mesopotamia". 2 
Meanwhile Trenchard, sensing that the economic climate was 
set in his favour, anticipated the best and sent out Group 
Captain A. E. Borton. Via him he sent a hurried note to AVM Sir 
Geoffrey Salmond, AOC Middle East, to inform him that whatever 
might be in the wind was "changing daily, almost hourly". Borton, 
he instructed, was to be sent on to Mesopotamia "by the quickest 
possible means". 3 
At the same time, Wilson pressed on with his efforts to 
abort the scheme. Churchill, he told Lt. General Sir Walter 
Congreve in a letter, was guaranteed to box up the whole 
situation quicker than any "frock" he knew. The air scheme was 
not viable, and occupation by the Army would involve almost a 
division and a half at a cost of eight to ten million pounds a 
year. It was best to withdraw to the railheads from where the 
oil resources at Ahwaz could be protected. 4 Three days later, 
according to his diary, he was told by Churchill that the 
military force had to be reduced and withdrawn to Basra. 5 Wilson 
was delighted and wrote to Haldane the following day: 
I had a long talk with Winston last night. 
.. and I think he is gradually coming to 
realise that he cannot hold Mesopotamia 
1. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 510, wire dated 
8 January 1921. 
2. Ibid., p. 516. 
3. Trenchard Papers, II/27/144, Trenchard to Sir 
Geoffrey Salmond, 5 January 1921. Borton, 
then on the permanent staff at Halton, was 
appointed AOC Mesopotamian Group the next day. 
4. Wilson Papers, Wilson to Congreve, Folio 7, 
20 January 1921. Congreve was then GOC Egypt 
and Palestine. 
5. Wilson Diary, 23 January 1921. 
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with aeroplanes and a few odd 
garrisons dotted about. ' 
This constant opposition on the part of the WO also had an' 
effect on Trenchard. Vitally aware though he was of the 
importance of the scheme to the Air Ministry at this stage, he 
also began to waver. "I have reluctantly come to the conclusion 
that the scheme is unworkable, " he wrote to his Secretary of 
State at the beginning of February, "for reasons that a) it is 
entirely dependent on the wholehearted cooperation of the 
military, which I feel convinced is quite out of the question at 
present; and b) this area is very badly situated strategically 
and until our relations with the Turks and Arabs have been put on 
a more satisfactory basis it will always be a source of anxiety. " 
However, despite the "ill-advised criticism on insufficient data 
that, has been put forward by various military officers lately", 
Trenchard wished to make it clear that the Air Staff still stood 
by the scheme they had produced. 
2 
But Wilson's optimism was misplaced. In fact, Churchill was 
now convinced that air control was the answer, if only for reasons 
of economy. As Liddell Hart points out, he was anxious at this 
time to make a fresh mark in current political affairs and saw 
that his best chance lay in the postwar retrenchment of 
expenditure. 3 "I am determined to save you millions, " he told the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Austen Chamberlain, on the 15th 
February. " 
Within a few days of taking over the Colonial Office, 
Churchill had already planned a meeting at Cairo in March to 
discuss the whole question of control in the Middle East 
territories. Haldane had no illusions as to the true purpose of 
1. Wilson Papers, 55/8, Wilson to Haldane, 
21+ January 1921. 
2. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, CAS to Secretary 
of State for Air, 5 February 1921. 
3. Liddell Hart in The Military Strategist, 
(Churchill: Four Faces of the Man), p. 180, 
quoted by James, op. cit., p. 125- 
4. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 531. The previous day 
Churchill had been appointed Secretary of 
State for the Colonies. 
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the conference. On the 14th February he asked Wilson for "an 
inkling of Churchill's scheme" so that he might have a chance of 
reflecting upon it "before the pistol is put to my head". 
' Two 
days later the DCIGS informed the Air Ministry that the General 
Staff fully endorsed the conclusions arrived at by Haldane as to 
the inappropriateness of the Air Force scheme. They felt that the 
answer to the problem lay in close cooperation, not in an 
independent air command. 2 In reply, Trenchard circulated a note 
a few days later. The scheme was viable, he insisted, but it 
could only be proved to be so if it were given a try. 
3 That same 
month a Cabinet committee under the chairmanship of the Duke of 
Devonshire set out the alternative schemes. The choice lay 
between a WO plan based on the existing method of occupation and 
costing some 120 million a year, and one by the Air Staff whereby 
control was exercised by the RAF at an estimated cost of E6 
million a year. 
' 
The Conference convened at Cairo on the 12th March 1921 
studied both schemes, but the choice never appeared to be in 
doubt. The need, emphasised the Colonial Secretary in his 
opening remarks, was for coordination. There had to be an 
abandonment of all prejudices in an effort to effect economies. 
5 
Despite their strong objections to the Air Force scheme, it was a 
message which, to a large extent, the military members observed. 
Major General Sir Edmund Ironside, who attended the conference 
and was due to undertake the task of preparing Mesopotamia for 
the handover, recalls that Churchill put through his economies in 
a masterly way and "with hardly even mild protests on the part of 
the Army authorities". 
6 But economy was not the only 
consideration. The Conference saw the air control, scheme as a 
means of giving the Air Force experience in command and of testing 
1. Wilson Papers, 55/9, Haldane to Wilson, 
lk February 1921. 
2. Air 8/3I, Lt. General Sir Philip Chetwode 
to CAS, 16 February 1921. 
3. Ibid., Note by CAS, 18 February 1921. 
4. R. Hannaford, Iraq 1918-32: The Role of the 
RAF in the Maintenance of Peace, p. 10. 
5. Air 8/37, Cairo Conference, March 1921. 
6. W. E. Ironside, High Road to Command, p. 195. 
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the potentiality of airpower in such conditions. ' Despite such 
outward agreement, however, relations between the two services 
were strained both inside and outside the conference room. 
Trenchard later claimed that he had been ostracised by his 
military colleagues 2 and that, during the discussions, absolute 
horror had been expressed by the Generals at the dangerous 
gamble to be undertaken in the name of economy. 
3 
As in the case of Somaliland, the greatest concern on the 
part of the Army was that the Air Force scheme would collapse, 
thus necessitating the despatch of an army to get the Air 
Ministry out of trouble. What dispute there was at the Conference, 
therefore, centred mainly around the disposition of forces 
under the air scheme. At the 5th meeting of the Combined 
Political and Military Committees, the military members expressed 
concern at the Air Staff's decision to station the main garrison 
at Baghdad. They favoured Amara. In the event of hostility within 
the country, they argued, this would obviate the guarding of 300 
miles of communication. Furthermore, Amara was well placed to 
protect the oilfields and could be used as a base from which the 
Army in India could be more readily reinforced should the need 
4 
arise. 
The CAS maintained that as some 1,800 men were to be 
stationed at Baghdad, he did not anticipate that it would be 
necessary to remove this force by air, it being large enough to 
hold out until relief arrived in the event of a general uprising. 
The DMO, however, Major General Sir Percy Radcliffe, felt sure 
that the CIGS would not agree to keep a military force in 
Baghdad which could not be removed by air and whose lines of 
communication were not guarded by troops. 
5 At the fourth meeting 
of the Joint Political and Military Committee the following day, 
the matter was again discussed and the Committee-eventually 
1. Air 8/37,3rd Meeting of the Joint Political 
and Military Committee, Appendix 13, Annexure 
1, para. l1,12 March 1921.. 
2. Boyle, op. cit., p. 383. 
3. Air 9/8, Notes on"speech given 20 February 1925. 
4. For sketch map of Mesopotamia see 1overleaf. 
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recommended in favour of Amara for the location of the Imperial 
forces. 1 At earlier meetings, recommendations were also made 
concerning the retention in Mesopotamia of all armoured cars and 
personnel, and the need was recognised for the RAF to recruit and 
train sufficient armoured car personnel to take over when the 
scheme came into operation. 
2 
As Ironside points out, as far as Mesopotamia was concerned, 
1. Air 8/37, Appendix 13, Annexure 3,18 March 1921. 
2. Ibid., Annexure 1,12 March 1921. 
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the military were virtually faced with an ultimatum. Less than a 
month was given for the garrison to be reduced from 39 to 22 
battalions, and this Haldane accepted without protest. ' The final 
scheme envisaged a mixed brigade of British and Indian infantry, 
some native levies, four squadrons of armoured cars and eight 
RAF squadrons. 2 But until the scheme was adopted in principle by 
the Cabinet, both services continued to plead their case. Wilson 
remained ever hostile. He wrote to Congreve describing the scheme 
as "a fantastic salad of hot air, aeroplanes and Arabs". 3 General 
Lord Rawlinson was'also opposed to the scheme but, faced with 
growing political unrest and the threat of trouble with 
Afghanistan, he at first welcomed the release of many Indian 
battalions from Mesopotamia to bring India's postwar army up to 
strength. 4 Less than a month later, however, he too was 
complaining bitterly to Wilson that the "hot air scheme" was 
bound to collapse and the Indian Army would be called to the 
rescue. 5 Like concern was voiced by the new Secretary of State 
for War over the prospect of having to send troops back into 
Mesopotamia. At a Conference of Ministers held in April, Sir 
Laming Worthington-Evans expressed anxiety lest the proposed 
desert air route between Egypt and Mesopotamia - an integral 
part of the air control scheme - might involve a serious risk of 
new military commi tments .6 
Trenchard, in the meantime, was anxious that the scheme 
should not only succeed but be seen to succeed. "What I want is 
the education of Borton and the people in Mesopotamia in working 
on the lines I indicate, " he wrote to AVM Sir Geoffrey Salmond. 
1. Ironside, op. cit., p. 189. 
2. The eight squadrons were composed of four single- - 
engined two-seater squadrons, one squadron of 
Sopwith Snipes, one reconnaissance squadron of 
Bristol Fighters, and two squadrons of Vickers 
Vimy bombers to be converted as troop carriers. 
See Hannaford, op. cit., p. 11. 
3, Wilson Papers, Wilson to Congreve, Folio 8, 
1 April 1921. 
4+. Ibid., 13d/16, Rawlinson to Wilson, 27 April 1921. 
5. Ibid., 13d/23, Rawlinson to Wilson, 25 May 1921. 
6. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 577. 
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If the scheme proved sound then the RAF would expand; if it 
failed then the Air Force would go through "very parlous times"* 
That there was risk involved the Air Staff were prepared to admit. 
Their fortunes were at such a low ebb, that in attempting the 
scheme they had nothing to lose but the chains which bound them 
tactically to the two older services. The Army, on the other 
hand, responsible as they were for the external defence of the 
Mandate, and only too aware of the Turkish menace from the north, 
were not prepared to take what they considered to be undue 
chances. 
In June, welcome support for the scheme came from a most 
unexpected quarter. Haldane, who had always been a severe critic, 
now began to have second thoughts. In a letter to Wilson he 
admitted that aeroplanes were doing better than he had 
anticipated. He was determined, he said, to give them a fair 
trial in order to show Trenchard that he was not in the slightest 
degree prejudiced. 2 The following week he wrote to Churchill in 
less guarded terms, suggesting that had he had sufficient 
aircraft during the previous year, he might have prevented the 
insurrection from spreading beyond the first incident. 
3 In a 
letter the following month he went further. He suggested that more 
British troops were not necessary in the proposed air control 
scheme. Aeroplanes, he claimed, were feared by the local 
population and, in any case, Mesopotamia was not a "white man's 
country". 
4 
For the Air Ministry, alive to the gamble they were taking, 
Haldane's "conversion" was most timely and was put to good effect 
in the propaganda war then being waged over the merits and 
demerits of air control. Some of Haldane's military colleagues 
were not so convinced that he had seen the true light, however. 
Lt. General Sir Walter Braithwaite, GOC-in-C Western Command, 
1. Trenchard Papers, II/27/144/2, Trenchard to 
Sir Geoffrey Salmond, 20 May 1921. 
2. Wilson Papers, 55/18, Haldane to Wilson, 
19 June 1921. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, Haldane to 
Churchill, 25 June 1921. 
4. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 801, letter dated 12 July 1921. 
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India, writing to Major General Montgomery-Massingberd some time 
later, referred to ulterior motives. He wrote: 
... we who know Master Haldane know very 
well he would say just what Winston and 
Co wanted him to say on this particular 
subject at that particular time... I 
personally am pretty sure that Haldane 
wasn't going to risk not getting his 
GCMG by opposing Winston or by making a 
statement throwing doubt on the capacity 
of Winston's pet scheme to materialise. 
That is a rather beastly thing for me to 
say of-Haldane, I admit, but I never have 
trusted him and never shall. ' 
At the beginning of July Wilson wrote to Haldane agreeing 
that the WO had pledged themselves to put no obstacles in the way 
of reasonable preparations by the RAF, and stating that they 
would approach the take-over in a spirit of "give and take". 2 A 
few days later, however, after a long talk with Major General 
Sir Edmund Ironside, Wilson's attitude appeared to harden once 
more. Ironside, he was pleased to discover, was strongly opposed 
to air control. RAF officers, he had argued, were little more 
than chauffeurs and it would be quite impossible to put soldiers 
under their command. Furthermore, matters would become even worse 
when so-called officers who had never been brought up either as 
soldiers or sailors came to positions of authority within the Air 
Force. Wilson had also been taken with Ironside's argument 
concerning the employment of bombing as a means of control. The 
General felt sure that Arabs who had been bombed would threaten 
to withdraw their allegiance to the new King Feisal and thus he 
would have to insist that no villages be bombed. As a consequence, 
the whole scheme would fall to the ground. In relating this 
1. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 153, Braithwaite 
to Montgomery-Massingberd, 14 July 1922. 
But the Air Force was not without its defectors. 
A note at this time by the DOI, Air Commodore 
J. M. Steel, maintained that the Air'Ministry 
should not raise and maintain its own ground 
troops. The Air Force, he argued, would be 
judged by its work in the air, not on the 
ground. See Air 8/34, Note dated 28 July 1921. 
2. Wilson Papers, 55/17, Wilson to Haldane; 1 July 1921. 
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conversation to Rawlinson in a letter the following day, Wilson 
said that he was pleased to find that "Tiny", an eminently 
practical, hard-headed soldier, was so clearly of the same 
opinion as the General Staff on this matter. I In fact, Ironside 
had already made his views plain to Sir Geoffrey Salmond during 
frank discussions at the Cairo Conference. "At first sight, " he 
wrote later, "the RAF scheme seemed almost childish, and I could 
not imagine that any such plan could have been conceived by an 
officer who had been educated at "the shop". " 2 
The end of July saw the beginning of a long and involved 
wrangle over the transfer arrangements between the two services. 
The major disputes centred around the employment of armoured 
cars and the general question of troop disposition, but the 
viability of the air control scheme as a whole was also called 
into question again. 
On the 23rd July, in reply to an Air Ministry enquiry 
concerning armoured cars and the part the General Staff were 
willing to play in their provision, the WO replied that they had 
learnt from Haldane that armoured cars were not suitable for the 
open country in Mesopotamia. The possibility of providing more 
suitable vehicles was therefore being considered. In the meantime, 
the WO advised that the present armoured car companies might be 
removed at any time for service in-Ireland. 3 Trenchard saw this as 
pure obstruction. Referring to this "vexed question of armoured 
cars" in a letter to Borton a few days later, he hinted secretly 
at the possibility of manning the cars with RAF personnel 
though this had in fact been openly suggested at the Cairo 
Conference. 6 The point raised by Wilson, however, appears to be 
genuine enough, though there seems to have been some dragging of 
feet on the part of the WO. Haldane in a letter to Wilson two 
months earlier had indeed suggested that the air scheme might be 
better served by some kind of light tank. He had advised that the 
1. Wilson Papers, 13e/l, Wilson to Rawlinson, 12 July 1921. 
2. Ironside, op. cit., pp. 192-3. 
3. Trenchard Papers, cii/8, WO to Air Council, 
23 July 1921. 
4. Ibid., II/27/20, Trenchard to Borton, 28 July 1921. 
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armoured cars then employed had too heavy a body for the chassis 
and that the pneumatic tyres were very vulnerable. I Prompted by 
the letter from the Air Ministry, Wilson wrote to Haldane at the 
beginning of August, complaining about the shortage of armoured 
cars and suggesting that those in Mesopotamia should be used 
elsewhere and replaced by new companies of light tanks as soon 
as possible. 2 
On the 4th August the area of dispute was widened. On that 
date a memo written by Churchill for the Cabinet took the WO to 
task for clinging onto the idea of a 12 battalion garrison at a 
º cost of f10 million a year. This, he calculated, worked out at 
something like £1,000 for every infantry soldier, regardless of 
colour. This was a force more fitted to face a German army and 
was far too costly for a "poor, starving, backward, bankrupt 
country like Mesopotamia". If this sort of military weight were 
required then it would be better to give up the mandate at once. 
What was needed was the "cheap, makeshift machinery" which his 
Office had successfully, employed in East and West Africa. He 
admitted that such a scheme would involve some measure of risk, 
but it would be introduced - and this is to be noted - "without 
prejudice to the over-riding and persistent right and duty of the 
WO and General Staff to prevent their troops being placed in a 
position which they consider unduly. dangerous or under conditions 
detrimental to their health or efficiency". 
3 
Wilson did not share Churchill's optimism. It would be only 
a matter of time, he told Haldane, before there would be a wave 
of indignation against the bombing methods being employed by the 
Air Force, and this would knock the bottom out of the scheme. 
4 
1. Wilson Papers, 55/16, Haldane to Wilson, 
9 May 1921. Borton had also written to Trenchard 
earlier on this matter, informing him that "the 
movement of armoured cars is very severely 
handicapped in this country .. ". See Trenchard 
Papers, 11/27/20,1 July 1921. 
2. Wilson Papers, 55/20, Wilsop to Haldane, 
8 August 1921. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, Memo by Secretary of 
State for the Colonies (CP 3197), 1+ August 1921. 
4. Wilson Papers, 55/20, Wilson to Haldane, 
8 August 1921. 
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In a letter to Congreve a week later, he clearly summed up in 
one paragraph his own views on the international situation. Of 
the Government he wrote: 
They have offered to come out of 
Ireland, they have agreed to come out 
of Egypt, and they are going to be 
kicked out of India. On the other hand, 
they cling on to Silesia, they cling 
on to Constantinople, they hold on 
like the devil to Palestine, and like 
grim death they clutch to Mesopotamia. 
Is there .. anything more amazing? l 
The following day the WO took their grievance to the 
Cabinet. In a long, hard-hitting memo, the Secretary of State 
for War questioned the basic reasoning behind the air control 
scheme. If economy were the paramount need, he asked, why were 
the RAF to be allowed to set up their own army and navy in the 
shape of armoured cars and gunboats, not to mention a host of 
auxiliary services? His Department was being asked to supply 
personnel to train airmen in tasks which they could well do 
themselves in an Army framework. The Arab levies were by no means 
up to standard and all the RAF could rely upon was the bombing 
of women and children. The proposed military forces, on the other 
hand, were intended to keep order and gradually to reconcile 
hostile tribes to a civilised rule. Nor could the comparison with 
colonial rule in Africa be accepted. The troops in East and West 
Africa were raised by local authorities and there were no white 
troops involved. The scheme under discussion would remove all 
Army jurisdiction over the garrison yet, at the same time, the 
WO would still be responsible for the defence of the country 
from outside aggression. 
But what perturbed the Army Council most, complained the 
War Minister, was the fact that, under the scheme, it was 
proposed to evacuate the imperial forces in the event of a 
general uprising. This would leave the local levies to their 
fate, a policy hardly conducive to the instilling of loyalty 
among their rank and file. He continued: 
1. Wilson Papers, Wilson to Congreve, Folio 14, 
16 August 1921. 
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But leaving our friends in the lurch 
has not hitherto been a policy of the 
British government and I feel that we 
ought not to shut our eyes to the 
possibility that, when calamity arises, 
we may not be willing to put the 
policy into operation, and that we may 
therefore be called upon to send 
reinforcements to extricate our small 
beleaguered garrison. 
The Secretary of State held that the estimates of cost put 
forward by the Air-Ministry were illusory. It was undesirable and 
uneconomical to allow the Air Force to depart from its present 
function as an auxiliary force. Furthermore, the proposal to give 
the Colonial Office financial and executive control over troops 
of the British Army was unconstitutional and would lead to 
hopeless confusion. 1 
At a Cabinet meeting the following day the scheme was 
debated in full and all the arguments were given a fresh airing. 
The Air Force took particular offence at the War Minister's 
reference to the bombing of women and children, arguing, as they 
had before, that due warning was given of bombing and that it was 
only used to disrypt the daily life of the Arab until such time 
as he toed the line. As regards the use of armoured cars, the Air 
Ministry maintained that they would not have had to contemplate 
the maintenance of these vehicles if they had not had good reason 
to fear a policy of consistent obstruction on the part of the 
Army. In the event, money spoke louder than any words uttered by 
the WO. Whilst appreciating that some risk was involved, the 
Cabinet came down in favour of the Air Force scheme. 
2 To do 
otherwise, noted an observer at the time, would have reduced the 
Government's Anti-Waste Campaign to nothing more than "Lloyd 
Georgian window dressing". 3 
Worthington-Evans agreed that he would loyally carry out the 
Cabinet's decision and that, in particular, he would be 
reasonable in interpreting the provision concerning the WO's 
1. Air 19/109, Memo by Secretary of State for War 
(CP 3240), 17 August 1921. 
2. Cab 23/26, Cabinet Meeting 70(21), 18 August 1921. 
3. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XXI, 10 August 1921, p. 118. 
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right and duty to ensure the safety of their troops. 
1 
Pronouncements of loyalty aside, however, the WO took the 
Cabinet ruling with little good grace. A letter from Captain 
T. B. Marson, Trenchard's Private Secretary, to Air Commodore 
P. W. Game a few days later reads: 
... the WO are taking it badly and 
are very bitter about it, and will do 
everything in their power to render 
impossible any sort of cooperation 
with them. It seems a great pity but 
I suppose we are up against vested 
interests and shall have to fight 
accordingly. 
In the same letter, however, Marson pointed out that, according 
to Air Commodore H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, Haldane had now become 
completely convinced of the ability of the Air Force to deal 
with any situation that was likely to arise in Mesopotamia. 2 
Later that month - though it hardly seemed necessary - the 
WO sent a letter to the Colonial Office stating that the Army 
Council viewed with "profound misgivings" the future of the 
regular troops that were to be retained in Mesopotamia under the 
proposed conditions. On receipt of the letter, a member of the 
Colonial Office staff jotted in the margin: "profound misgiving 
is a bad spirit in which to commence a policy of loyal 
cooperation. " 
3The 
next month Churchill wrote to Trenchard: 
You require to watch very carefully what 
the WO do, as they are very sore over 
recent decisions and are not likely to 
be very helpful to us. 4 
With such feelings of mistrust abroad, it is not surprising 
that the dispute over the provision. of armoured cars should again 
be raised. The Air Ministry, convinced that a WO decision to send 
two of the armoured car companies to India was but a subtle'means 
1. Cab 23/26, Cabinet Meeting 70(21), 18 August 1921. 
2. Trenchard Papers, II/27/71/1, Marson to Game, 
22 August 1921. Game was then Director of 
Training and Organisation, and Brooke-Popham 
was Commandant, RAF Staff College. 
3. CO 730/13, WO to Colonial Office, 25 August 1921. 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, Churchill to CAS, 
10 September 1921. 
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of avoiding their obligation, wrote to the WO on two occasions 
early in September to remind them of their undertaking. ' Despite 
assurances from the WO, the Air Council were not convinced. 
Trenchard began to prepare a scheme whereby he could provide his 
own cars and train the necessary crews just in case the WO "left 
us in the lurch". 2 At the same time, he badgered the Colonial 
Office to have the matter clarified. This the Colonial Office did 
and towards the end of September received what they considered to 
be a firm undertaking on the part of the WO to supply three 
companies of armoured cars or light tanks by the inception of the 
RAF scheme on the 1st October 1922.3 The Air Ministry was informed 
by letter on the 13th October. 4 A similar pledge was made direct 
to Churchill two months later. A request that three armoured car 
companies be sent direct from Ireland to Mesopotamia was bluntly 
refused, but Wilson assured the Colonial Secretary that they 
would be in the Mandate before the next hot weather. 5 
By this time, however, a more authentic threat to the Air 
Force scheme was materialising. In August Wilson had informed the 
Colonial Office that, because of the risks involved, he was 
opposed to having regular troops stationed in Mesopotamia when the 
Air Force scheme was introduced. 6 The following month a warning 
also came from Baghdad. The High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, in 
a telegram to the Colonial Office,: expressed concern over the 
possibility of Turkish hostility from the north. The scheme 
adopted at Cairo, he pointed out, had been based on the hypothesis 
of a friendly Turkey. He wished to emphasise that point so that 
"in our keen desire to effect economy and to reduce our force we 
may not close our eyes to the fact that our calculations may 
be vitiated by external situation". 7 
1. 'Air 5/476,37b, DOI to DMO, 5 September 1921, 
and 37a, Air Council to WO, 7 September 1921. 
2. Ibid., Minutes of Conference between Air 
Ministry and Colonial Office, 15 September 1921. 
3. CO 730/13, WO to Colonial Office, 24 September 1921. 
4. Ibid., CO to Air Ministry, 13 October 1921. 
5. Wilson Diary, 9 December 1921. 
6. Air 5/476, Item 39, WO to Colonial Office, 24 August 1921. 
7. Ibid., 64a, High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, to 
Secretary of State for Colonies, 24 September 1921. 
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Three days later, Rawlinson, writing to Wilson, made it 
plain that if he (Wilson) were not willing to put British 
battalions at risk, neither was he willing to put Indian troops 
in danger. ' The CIGS noted in his diary the following day that 
Churchill was frightened about the Turks attacking from the north 
and now realised that his "miserable policy is going to pot". 
2 
By early October, Wilson was telling Rawlinson that he was 
rapidly losing all interest in Mesopotamia. He could not 
understand a plan which put King Feisal in power, supported him 
with hot air, aeroplanes and Arabs, and, at the same time, 
quarrelled like hell with the Turks in every other theatre. The 
letter concluded: 
Nor can Winston call on me any longer 
to pull him out of a mess, nor can he 
call on you and so having got into a 
mess whenever that day comes, he can 
only hop into an aeroplane and fly 
away shouting tata to any poor bloody 
native who is stupid enough to back us 3 
In fact, the dangers envisaged by the WO and HQ India were 
fully appreciated by the Colonial Office. Churchill admitted in a 
telegram to Cox in mid-November that, in the event of an invasion, 
the forces available might not be able to cope successfully. His 
Department was fully alive to the. risks involved. 4 As Wilson 
later put it, Churchill was "between a cheap and fatal tenure 
and a real occupation with security and peace which he can't 
pay for". 
5 Only a few days earlier, however, at a conference at 
which the War, Colonial and Foreign Offices were represented, the 
Air Ministry had contended that when full air control had been 
assumed, invasion could be delayed, if not repelled. 
6 
This Turkish threat - at its most acute during the next three 
1. Wilson Papers, 13f/l, Rawlinson to Wilson, 
27 September 1921. 
2. Wilson Diary, 28 September 1921. 
3. Wilson Papers, 13e/29,5 October 1921. 
4. Air 5/476,81+a, Secretary of State for the Colonies 
to High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, 14 November 1921. 
5. Wilson Diary, 9 December 1921. 
6. Air 5/476,81a, Secretary of State for the Colonies 
to High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, refers. 
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months - now reopened the whole question of the proposed 
disposition of troops under the Air Force scheme. To the surface 
again came the dispute over the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of Baghdad and Amara as the HQ for the imperial 
troops. As early as July in a letter to Borton, Trenchard had 
complained that the site of Amara, as suggested by the Cairo 
Conference, was "unsound from every point of view". He 
considered, too, that General Haldane's optimism concerning the 
effectiveness of raised platforms on barges - thus making river 
travel more secure - greatly added to the Air Ministry's case. 
' 
By the middle of October, after work on new accommodation had 
been put in hand at Baghdad, Trenchard could write to Borton, 
"I do not anticipate any further serious opposition on the part 
of the WO to the stationing of troops at Baghdad instead of 
Amara and that General Haldane shares this view appears to be 
evinced by the continuation of the building programme ..., 
2 
With the growing menace from the north, however, Trenchard's 
optimism proved to be misplaced. In a note to Wilson on the 16th 
December, the DMO, General Sir Percy Radcliffe, reminded his 
Chief that the Cairo Conference had explicitly laid down that 
the four battalions under the Air Force scheme would not be 
quartered at Baghdad, but at Basra or Amara. He did not suggest 
that it would be impossible for two British battalions with the 
aid of the Air Force to cut their way out of Baghdad and retire 
to Basra, but they could only do this if they received the order 
to move in time - and that was the crux of the matter. Knowing 
as he did the machinery of "Government", it would be optimistic 
to suppose a decision would be forthcoming until it was too late 
to extricate the troops. 
3 Three days later, at a"conference on 
Mesopotamia in the Colonial Office, the CIGS made it clear that 
he could not agree to leave two British battalions at Baghdad 
with no proper lines of communication and with no power of 
reinforcement. 
4 He could only consent to. this if extra Indian 
1. Trenchard Papers, II/27/20,28 July 1921. 
2. Ibid., Trenchard to Borton, 13 October 1921. 
3. WO 32/5899, DMO to CIGS, 16 December 1921. 
4. Wilson Diary, 19 December 1921. 
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or British troops were provided to secure the lines of 
communication along the Tigris. 
Trenchard was not a little vexed. Such an idea was nonsense, 
he fumed in a letter to Churchill. If one were required to 
guarantee absolute safety in everything, then one might as well 
give up the Mandate. The General Staff, he complained, would take 
no responsibility themselves and would never agree to the Air 
Force scheme. He would not shirk the responsibility, however, and 
was willing and anxious to take the blame. ' Early in the New Year 
the CIGS sent a letter on the same subject to his Minister, 
Worthington-Evans, in much the same tone but not the same tenor. 
He argued that if three battalions were to be stationed at 
Baghdad, then a total force of six battalions must be left in 
Mesopotamia in order that the lines of communication were 
adequately protected. Such numbers would certainly be necessary 
because from every point of view the situation had become worse 
over the past twelve months. In addition, since the discussion of 
these questions had begun, the Geddes Committee had recommended 
a reduction of 28 regular infantry battalions. If this 
reduction were to be enforced, he could not agree to any 
battalions being locked up in Mesopotamia. Apart from being of no 
use from the military point of view, they would be an added 
liability if troubles began. 2 
Alongside this dispute over the precise stationing of the 
imperial troops went a heated argument over the defence of Mosul 
in the extreme north. The scheme as presented at the Cairo 
Conference had not envisaged a permanent garrison at Mosul, but 
later in the year, in a letter to Borton, Trenchard hinted that 
local conditions might necessitate a temporary RAF occupation 
of Mosul and that this might "extend over a considerable period". 
3 
Early in the New Year, after the WO had decided-to withdraw their 
forces from Mosul by the 31st March, Cox sent a telegram to the 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, CAS to Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 21 December 1921. 
2. WO 32/5899, CIGS to Secretary of State for 
War, 9 January 1922. 
3. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/20, Trenchard to 
Borton, 13 October 1921. 
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Colonial Secretary strongly urging that between the date of the 
military withdrawal from Mosul and the introduction of the Air 
Force scheme, the existing facilities for air action in the area 
should in no way be reduced. ' Two days before the despatch of 
this wire, however, Haldane had informed the WO that he was 
strongly opposed to such an idea, 2 and on the 14th January the 
WO warned the Air Council that they were "quite unable to agree 
to the retention of an isolated detachment (a squadron of 
aircraft and an armoured car company) at so great a distance 
from any means of support". 3 
The crisis over Mosul at this time also provided Colonel 
J. F. C. Fuller with an opportunity to criticise the policy of air 
control. Writing in the Army Quarterly, he admitted that man 
could be controlled from the air if one were prepared to follow 
the example of the doctor and the axe. By using drastic measures 
a troublesome knave in Mosul could be obliterated like Carthage, 
man, woman and child, but the British Empire was not built upon 
obliteration but upon pacification. ' 
On the 19th January the dispute over troop dispositions 
came to a dramatic head. At a meeting called by the WO to which 
Trenchard was personally invited, the Air Staff were informed 
by the Adjutant General that the Secretary of State for War had 
decided that he would allow no personnel or armoured car units 
to be retained in Mesopotamia once the Air Force scheme came 
into operation. The only exception to this ruling would be 
staff officers who agreed to be seconded and other ranks who might 
volunteer to be transferred to the RAF. By way of explanation, 
it was stated that the Secretary of State for War had taken 
this decision on account of the objections voiced by the General 
Staff concerning the insecurity of the Baghdad garrison. 
5 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, Cox to Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 12 January 1922. 
2. Ibid., Haldane to W0,10 January 1922. 
3. Air 5/189,1+a, WO to Air Council, 14 January 
1922. See also CO 730/32. 
ii. Article entitled "Problems of Mechanical Warfare", 
Army Quarterly, Vol. TII, No. 2, January 1922, p. 295- 
5. Trenchard Papers, CII/8,19 January 1922. 
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The following day the WO informed the Colonial Office of 
their decision' and, at the same time, put in a lengthy memo to 
the Cabinet with the recommendation that the paper should be 
considered "before the Cabinet Committee deals in detail with 
the proposals for the reduction of the Army put forward by the 
Geddes Committee". It is clear that the WO were using the 
findings of the Geddes Committee to add support to their policy 
in Mesopotamia whilst, at the same time, using the situation in 
the Mandate to take some of the sting, if possible, out of the 
Committee's recommendations. In their memo, the General Staff 
claimed that the assertions of the Air Ministry with regard to 
air control were, in fact, just that; they remained to be proved. 
It had already been shown that for the normal police work of the 
Army abroad it was men that must be had in adequate numbers. As 
for tanks suitable for operations in a hot climate, it would 
probably take several years before a satisfactory type could be 
produced. The General Staff also took the Geddes Committee to 
task. The proposed reduction of cavalry forces - apparently 
influenced by the advent of the Air Force - was a mistake. 
Aircraft in their present state of development were only 
effective against an enemy presenting a tangible and extensive 
target, they could not replace cavalry in advanced or flank 
guard actions. The proposed cuts would "disastrously cripple the 
efficiency of the expeditionary force". 
2 
A few days later, Trenchard wrote a strong protest note to 
Churchill. Arrangements between the Air Ministry and WO, he 
reported, had reached deadlock and reference to the Cabinet 
appeared inevitable. After giving a resume of what had taken 
place at the meeting of the 19th, he complained that the WO had 
not lived up to the spirit or the letter of their undertakings 
to the Cabinet when the air scheme was approved. -It had taken 
five months since then for the WO to discover the reasons on 
which they now based their uncompromising refusal. If this 
refusal did in fact hinge on the question'of defending lines of 
f 
1. Air 5/476,85a, WO to Colonial Office, 
20 January 1922. 
2. Cab 24/132, CP 3619,10 January 1922. 
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communication, then he would prefer to do without the battalions 
altogether. Any such arrangement would be a contradiction of the 
principle on which the scheme of air control was based. By 
withholding all cooperation from any undertaking which was not in 
accordance with their views, the General Staff were claiming the 
right to retain the Air Force in a "state of permanent tutelage". 
In support of his complaint, Trenchard pointed out that as late 
as the 16th January in a paper circulated to the Indian 
Requirements Committee, the CIGS had stated that the General 
Staff had accepted . the Air Force proposals for the control of ." 
Mesopotamia. Trenchard complained, too, that from the beginning 
of negotiations between-the two departments, involving both semi- 
official discussion and a number of conferences, the WO had shown 
a lack of cooperation. On the question of armoured cars, the loan 
of Army personnel to assist with auxiliary services, and the 
transfer of responsibility for works and services, neither the 
Air Ministry nor the Colonial Office had been able to elicit any 
definite answers from the WO. ' 
There can be no question that to some extent the complaints 
made by the CAS were justified. The WO, obdurately opposed to the 
scheme from the start on the grounds that it had no chance of 
success, had certainly not gone out of their way to assist the 
Air Ministry. Despite public protestations of loyalty, they had 
entered into cooperation with very little heart in their work 
and a great deal of reservation. A number of examples can be 
cited. In January 1921, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under- 
Secretary of State for India, had complained to Churchill about 
Haldane's "obstructiveness", stating that answers to important 
questions had been delayed. for over two weeks. 
2 This comment 
prompted Churchill to write a strong letter of protest to 
Worthington-Evans, then the Under-Secretary of State for War, 
reproaching the WO for their "inveterate hostility". The letter 
was couched in such strong terms that, on reflection, Churchill 
decided not to send it. 
3 
1. Air 8/34, Minute 16,23 January 1922. 
2. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 519. 
3. Ibid., pp. 519-20. 
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On another occasion Trenchard wrote to Borton, "I am 
trying to reach an agreement with the WO with reference to the 
handing over of the surplus building material accumulated by the 
Army but have not yet been able to obtain a decision. " In the 
same letter, too, referring to a WO demand for ten instead of 
eight squadrons of aircraft in the proposed scheme, he wrote: 
It is part of the tactics of the Army 
to embarrass us by demanding two 
additional squadrons, the provision 
of which they are aware would prove a 
severe strain on our resources at the 
present juncture .. I 
AVM Sir Geoffrey Salmond, too, had written to Trenchard towards 
the end of 1921 to report that he was experiencing difficulty with 
the Army over the proposed building programme. The trouble was, he 
complained, the Army had originally agreed to carry out these 
services and they were therefore not dealt with by the Air Force. 
He continued: 
The Army, however, appears to be 
delaying matters whereas if they 
were going to remain in Mesopotamia 
they would have got the money and 
would be pushing on with the 
building concerned as fast as possible. 2 
At one stage relations had become so estranged that Churchill 
threatened to dispense with British forces altogether, complaining 
that the WO wished to maintain as many non-combatant as combatant 
troops in the Mandate. 3 Troubles there had been, too, over the 
supply of armoured cars. Nonetheless, by the date of Trenchard's 
complaint to Churchill, the 23rd January, the WO had confirmed 
with the Colonial Office and, via them, with the Air Ministry 
itself, that three companies of armoured cars or light tanks would 
be available when the Air Force scheme came into'operation. 
4 
In fact, the real bone of contention, and one not mentioned 
1. Trenchard Papers, II/27/20, Trenchard to Borton, 
28 July 1921. 
2. Ibid., II/27/144/2, Sir Geoffrey Salmond to 
Trenchard, 16 November 1921. 
3. CO 730/15, Churchill to Colonial Office, . 26 July 1921. 4+. CO 730/13, WO to Colonial Office, 24 September 1921. 
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by Trenchard in his memo, was the fact that, despite the 
recommendation of the Joint Military and Political Committee at 
the Cairo Conference that the imperial forces should be stationed 
at Amara -a decision reached after strong military opposition to 
the alternative site at Baghdad - the Air Ministry had gone ahead 
with their plans to station HQ forces near the capital. With the 
growing menace from the north, about which, it should be noted, 
the AOC Mesopotamia was himself seriously concerned, 
' the WO could 
not ignore the very real danger of external aggression and the 
consequences such aggression was likely to have on the internal 
situation. The Air Force scheme was untried and suspect, and the 
WO had an undisputed obligation towards the safety of their own 
forces and those of the RAF. 
On the 30th January 1922, the Middle East Department of the 
Colonial Office, in consultation with members of the Air Staff, 
came to the conclusion that they had no option but to accept the 
WO's decision. 2 Early the following month the Viceroy's Army 
Department informed the Secretary of State for India that they 
too were not prepared to expose Indian troops to risks which the 
WO were unwilling to entertain in respect of British troops. 
3 At 
the same time the Air Minister, Captain F. E. Guest, noted in a 
memo to his Chief of Staff that Churchill fully realised that he 
was "sitting on a volcano" and counted upon the Air Force and 
the Air Force alone to see him through. 
4 
The following day a conference of Ministers, 5 chaired by the 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/20, Borton to Trenchard, 
17 February 1922. Borton writes, ".. although I 
would be prepared to risk keeping one squadron and 
one armoured car company there unsupported 
indefinitely as far as the internal situation is 
concerned, I do not think it would be justified 
with this threat from outside, which could 
concentrate practically within two night marches 
of Mosul. " 
2. CO 730/32, Middle East Department of the Colonial 
Office to Trenchard, 30 January 1922. 
3. Air 5/476, Viceroy, Army Department, to Secretary 
of State for India, 7 February 1922. 
1+. Trenchard Papers, CII/8, Secretary of State for 
Air to CAS, 8 February 1922. 
5. Cabinet Meeting 11+(22), 2 March 1922 (Qab 23/29) 
gives siu wary of this Conference. 
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Prime Minister, was held to discuss the situation in Mesopotamia. 
At this meeting the WO carried their objections further. The 
Secretary of State for War stated that the WO could now assume 
no responsibility for reinforcing or rescuing any forces of the 
Air Ministry which might become besieged in Baghdad or elsewhere 
in the country. If trouble occurred and the nation insisted on a 
relief expedition, there could well be a repetition of the 
situation at the time of the siege of Gordon at Khartoum. 
A General Staff memo, circulated at the meeting, resurrected 
the question of the defence of Mosul. It argued that when the 
existing garrison in Mesopotamia had been decided at the Cairo 
Conference, one of the basic conditions had been the creation of 
a friendly Turkey. In fact, the problem of Turkish aggression was 
becoming daily more imminent. Once the armoured car company and 
RAF squadron were left isolated at Mosul, they would be a prey 
to frequent acts of sabotage. If openly attacked, they would have 
to retreat and this would mean that over 100 personnel and vital 
stores would have to be carried in open vehicles for a journey of 
some-300 miles. As the cars would have to be kept to the roads, 
it could be confidently predicted that ambushes would be laid. 
The memo concluded: 
If the political reasons for retaining 
this detachment in Mosul are overwhelming 
perhaps all military objections may have 
to be discounted, but the General Staff 
feel bound to add that they can see no 
political gain which will in any way 
compensate for the consequences, political 
as well as military, of the defeat and 
capture of these British units. ' 
As a solution to the problem, the War Minister urged that all 
troops should be withdrawn to the area around Basra. Apart from 
effecting a large reduction in liabilities, this would also save 
some f5 million per annum. Churchill retorted that £5 million had 
already been saved in the current year's. estimates and that for 
the year 1923-24 it was hoped to reduce the cost of the garrison 
to some £3 or £4 million. He felt confident that the Air Force 
1. Cab 24/133, CP 3717,9 February 1922. 
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scheme could deal with the present situation, especially as there 
was no evidence that a Turkish invasion was contemplated during 
the next two months. ' 
The conclusions reached at this conference went some way 
towards vindicating the arguments put forward by the WO. It was 
agreed that part of the existing garrison should remain at Mosul 
until the conclusion of the forthcoming conference on the Turkish- 
Greek peace settlement, but that their further retention should be 
reconsidered before the beginning of May. The conference also 
agreed, however, that under the same conditions, two white 
battalions would be retained at Baghdad, and it called upon the 
WO to give every assistance to the Air Ministry when they were 
taking over the units and individuals of the Army ancillary 
services. It was also concluded that the Air Ministry should 
continue to raise such armoured car units as they required for 
service in Mesopotamia and Palestine, but that "this should in no 
way prejudice any future discussion by the Cabinet on the general 
question of the responsibilities of the Royal Navy, the Army and 
the RAF". 2 
In a letter to Borton a few days later, the CAS confirmed 
that, as a result of Cabinet pressure, the WO had abandoned their 
objections to keeping troops in the territory. He now openly 
welcomed, too, the ruling that the. Air Force should raise and 
maintain its own armoured car companies. This had become necessary 
becäuse of WO delays, he maintained, but, in fact, as these 
companies would be the only regular troops engaged in active 
operations, it would make matters of command that much easier. 
3 
At about this time, too, the air control scheme also received 
strong public support from Sir Sefton Brancker to counteract what 
his biographer terms the Army's "destructive and retrogressive 
policy". 4 In a letter to The Daily Telegraph he pointed out that 
the Army's attacks on the RAF were "far more bitter and jealous 
than the public have imagined". It was wrong but understandable 
1. Cabinet Meeting 11+(22), 2 March 1922, (Cab 23/29), refers. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/20, Trenchard to Borton, 
10 March 1922. 
4. Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 251-59. 
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that the General Staff should strive to preserve their power and 
restore their "dwindling establishments". Aviation alone, however, 
could maintain order in such territories as Mesopotamia if the 
nation were not to go bankrupt. Neither of the older services had 
the knowledge or the faith necessary to make the full, economical 
use of aviation. I 
By April 1922 WO opposition appeared to be over. Trenchard 
wrote to Ironside during that month, "... You may be glad to hear 
that since I saw you last we are all a happy family again between 
the army side and the air side, and I hope to goodness it will 
never break out into a quarrel again. The Army are doing all they 
can to help us, and I hope we are doing our small part to help 
them. " 2 The major reason for this happier relationship was 
undoubtedly the retirement of Wilson as CIGS earlier in the year 
and his replacement by the more affable, easy-going Lord Cavan. 3 
"With Lord Cavan as CIGS, " wrote Trenchard to Borton, "the 
attitude of the WO towards us has .. changed very greatly for the 
better, and this is all to the good, as it will permeate in due 
course throughout the Army and will make our task very much 
easier. "4 Following this more conciliatory line, the WO wrote to 
the Colonial Office at the beginning of June to say that in the 
opinion of Lt. General Sir Aylmer Haldane, four battalions would 
suffice for the regular infantry garrison of Mesopotamia and that 
the. Army Council were prepared to accept a reduction on this 
basis. 5 
But if a change at "the shop" brought an easing of tension 
between the Ministries, a change at HQ Baghdad at this time had 
the opposite effect. In March Haldane was replaced by Major 
General Sir Theodore Fraser as GOC Iraq. Until this date, 6 
1. Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 25l-59. Letter dated 13 
February 1922. Brancker was appointed Director of 
Civil Aviation three months later. 
2. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/99,13 April 1922. Trenchard 
was promoted to ACM on 1 April 1922. 
3. General Lord Cavan was appointed CIGS 19 February 1922. 
4+. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/20, Trenchard to Borton, 
8 May 1922. 
5. Air 5/476, WO to Colonial Office, 2 June 1922. 
6. At about this time the name "Iraq" became widely used. 
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relations between the Army and Air Force staffs had been good. 
Haldane, for one reason or another, had come to view the air 
control scheme with favour, whilst Borton, writing to Trenchard 
at the beginning of 1922, had been full of praise for his 
military colleagues. He wrote: 
I should like in this connection again 
to emphasise the invaluable assistance 
I have always had from the Army - the 
C-in-C, Col. Frith and Heads of 
Departments downwards have gone out of 
their way to consult our interests and 
to help generally about the future. I 
feel sure that if the WO would only 
adopt as reasonable an attitude, it 
would relieve you of much unnecessary 
trouble .. ' 
Fraser too, on the eve of his appointment, wrote to Trenchard, 
"The more I see of the men and the methods of the Army and RAF 
in connection with one another out here the more I wonder why 
'friction' is so dreaded in London. There's not a suspicion of it 
in Iraq and the handing over will be quite smooth. " 2 
Within a few weeks of this handover, however, Borton was 
warning Trenchard that the new C-in-C might "start some ill- 
considered hare in his personal letters to Lord Cavan". 
3 Then in 
early July, in confirmation of his fears, he informed the CAS 
that a cable he had written to AVM Sir John Salmond concerning 
the part played by the Air Force in the recent operations in the 
Sulaimania district had been redrafted by General Fraser. Claims 
made as to the successful effect of air action had been "blue- 
pencilled" on the grounds that it was too early to make any 
definite statement. The new C-in-C, Borton advised, was openly 
antagonistic to the RAF scheme and was incapable of visualising 
the possibilities of the new arm. As one of the, old school, he 
was in favour of increasing the number of troops, especially as 
this would justify'the appointment of a general officer 
commanding. Borton feared that he had already resurrected with 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/20, Borton to Trenchard, 
6 January 1922. 
2. Ibid., 11/27/69, Fraser to CAS, 8 May 1922. 
3. Ibid., 11/27/20, Borton to CAS, 8 June 1922. 
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Lord Rawlinson the bogey of the danger of keeping Indian troops at 
Baghdad. Fraser's attitude might lead to difficulties not only at 
home but also in Sir John's conversations in India concerning the 
future of the air arm in that country. I But Trenchard was anxious 
not to rock the boat at this juncture. He told Churchill that it 
was most important to avoid friction with the Army authorities 
until the RAF had taken over, and that he had instructed Borton 
along these lines. Iraq was the one place where the Air Ministry 
had so far succeeded in keeping on friendly terms with the military 
element. 2 In a private letter to Salmond just two days later, 
Trenchard expressed anxiety about continual criticism from the WO 
concerning bombing operations in Iraq. Churchill, he wrote, was 
becoming a little alarmed and was inclined to think that a great 
crisis was imminent. 3 
At the beginning of August, Fraser launched his long-awaited 
attack upon the system of air control. In a letter to his 
Secretary of State, he advised that the Iraqi Army was highly 
suspect as a fighting force. It carried no prestige to help it 
maintain internal order, and it would be incapable of making any 
stand against regular troops for many months to come. At Mosul, 
he instanced, 75% of the men had done less than six months service 
and a large number of the Mosulawis were of very doubtful quality. 
As for the Iraqi levies, these were not and never would be a 
homogeneous force. 4 Fraser followed this up with a letter to 
Trenchard the next day in which, whilst praising the work of the 
RAF contingent, he maintained that the cooperation between the 
levies and aeroplanes "cannot be as close as theory thinks". 5 
The outcome of Fraser's report to the WO was a letter from 
Worthington-Evans to Churchill enclosing a paper by the General 
Staff. Once again the matter of the defence of Mosul was raised. 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/20, Borton to Trenchard, 
6 July 1922. See also CO 730/32. Salmond's mission 
to India is discussed in Chapter 6-of this work. 
2. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/50; Trenchard to 
Churchill, 25 July 1922. 
3. Ibid., CII/27/143/2, Trenchard to Salmond, 27 July 1922. 
4. CO 730/32, Fraser to Secretary of State for War, 
1 August 1922. 
5. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/69, Fraser to CAS, 2 August 1922. 
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The Secretary of State for War contended that the levies were not 
up to the required standard, yet these were the very forces which 
would bear the first brunt of an attack upon Mosul. The General 
Staff agreed that Iraq had been free from any organised uprising 
since 1920, but felt that this was probably due to the memory 
of the punishment inflicted by the Army during the rebellion of 
that year. I As this memory faded and the reduction of the British 
garrison revealed a weakening of our strength, the risk of 
internal disorder would certainly increase. The solution, 
reiterated the General Staff, was a strengthening of the garrison 
or the withdrawal of the present forces to the area around Basra. 
The WO were not opposed to the Air Force scheme, but too sudden 
and too drastic a reduction of the garrison would hardly give the 
experiment a fair chance. And it was all an experiment. The 
placing of Feisal on the throne was an experiment, the Iraqi 
Army was an experiment, and the levies were still in the 
experimental stage. Finally, the RAF scheme itself was an 
experiment. 2 
Trenchard, fearing even at this late stage that such attacks 
might weaken Churchill's resolve, informed him that Fraser was 
doubtless the major source of the agitation and sent him Borton's 
letter of the 6th July to give him "the other side of the picture". 
3 
But as far as the Colonial Office were concerned, the Army's 
attacks were seen as their "Parthian epistle", and they informed 
the WO that they were prepared to accept the risks involved. 
' 
Even at this late hour, however, there was concern within the 
Colonial Office over the possibility of a last minute hitch. In 
a letter to Major H. Young concerning Trenchard's wish that 
1. Towards the end of 1920 punitive expeditions 
burnt villages, collected fines, and confiscated 
60,000 rifles and three million rounds of 
ammunition. See Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 496-7. 
2. CO 730/32, Worthington-Evans to Churchill, 
1 August 1922. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/50; Trenchard to 
Churchill, 8 August 1922. 
1. CO 730/32, Meinertzhagen to Young, 9 August 1922, 
refers. Both were serving in the Middle East 
Department of the Colonial Office, Meinertzhagen as 
Military Advisor and Young as Assistant Secretary. 
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troops should remain in Mosul until the handover of responsibility, 
Colonel R. Meinertzhagen refers to the danger of Fraser staying 
in command and the consequent deferment of the air scheme. ' Nor 
did the WO slacken their efforts as the handover date approached. 
Indeed, doubtless anxious that their opposition should be well 
remembered should their gloomy predictions come true, they sent 
a letter to the Colonial Office as late as the 26th August 
enclosing Fraser's criticisms and a General Staff note drawing 
attention to the tense situation prevailing in Iraq. 2 
On 1st October the military control of Iraq was handed over 
to AVM Sir John Salmond. The RAF were given the chance they had 
for so long sought, but the opportunity was only won with 
difficulty and was only to be retained with difficulty. At the 
beginning of the previous month war had only just been averted 
between Britain and Turkey during the Chanak crisis. In Iraq 
itself the Turks were casting covetous eyes upon the oil-rich 
area of Mosul and stirring up anti-British feeling among the 
Kurdish tribes of the north. Trenchard wrote to Salmond towards 
the end of October: 
What I am frankly afraid of is that the 
WO will begin agitating again against 
the insecurity of their troops out there 
under our scheme, and I shall have a 
hard fight for it all over again to 
prove that we are competent to look 
after the Army just as much as they are 
competent to look after the Air. 3 
His fears were justified. 
1. CO 730/32, Meinertzhagen to Young, 
14+ August 1922. 
2. Air 5/202, WO to Colonial Office, 
26 August 1922. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/113/2, 
Trenchard to Salmond, 21 October 1922. 
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Air control in Iraq, however, was in substitution for other 
forces. The WO could rightly claim that the task of imperial 
policing had been and could continue to be accomplished by ground 
forces, albeit with air support. From the Air Force's point of 
view, too, their scheme in Iraq, important though it was as a 
raison d'eetre, was a sideline rather than a vocation. Even'the 
economic argument in favour of such work broke down if this was to 
be the sum total of the Air Staff's contribution. If the Air Force 
was to survive as a separate force then it would have to find a 
task peculiar to its own arm, a task in which the other services 
played a clearly ancillary part or no part at all. So long as 
there was no genuine, independent air striking power, there was no 
pressing need for an air strategy or for a centralised direction 
of air operations. Indeed, there was no need, some could argue, 
for an Air Ministry at all. 
This lack of an independent role was fully appreciated by the 
Air Staff. An Air Ministry publication of July 1921 recognised 
that "the successful outcome of the war has greatly lessened the 
possible obligations of the independent Air Force at home". Formed 
amid the last knockings of the war and with insufficient time to 
prove its anticipated value, the Force could claim no right to an 
existence in the immediate postwar world. Russia was in a state of 
chaos; Germany had been defeated and chained; France was, for the 
present at least, an ally. The allocation of squadrons at this 
time clearly reflected the low priority given to home defence. Of 
the 24 squadrons possessed by the RAF, eight were in Egypt and six 
in Iraq. Only three were stationed in the United Kingdom. 
Looking to the future, however, the Air Staff lost no 
opportunity in pointing out that as soon as conditions changed, 
and France or any other continental Power had to be reckoned with 
as a potential enemy, then the air defence of the nation would 
depend not so much upon passive defence as upon the strength of 
the aerial attack which could be launched upon the enemy. The 
"bolt from the blue" would become a real possibility and instant 
steps would have to be taken to "maintain the independent Air 
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Force on a very considerable scale in Home Areas". 
' 
The Air Ministry and the country at large had not long to 
wait for possibility to give way to reality. The scare was started 
in October, when an editorial in Flight Magazine claimed that, in 
contravention of Article 198, the Germans had hidden away 2,000 to 
3,000 aero engines of a type suitable for military use. 
2 This 
allegation was not taken very seriously, but in the following 
Spring a more formidable and immediate threat was brought to the 
public's notice. A series of articles by P. R. C. Groves in The Times 
drew attention to the growing might of the French Air Force. The 
French, claimed Groves, possessed 126 squadrons compared in Britain 
with a force of 7 squadrons, including aircraft allotted to 
cooperation with the Navy and Army. 
3 Then in October Mr. Balfour, 
President of the Council, informed the CID that the French were 
"overwhelmingly superior" in regard to airpower, having 47 
independent air squadrons compared with three in the RAF. He 
viewed the situation with "profound alarm". 
4 At the following 
meeting Trenchard warned that the air menace from France would be 
a grave danger in future years if relations with our neighbour 
became unsatisfactory. Britain was very vulnerable to air attack 
from the continent. 
s 
The Editor of Flight Magazine, readily seizing upon this new 
source of danger, 'declared that the-only way in which the Empire 
could be safeguarded from aerial attack was by what he termed 
"an offensive-defensive long-distance striking force". 
6 By this 
time, too, with Anglo-French relations embittered by divergent 
views over reparations and the Chanak crisis, Balfour was seeing 
the protection of the United Kingdom against air attack as "the 
most formidable defence problem" facing the country. The CAS 
1. Brooke-Popham Papers, IX/5/12, Air Ministry 
Publication, July 1921. 
2.. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XIII, 20 October 
1921, p. 681. 
3. Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, Our Future in 
the Air, (pub. 1935), p. 102. 
4+. Cab 2/3, CID 1145th Meeting, 14 October 1921. 
5. Ibid., 146th Meeting, 21 October 1921. 
6. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XIV, 30 March 1922, 
p. 183. 
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concurred and adroitly pointed out that iý view of that situation 
it was most desirable that the position of the Air Force in 
relation to the Army and Navy - then under discussion - should be 
speedily settled. I The same day, the Air Ministry produced a paper 
on the vulnerability of the British Isles to air attack. Referring 
to the recent naval settlement at Washington, it claimed that the 
menace of attack from the air appeared to be more formidable than 
a somewhat fanciful possibility of a naval war with the USA or any 
other Power. The paper continued: 
The continental menace is now from the air 
and not from the sea, not from a landing on 
these islands by armed forces, but from 
repeated incursions on a large scale by 
hostile aircraft, operating from the sky and 
returning to their own bases. 
Germany, unlikely to compete at sea again, would probably 
concentrate her resources on airpower in the future, while France, 
although at present friendly, had been an enemy in the past and 
possessed a very large air force. 2 
The paper was discussed at a meeting of the CID early in 
November, when it was agreed that a special committee should be 
appointed to go fully into the question of the vulnerability of 
the British Isles to air attack and the measures necessary to meet 
such an attack. 
3 
Up to this point the CIGS, an avowed francophil, had paid 
scant attention to the matter. Commenting upon the CID meeting in 
his diary that evening, Wilson wrote: "It was all so unreal that I 
could take no interest, but I could not help pointing out that it 
was curious that, on Trenchard's showing, a country without a 
separate Air Ministry could annhilate a country with a separate 
Air Ministry. " 4 When the matter was again raised, however, at a 
CID meeting later that month, Wilson took a more forceful line. 
There was in his view no menace from the French. They had no 
aggressive intentions except perhaps towards the Ruhr. He admitted 
1. Cab 2/3, CID 147th Meeting, 31 October 1921. 
2. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 156-C, 31 October 1921. 
3. Cab 2/3, CID 148th Meeting, 9 November 1921. 
4. Wilson Diary, 9 November 1921. 
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that they possessed a powerful, modern army and air force but, 
seeing that the whole continent was in a state of chaos, he 
considered this to be a blessing rather than a menace. France was 
the one steadying factor in Europe, and England (sic) was 
exceptionally fortunate in having such a friend at such a moment. ' 
Such advice, though eminently reasonable, was ignored by the 
Air Staff and the Air Ministry. In early December the Secretary of 
State for Air added to the fears he had helped to engender. He 
told the CID that the situation with regard to French airpower was 
worse than previously thought. Conscription provided the French 
with an unlimited number of ready-made mechanics and this made 
possible an immediate expansion of their air force upon 
mobilisation. 2On the same day, the Prime Minister wired to Balfour, 
our representative at the Washington Conference on the Limitation 
of Armaments, to inform him of the Committee's concern and of 
their view that no limitation of aircraft was practicable. 
3 
To these gloomy statistics were added the even gloomier 
predictions of the fiction writer H. G. Wells. According to one 
observer, his prophecies concerning aerial bombardment in a future 
war, published in the Daily Express at this time, were enough to 
"make our flesh creep". 
4 
At this stage, the WO attitude to the question was that it 
could not possibly be studied in isolation. At the first meeting 
of the special sub-committee, the DMO, Major General Sir Percy 
Radcliffe, maintained that war could not be waged by one of the 
services alone in a "water-tight compartment". If HMG seriously 
contemplated preparing for war with France, then should not the 
Committee study the question comprehensively and include the 
measures necessary to deal with the naval and military forces of 
France? To this, the Air Ministry representative retorted that the 
admitted air menace might be decisive without the army of either 
nation becoming involved. 5 It was this arrogant attitude adopted 
1. Cab 2/3, CID 151st Meeting,. 26 November 1921. 
2. Ibid., 153rd Meeting, 6 December 1921. 
3. Cab 4/7, CID Paper 299-B, 6 December 1921. 
4. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XIII, 
15 December 1921, p. 822. 
5. Air 8/39,13 December 1921. 
79 
by the Air Ministry to which the WO could rightly take exception. 
Later in the month an Air Staff memo actually selected France 
as the potential enemy and argued that the average weight of bombs 
which could be dropped by France, allowing for only twenty bombing 
days a month and using but 50% of their force, was something like 
1,600 tons a month. London was liable to receive 147 tons in the 
first 24 hours, 110 tons in the second 24 hours, and 73J tons in 
subsequent 24 hour periods. This compared with the 12 tons dropped 
on England during September 1917, the heaviest weight of bombs 
dropped by the Germans in any one month. So continuous would be 
the attack, predicted the Air Staff, that it would be impossible 
to repair damage already done and the mobilisation of the Army 
would be seriously affected. 
1 In the New Year the Secretary of 
State for Air informed the Cabinet that the French were building 
150 machines a month compared with a home production of 23 per 
annum. It was generally agreed that the French air development 
constituted a formidable danger and the CID was asked to expedite 
its enquiries concerning the continental air menace. 
2 
Shortly afterwards, the General Staff let it be known that in 
their view the Air Staff's predictions were exaggerated to the 
point of being alarmist. In a paper to the Sub-Committee in late 
March they made it clear that, whilst they accepted as a basis the 
scale of, attack laid down by the Air Staff and elaborated in 
subsequent papers, they wished to place on record that they 
hesitated to accept these statements as a true picture of what 
might happen. In the first place, they were unable to envisage an 
international situation in which France would be able to 
concentrate the whole of her Air Force against this country. 
Secondly, the estimates of the scale of such an attack did not 
take into account the effect of counter attacks by the RAF, and 
they greatly minimised the physical effects of climate and the 
psychological effects of temperament. 3 For their part, the 
Admiralty took the line adopted earlier by the General Staff. 
1. Air 8/39,23 December 1921. 
2. Cab 23/29, Cabinet Meeting 18(22), 15 March 1922. 
3. Cab 16/39, CID Continental Air Menace, 27 March 1922. 
80 
At the second meeting of the Sub-Committee, the First Sea Lord, 
Admiral Beatty, said that while he did not think it were possible 
for the Committee to controvert the "lurid and heart rending 
picture" drawn by the Air Force, he felt it impossible to discuss 
a continental air attack without making reference to the other 
fighting services. At this meeting, however, the new CIGS, General 
Lord Cavan, responsible as he was for the static home defences, 
took a more cautious view and did not seek to minimise "the 
undoubted menace which existed". 
' Nor, indeed, did Balfour. In his 
summary of the situation he once more gave his imagination free 
rein. The Army and Navy would be paralysed, London would be made 
uninhabitable, lines of communication would be cut. In short, an 
enemy could strike a blow which would render the nation almost 
impotent. He concluded: 
The proper reply to aerial attack is aerial 
defence and aerial counter-attack, and our 
relatively insignificant Air Force is 
incapable of either. 2 
The picture so vividly painted by Lord Balfour must be seen 
as the. product of "the heat-oppressed brain". 
3 As Collier points 
out, there was little evidence to support his fears and contentions. 
4 
They were amply sufficient, however, to stir the imaginations of 
fellow politicians. At the beginning of June the Parliamentary 
Air Committee, in a letter to the Prime Minister, predicted that, 
in the initial stages, the next war would be largely decided in 
the air and urged the Government to increase the strength of the 
Air Force. 5 
A month later at a special meeting of the CID at which the 
Prime Minister presided, the report of the Sub-Committee was again 
discussed. It recommended the organisation of a defence zone and 
an increase in the home air force from 3 to 15 squadrons in order 
that an offensive organisation might be created. Lloyd George, 
concerned lest weakness in the air might place his Government at 
1. Cab 16/39,29 March 1922. 
2. Cab 3/3, CID Paper 108-A, 29 May 1922. 
3. Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene 1, line 39. 
lt. Basil Collier, Defence of the United Kingdom, p. 11. 
5. Cab 1+/8, CID Paper 31+9-B, 2 June 1922. 
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a diplomatic disadvantage visa-via the French, agreed that the 
RAF should be strengthened but, with cost in mind, was uncertain 
as to the best method to adopt. ' At a later meeting he astutely 
pointed out that by not possessing a separate Air Force the 
French appeared to obtain more for their money. They were more 
readily able to use the personnel and materiel belonging to their 
Army. The Secretary of State for War wholeheartedly agreed with 
this comment and was quick to suggest that an estimated saving of 
£1 million might be effected by amalgamation. With a unified 
service, skilled tradesmen might be available for both Army and 
Air Force work. In 'reply, the Air Minister, Captain Guest, denied 
that his administration was wasteful and referred to the findings 
of the Geddes Committee, but his assurances only served to ward 
off, not to destroy, the WO attack. 2 
At the beginning of August the CID recommended the adoption 
of the Air Ministry's revised scheme providing for 23 squadrons 
(14 bomber and 9 fighter) for Home Defence, 3 and these 
recommendations were adopted by the Cabinet the following day. 4 
In view of the impressive French programme at this time and the 
threat it was held to contain, Trenchard's programme must be 
regarded as modest. Boyle states that privately Trenchard 
dismissed the French threat as "a political chimera of the first 
magnitude". 
5 This might well be so, but in public the Air 
Ministry certainly made the most of what was, in fact, a highly 
problematical threat, both as regards to strength and feasibility. 
Roskill, in a study of navy-air force relations of this period, 
refers to information from the French Service Historique de 
Z'armee de Z'air to show that the Air Ministry took the worst 
possible case with regard to the tonnage of bombs which could be 
dropped on London in the first 24 hours of a war. The Service 
Historique also points out that during the so-called menace 
the French bomber squadrons were actually stationed in eastern 
France or in Germany-and that a major redeployment would have 
1. Cab 2/3, CID 158th Meeting, "5 July 1922. 
2. Ibid., 162nd Meeting, 31 July 1922. 
3. Ibid., 163rd Meeting, 2 August 1922. 
1. Cab 23/30, Cabinet Meeting, 3 August 1922. 
5. Boyle, op. cit., p. 431. 
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been necessary before any serious attack on England could have been 
mounted. It is improbable, as Roskill points out, that the Air 
Ministry was unaware of such facts. ' 
Shortly after the Cabinet's decision, the Coalition 
Government fell from power and the question of home defence 
. expansion schemes and, 
indeed, the very survival of the Air Force 
as an independent service, were put in the balance once more. On 
taking office in the new Government, the Secretary of State for 
Air, Sir Samuel Hoare, was advised by the Prime Minister that he 
did not intend to retain the Air Force as a separate department. 
2 
At first, however, Trenchard appeared confident that the new 
Administration appreciated the increasing importance of the air. 
He told AVM Sir Edward Ellington towards the end of October that 
it should be made clear to all that the future of the RAF was not 
in the melting pot. "The Government, " he wrote, "owing to the 
urgent need for economy, are reviewing all the commitments in 
every walk of life and policy. "3 Such was the air of uncertainty 
surrounding the new government's intentions, however, that only a 
few days later he was fearing that the new administration might 
put the Air Ministry under the WO and reduce commitments in Iraq 
and Palestine. 4 
Early in 1923 the question of home defence was given fresh 
impetus by the French occupation of the Ruhr. This sudden crisis, 
though never a Casus belli, added weight to arguments which might 
otherwise have been dismissed as unrealistic or as economically 
unacceptable by the new government. Nevertheless, the Air Ministry 
fully realised that they were still under a suspended sentence. 
Trenchard wrote to Salmond in February: "The PM cannot make up his 
mind about the Air Service as far as I can see, or about Iraq. 
1. Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, 
. p. 382. 
2. Viscount Templewood, Empire of the Air, p. 36. 
Hoare was appointed Secretary of State for Air 
on 2 November 1922. 
3. Trenchard Papers, II/27/63/1, Trenchard to Ellington, 
27 October 1922. Ellington was then AOC Middle East. 
1. Ibid., Trenchard to Ellington, 30 October and 
9 November 1922. 
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He wants peace at any price... "' 
In a memo to the Cabinet in the same month, Hoare was at 
pains to point out that if it were not possible to fulfil the 
expansion programme to counter the French menace, then it was 
necessary to go for quality in material as well as in personnel. 
This made the problem of research vital. Furthermore, numerical 
inferiority made it all the more essential that the development of 
such forces should be concentrated in one organisation and not 
dissipated by breaking up the Air Force into three fragments. If 
the Cabinet set aside the one power standard as impracticable, 
then the need was to maintain a highly trained and consequently 
expensive Air corps d'oUte to ensure quality as against quantity. 
2 
The other service chiefs saw no need for such extravagance. At 
his first meeting with them, Hoare was bluntly told that, in their 
view, a third service was indefensible. 3 Indeed, it was only after 
some powerful pleading on the part of the Air Minister - according 
to Montgomery Hyde - that Bonar Law, a man with little interest in 
matters of defence, agreed to the setting up of an impartial 
committee to "enquire into the cooperation and correlation of the 
fighting services". 
4 
The so-called Salisbury Committee, set up the following month, 
was to afford the WO a further opportunity not only to oppose what 
they regarded as an unwarranted expansion of the independent 
bomber force at the expense of the older services, but also to 
reopen their case against the very existence of a third service. 
In fact, however, the enquiry, held throughout the Spring and 
Summer of 1923, came at a most inopportune time for the Army. 
Quite apart from the deep concern felt by many politicians and 
some of the public over the French air threat at this particular 
juncture, the system of air control introduced into Iraq six 
months previously had, on the face of it, proved capable of 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/143/2, Trenchard to 
Salmond, 28 February 1923. 
2. Cab 24/158, CP 88(23), February 1923. 
3. Montgomery Hyde, op. cit., p. 115. 
1+. Ibid., pp. 116-7, and W. J. Reader, Architect of 
Air Power, pp. 102-3. 
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counteracting the Turkish menace in the north, thus confounding 
the gloomy predictions of the General Staff. 
' Before the enquiry 
got under way, therefore, the War Minister, Lord Derby, wrote 
to Lord Salisbury, warning him against any reductions in the Army 
to set off increases in the Air Force. He explained that any 
increase in the air arm would, in fact, add to the work of the 
Army. More ground troops would have to be provided to "follow and 
consolidate the results obtained by air action" and more ground 
installations would have to be defended. His letter concluded: 
I feel I must place on record my opinion 
that the committee will be failing in its 
objects unless it reviews the military 
commitments of the Empire in relation to 
our military strength. .. It is only on the assumption that this question will not 
be overlooked that I can willingly consent 
to serve as a member of the committee. 2 
In presenting their case to the Sub-Committee, the WO 
marshalled their arguments well. In essence, they called for 
separate air arms for the Navy and Army and a reduced Air Ministry 
to administer research, experiment, supply and civil aviation. The 
foundations of the new service, complained the General Staff, had 
been laid in so critical a period of war that the process had 
passed almost unnoticed and it was not until the end of the war 
that the fait accompli had been disclosed. Since then they had 
protested as to the unsoundness of the measure. It was significant 
that this "costly experiment" had not been adopted by. any other 
country. 
1. Trenchard wrote to Salmond on 6 June 1923: 
"I cannot emphasise too much the value your 
successful command in Iraq has been to us. " 
See Trenchard Papers, CII/27/143/2. 
2. Derby Papers, WO 137/12, Derby to Salisbury, 
12 March 1923. Military commitments at this time 
were: India, a force of nearly 70,000 men made up 
of 8 cavalry regiments, 45 infantry battalions 
and 55 field batteries; elsewhere overseas, 37 
battalions, including 27 on the Rhine, in the 
Constantinople area and in Egypt; at home, 53 
battalions and 9 cavalry regiments. See N. H. 
Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Vol. I, p. 52. 
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Air action, their argument continued, could do no more than 
contribute to the victory of one side or the other; it could not 
by itself achieve or consolidate that victory. The Army and Navy 
had their own distinct spheres of action on the earth's surface, 
whilst the Air Force was supplementary to both in a "secondary 
plane". The Air Force was a new arm, not a new service. Thus in 
any military or naval operations, aircraft must be at the 
absolute disposal of the commanders and staffs concerned. 
Otherwise there would be the danger of independent action and 
the consequent diversion of resources and effort. 
Turning to the question of the independent use of aircraft in 
home defence, the General Staff did not consider that it was such 
a distinct and specialised task as to warrant the maintenance of a 
separate air staff and air ministry. The WO viewed home defence as 
a single problem in which naval, military and air forces all had a 
part to play. It was, moreover, a normal problem of modern warfare 
well within the competence of the General Staff. It was agreed 
that aircraft would at times be the principal arm employed by both 
sides, but this would only require that the General Staff should 
include officers thoroughly trained in air fighting and that the 
"General Staff as a body should be as familiar with the 
capabilities of the aeroplane as with those of other weapons at 
their disposal". There was, too, the danger of divided control. 
The searchlights, sound locators and anti-aircraft guns which 
worked with the aircraft were organised by the Army. It seemed 
unwise to give over all control to an independent staff 
specialising in the use of one particular weapon. 
The Sub-Committee was reminded, too, that the Air Force could 
never free itself from its administrative dependence on Army lines 
of communication and Army ground protection. Indeed, the 
proportion of ground troops in a defence scheme of England, and 
the importance of such troops, was so great that, should an Air 
Ministry be maintained in its present form, it would have to be 
provided with staff officers and experts by the WO. In short, the 
WO could not visualise air action in the military sphere except as 
part and parcel of the general strategic plan for which the General 
Staff were responsible. All the needs of the new service could be 
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met by grafting an air staff branch onto the WO staff within the 
Army Council, and by fitting Air Force commands into the-chain of 
Army commands. It was conceded that an Air Ministry would be 
required for civil aviation, research, experiment and supply, but 
relieved of its military responsibilities, it could be much 
reduced. 
On the policing of Iraq and Palestine, the General Staff 
continued to maintain that the air scheme was "fundamentally 
unsound". Army control was necessary to put the Air Force in and 
to bring them out. "Sandwiched" between these two phases there 
was, indeed, a period of air control but this was, in reality, 
a policing rather than a fighting interlude. As far as 
liabilities were concerned, it was a military rather than an 
air commitment. ' 
The problem of divided command as it affected the supply of 
aircraft for Army needs had been taken up earlier by the General 
Staff. They argued that, should the Air Force remain independent, 
the air contingent for the Expeditionary Force - then standing at 
eight. squadrons - should be accepted as an integral and 
inalienable part of the field force. They asked that a definite 
guarantee should be given that these squadrons would be available 
when required. Furthermore, a similar undertaking was sought 
concerning the Army's minimum requirements overseas, namely six 
squadrons in India and two in Egypt, including a detached flight 
at Aden. 
In an earlier paper to the Committee, the Secretary of State 
for War had also raised the question of finance. Any expansion of 
the Air Force to meet corresponding developments in other 
countries would mean a reduction in the Army vote, Derby pointed 
out, despite the fact that Army commitments and possible future 
dangers were in no way reduced. 3 
The CIGS, before presenting his case, had warned Trenchard 
that he would pull no punches. 
' He was true to his word. In giving 
1. Cab 16/1+7, ND 4o, 8 *June 1923. 
2. Ibid., ND 34,16 May 1923. 
3. Ibid., ND 14+, 17 April 1923. 
4. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/113/2, Letter, 
Trenchard to Salmond, refers, 6 June 1923. 
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evidence he showed, above all, a much more realistic approach to 
the potentialities of bombing than did the Air Staff. He thought 
it unthinkable that Britain would surrender its fleet and army 
just because London were bombed, nor did he think that the 
bombing would be anything like as severe as it was made out to be. 
He also took a more optimistic view and, as events. were to prove, 
a more accurate one, of the effects of bombing upon troop 
movements. He told Hoare: 
You cannot be everywhere in the air because 
even with the .. strength of France against England at this moment I still think troops 
could be moved to suit the various 
concentrations as required. ' 
Furthermore, in a note presented to the Committee at their 
next meeting, Cavan expounded his views on the moral and material 
effect of bombing. He accused the Air Staff of giving rein to what 
he termed "an elastic imagination" as to the future possibilities 
of aerial bombardment. He maintained that the evidence as to the 
loss of output which occurred in the war through panic, desertion 
or fear was contradictory. It was safe to say that so far as 
industry was concerned, material damage to factories had a greater 
and more lasting result on production than did the moral effect on 
the workers. Indeed, he held that the effect of such bombing was 
to strengthen the determination of all classes to see the war 
through to a successful conclusion. It was therefore questionable 
whether intensive bombing of a section of the community at the 
very beginning of hostilities would shake the will to fight of 
the nation as a whole. 2 
Thus on the future role of the Air Force, Cavan argued that 
the Air Staff claimed "a little too much", relegating the Army to 
"escorting the air and nothing more". As the airman saw it, the 
Army was to advance slowly in order that aerodromes could be made 
behind it. From these aerodromes the air was to go on and win the 
war alone. That, he considered, was an exaggerated view. He 
conceded that the Air Force would-develop and increase in strength, 
1. Air 8/63, ND 12th Meeting, 12 June 1923. 
2. Cab 16/17, ND 49,14 June 1923. 
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but so too would the opposition it would have to face. 
The CIGS also had something to say on the question of divided 
command. He warned that to have two or more commanders-in-chief 
was "absolutely fatal". He would like to see the CAS a member of 
the Army Council, with the air branch taking its place alongside 
the administration and supply branches within the Army. Concerning 
the situation in Iraq, however, Cavan was much more on the 
defensive. In reply to searching questions from Lord Weir and Hoare, 
he claimed, not wholly convincingly, that had the Array been in 
control of the Mandate, the same use would have been made of 
aircraft as under the present scheme. The General Staff, Cavan 
assured the Committee, looked upon the air as an absolutely 
invaluable arm and would have been prepared to use it had it proved 
to be the cheapest and most efficient weapon. He denied, further- 
more, that the WO had opposed the air experiment in Iraq, asserting 
that the General Staff had only been concerned lest they be called 
upon to get the Air Force out of a mess. The need for ground troops 
had been amply demonstrated earlier that year when the AOC had 
postponed the departure of two battalions during the crisis over 
Mosul. I 
Returning to the question of French airpower, the General 
Staff argued that an attack on the part of France would be suicidal. 
France's concern with Germany must of necessity occupy all her 
thought and energy for at least the next two decades, and this made 
friendship with Britain essential. And even if an attack should 
materialise, the Air Ministry had exaggerated the danger. It was 
difficult to believe that French aircraft in North Africa could be 
used in such an attack. Moreover, of the 596 machines within the 
French Air Force, 300 were fighters or aircraft allotted to 
cooperation with their array. It had to be remembered, too, that any 
money expended on the RAF must react on the Navy and Army votes. 
This could lay open the Empire to attack and bring about defeat 
without the air force at home ever having been brought into action. 2 
Derby likewise warned the Committee that panic legislation might 
result if the Committee's interim report were based on the Air 
1. Air 8/63, ND 13th Meeting, 14 June 1923. 
2. Cab 16/47, ND 31,11 May 1923. 
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Staff's figures. The WO considered that war with France was 
"a remote contingency". ' 
The General Staff's memo was promptly criticised by Balfour 
on the grounds that it was not of a military nature but dealt with 
purely political considerations. 2 This criticism was in some 
respects justified, but by this time Ministers were indeed 
becoming concerned at the political consequences of such defence 
measures. At a Cabinet meeting in May, the Lord President of the 
Council had been asked to make it clear in the House of Lords that 
the Government deprecated any talk of aggression on the part of 
France towards this country. The Government wished to make it 
plain that they could conceive of nothing worse than a competition 
in armaments with France. 3 On the 1st June, however, the Secretary 
of State for Air laid before the Salisbury Sub-Committee a scheme 
to increase the number of aircraft for home defence from 52 to 
1,692 machines, carried out in four stages, in order to maintain 
a ratio of 3 to 4 with French air strength, real and projected. ' 
These figures were challenged by the WO. In a memo to the 
CabinQt, the War Minister claimed that, in calculating present 
needs at 594 aircraft, no allowance had been made for the normal 
expansion of British squadrons on the outbreak of war from a peace- 
time strength of 12 machines to a war-time strength of 18. 
Furthermore, the Air Ministry's solution was simply to form and 
maintain a large number of new formations to meet an eventuality 
which was "highly problematical". The General Staff considered 
that the problem had to be considered from two aspects. Firstly, 
the fighter aircraft and static defences required to meet and 
defeat the raiding aircraft; secondly, the counter-offensive 
measures provided not only by the Air Force but also by the Navy. 
Surely if London were bombed the Navy would be entitled to 
retaliate against French ports and coastal towns? There was, too, 
the threat of military operations against French colonies. The 
General Staff maintained that an economical and efficient 
1. Cab 16/46, ND 10th Meeting, 16 May 1923. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Cab 23/45, Cabinet Meeting 25(23), 9 May 1923. 
4. Air 2/1267, `ND 37,1 June 1923. 
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organisation could be devised which, on mobilisation, would provide 
a number of highly efficient squadrons. These, together with the 
latent power of the Royal Navy, would provide the necessary 
deterrent to sudden attack. 
Turning to the question of cost - an aspect with which the 
Bonar Law administration was desperately concerned - the paper 
maintained that the additional expense of any defence scheme need 
not be so large as that proposed. Substantial economies could be 
made by the amalgamation of the RAF schools with existing Army 
schools of the same-type; by the reorganisation of the 
instructional staff of the flying schools; the abolition of certain 
HQ establishments, and the reduction of the very large staffs at 
others. Home defence, it argued, was a single problem and could not 
be solved merely by the sudden expansion of a single arm. 
' 
In presenting their case before the Salisbury Sub-Committee, 
the Air Staff again laid great stress upon Britain's vulnerability 
to aerial attack and made much play upon the potentiality of 
strategic bombing. In his evidence, the CAS argued that the 
enormous increase in airpower since the late war would have an 
"overwhelming effect". He maintained that all ports in the south of 
England would be unusable and that repairs would not be able to be 
made as quickly as damage were being done - an assumption which 
prompted Balfour to comment: "If Plymouth and Bristol are shut up, 
you cannot feed London". 
2 An earlier Air Staff paper had raised 
more sinister dangers. It had warned that, in a future war, London 
would be uninhabitable and that, under the "fearful strain of 
unremitting air attack", revolution might gain the upper hand. 3 
Thus the Air Staff remained convinced that the effect of air 
attack in the future could be of such proportions as in itself to 
bring hostilities to an early and successful conclusion. They 
agreed with the WO that the Air Force could not occupy a country, 
but maintained that, following sufficient air bombardment, 
occupation would be unnecessary simply because the very factor 
1. Cab 21/160, CP 294,15 June 1923. 
2. Air 8/63, ND 6th and 9th Meetings, 
26 April and 10 May 1923. 
3. Cab 16/47, ND 10, April 1923. 
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which had brought about the enemy's capitulation - repeated air 
attacks - remained as a real threat. Airpower could strike at the 
vitals of a nation. The Army, on the other hand, was confined to 
a single line of attack along which it could advance but slowly 
and at the cost of heavy fighting. It could take months, possibly 
years, before such an approach would affect the morale of an 
enemy nation. 
On the matter of army-air cooperation, the Air Staff stated 
that they were in no position to make a definite allotment of 
squadrons to the Army until some idea had been gained as to the 
type of enemy to be fought. ' Trenchard himself admitted frankly 
that whilst he was most anxious to meet the Army's requirements, 
of the eight squadrons assigned to the Expeditionary Force, only 
one was available at that time. 2 
Turning to the controversial subject of strategic bombing, 
the Air Staff considered that the Army was entirely out of touch 
with public opinion and still appeared to be labouring under the 
fallacy that so long as the army and navy were comparatively 
intact, the position of London and the civil population generally 
were of little account. Such a mistaken attitude was a "striking 
example of the wisdom of the proverb ne cuter ultra crepidum - 
the General Staff cobbler should stick to his last". The WO were 
wrong to assume that they were the only people concerned with 
strategy, that the strategical plan was the Army's plan, and that 
no other force could play a part. 
3 
By the beginning of June a victory over the WO was confidently 
anticipated by the Air Ministry. Indeed, by this time Trenchard 
saw the attacks by the General Staff as a factor in helping to 
defeat a more dangerous threat - the Navy's demand for its own air 
service. He reasoned that whilst the Government might have been 
prepared to resurrect the naval air arm, public opinion would 
never permit any government to break up, much less abolish, the 
RAF. He wrote to Salmond early in June: 
1. Cab 16/47, ND 38,1 June 1923. 
2. Air 8/63, ND 7th Meeting, 1 May 1923. 
3. Air 8/67, Folio 3, Comments on WO Paper 
ND 52, Undated. 
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I think ... that the very fact that the General Staff are, so to speak, joining 
forces with the Admiralty, will 
strengthen the hands of the government 
in maintaining our integrity and I am 
certain that we shall win. ' 
At the end of the-month the Sub-Committee announced their 
preliminary findings and proved him right. They adopted the Air 
Staff scheme for a metropolitan air force of 52 squadrons with a 
first line establishment 'of 394 bombers and 204 fighters. At the 
same time, they decided in favour of retaining the RAF as a 
separate force, fearing that progress in aerial warfare would not 
be so great if the WO proposals were adopted. 2 
It would be difficult to quarrel with this last statement, 
but the decision to embark upon an air expansion of the proposed 
size and composition must be open to question. The gruesome 
picture of a London in ruins, the navy and army immobilised, and 
revolution in the streets, evoked a nightmare which few 
politicians felt sufficiently knowledgeable to question or 
sufficiently confident to ignore. It was a nightmare, however, 
which owed much more to the imagination than to a rational 
appraisal of the feasibility and possible effects of aerial 
bombardment. To their credit, the WO took a more realistic view. 
As a protest, Derby asked that his, dissent from the Committee's 
conclusions be recorded, and gave notice of. his decision to raise 
the matter at Cabinet level .3 This he did, but the Cabinet 
endorsed the Committee's recommendations. 4 
Despite its failure, the Army's case had much to commend it, 
and both Lord Derby and Lord Cavan presented their arguments 
adroitly. There was, however, as Hankey observed, a certain lack 
of conviction and urgency in the presentation of their views. 
Hankey wrote to Balfour just before the verdict was given: 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/11+3/2, Trenchard 
to Salmond, 6 June 1923. 
2. Cab 16/47, ND 58, Interim Report, 30 June 1923. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Cab 23/46, Cabinet Meeting 35(23), 9 July 1923. 
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Their case was worked up with considerable 
ability and Cavan was a good witness. I 
had the feeling, however, that it was 
rather in the nature of an Aldershot field 
day and that there was not much sting 
behind the attack. I do not think there is 
the slightest chance of the sub committee 
recommending its adoption. The political 
objections would be almost overwhelming. 
Indeed, such was the weight of these political objections that 
Derby had himself conceded in front of the Committee that the WO 
arguments might not. be politically acceptable and, in addition to 
an all-out takeover bid for the Air Force, had put forward 
proposals whereby the two departments might best cooperate. 2 It was 
a realistic approach on the part of the WO, but not one designed 
to inspire unbridled confidence in the success of their declared 
aim - the abolition of an independent air service. 
There was unquestionably too in the minds of the Sub-Committee 
a deal of scepticism as to the assertion by Cavan that, had the 
Army been in command in Iraq, it would have made full use of 
airpower and reduced its ground forces accordingly. The attitude of 
the WO to the air schemes in both Somaliland and Iraq had hardly 
created that impression. In neither case had the WO shown a real 
interest to experiment with aircraft in the policing of colonial 
areas, relying almost entirely upon the traditional use of large 
ground forces on the spot and punitive expeditions when the need 
arose. Chamier, writing in 1921 about Army control in Iraq, had 
complained that military commanders and their staffs Only partially 
appreciated air potentiality and were unable to "think in aerial 
terms". He had warned: 
... trifling with this new weapon of warfare 
will prove to the users to be reliance on a 
broken reed, and to the Air Force a blow 
from which it will take years to recover. 3 
1. Cab 21/266, Hankey to Balfour, 19 June 1923. 
2. Air 8/63, ND 12th Meeting, 12 June 1923. 
3. Wing Commander J. A. Chamier, '"tThe use of the Air 
Force for replacing Military Garrisons", RUSI 
Journal, Vol. LXVI, 12 January 1921, p. 209. 
Chamier was then working in the Directorate of 
Operations and Intelligence. 
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Slessor, commenting on the Army's attitude to airpower many years 
later, contended that if the RAF had been split up between the 
older services, it would have suffered the fate of the Tank Corps 
and the Battle of Britain would have been lost. ' 
Such claims must not be pushed too far, however. Whilst it 
may be true, as Slessor implies, that strategically the Army would 
not have paid sufficient attention to the development of aircraft 
in an independent role, on the tactical level the comparison made 
with tank development is not a fair one. Unlike the tank, the Array 
did not look upon airpower as a totally competing arm. Indeed, 
aircraft were seen as a most valuable and necessary weapon on the 
battlefield of the future. This was particularly so in these 
immediate postwar years when the Army authorities showed a great 
deal of interest in close cooperation between air and land forces 
2 
It could be argued, therefore, that had the WO been granted its 
own air branch - and the prospect was held out by Trenchard in 
1919 - the development of airpower as an auxiliary arm on the 
battlefield might well have been encouraged and a greater measure 
of cooperation and coordination achieved between ground and air 
forces than was in fact realised under the dual system which 
prevailed. 
It can be said, too, that in presenting their case to the 
Salisbury Committee, the WO put the potentialities of strategic 
bombing into more rational perspective. Furthermore, they 
anticipated the enormous difficulties created by divided control 
in time of war, difficulties which did not arise in an Air Staff 
appreciation in which the Army was relegated to the task of 
occupying land already won by bombing or the threat of it. The 
enquiry made it clear, too, that the Air Staff's emphasis upon 
the power of strategic bombing was at the expense of interservice 
cooperation. This was evident in remarks made by AVM Sir Geoffrey 
Salmond in connection with a paper presented by Major General 
Sir Edmund Ironside on relations between the Navy and the Air 
1. Slessor, op. cit., p. l6. 
2. See this work, Chapter 4+, p. 106. 
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Force. ' After describing the General as a man who "has never 
imbibed the true spirit of the air", Sir Geoffrey comments: 
Whatever air officers rise to direct 
affairs in the future they will thoroughly 
understand the air arm and this will 
include the subsidiary problems of Army 
and Navy cooperation which are really 
minor questions, easily mastered, compared 
to the great Air problems that the 
Science of air involves. 2 
Ironside's paper was also criticised by Trenchard, his 
proposal that home defence be entrusted to the Civil Service 
being particularly singled out for comment. Such an idea, he told 
the Committee, showed more clearly than many pages of argument the 
necessity for a separate air service and the "danger to vital 
national interests of allowing it again to be controlled according 
to the bias and pre-positions of naval and military commanders". 3 
Furthermore, a memo from the CAS to his Secretary of State at this 
time suggests that the Air Staff were determined to deny the Army 
any say in the type and organisation of aircraft earmarked for 
cooperation with ground forces. Referring to a WO suggestion that 
a military staff be maintained at the Air Ministry to assist in 
the organisation of home defence, Trenchard wrote: 
You must bear in mind-that underlying this 
there is the old controversy on which the 
WO feels very strongly and which has 
definitely been decided against them, but 
in spite of it they have repeatedly tried 
to'lay down the types of machines required 
for their work, the organisation of the 
squadron for their work, different types 
of machines in squadrons, the number of 
flights to a squadron, and similar questions 
1. The Paper was entitled "Reflections upon Naval 
Flying". The Sub-Committee had been given to 
understand that Ironside, then Commandant of the 
Staff College, had some knowledge of relations 
between the two Services at sea. See letter from 
Hankey to Derby, 8 May 1923, Cab 21/266. 
2. Air 8/67, Folio 8,30 May 1923. Author's underlining. 
Sir Geoffrey Salmond was then Director General of 
Supply and Research, a fact not without relevance. 
3. Cab 21/266, ND(R) 11,1 June 1923. 
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of organisation with which they claim 
they are competent to deal, but which 
we claim are solely within our province. 1 
On the 20th June the Cabinet approved the Air Staff's scheme, 
seeing it as "a melancholy necessity". 2 The need, Premier Baldwin 
told the House of Commons, was for a home defence force 
sufficiently powerful to protect the country against the strongest 
air force within striking distance. 3 Trenchard wrote to AVM P. W. 
Game two days later declaring that the Army fight was over, but 
adding: "They are frightfully sore that their proposals for doing 
away with us have been turned down so quickly. "4 He was right. The 
Army was perturbed by the interim report and at once renewed their 
attack upon the need for so large an independent air force. In a 
memo towards the end of June, the General Staff argued that war 
with France alone was neither the most dangerous nor the most 
likely contingency. If France attacked England, other nations were 
not likely to stand idly by. Indeed, the General Staff declared 
that the Great War should not be regarded as exceptional but as 
"the greatest lesson we have ever had". They foresaw Britain being 
drawn with all its reserves "into the vortex of a great struggle". 
In preparing for such a struggle the Air Staff should be 
incorporated within the General Staff so that future developments 
could come from one organisation. 5 
At the same time the WO produced a long paper for the Cabinet 
summing up their arguments against a separate air service. The 
idea, they warned, quite apart from being uneconomical, would 
break down in time of war. 
6 A few days later the former Secretary 
of State for War, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, 7 took up the same 
1. Air 8/67, CAS to Secretary of State for Air, 
Folio 12,11 June 1923. 
2. Cab 23/45, Cabinet Meeting 32(23), 20 June 1923. 
3. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin, p. 320. 
ii. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/71/1, Trenchard to Game, 
22 June 1923. Game was then AOC India. 
5. Cab 16/47, ND 57, Memo by General Staff, 
26 June 1923. 
6. Cab 2)+/160, CP 296,28 June 1923. 
7. Worthington-Evans was then Postmaster General. He 
had been Secretary of State for War from February 
1921 to October 1922. 
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theme in a paper to the Cabinet. A separate air force would lead 
to duplication of forces and division of command. The aim, he 
contended, should not be to develop the Air Force so that at some 
time it might be possible to do without the Army, but so to graft 
aerial progress upon the existing land forces that all the new 
factors which the new arm brings into play could be tactically 
used in the most effective and. economical manner. The object 
should be to make the Army stronger by effective use of flying 
rather than to make an Air Force. Nor could he accept the Air 
Force doctrine that*the air was one and. indivisible. He wrote: 
Operations on land and sea must always 
remain largely different in character. 
The realms are contiguous but not 
coincident. It seems a false analogy 
that seeks to perpetuate a third realm 
of quasi independent action where the 
spheres of action do in fact coincide 
and only differ in dimension. ' 
In reply to these new attacks, the Air Minister complained 
bitterly about the "prodigious mass of memoranda and oral 
evidence" that had accumulated over the years on the question of 
Air Force independence. He made it clear that he had no confidence 
in the Army to develop the new air weapon along the right lines. 
Their "nebulous counter proposals" were based on a complete mis- 
understanding of the principles underlying the Air Staff's case. 
Criticisms based on an entire misapprehension of the technical 
factors involved had little real value. If the Air Force were 
broken up and made a subsidiary of the two older services, then 
the enthusiasm of British air personnel would be "choked" and the 
development of British airpower crippled at the very moment when 
the air menace was acute and the need for air force expansion 
was urgent. 
2 
In an accompanying paper, the Air Staff again warned that air 
action alone, if on a sufficient scale, might well be capable of 
forcing a decision in a European war. They found no substance in 
the WO arguments. A return to the old system could not but result 
1. Cab 24/262, CP 301,3 July 1923. 
2. Cab 24/161, CP 310,6 July 1923. 
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in loss of efficiency and much friction. As far as the Navy was 
concerned, they felt that even a successful bombardment of a few 
French coastal towns would be a singularly ineffective counter 
measure to concentrated aerial attacks on London. And why should 
the Air Force not be maintained to meet contingencies which it is 
hoped would never occur, for surely the Navy was maintained for 
such a reason? The French clearly held a diametrically opposite 
view to that of the British General Staff, for they, it was to be 
noted, were in favour of maintaining a large standing regular 
air force. 
Three days later, after considerable discussion and continued 
opposition on the part of the War Minister, the Cabinet agreed 
that the conclusions of the Salisbury Sub-Committee should be 
adopted. 2 It was unwise, announced the Prime Minister, to "break 
up the lessons of experience". 3 For the Air Force, the 
stringencies of the Geddes era appeared to be at an end. 
Once more the WO had lost their case and, once more, they 
returned immediately to the attack. The Secretary of State for 
War, Lord Derby, wrote to the Prime Minister the day after the 
Cabinet's decision. After warning him that the present system was 
quite unworkable, he turned his attention to a new target - the 
quality of RAF leadership. He wrote: 
It is no use thinking you can have an 
Air General Staff unless the quality of the 
men on it is of a sufficiently high 
standard to make their decisions acceptable 
both to the Army and Navy, and such is not 
the case now. After Trenchard, who is a 
first class man, there is nobody and what 
is more, amongst the younger officers there 
are (sic) none who" have had sufficient 
staff education and training to ever warrant 
their being accepted as experts from a 
staff point of view. 4 
1. Cab 2+/161, CP 310,6 July 1923. 
2. Cab 23/46, Cabinet Meeting 35(23), 9 July 1923. 
3. PM in House of Commons, Hansard, (HC5s), 
Vol. 167, Col-1718,, 2 August 1923. 
4. Derby Papers, WO 137/10, Derby to PM, 
10 July 1923. 
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Derby maintained that he would have difficulty in persuading his 
own staff officers to assist the Air Force because they would 
object to working under or alongside some of the men who were then 
holding high places at the Air Ministry. ' 
The Minister's criticism appears to be rather harsh, 
particularly in view of some of the very fine officers produced by 
the RAF in later years. 2 In immediate terms, however, there was 
indeed a serious shortage of experienced staff officers and, with 
the sudden expansion of the home defence air force, the Air 
Ministry was obliged to seek assistance from both the WO and 
Admiralty. Grey, writing at this time, bluntly described the staff 
work within the RAF as "rotten", pointing out that even the most 
senior officers in the Air Force were very young in 1914 and that 
hardly any of them had had a staff college training. In his view 
there was a need for men who could put the paper work into an 
efficient system and only officers of high rank had the necessary 
experience for the job. 3 
In his letter to the Prime Minister, Derby maintained that 
the Air Ministry's difficulties lay in the fact that good men were 
not willing to join the RAF if their career was to be cut short 
within some seven years at the end of their flying days. He 
suggested that the answer was to put the provision of personnel 
under the Army and to insist that every man who joined the Army 
should have a two year course of flying. In this way, if a man 
were found to be unfitted for flying, he could go back to his 
Regiment and enjoy an ordinary run of promotion. He concluded: 
I am rather in despair about it because 
I believe that the Air Ministry is going 
to cost us millions which could be 
saved and in the end it will not be an 
effective force. ' 
Only a few days earlier this question of promotion prospects 
1. Derby Papers, WO 137/10, Derby to PM, 10 July 1923. 
2. Montgomery Hyde claims that Derby's criticism was 
quite unfounded, and lists a number of senior and 
junior officers whom he considers to have been of 
outstanding ability. See op. cit., p. 111. 
3. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XXV, 24 October 1923, p. 1+11+. 
4. Derby Papers, WO 137/10, Derby to PM, 10 July 1923. 
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within the Air Force had been raised by Worthington-Evans, the 
former War Minister. In a memo to the Cabinet, he had argued that 
in view of the short length of a flying career - estimated by him 
as an average of five years - there would never be sufficient 
room in the higher ranks of the Air Force for their useful 
employment. On the other hand, the Army could easily absorb such 
officers. In reply, the CAS had denied that a flying career would 
be so short and had pointed out, too, the number of short- 
service commissions available. ' 
For their part, the Government were not prepared to reopen 
the issue, convinced as. they were that an independent Air Force 
was essential for the development of airpower and the doctrines 
and skills that should attend it. Later that month, Derby 
accepted the verdict with seemingly good grace. He wrote in a 
letter to Salisbury: 
There is a clear cut between the WO 
and the Air Ministry and as I said, I 
try to play the game and help them in 
every way I can. I am sure we shall be 
able to work amicably ... 
2 
Cavan, not a man to show rancour, also proved willing to 
cooperate with the new and expanding service, at least until 
circumstances favoured a further attack. In August Trenchard 3 
felt able to write to Group Captain P. F. M. Fellowes: 
As you know the government have decided 
that the integrity of the air service 
will be maintained. .. I hope to goodness that we may now have a period of peace. ' 
Later in the year, tangible expression was given to this 
improved relationship. In order to assist the Air Force in its 
1. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic 
Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, Vol. I, p. 53. 
2. Derby Papers, WO 137/12, Derby to Salisbury, 
23 July 1923. 
3. See Trenchard Papers, CII/2T/1'+3/2, Trenchard to 
Salmond, 6 June 1923: "(Cavan) tells me .. if the 
decision goes against him he will carry on 
loyally with us in the future. " 
4. Ibid., 11/27/65, Trenchard to Fellowes,. 7 August 
1923. Fellowes was then AOC Constantinople Wing. 
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expansion programme, the Army - despite Derby's misgivings - did 
provide several distinguished General Staff officers to work in 
the Air Ministry. In a speech at Colchester in October, the Air 
Minister, citing this as an example of the cooperation existing 
between the two Services, declared that it would be a calamity to 
the Air Force if the development of airpower were to isolate the 
air from the land and sea. He welcomed the help and experience of 
the older services. ' 
But this better understanding was not to last. The 
establishment by the Salisbury Sub-Committee of the COS Sub- 
Committee in which the Air Force attained equal status with the 
older services, meant though it was to improve defence 
coordination, served only to intensify inter-service rivalry. 2 
Furthermore, with the setting up of the Colwyn Committee, charged 
with the task of making drastic economies in defence spending, 
the entire question of Air Force independence was reopened. As 
the work of the Committee got under way, Mr. C. Bullock, 
Principal Private Secretary to the Air Minister, wrote to 
Trenchard to warn him that the Army was likely to use the enquiry 
as a pretext for further attacks upon the Service. He advised: 
The Secretary of State for War has been so 
much in the foreground of the attack on 
our-integrity that it seems to me more than 
probable that he has dished up again the 
actual criticisms of our internal 
administration as well as of our general 
policy made by the General Staff before the 
National and Imperial Defence Committee 
in 1923.3 
In the same month the CAS, concerned about Churchill's 
sympathetic attitude towards the Army's claims, wrote a strongly 
worded letter reminding him of the steady growth of the RAF and 
1. Flight Magazine, Vol. XV, 25 October 1923, p. 658. 
2. Lord Ismay, Assistant Secretary to the CID 1925 
to 1930, recalls: "For the first few years of their 
existence the C. O. S. were npt exactly a band of 
brothers. Inter-service cooperation had never come 
their way, and each of them was intent on fighting 
for his own corner. " The Memoirs of Lord Ismay, p. 52. 
3. Air 19/120, Folio 52, Bullock to CAS, 28 October 1925. 
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warning him not to be fooled by promises of economy. He 
continued: 
... will you say that because a few people with a little knowledge like 
Worthington-Evans state to you that 
they can save 4 or 5 million by 
taking over the air and running it 
differently you think you have made 
a mistake? I can quite easily state 
and substantiate that there is not 
3 or 4 million to save in what they 
propose, and not a penny piece would 
be saved in doing away with what you 
call "the hideous duplication and 
triplication of many services". 
The only true way to economy, advised Trenchard, was the 
substitution of air for some of the Army's duties and 
responsibilities, and this could never come about without a 
separate Air Force. The Army, he reminded the Chancellor, had 
never favoured substitution in Iraq. They gave lip service to the 
idea of substitution but, given the chance,. would only add to 
their own forces. ' 
In making out his case to the Colwyn Committee, Trenchard 
was able to make good use of the Air Force record in Iraq, where 
expenditure had been reduced - so far as the British Government 
were concerned - from f20 to E4 million per annum in the space of 
five years. More could be achieved in India too, he maintained, 
if aircraft were given their rightful place. He admitted that 
only four squadrons, a total of 48 machines, were provided 
exclusively for Army cooperation, but pointed out that, in the 
event of an Expeditionary Force being sent overseas, bombers and 
fighters would be provided from the home defence forces, where a 
number of squadrons were on a more mobile basis for this very 
2 
purpose. 
The Army's line of approach, thrashed out at a meeting of 
the Army Council in mid-November, whilst drawing attention once 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/50, Trenchard to 
Churchill, October 1925. 
2. Ibid., 11/22, CAS to Colwyn Committee, 
Chapter V, 23 December 1925. 
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again to the duplication of services, showed a marked swing away 
from former policy. Sensing that the Government would remain in 
favour of an independent air force for the foreseeable future, 
the WO trimmed their sails accordingly and, discarding earlier 
claims to an all-out takeover of the Air Force, decided to press 
the Committee for the return to the Army of their own military 
wing in the interests of both economy and efficiency. ' This 
decision to accept the existence of a third Service was echoed 
two days later by Major General Sir John Davidson. Speaking at 
the Royal United Services Institute, he emphasised the "great 
moral power of the air in future wars". In the interests of 
stringency and economy, the coordination, co-relation and 
cooperation between the Services had to be made very real. He knew 
the conservative mind in the Army which wanted to get rid of the 
Air Ministry, but it was "of no value to the Service or the State 
to live in an imaginary paradise" .2 
Despite the Army's new line of approach, Trenchard was 
confident that the Committee, like others before it, would rule in 
favour of an Air Force which was one and indivisible. 
3 The 
important decisions of the Salisbury Committee were still fresh in 
the mind, and a Cabinet Committee presided over by Lord Birkenhead 
was at that time considering Air Force expansion with reference to 
the Home Defence Scheme. Nonetheless, the Air Ministry was anxious 
to put an end to the claims of the older services once and for all. 
The Secretary of State for Air wrote privately to Lord Chalmers, 
imploring that if the Committee did come out in favour of an 
independent air organisation, the meaning of their decision should 
be precisely defined for fear that, under a vague definition, the 
Army and Navy might continue to claim their own arms. Sir Samuel 
Hoare even went so. far as to suggest the form of wording the 
Committee might use so as to leave the senior services and those 
who supported their cause in no doubt as to the Government's 
1. WO 163/31, Army Council 348th Meeting, 16 November 1925. 
2. RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXXI, 18 November 1925, p"3. 
3. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/63/2, Trenchard to Ellington, 
26 November 1925. AVM Sir Edward Ellington was then 
AOC India. 
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determination to maintain an independent Air Service. ' 
Hoare's plea did not fall on stony ground. When the Committee 
reported towards the end of December 1925, it did so in favour of 
an independent Air Force which would, in Hoare's very words, 
"administer a single unified air service which should carry out 
all air work whether for the Navy, Army or central Air Force". 
Nor did the findings provide much comfort for the WO. Whilst 
satisfied that the Army on the whole was prudently and 
economically administered, the Committee suggested that greater 
savings could be secured by the extended substitution of airpower 
as a "substantive arm". Thus the Committee saw no prospect of a 
positive reduction in air votes below the existing total. 
2 
In the New Year Trenchard wrote to Churchill, pleading that 
there should be no more committees and asking for his help "over 
the last stile". 3 A few days later, in a letter to the Prime 
Minister, he stated that he could not carry on any further with 
this "perpetual uncertainty" over the future of his Force. 
Furthermore, he pointed out, the effect on the older services was 
equally as harmful. He wrote: 
How can they settle down to work with us 
in harmonious cooperation when senior 
officers are perpetually lecturing and 
talking about how the air service is 
going to be broken up and given back to 
them in a year or two? The present CIGS 
when he first came into office tried to 
stop the agitation but could not quell 
the malcontents even among his own 
subordinates, owing to the atmosphere 
of uncertainty. 4 
1. Air 19/120, Hoare to. Lord Chalmers, 18 December 
1925. Lord Chalmers was a member of the Colwyn 
Committee. 
2. Air 19/122, Committee. on Navy, Army and Air 
Force Expenditure, 23 December 1925. 
The Committee recommended a reduction of £71 
million in the Naval estimates and £2 million 
in the Army and Air Force votes. 
3. Air 8/78, Folio 56,28 January 1926. 
4. Ibid., Folio 57,4 February 1926. 
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At the end of February in a statement to the House of 
Commons, Baldwin made it clear that the Cabinet had no intention 
of reopening the question of a separate Air Force and Air 
Ministry. The Government, he declared, intended to organise 
imperial defence on the distinct basis of three co-equal Services. 
The controversy on the subject should cease forthwith. ' 
1. Air 9/5, Minute 25,25 February 1926. 
Hansard, (HC5s), Vol. 192, Col-719. 
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PART I 
THE SURVIVAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1918-1926 -" 
Chapter 4 
The Nature and Extent of Army-Air Force 
Cooperation at the Tactical Level 
December 1920 - December 1925 
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By the end of 1920, Air Staff belief in the potentiality of 
strategic bombing was well established and was affecting policy. 
The aeroplane, as a long range gun, had become in the eyes of the 
Air Force "the instrument of-a new kind of war". ' Demands made by 
the General Staff at this time for more Bristol Fighter squadrons 
at the expense of such types as the DH9A bomber, were firmly 
resisted on the grounds that "close cooperation with troops is 
only a small portion of the duties of aircraft". The late war, ran 
the argument, had shown the limits to which the demands for close 
cooperation were likely to go and it was therefore easy to make 
adequate provision. Bombing, on the other hand, when conducted 
scientifically, would prove of ever increasing power and the 
limits of this form of air action could not be foreseen. 2 In March 
the following year an Air Ministry memo added further testimony 
to the Air Staff's growing faith in the power and importance of 
the long-distance bomber: 
In attack is our best defence, and we 
must have powerful air squadrons to 
carry the war into the enemy's country, 
to attack his forces in the air and his 
personnel and establishments on the 
ground ... 
3 
There were, indeed, those in the immediate postwar period 
who saw the value of close cooperation between air and ground 
forces and advocated training to that end. Fuller had come out 
strongly in favour of close air support for armour in his Plan 
1919. Liddell Hart had visualised the "land fighting aeroplane" 
as a means of providing auxiliary firepower in the battle of 
the future 'Likewise Chamier, writing in October 1920, had 
recognised the need for specially detailed and trained air units 
1. E. Colston Shepherd, The Air Force of Today, 
P. 19. 
2. Trenchard Papers, CII/1/36, Air Staff Memo, 
31 December 1920. 
3. Brooke-Popham Papers, IX/5/ll, Air Staff Memo, 
March 1921. 
1+. Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military 
Thought, p. 24, refers to article in the United 
Service Magazine, April 1920, pp. 30-l+k. 
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to cooperate with armour and to deal with enemy tanks. ' Two 
months later, an article by Lt. Colonel Johnson had stressed the 
importance of coordination between aircraft and tanks, suggesting 
that in the future tank columns might be directed entirely from 
the air. 2 A General Staff paper of October 1921 had taken up the 
same theme, accepting with enthusiasm the potentiality of 
aircraft in an anti-tank role. It had informed the Air Ministry: 
Of all existing weapons, aircraft 
possess the greatest power of speed 
and radius of action, and are there- 
fore plainly indicated as forming one 
of the most powerful means for 
creating successful action against 
enemy tanks. 3 
In practice, however, training in tactical cooperation 
between the two services in these years was very meagre, and 
what cooperation there was was centred around the reconnaissance 
and artillery spotting which had characterised the early air 
operations of the Great War. As a tactic, the extensive use of 
close support aircraft, used to such telling effect in the 
closing stages of the war, barely survived the Armistice as far 
as the Air Force were concerned. Although highly successful in 
halting the German advance of March 1918 and assisting in the 
counter attack the following August, the employment of low 
flying aircraft in direct support of infantry and armour was 
seen as a misuse of airpower by the Air Force purist. Joubert 
claims that such tactics were particularly disliked by junior 
officers, who felt it to be a most unrewarding method of air 
attack. They favoured attacks upon the enemy's homeland, his 
war factories, and his main lines of communication. ' 
1. Wing Commander J. A. Chamier, "Aircraft in Cooperation 
with Infantry", Army Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1, October 
1920, pp. 123-4. Chamier was then working in the 
Directorate of Operations and Intelligence. 
2. Lt. Colonel P. Johnson, "The Use of Tanks in Undeveloped 
Country", RUST Journal, Vol. LXVI, 8 December 1920, 
P"195. 
3. Air 5/175,1A, WO to Air Ministry, 11 October 1921. 
4. Joubert, op. cit., p. 67. 
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Independence, then, not cooperation,. was to be the keystone 
of Air Staff policy. They believed with the Editor of Flight 
Magazine that the RAF should be allowed "to develop untrammelled 
towards its ultimate destiny of being our principal fighting force 
and our first line of defence". ' As a government official was to 
observe some years later: 
Being a new Service, the RAF have felt 
it necessary to evolve a strategy of 
their own, and have shut a blind eye 
(sie) to the possibilities of the Air 
Force as an ancillary arm of the Army. 2 
In contrast, the Army authorities continued to press for a 
greater measure of cooperation. In May 1922, General Ironside, 
recently appointed Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, 
wrote to the Air Ministry to voice his concern over the lack of 
instruction on air matters, particularly in connection with small 
wars. 3 A few months later a conference was held at the college 
specifically to discuss the organisation of the Air Force for 
cooperation with other services. Held for the benefit of officer 
students who, it had been found, "had little or no conception of 
the tasks that might be assigned to the Air Force in moving 
warfare", the main part of the discussion centred round the 
employment of reconnaissance aircraft during a rearguard action. 
Great interest was also shown, however, in the possibilities of 
direct intervention by the air force in the tactical phases of the 
battle. 4 Group Captain P. B. Joubert, who had assisted in drawing 
up the agenda for the conference, reported back to the Commandant 
1. Flight Magazine, 
"Editorial, 
Vol. XIV, 16 March 1922, 
p. 156. 
2. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/613, Sir Archibald Rowlands 
(Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Aircraft Production) 
to Liddell Hart, 24 August 1941. 
3. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/99, Ironside to Air Ministry, 
6 May 1922. In requesting "an officer of great 
prestige" to lecture on air matters, Ironside felt 
it necessary to add, "I can assure the officer 
carrying out this duty of our entire sympathy so 
that he may not be oppressed by the idea of any 
hostility. " 
4. Air 5/282, Report of Conference, 7 November 1922. 
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of the RAF Staff College, and an account of the meeting was sent 
to the Air Ministry to provide them with some idea of the "trend 
in Army thought". 1 
But at this time, in fact, cooperation between the two 
services was being put to a more practical test in the crisis 
over Chanak. Here, combined training proved most successful. In 
particular, close support exercises in which aircraft, flying low 
and hugging the contours of the terrain, launched surprise 
attacks upon the Ist Guards Brigade, opened up "new possibilities 
of aircraft attack". according to the Colonel Commandant. 
2 Lt. 
General Sir Charles Harington, commenting generally upon the 
success of the combined operations,. remarked: "It is a perfect 
pleasure to see the way in which all three services work here 
just like one family and I am sure .. that this friendship will 
spread throughout all three services and is a far better way of 
getting efficiency than all the memoranda in the world. "3 But 
the tactical lessons to be learnt were lost on the Air Staff. 
Trenchard saw such success as simply a vindication of his belief 
in an independent service. He wrote to Group Captain Fellowes, AOC 
Constantinople Wing: 
In this case all the air, whether working 
with the Army or the Navy, understood one 
another's views and thought alike and 
found no difficulty in working together. 
This is due to the fact that we are one 
service. 4 
In any case, cooperation of this nature with the 
opportunities it afforded for the development of army-air 
coordination at tactical level were to be few and far between. By 
this time, the fundamental. strategies of both services were 
1. Air 5/282, RAF Staff College to Air Ministry, 
8 November 1922. 
2. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/65, Fellowes to Trenchard, 
16 May 1923. The Commandant was Col. J. McC. Steele. 
3. Ibid., 11/27/88, Harington to Trenchard, 2 February 
1923. Harington was then GOC-in-C Allied Forces of 
Occupation, Turkey. 
4. Ibid., II/27/65$ Trenchard to Fellowes, 
14 October 1922. 
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swiftly moving apart. Writing at this period, P. R. C. Groves argued 
that the independent striking arm was the first essential, 
cooperation with sea and land forces being of an auxiliary nature. ' 
On the other hand, Major General W. D. Bird reminded the readers of 
the Army Quarterly of the principle that war was best ended 
through the defeat of the enemy's armed forces and that raiding 
with the object of striking terror would be of secondary 
importance until the military objectives of victory in the air and 
on the sea and land had been achieved. 2 
Such differences were accentuated by the diverging roles of 
the two services. The Ten Year Rule, assuming as it did that the 
British Empire would not be engaged in a great war for the next 
decade, defined the principal functions of both services as the 
provision of forces for the protection of British territories 
overseas and for the support of the civil power at home. Whilst 
the General Staff never lost faith in the importance of the Army 
in any future continental conflict, they officially recognised 
the nature of their postwar role. In his address at the Staff 
Exercises held in the autumn of 1922, the GIGS made it clear-that 
the Army's policy, as laid down by the Government, was to train 
for a small war. 
3 The Air Ministry, on the other hand, saw the Air 
Force as the country's first line of defence in a European 
conflict. An Air Ministry memo of January 1923 firmly pointed out 
that in the event of a great war the primary function of the RAF 
had to be the attainment of air superiority without which "it may 
be impossible to land the Army on the enemy's shores". Aircraft 
designed for such a purpose, however, were not of a suitable type 
with which to assist the Army in a minor war. Conversely, it was 
more than doubtful whether-types designed in the first instance 
for close cooperation with the Army would be of much value for the 
1. Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, Our Future in 
the Air, (pub. July 1922), p. 13. 
2. Major General W. D. Bird, "Some Speculations on 
Aerial Strategy", Army Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 2, 
July 1922, p. 2)9. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/19/1, Air Staff Notes, 
31 January 1923. 
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type of aerial action with which a great war would probably start. 
Thus, concluded the memo, in those types of war in which the Army 
was most likely to be engaged it might well be found that the best 
assistance to the Army might be afforded less by specialised close 
support aircraft than by bombing and aerial gunfire. ' 
Remarks on this memo by Air Commodore Brooke-Popham a week 
later throw further light on Air Staff thinking at this time. The 
requirements for the Army, he pointed out, would have to be 
balanced by the Air Staff against other needs of which those for 
direct action against the enemy would presumably be the most 
important. 2 
This emphasis upon the Air Force's independent role, 
inevitable in the eyes of an Air Ministry which saw its primary 
task as the defence of the homeland against massive air attack, 
was destined to push the needs of the Army further and further 
into the background. A General Staff paper to the Air Ministry 
at this time, drawn up following an Army conference on the subject 
of combined training, remarked: "An alarming feature of the past 
training season and of the various staff exercises was the 
ignorance displayed as to the methods of cooperation between the 
RAF and the Army. " It was vital for the Army, the paper argued, 
that in the first place the RAF should know military requirements, 
methods and formations, and that, in the second place, Army 
commanders and troops should know what the air means to them both 
as an ally and an enemy. It suggested that an Inter-Departmental 
Committee of Directors be made permanent and meet when necessary 
to consider questions of tactics and training, particularly with 
regard to the use of aircraft against ground targets in hilly 
terrain. It recommended, too, the appointment of an RAF instructor 
at Camberley and an Army instructor at the RAF Staff College, 
Andover. It urged also that an Air Force staff officer be attached 
to the HQ Staff at Aldershot, Salisbury and the Eastern Command 
to assist in training and the making of policy, and that an Air 
1. Air 5/282,10A, Air Ministry Memorandum, 
1 January 1923. 
2. Ibid., Remarks by Brooke-Popham, 8 January 1923. 
Brooke-Popham was then Commandant, RAF Staff College. 
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Officer be made available at the other Commands to advise the 
GOC-in-C on air matters when necessary. 
In the Air Force itself, the General Staff felt that higher 
commanders must be kept fully aware of the problems facing the 
Army and that junior ranks who were likely in any way to cooperate 
with ground forces should have a clear and definite knowledge of 
Army formations. The paper continued: 
It is understood that the Air Ministry do 
not at present regard Army cooperation 
work as. a specialised branch of Air Force 
work. The General Staff are strongly of 
the opinion that satisfactory results are 
unlikely to be reached unless this work 
is definitely recognised as a specialised 
branch and a certificate given for it., 
As far as aircraft for the Army Commands were concerned, the 
General Staff considered that in peace time the minimum number of 
squadrons attached to the Army for training purposes should be two 
for Aldershot; one for the Southern and Eastern Commands; and, for 
the Northern, Scottish and Western Commands, the call on a flight 
when required. It was also considered necessary to have one scout 
squadron at the Army Air School, a flight at Cologne, and two 
flights with the Air Defence Brigade at Aldershot. In addition, 
maintained the General Staff, the Air Ministry should make 
arrangements so that aircraft could be present at every artillery 
practice camp in order to carry out shoots in cooperation with 
army batteries. 2 
Despatched to the Air Ministry on the 17th January, the paper 
was studied by the DTSD, Air Commodore T. C. R. Higgins. His note on 
the recommendation that certain RAF personnel should have a 
thorough knowledge of Army affairs is illuminating. It reads: 
Agree, but they must not study detail too 
much, after all Army cooperation is only 
one of many branches of Air work and as 
time goes on its importance from an air 
point of view may decrease. 3 
1. Air 5/280, la, WO to CAS, 17 January 1923. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 3a, 18 January 1923. 
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In the circumstances, Higgins regarded the number of cooperation 
squadrons required as a "tall order". The Air Force already had 
a school specialising in Army cooperation and sixty officers 
were trained each year, twenty of them from the Army. In any case, 
the need for such cooperation was greatly dependent upon whether 
the Air Ministry's preparations for war were to be based on the 
policy and strategy of the Army or the Air Force. The DTSD was 
not alone in holding such views. As one Air Force officer was 
later to point out, the senior Army officers of this time had 
their brains "clogged with two dimensional instincts and 
traditions". It could not be expected that responsible Army 
leaders could devise new and hitherto unheard of methods of 
employing a novel weapon when they wanted to use such a weapon 
for their own purposes. 2 
At the end of the month, the Air Staff made their own 
observations on the type of cooperation likely to be required 
between the Air Force and the Army in any future war. Commenting 
upon the fact that the General Staff were training for a small, 
mobile war, the Air Staff pointed out that, unlike the Army, the 
Air Force was not able to adapt itself to the requirements of 
major warfare without great loss of time and efficiency. Thus 
whilst air policy would cover the needs of a small war, its 
primary concern would be training for a major conflict in which 
the nation would be threatened by air attack. Thus it had to be 
fully understood that air action as a whole had to be of an 
independent nature, i. e., the bombing of military targets behind 
the enemy's lines, the destruction of his factories and 
organisation, and the creating of terror among his civil 
population. Such action would indirectly assist the ground troops 
who might ultimately have to occupy the enemy's territory until 
peace terms had been concluded. The paper asserted: 
The functions of the Air Force are not 
concerned solely with assisting the other 
services, nor are they limited to aerial 
1. Air 5/280,3a, 18 January 1923. 
2. Air Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, War From the Air, 
p. 147. 
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combat; they possess the power of 
striking a blow which may be far 
reaching before the forces on land 
come into collision. ' 
Thus when a conference between the two Ministries was held 
in February 1923 to discuss this whole matter of cooperation, both 
departments had already made their positions abundantly clear. In 
warfare, the WO saw the air forces as providing an important but 
auxiliary service, trained specifically to meet the needs of 
ground forces in a tactical support role as well as for 
reconnaissance and artillery spotting; the Air Ministry saw the 
Air Force primarily as an independent striking force not only in 
its deterrent role, but also in its support of the Army in the 
field. 
The results of the Conference proved of little value or 
comfort to the WO. The fundamental strategies of both services 
were shown to be poles apart. Whilst the CIGS pointed out that the 
Army was obliged to train for a small war because it had small 
numbers and little money, the CAS envisaged a battle of the future 
in which, instead of big guns bombarding to a depth of ten miles 
or so, there would be a large number of squadrons bombing to a 
depth of some 150 miles. This long distance bombing, he claimed, 
would prevent the supplies, ammunition and reinforcements from 
getting through and the enemy's army would therefore "come to a 
standstill". Arguing from this hypothesis, he concluded that in 
any future war there would be less machines needed for artillery 
cooperation and more for long distance bombing. 
As for the specific requirements sought by the General Staff, 
these were not met, modest though they were. Trenchard regretted 
that no senior officer could be spared as an instructor at 
Camberley and that only one or two lectures could be provided. 
As far as a military instructor at the RAF Staff College was 
concerned, it was felt that there was not sufficient work to 
provide full employment but that, again, -three or four lectures 
1. Air 9/5, No. 16, Minute 2, Air Staff Paper on 
the type of cooperation likely to be required 
in a future war, 31 January 1923. 
116 
could be arranged. At the operational level, Trenchard pointed 
out that officers at present with commands were not sufficiently 
experienced to give opinions on matters of strategy and policy. 
Certain officers could be made available, however, for staff 
exercises. 
Likewise on the question of squadron allocation for training 
with commands, the Air Ministry were in no position to meet the 
Army's requirements. Only one squadron could be provided in the 
immediate future. This would be stationed at Andover and would 
be shared by the Aldershot, Southern and Eastern Commands. ' Nor 
could the Air Staff undertake to provide aircraft at every 
artillery practice camp. Though they accepted the idea in 
principle, they pointed to difficulties over suitable landing 
grounds. 2 
There were those in the Army who were deeply concerned at 
the Air Staff's apparent lack of interest in matters relating to 
Army-Air cooperation. It was, to be sure, an attitude hardly in 
keeping with the undertaking given by the Government at the 
formation of the RAF and re-affirmed a year later by the CAS in 
his appraisal of the Air Force's future role. Ironside for one 
was bitterly disappointed at the inability of the Air Ministry 
to provide a full-time instructor at Camberley to lecture on 
matters of gunnery, reconnaissance and general liaison. "What 
we want, " he wrote to the DSD, Major General C. F. Romer, "is 
continuous air instruction all through our training. You cannot 
separate air action from military action any more than you can 
separate artillery. .. Trenchard is apparently frightened of the 
bigger air views being misrepresented. This is not what we want 
an Air instructor for. " 3 
1. The Army's requirements had not been fully met by 
the end of 1924. By November of that year the RAF 
had four Army Cooperation Squadrons permanently 
allotted to the Eastern and Southern Commands, 
Aldershot, and the Army Air School. See Air 19/107, 
CAS to Secretary of State for Air, 12 November 1924. 
2. Air 5/280,9a, Minutes and Conclusions of a 
Conference between WO and Air Ministry, 13 February 1923. 
3. Ibid., 22a, Copy of letter, Ironside to Romer, 
28 February 1923. 
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Romer wrote to the CAS a few days later: "Tiny and I are 
very keen that our staff college students should never for a 
moment cease to remember the air when they are considering 
any operations. "' 
Like concern was felt about the meagre tactical support 
likely to be provided because of the Air Ministry's undue 
emphasis upon the long distance bomber. In May, a General Staff 
memo to the Salisbury Committee sought a definite guarantee that 
aircraft earmarked for the Field Force -a total of eight .. 
squadrons for the 1st and 2nd echelons - would be "mobilizable 
automatically in whole or part pari pasau with that force". 2 The 
following month a further memo renewed fears that, in a future 
war, the Air Staff would concentrate their efforts against 
distant objectives whilst a decisive battle requiring close air 
support was being fought on the ground. The memo considered that 
it should be expressly laid down that once mobilisation was 
ordered, the Air Ministry should have no responsibility with 
regard to any theatre in which the Army was operating other than 
for the provision of material and personnel, whether the war be 
on a minor or major scale. Underlying this proposal was an 
understandable fear that a lack of precise definition as to the 
responsibilities of each service in the battle zone might lead to 
serious confusion and disagreement at commander level. The memo 
pointed out that according to the RAF Manual of Operations, such 
targets as billets, enemy concentration areas, and road and rail 
junctions and bridges were among the objectives to be selected by 
the military commander yet, in the same manual, such targets were 
listed among the objectives of independent air operations. There 
was therefore an "undefined area" which might well result in a 
breakdown of that unity of command which was so essential in 
battle .3 
On receipt of this memo, Mr. Bullock, confusing tactics with 
strategy, dismissed this last point as being an attempt by the 
1. Air 5/280,22a, Romer to CAS, 1 March 1923. 
2. Cab 16/47, ND 34+, 16 May 1923. 
3. Ibid., ND 4+0, Memo by Secretary of State 
for War, 8 June 1923. 
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Army to raise the bogey that there could be no dividing line 
where targets become air and cease to be military objectives. 
"It is this lack of capacity to visualise the future of the air 
arm, " he wrote to Trenchard, "which necessitates the existence 
of the Air Staff. " The General Staff were simply jealous. ' 
Later that month another General Staff paper outlined the 
Army's air requirements at home and overseas. It assessed the 
present needs as no less than 30 squadrons, 25 of which should be 
fighters. In time of war, the total need at the outset was seen 
as 57 squadrons with once again a large preponderance of fighter 
aircraft. As far as the Expeditionary Force was concerned, the 
memo considered that a total of eight squadrons would be required 
for actual cooperation with a force of six divisions and that 
these squadrons should be allotted permanently to the Army for 
training purposes. 2 
When the matter was discussed at the first meeting of the 
COS Sub-Committee the following month, however, no decision was 
reached as to the allocation of fighters and bombers to the Army. 
The CAS considered it premature to discuss the establishment of 
such'units. The need, he argued, was for a "flexible agreement" 
whereby a certain number of home defence squadrons was earmarked 
for service with the army overseas should they not be required 
for their assigned purpose. In reply, the GIGS, whose main 
interest lay, in fact, with the Army's imperial role, 3 conceded 
that in the event of a war with a first class European power, 
the Expeditionary Force would at first be confined to these 
islands and that, during that period, he would be content with 
the two Army Cooperation Squadrons and the three squadrons 
designated as reserves. Nor, despite the matter of training, did 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/19/1, Minute 14, Bullock 
to CAS, 11 June 1923. 
2. Cab 53/12, COS Paper 1,27 June 1923. 
3. See Cab 53/1, COS 6th Meeting, 8 January 1924, 
Memo by CIGS on Consideration of Strategic 
Problems: "We must concentrate on our Imperial 
defence. There is no need tö try and justify 
our existence by wasting our time and energies 
in the compilation of elaborate plans for war 
against hypothetical enemies .. " 
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he consider that the number of fighter and bomber squadrons 
allotted to the Army was of pressing importance since such 
squadrons were to some extent detached from the Army and would 
be given specific orders by the C-in-C. I 
Thus at this early stage no provision was made for the 
attachment of certain bomber and fighter squadrons to army units 
for coordination in tactical operations. The Air Staff ignored 
the substantial air requirements to which the General Staff laid 
claim. Furthermore, assisted in their attitude by an over- 
conciliatory Cavan, they would assign no aircraft on a permanent 
or even temporary basis for training in tactical support. 
Later that month, therefore, when the Air Staff came to 
hammer out the composition of their new expansion programme of 
52 squadrons, their findings were narrowly based upon a limited 
fighter defence and a massive counter-offensive based on long 
range bombers. No thought was given to Army needs. Indeed, in a 
series of conferences held at the Air Ministry, Trenchard pointed 
out that the Army could only defeat the enemy's land forces, 
whereas the Air Force had as its aim the defeat of the enemy 
nation. Thus the RAF had to avoid allowing its policy to be 
affected by that of another service. Air Force policy and 
strategy were totally different from those of the Army. In his 
opinion any war with France would be a "bombing duel" in which 
France would probably squeal first. The nation that could stand 
being bombed the longest would win in the end. 
AVM P. W. Game, recalled from India to advise on the RAF 
expansion programme, supported his Chief. Bombing, he maintained, 
provided positive results. 2 The DCAS, Air Commodore J. M. Steel, 
took the same line and urged the importance of continuity in 
attack. Bombing should be carried out ceaselessly by day and by 
night so that damage caused could not be repaired. 3 Given such 
views, it is hardly surprising that a ratio between bombers and 
fighters of 3 to 1 was recommended to the CID and later approved 
1. Cab 53/1, COS 1st Meeting, 17 July 1923. 
2. Air 2/1267, Meeting held on 19 July 1923. 
3. Ibid., 25 July 1923. 
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by the Cabinet. I 
In fact, however, this ratio and the theory of the knock-out- 
blow which played so large a part in its determination, had no 
scientific basis. Indeed, it was this very lack of certainty 
which afforded advocates of strategic bombing and nervous 
politicians alike the opportunity to give free rein to their 
imagination. 
Such claims did not go unopposed however. Cavan, as recorded 
earlier, questioned the validity of the Air Staff's figures both 
as to the destructive power of the bomb and the strength of French 
airpower which could be ranged against England. 2 The Editor of 
The Aeroplane also had his feet more firmly on the ground. After 
stressing the importance of cooperation with the Army, one of the 
Air Force's activities which was "least considered by the great 
majority of the officers", he warned against "Air Bogeys". 
Referring to prophecies of London being devastated in a single 
night, he wrote: 
The people who talk and write nonsense 
of that sort always remind one of the 
fat boy in Pickwick whose object in 
life was to make people's flesh creep. 
The fact is that they merely defeat 
their own object. 3 
This growing tendency on the part of the Air Ministry to take 
a blinkered view of their future strategy - however politically 
justified by lack of funds - was also criticised by Army officers, 
both senior and junior. Generals Ironside and Chetwode spoke out 
against Air policy in a lecture at Camberley. The Air Force, 
claimed General Sir Edmund Ironside, appeared to think only of 
the offensive. They needed to pay more attention to defensive 
measures, especially anti-aircraft units. Lt. General Sir Philip 
Chetwode, GOC-in-C Aldershot Command, resurrected the Wilson line. 
1. Denis Richards claims that this ratio would have been 
1+-1 had it not been for the arguments put forward by 
the most junior member present, Squadron Leader 
Charles Portal. See Portal of Hungerford, pp. 89-90. 
2. This work, p. 87- 
3. The Aeroplane, Vol. XXV, 26 September 1923, p. 305, 
and 26 December 1923, p. 598. 
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He considered that the Air Force could only win a war by bombing 
women and children., The proper task remained the support of the 
Army in order to'defeat the enemy's forces in the field. 
' Later, 
a young engineer, -writing in the Army Quarterly, advised against 
"doctrines based upon imagination, and not upon facts". There were 
those who would have the country believe that armies were already 
obsolete but, in fact, there were no grounds at that time for 
" supposing that wars could be won by aircraft alone. 
2 
Stressed too, at this time, was the specialist nature of Army 
cooperation work. Finding troops on the ground, recognising what 
they were, and deciding what they were doing, required a "very 
highly specialised education". For this reason, it was argued, RAF 
officers should be allocated permanently to Army cooperation units. 
3 
Wing Commander C. H. B. Blount, in a paper given at the RAF Staff 
College in 1925, likewise referred to the "vast store of military 
knowledge" with which a pilot in an Army Cooperation Squadron had 
to become familiar. He warned: "Should a military-wing be found 
necessary, it will be due to lack of military knowledge of RAF 
personnel engaged in Army Cooperation. " 4 
One lasting result of this emphasis upon independent action 
and the need to provide a large bomber force as a deterrent 
against attack, was the theory of the all-purpose aircraft. During 
the late war there had been a strong body of opinion against 
specialisation. It had been felt that too many types not only 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/28, Marson to CAS, 
17 December 1923. In his account of the lectures, 
Marson writes, "He (Brooke-Popham) feels that all 
the good liaison work between Ironside and himself 
and their respective students was nullified by the 
finish, and particularly by the nature and manner 
of General Chetwode's speech. " 
Air Commodore H. R. M. Brooke-Popham was Commandant 
of the RAF Staff College. 
2. Captain McA. Hogg, RE, "Aeroplanes in Future Warfare", 
Army Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 1, October 1924, p. 101. 
3. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XXV, 10 October 1923, 
p. 378. 
4. Wing Commander C. H. B. Blount, "The Development of 
Army Cooperation since 1918", 14th Course of the RAF 
Staff College, 1925-6. Available at Adastral Library, 
Adastral House, London. 
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meant that smaller numbers of aircraft would be produced, but that 
by reducing flexibility, it would prevent concentration of attack 
upon the most important objectives. ' 
After the war such views persisted within the Air Staff. In 
1920 a letter from Wing Commander Fellowes extolling the virtues 
of the RE8 over those of the DH9 and DH9A bombers, brought a sharp 
rebuke from the DOI, Air Commodore. J. M. Steel. In a letter to 
Trenchard, Wing Commander J. A. Chamier, writing on behalf of Steel, 
complained that Fellowes only looked at one side of the question. 
It was not possible to supply ideal machines for each individual 
job. Under the prevailing conditions a very few squadrons had to 
do the whole work of a large country. "Apart from this, " he 
continued, ".. it would be an impossible situation if the outbreak 
of a war found the Air Force with regard to a large number of its 
squadrons armed with slow, short range and obsolete types of 
machines unsuitable to take any part in European warfare. " 
2 
An even stronger denunciation of aircraft specialisation came 
in February 1924. An Air Ministry reply to the Air Attache at 
Washington concerning an "Attack Aviation group" within the US 
Army Air Service (a unit of ground-attack aircraft) left. the 
Attache in no doubt as to the Air Staff's views on such units: 
I am to say that the policy of the Americans 
is regarded as quite unsuited to the needs 
of this country and that it would be 
impossible to produce a similar organisation 
without starving far more important branches 
of the RAF. 
The idea of armouring aircraft for use in the RAF, added the reply, 
had been definitely abandoned and although it was probable that 
extensive use would be made of low flying attacks against ground 
targets in the future, the ordinary service types of machines 
3 would be used for that work. 
1. Webster and Frankland, op. cit., p. 56. 
2.. Trenchard Papers, II/2T/144/2, Chamier to 
CAS, 13 October 1920. Fellowes was then 
AOC Mesopotamian Wing. 
3. Air 9/6, Item 14 in Note by Plans on Ground- 
Attack Aircraft, 28 February 1935, refers. 
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In view of such dogmatism, it is worthy of note that the. 
United States was not the only nation to retain attack aviation 
as a separate branch. Towards the end of the war the Germans had 
arrived at a similar conclusion. They considered that the tactics 
as well as. the techniques of executing ground attacks differed so 
much from other. air operations that a separate organisation and 
tactical training were necessary. ' 
In the eyes of the British Air Staff, however, such 
specialisation was a luxury which only a few Air Powers could 
afford. It was felt that it was only be reducing the number of 
specialist aircraft that "an air effort adequate for the defence 
of this country and of the Empire could be achieved". 2 Airpower, 
it could be argued, had to be flexible and multi-purpose. In the 
case of the RAF, however, this stubborn reluctance to consider 
any form of specialisation was born of an inordinate and, at this 
stage, unfounded faith in the power of the long-range bomber. It 
was a faith shared by influential observers outside of Air Force 
circles. In particular, the publication in 1925 of Liddell Hart's 
Paris, or the Future of War, claiming that the true object of war 
was the morale of the enemy nation, and depicting as it'did the 
horrific effects of sustained bombing, added welcome weight to 
Air Staff doctrine. AVM Brooke-Popham, referring to this work, 
wrote to Marson at this time, "There is nothing novel in it to us 
but it is interesting to see other people thinking on the same 
lines. " 3 
But the case for greater tactical cooperation between the 
two services did not go by default. In July of that year an 
Editorial in the Army Quarterly played down the effects of 
strategic bombing and stressed the inter-dependence of Army and 
Air tactics, "a fact which many soldiers and airmen are sometimes 
too much inclinded to forget". 
4 Two months later the Editor of 
1. William C. Sherman, Air Warfare,. p. 163. 
2. Lord Swinton, I Remember, p. 141. 
3. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/28, Brooke-Popham 
to Marson, 17 July 1925. 
4. Army Quarterly, Editorial, Vol. X, No. 2, 
2 July 1925, p. 226. 
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The Aeroplane questioned the validity of Air Staff policy. He 
wrote: 
When one remembers how much trench straffing 
was done during the war and how much more 
ground straffing (or contour fighting) is 
likely to be done in the future, because in 
the next war we shall have to engage in open 
fighting, it is rather peculiar that so 
little attention has been given to special 
ground straffing aeroplanes either in offence 
or defence. ' 
Earlier that year,, the same journal had taken the Air Ministry 
to task for the "lamentable lack of progress in aircraft design". 
It was their duty, an Editorial had claimed, to see that the 
fighting men were provided with adequate weapons, yet our single- 
seater fighters were 20 to 40 miles an hour slower than those of 
certain foreign Powers, and our general purpose reconnaissance- 
cum-bomber-cum artillery machines were hardly any better. 
2 
This is not to suggest that there was no training in close 
support tactics. Indeed, according to one RAF Officer who served 
in Army Cooperation at this time, a series of exercises, carried 
out in BAOR in the autumn of 1924, proved of particular value in 
this respect. He recalls that during these exercises, which had 
been arranged at the request of the Army'authorities, a flight of 
aircraft had carried out a successful low-flying attack upon an 
Infantry Brigade, pelting the men and wagons with tennis balls 
before a shot could be fired. 
3 Even when held, such exercises 
were not always appreciated. In September 1925, for example, the 
CIGS himself wrote to Trenchard to protest about the "very low 
flying of your boys". He complained that in recent manoeuvres 
he had seen aircraft flying at a height of 25 to 30 feet and he 
1. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XXIX, No. 14, 
30 September 1925, p. 387. 
2. Ibid., Vol. XXVIII, No. 5,1 February 1925, p-93- 
3. Group Captain (Retd. ) J. A. G. Haslam. Interviewed 
by author, 15 March 1977. Haslam"commanded the 
Signal Cooperation Flight., 1922-24. The Flight 
was based at Biggin Hill but for most of his 
command the unit was mobile and, apart from the 
visit to BAOR, toured the Northern and Scottish 
Commands. 
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thought that this was wrong teaching for his men. ' 
Later that year strong pleas for a separate Army air arm 
were renewed. Liddell Hart, reporting on Army manoeuvres during 
the year, voiced the opinion that, in matters of air support, 
the best cooperation between the two services was no substitute 
for a military air arm. The Army, he claimed, should provide an 
air arm from its own resources over which it would have complete 
control. 2 The Editor of The Aeroplane, commenting upon the 
ground straffing, wrote: 
It was a very pretty exhibition, but it 
showed one for the first time how 
extraordinarily ineffective ground 
straffing must be when attempted with 
single-seat fighters of the existing type. 3 
The following month the whole question of inter-service 
training was raised by Lt. Colonel F. A. Pile. Writing about the 
same manoeuvres, he complained that in any future war squadrons 
allocated for control by the GOC of the ground troops would lack 
the required training. The allotment of bomber objectives, he 
maintained, was as difficult and as skilled a task as the allot- 
ment of bombardment tasks to the artillery. In any future war 
the GOC would be obliged to leave the selection of objectives to 
be bombed to his Air Force advisor because he had received no 
practice in selecting them in peace time. He complained, too, 
that no genuine attempt at ground reconnaissance had been made. 
In his opinion the need for a greater understanding between 
airmen and soldiers was more essential at that time, when the 
bulk of RAF officers were not soldiers and when the tank battle 
was likely to range over far wider areas than in the past. The 
Air Force, he claimed, was too much inclined to regard Army 
cooperation as merely a matter of reconnaissance and artillery 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/28, Cavan to Trenchard, 
8 September 1925. 
2. RUSI Journal, Vol. LXX, 1925,, p. 655" 
Liddell Hart stressed, however, that the RAF 
had an independent role of almost incalculable 
importance. 
3. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XXIX, 30 September 
1925, p"387. 
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spotting. Adequate practice was also required, however, for the 
role of close support aircraft. If squadrons could not be with- 
drawn from their watch aloft for this purpose, then the Army 
should have its own low-flying squadrons. In his view the whole 
question of the intervention of aircraft in the ground battle 
required serious consideration. At present there was no practice 
in this form of cooperation despite the fact that aircraft were 
capable of knocking out tanks and anti-tank guns. He concluded: 
It is of course amazingly difficult to 
cooperate effectively even with other 
arms of the same service, but for 
different services to hope to cooperate 
on the field of battle without a great 
deal of previous training and experiment 
seems somewhat futile. ' 
General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, GOC Ist 
Division, speaking in November 1925, argued that whilst most 
soldiers would agree that the Air Ministry had come to stay, the 
Air Staff should "make some modification in their present line 
of action". They should give the Army more control over Army 
Cooperation Squadrons, and the overlapping of services should be 
avoided. During the last year, he said, he had had a whole 
squadron working in his division and he had constantly felt that 
his task would have been easier if. that squadron had been 
entirely under his control. At the same meeting, Lt. General Sir 
Noel Birch, Master General of the Ordnance, hinted that an Army 
Wing for Christmas would be a very acceptable gift. 
2 
1. Lt. Colonel F. A. Pile, "The Army's Air Needs", 
RUST Journal, Vol. LXXI, 1926, pp. 725-7. 
Pile was then on the staff of the Territorial 
Army Air Defence Formations. 
In the October issue of The Edinburgh Review, 
the former CAS, Major General Sir Frederick 
Sykes, also criticised the Air Ministry, 
alleging that the senior services were badly 
served in their tactical air requirements. 
See report of article in the Army Quarterly, 
Vol. XI, No. 2,2 January 1926, pp. 229-30. 
2. Discussion following lecture at the RUSI, 
18 November 1925. See RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXI, 
1926, pp. 15-18. 
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The following month, Ironside, in a course of lectures on 
land warfare at University College, London, complained that the 
Army suffered the grave disability of being dependent on another 
service altogether for their reconnaissance and artillery 
observation. The observer needed to be able to form military 
judgements from what he saw as to the best line of action. It was 
perhaps only natural that in the event of a future war the Air 
Ministry, however well intentioned they might be, would use their 
best men for what was in their eyes the main purpose, and the 
Army would be left without eyes. The maintenance of these two 
separate services was checking the proper evolution of the Army. 
As a result, the two services were drawing apart from each other 
rather than together. ' 
This "drawing apart" was not confined, in fact, to the 
tactical level. In the wider issue of home defence, one of the 
most pressing problems of the day, what plans emerged for 
cooperation and coordination between the two services were frail 
in the extreme. As early as May 1921, Trenchard had made out a 
case for the transfer from the WO to the Air Ministry of all 
matters relating to the air defence of Great Britain. The 
arrangements then existing, he had argued, provided an excellent 
illustration of the "over subordination" of the air arm to the 
military service. The organisation required to meet air attack 
was. a highly complicated one, necessitating considerable expert 
and technical knowledge. Such knowledge could only be acquired by 
a close study of aerial matters. Thus the organisation and 
disposition of the home defence forces must be based on the aerial 
resources which an enemy was likely to employ and of which the 
Air Staff were the only competent judges. 2 
This take-over attempt was vigorously opposed by the General 
Staff, but the Air Staff's case was upheld by the Balfour enquiry. 
In the matter of air defence, Balfour had advised, the Army and 
1. Ironside lecturing on land warfare, 3 December 
1925. See The Aeroplane, Vol. XXIX, 9 December 
1925, p. 674. Major General Sir Edmund Ironside 
was then Commandant,. Staff College, Camberley. 
2. Cab 5/4+, CID Paper 140-C, 27 May 1921. 
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Navy should play a "secondary role". ' In the Spring of 1922 the 
Cabinet approved the transfer of responsibility. It was, at this 
stage, a transfer in name only. The extensive defence system in 
operation at the end of the war had been completely disbanded by 
1920 and a completely new organisation was required. 
The Army Council discussed the matter at the end of May 1922 2 
and, in a letter to the CID early in July, sought clarification 
as to the line of demarcation to be drawn between the operational 
responsibilities of the two services. They considered that the 
responsibility for training, maintaining and controlling the 
ground forces, together with the design and provision of 
equipment, should be borne by the WO "in consultation with the 
Air Ministry". At ground level, they claimed that the passive 
means of defence - such as guns, searchlights and sound locators 
- should be under the immediate command of a military officer who 
would receive general directions from the AOC as to the conduct 
of the defence operations. The WO suggested, too, that the 
general policy of AA defence should be "directed" through a sub- 
committee established on the analogy of the Home Ports Defence 
Committee and entitled "The Sub-Committee for the AA Defence of 
the United Kingdom". 3 
For their part, the Air Ministry was in no way anxious to 
become burdened with responsibility for the ground forces. They 
placed little reliance upon such static measures of defence, 
regarding the ability to respond in kind as the best means of 
deterring a would-be attacker. In their reply to the WO, 
therefore, they accepted the proposals made concerning the 
direction of the passive defence measures, pointing out that 
similar proposals had in fact been made earlier by the Air Staff 
themselves. They emphasised, however, that the operational 
control of the ground defences would be exercised by an AOC 
responsible to the Air Ministry. This officer would control 
these units through the senior Army officers in immediate command, 
in precisely the same way as the GOC of an Expeditionary Force 
1. Cab 5/4, CID Paper 119-C, 26 July 1921. 
2. WO 163/28, Army Council 303rd Meeting, 30 May 1922. 
3. Cab 4/8, CID Paper 351-B, 4 July 1922. 
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controlled through a senior Air Force officer those air 
squadrons allotted for Amy cooperation. 
The suggestion that a new sub-committee of the CID be formed 
to direct policy was opposed, however, by the Air Ministry. 
Concerned -lest their own authority might be undermined thereby, 
they declared that any questions which might arise concerning the 
respective spheres of the two departments could be adequately 
dealt with by the Defence Sub-Committee of the CID. 
I A compromise 
solution to this particular question was put forward by the CID 
Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey. He suggested that instead of 
creating a new sub-committee, the wishes of the Army Council 
could be adequately met and the coordination of all aspects of 
home defence effectively ensured if the scope of the Home Ports 
Defence Committee were widened so as to enable it to deal with 
all questions appertaining to home defence. This committee, 
renamed "The Home Defence Committee", would remain a consultative 
body in deference to the wishes of the Air Ministry. 
2 
In December the WO accepted this proposal and a few days 
later the CID made the necessary recommendations. 
3 In April the 
following year a Committee under the joint chairmanship of Air 
Commodore Steel and Colonel W. Bartholomew, formed to draw up a 
defence plan for the South-East of England, warned that no 
adequate defence system could be provided before 1925.4 That same 
year the Salisbury Committee rejected a claim by the WO that 
"Home Defence is a normal problem of modern warfare well within 
the competence of the General Staff". 5An independent Air Force 
was required, the Committee concluded, to deal with the distinct 
and specialised tasks associated with home defence against aerial 
attack. 
6 In 1924 a Committee under Major General Romer assigned 
- not without some difficulty - the administrative duties to be 
shared by the two departments, and early the following year 
1. Cab 4+/8, CID Paper 356--B, 19 July 1922. 
2. Ibid., 365-B, 18 October 1922. 
3. Ibid., 378-B, 5 December 1922, and Cab 2/3 
CID 168th Meeting, 14 December 1922. 
4. General Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack, p. 52. 
5. Cab 16/47, ND 40,. 8 June 1923. 
6. Ibid., ND 58,30 June 1923. 
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Air Marshal Sir John Salmond was appointed to command the whole 
Air Defence of Great Britain. 
' 
Thus was established a compromise system of dual control 
which contained the seeds of future trouble. The WO were to 
prove reluctant to provide money for a defence system-for which 
they were not ultimately responsible; the Air Ministry were to 
prove reluctant to provide money for a defence system in which 
they had little faith. Ashmore was to write later: 
The ground forces have two masters 
pulling in opposite directions; the 
RAF only want them efficient, the 
War Office only want them cheap. 2 
Given such a situation there was little hope that the development 
of air and land responsibilities would go hand in hand. Indeed, 
within a few years the two arms of defence were "no longer in 
step". 3 
Nor was a larger measure of success obtained in the matter 
of coastal defence, a question which was destined to loom large 
in tide wider issue of imperial protection. In a letter to the 
CID in June 1921, the WO clearly spelt out their views concerning 
the defence of ports at home and overseas. They argued that the 
object of any determined attack upon a port was the ultimate 
capture of that port in order that'its use might be denied the 
enemy or that it might be used as a base for invading troops. As 
capture could only be accomplished by the landing of an enemy 
force, and as this force could only be opposed by troops, the 
Army Council claimed that the supreme commander at every defended 
port must be a soldier. 4 
To the Air Ministry such an argument was illogical. In a 
letter to the CID. a few days later, they maintained that in the 
great majority of cases an attack upon a port would never develop 
into a serious attempt to capture the fortress itself, but would 
be confined to sea or air bombardment. In such cases there was no 
1. Pile, op. cit., p. 53. 
2. Major General E. B. Ashmore, Air Defence, p. 134. 
3. Pile, op. cit., p. 61. 
4. Cab 4/7, CID Paper 272-B, 7 June 1921. 
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reason why the commander should be a soldier. For their part, 
they favoured a formula whereby anyone of the three service 
commanders could have a "predominating voice", the choice to 
depend upon the nature of the attack to be repelled. I 
It was not until a meeting of the CID in February 1923 that 
the matter was again discussed. The Committee approved of . 
the 
Air Ministry's formula, but were unable to agree as to which 
service should provide a commander in the first instance. The 
matter was referred to an inter-departmental committee consisting 
of the Chiefs of Staff. 2 The. Committee met in December when it 
was agreed that, for the present, the fortress commander should 
be a military officer since the military garrison was the only 
force which was available at all times. However, the Committee 
ruled that if, because of scientific or other developments, the 
main burden of defence in any particular fortress came to fall 
on either the Navy or the Air Force, the appointment of the 
commander would be decided "on the merits of the case". 3 
So loose were the terms of this agreement that it really 
counted for little when the appointment of a commander was in 
dispute. It was to count for even less when the means of defence 
themselves were in contention, as was to be the case in the 
protracted dispute over the defence of Singapore. It was, in 
effect, but another compromise which, as far as the fighting 
services were concerned, depended in the last resort upon the 
will to cooperate -a commodity which was in very short supply 
for much of the period under review. 
Indeed, where a measure of cooperation was favoured by one 
department, as in the case of the amalgamation of common services, 
the intentions were hostile not conciliatory. As noted earlier, 
from mid 1919 the WO lost no opportunity of bringing to the 
Government's notice the costly duplication made by the Air 
Ministry in certain administrative branches. 
4 In February 1922 
1. Cab 4+/7, CID Paper 275-B,. 16 June 1921. 
2. Cab 2/3, CID 169th Meeting, 20 February 1923. 
3. Cab 4/10, CID Paper 1+68-B, 12 December 1923. 
lt. See in particular WO Memo, Cab 5/4, CID Paper 
159-C, 4 February' 1922. 
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the Coalition Government appointed the Mond Committee to 
investigate the charge. ' Reporting in January 1923, this Cabinet 
Sub-Committee concluded that no substantial economies could be 
made by the amalgamation of these common services unless the 
three departments themselves could be incorporated within a 
Ministry of Defence. 2 Understandably, the Government shrank from 
taking such a revolutionary step. Churchill, then Colonial 
Secretary, opined that it would not be possible to create such a 
body "for a considerable time". 3 In fact, the amalgamation of 
certain common services did not materialise until after the 
Second World War, and then only to a limited extent. 
4 
.... 0.... 0....... 0........ 0... 0.. 0.. 
By the end of 1925 the future of the RAF was assured. The 
Army's opposition to a third Service, persistent and strenuous 
though it had been throughout the early 1920s, had failed to put 
an end to the new department or to restrict its growth. At home, 
as the nation's first line of defence against air attack, the Air 
Force had embarked upon a massive programme of expansion, whilst, 
overseas, it had established itself as a viable alternative to 
the Army in the control of the mandated territory of Iraq. 
Events were to prove that, in the matter of home defence, 
the increase in airpower was not to be fully realised in the 
immediate future. In-Europe, the sense of security engendered by 
the Locarno Treaty, to be followed shortly be severe economic 
depression and prolonged attempts at international disarmament, 
served to stunt any growth in the nation's armed forces. Further 
afield, however, the problem of policing and defending the Empire, 
made the more pressing by the military threat anticipated from 
the Soviet Union and Japan, was to afford ample opportunity for 
further conflict between the two fighting services. 
1. Lord Weir became Chairman of the Committee 
in October 1922 in succession to'Lord Mond. 
2. Cab 24/158, CP 22(23), January 1923. 
3. Hansard, (HC5s), Vol-152, Col. 393,21 March 1922. 
4. F. A. Johnson, Defence by Committee, p. 1714. 
133 
PART II 
THE ROLE OF AIRCRAFT IN IMPERIAL. POLICING AND DEFENCE 
Chapter 5 
The Middle East: 
Iraq, Aden, the Sudan and Palestine 
May 1922 - September 1936 
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On the 1st October 1922, AVM Sir John Salmond took over 
command of British and Indian troops in Iraq. The force comprised 
nine battalions, two batteries, four armoured car companies, some 
defence-vessels, and eight squadrons RAF. In addition, there were 
three regiments of Kurds, three battalions of Assyrians, one 
battalion of Arabs, and a pack battery, over all of which he had 
executive control for operations. 
' Such a force was to prove by 
no means excessive. Throughout 1922 Turkey had been active in the 
area, organising political intrigue, disseminating propaganda, 
and providing armed support for dissident tribes. By October 
matters were swiftly coming to a head. On his arrival, Salmond 
found that powerful Turkish forces were grouped along the northern 
frontier and that some irregular troops had crossed into Mosul. 
2 
Added to these field difficulties was to be the continued 
opposition of the WO to the air control scheme. The embittered 
relations between Britain and Turkey, not fully remedied until 
the Turko-Iraq Treaty of June 1926, led to constant border 
incursions and provided thereby ample opportunity for criticism 
and dissent. Just five days after the Air Ministry had officially 
taken over control, the Cabinet had under consideration a memo by 
the Secretary of State for War warning about the situation in 
Mosul. The line of communication between Baghdad and Mosul, the 
paper pointed out, was liable to be cut if hostile forces made a 
flank advance of 50 miles. Mosul would then be beleaguered. Too 
much reliance could not be placed on the Arab army. If the Turks 
attacked in force at Mosul, neither the British nor the Arabs 
could put up an effective resistance. 
The Cabinet, whilst reminding the WO that the Air Ministry 
was now in control of Iraq, agreed that the AOC Mesopotamia should 
be informed that if his more northerly detachments and lines of 
communication with Mosul were likely to be threatened, he was at 
liberty, in consultation with the High Commissioner, to withdraw 
1. Salmond Papers, AC 73/1+, Notes on Iraq and India. 
2. For a highly subjective account of this first 
crisis see Laffin, op. cit., p. 162ff. For a 
general account of Iraq during the interwar 
years see Hannaford, op. cit. 
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the forces to whatever line he thought advisable to avoid the 
garrison being beleaguered. ' 
Later that month, however, the Air Ministry received a 
striking testimony to the early success of their air control 
scheme. A report from the High Commissioner stated that the 
Turkish elements had withdrawn from almost every area into which 
they had penetrated. This had been achieved by "vigorous and 
sustained air audacity". Furthermore, the report claimed that the 
Turks had been driven out by air action alone. 2 Trenchard lost no 
time in sending a copy of the report to Cavan. This report, he 
claimed, justified to some extent the air claims made in the past. 
In this instance, prompt action had been taken with a full 
knowledge of what the Air could do. 3 The CIGS was not so easily 
convinced. He replied: 
The General Staff feel that the recent 
successes attained by air action in 
Kurdistan against small Turkish 
detachments hardly enable them as yet 
to endorse the AOC's confidence in his 
ability to meet any scale of attack 
that the Turks could probably develop 
in Iraq ... 
In effect, what the WO was anxious to achieve was a complete 
withdrawal to Basra. In a private letter to the Duke of Devonshire 
at this time, the Secretary of State for War, Lord Derby, confided 
that he was in favour of "cutting our losses". Basra and the pipe- 
line there could be held with comparatively few troops and at very 
little cost, whereas to attempt to hold the whole country would be 
beyond the Government's strength and power. A scheme of air control 
was certainly no solution. He continued: 
The Air Force think that they can protect 
the whole country. It is a new force and 
they have all the optimism of youth. I am 
1. CP 4192, Cab 23/31, Cabinet Meeting 56(22), 
5 October 1922. 
2. Air 19/109, The Development of Air Control 
in Iraq, 21 October 1922. 
3. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/39, Trenchard to 
Cavan, 23 October 1922. 
4. Ibid., Cavan to Trenchard, 15 November 1922. 
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perfectly certain that the air force 
alone, unsupported by bayonets, is 
quite incapable of defence of this 
vast area. I 
As to the question of Mosul, he did not see the need to remain 
there on account of oil deposits. He could not envisage any sane-. 
minded business man building an oil factory at Mosul for many 
years to come. The area would be a constant source of danger even 
if some agreement were reached with the Turks at Lausanne. 
2 He 
agreed that certain pledges had been made to King Feisal, but 
considered that these might be rescinded by paying the King a sum 
of money. Even a large amount would be a small outlay in comparison 
with the cost involved in holding the country for the next ten 
years. Opponents would condemn such action as a policy of scuttle, 
but he felt that, in the circumstances, it was the wisest move. 
3 
The Air Staff harboured no such-misgivings. Reasons for the 
success of their scheme, they announced in the New Year, were the 
speed with which all parts of the country could be visited and 
controlled, the elimination of practically all kinds of "ground 
bait", and the avoidance of isolated detachments. 4 Likewise in 
March, the Colonial Office, reporting on the progress of the air 
scheme, argued that the success of the operations the previous 
month, in which Salmond had advanced his forces to Mosul and 
forced the Turks to withdraw, would not have been possible had not 
the commander possessed an intimate knowledge of the air arm and 
a firm belief in the value of ample airpower. Furthermore, claimed 
the Colonial Office, by means of air transport it had been possible 
to achieve a highly centralised yet wide understanding of that 
1. Derby Papers, WO 137/12, Derby to Duke of 
Devonshire, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 8 December 1922. 
2. The Treaty of Lausanne, finally approved on 21+ 
July 1923, settled all matters between Britain 
and Turkey save the question of Mosul. This issue 
was left for discussion between the two countries 
with the provision that if no agreement were 
reached within nine months the matter would be 
referred to the League of Nations. 
3. Derby Papers, WO 137/12, Derby to Devonshire, 
8 December 1922. 
4+. Air 8/34, Folio 22, Air Staff Note, 23 January 1923. 
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type of intelligence which was the essence of wise and economical 
control. ' Trenchard, however, preferred to play it cool. A report 
drawn up by the Air Staff at the request of the Air Minister to 
show the success of RAF control was not circulated. "I would 
strongly urge, " Trenchard added to the draft copy, "that no 
circulation of this paper is made at present as I think it would 
be likely to promote controversy when we are comparing what we 
have done with the Army. " 2 
Such caution proved of no avail. In January 1924, following 
a debate in the COS. Sub-Committee on the respective 
responsibilities of the fighting services, 3 the General Staff 
raised the question of command in Iraq and Palestine. In the 
event of reinforcements having to be sent into either of these 
territories, stated their memo, the Army Council were "naturally" 
not prepared to entrust any considerable body of troops to the 
command of an Air Officer for active operations in what would 
almost certainly be a land campaign. Should an attack by land be 
launched upon the Mandates, then a land campaign would be required 
to defeat it and the air forces would then revert to their normal 
war role of supplementary cooperation with the Army. The conduct 
of the operations would then have to be entrusted to a soldier. 
The Army Council considered that when total military forces 
employed amounted to a division, despatched to carry out a ground 
campaign, control of the territory must pass to the WO. It was 
admitted that the precise moment when this transfer of command 
took place was difficult to define in advance but, in the opinion 
of the Council, such a transfer must be deliberate, decided by the 
Cabinet and, above all, made in good time. If conditions 
necessitated the substitution of a military commander, then the 
sooner the decision was taken the better. ' 
This whole question of command was to be put severely to the 
test the following year, but at the beginning of 1924 a fresh 
1. Salmond Papers, AC/73/14, Notes on Iraq and India, 
Report by the Colonial Office, April 1922 - March 1923. 
2. Air 5/476, Note by Trenchard dated 4+ July 1923. 
3. Cab 53/1, COS 6th Meeting, 8 January 1924. 
4. Cab 53/12, COS Paper 7,25 January 1921+. See 
also Air 9/14, Folio 86. 
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dispute arose over the defence of certain oilfields in southern 
Persia. ' At a meeting of the CID in February, Trenchard pointed 
out that a qualified promise made by the Air Staff in May 1922 
to send a force from Iraq to defend oilfields in southern Persia 
could no longer be met. At the time the undertaking was given 
there had been twelve battalions in Iraq; that number had now 
been reduced to four. He felt that the problem of the protection 
of these oilfields was, in fact, a question for the General Staff. 
The Army, however, would not be used in this way. Major General 
Sir John Burnett-Stuart, the DMOI, claimed that the WO no longer 
had any responsibility whatever in regard to Iraq. Whilst 
recognising that the protection of the oilfields was an imperial 
obligation, they considered that it was necessary for the nearest 
commander available to make the necessary preparations concerning 
possible operations in that district. 2 
This argument was expanded in a note by the General Staff 3 
the following month. In it they claimed that when the Air Ministry 
had been entrusted with the sole military control of Palestine 
and Iraq, the WO had taken it for granted that the contingent 
responsibilities which were the inevitable corollary of 
independent military command had also been assumed by the Air 
Force. Had the WO remained in control of Iraq, the GOC might well 
have stated that his forces were not adequate to safeguard the 
oilfields, but this would not have absolved the WO from its 
responsibility. The note continued: 
In like circumstances the fighting 
services presumably assume like 
obligations; no other solution is 
1. In May 1922 it had been agreed by a Standing 
Defence Sub-Committee of the CID that under a 
scheme prepared by the Air Staff a qualified 
promise of military assistance from Iraq could 
be given for the protection of oilfields in 
southern Persia. At that time the force considered 
adequate for this protection was 1+j battalions, 
2 sections of armoured cars, and supporting 
aircraft. See Cab 5/1, CID Paper 168-C, 8 May 1922. 
2. Cab 2/4, CID 182nd Meeting, 25 February 1924. 
3. Cab 5/5, CID Paper 224-C, 20 March 1924. 
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practicable, and the General Staff 
are at a loss to understand how the 
Air Ministry should claim exemption 
from this well established rule. ' 
The General Staff, continued the note, could only assume this 
responsibility if they were given such standing and representation 
in Iraq as would allow them to study the problem, and also given 
some control of the available resources which would enable them 
to deal with it. There was an important principle at stake. If 
the Air Ministry, while entrusted with the sole military command 
and control in Iraq and Palestine, could unload onto the WO the 
responsibility for contending with regional problems, then the 
converse should hold for areas for which the WO were responsible. 
Such a system of dual responsibility was difficult to visualise 
in practice. 2 
When the memo was circulated to the CID in April, Cavan 
maintained that the. Air Ministry had to'accept full responsibility 
for the areas under their control. Lord Thomson, Secretary of 
State for Air, retorted that his Ministry did accept full 
responsibility. With regard to the Persian oilfields, however, 
they were not prepared to give a definite guarantee, but would 
take such action as was possible with the forces at their 
3 
disposal, 
The General Staff's opposition in this instance was stilled 
by. the report of the Sub-Committee. It pointed out that since 
the Treaty of Lausanne, approved in July 1923, the strength of 
the regular infantry in Iraq had been reduced to four battalions 
and further reductions were planned. In view of this, the 
Committee recommended that the Government of India be asked to 
accept the liability of providing the small ground force required, 
this force to be under the command of the AOC Iraq. WO liability 
was to be kept to a minimum; the Committee merely asked that they 
accept the responsibility for replacing the force sent from India 
as soon as the forces at their disposal made this possible. ' 
1. Cab 5/5, CID Paper 221-C, 20 March 1924. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Cab 2/4, CID 183rd Meeting, 3 April 192k. 
4. Cab 5/5, CID Paper 227-C, 7 July 1924. 
140 
General Lord Rawlinson, C-in-C India, subsequently agreed that 
India would be prepared to send two brigades of infantry and two 
armoured car sections to assist in the protection of the Persian 
oilfields, provided that imperial troops were still in occupation 
of Basra. ' 
With regard to the general situation in Iraq, Trenchard was 
feeling optimistic by May 1924. He considered that, if necessary, 
the air forces there were strong enough to carry out action against 
several tribes simultaneously. The levies had also improved 
considerably in efficiency and the Arab army was 5,500 strong and 
of proven value. 2 Thus at a meeting of the COS in mid-May, a new 
Turkish threat was viewed with equanimity. A report before the 
Committee considered that the Turks could not organise an attack 
on Mosul in greater strength than 7,000 men and that this force 
would be ill-equipped by modern European standards. To oppose such 
an attack, the AOC Iraq could make use of some 5,000 men within 
ten days and 7,000 within one month, excluding three to four 
squadrons of aircraft and two or three armoured car companies. It 
was agreed., however, that in the event of the Turks determining 
to seize Mosul by force, it would be impossible to maintain the 
British position and that discretion would have to be given to 
the AOC concerning the possibility of withdrawal. 3 
When this report came before the CID, the GIGS "confirmed its 
conclusions as to the best line of opposition against Turkey if 
such a contingency should ever arise". 
4 In July, however, following 
renewed fighting along the border, the General Staff changed their 
tune. They proposed that the whole of the first contingent of the 
Expeditionary Force should be sent to Iraq, arguing that if war 
broke out with Turkey, Iraq should be made the area in which the 
conflict should be decided. This was something which the Air Staff 
had never supported and it was in complete contradiction to all 
previous WO policy. The only reason suggested for this change of 
view, contained - according to an Air Staff note - in a personal 
1. Cab 5/5, CID Paper 233-C, Appendix A, 
8 November 1921+. 
2. Cab 2/4+, CID 1814th Meeting, 5 May 1924. 
3. Cab 53/1, COS 9th Meeting, 14 May 1924. 
4+. Cab 2/4, CID 185th Meeting, 19 June 1924. 
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letter from Burnett-Stuart, was that if war did break out with 
Turkey, Britain would be fighting as a mandatary of the League of 
Nations. The Air Staff found it difficult to understand how that 
fact could make strategically safe what had been previously 
denounced as strategically dangerous, or how it could solve the 
problem of sending a large body of white troops into the heart of 
Asia in possibly the most trying season of the year. 
' For their 
part, the WO doubtless saw in such a move the possibility of 
; regaining command in Iraq. 
In the event, the threat came to nothing. Even during the 
worst of the crisis'in September and October, when the garrison 
in Iraq was down to four battalions with only 11,000 local forces 
instead of the 15,000 recommended, no reinforcements were called 
for. Notes written by the Air Staff in November and sent to their 
Minister made much of the feat. "Our air control, " one paragraph 
read, "was never intended to meet a crisis of external aggression 
and yet we have successfully withstood a deliberate invasion by 
regular and irregular Turkish troops, though admittedly in small 
numbers, without a rising in the country. " 2 An Air Ministry 
publication of the same month claimed that the past eighteen 
months had witnessed a very remarkable improvement in the respect 
paid everywhere to Government, and in the general condition of 
peace and order throughout the country. This improvement, it 
, contended, was clearly related to the exercise of air control. 
3 
. 
Looking to the future, a report by the COS considered that 
the existing forces in Iraq were sufficient to delay any advance 
by the Turkish forces then to the north of Mosul until 
reinforcements arrived, provided that the Turks had not 
infiltrated or moved bodies of troops across the northern border. 
1. Air 8/34, Item 27, Air Staff Note, Summary 
of the attitude shown by the WO regarding 
the Mandate of Iraq, 22 July 1921+. 
2. Air 19/107, CAS to Secretary of State for 
Air, Notes, Chapter 5, Iraq, December 1923 
to November 1921+. 
3. Air Ministry Publication 1105, Iraq Command, 
October 1922 to April 1924, published 
November 1921. Available at Adastral Library, 
Adastral House, London. 
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On the question of command, it was felt that, if needed, the 
first reinforcements should be under the supreme command of the 
AOC, but that when subsequent reinforcements arrived, the 
question would then arise as to whether a commander-in-chief 
should be appointed. ' 
This whole subject of command came to a head a year later 
when the Turks again massed along the Mosul border. In October, 
the CIGS advised the CAS that the question of command should 
further reinforcments be required after the despatch of Echelon 
A had been raised by India and that he was going to bring the 
matter up in the near future. 
2 At a meeting of the CID a week 
later, Trenchard urged that the AOC Iraq be granted complete 
liberty to take action at once in the event of a violation by the 
Turks. Cavan agreed, but raised the question of command. The 
Indian Government and the General Staff, he pointed out, were 
quite prepared to place the troops composing Echelon A under the 
command of the AOC. On the other hand, if Echelon B- which 
involved a Divisional Commander and Divisional Staff - were 
required, then they were definitely of the opinion that the 
C-in-C should be appointed to take command. The Secretary of 
State for India, Lord Birkenhead, endorsed this point of view. He 
felt that unless this was agreed, it would be doubtful whether 
the Indian Government would allow Echelon B to proceed to Iraq. 3 
At the beginning of December, with the situation 
deteriorating, the CIGS viewed with alarm the prospect of war 
with Turkey. Should the Turkish claims, then under consideration 
by the League of Nations, be rejected, he feared that the Turks 
might take the law into their own hands. If this happened, air 
action might delay but could'not prevent the Turkish capture of 
Mosul. To recapture this area would require the mobilisation and 
despatch of the whole of the British Expeditionary Force. His 
note continued: 
Such a war would involve the whole of 
1. Cab 1+/11, CID Paper 512-B, 4 November 1924. 
2. Air 8/34, Folio 27, Part II/l, CIGS to CAS, 
8 October 1925. 
3. Cab 2/4, CID 203rd Meeting, 15 October 1925. 
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the reduced military resources of the 
Empire and even if successful would be 
entirely profitless, disastrously 
expensive and of unlimited duration. ' 
In reply, the Air Staff complained that the General Staff had no 
solution to offer but to state at the eleventh hour that the 
policy with which they had agreed six weeks earlier would probably 
end in disaster, and that the various alternative means of bringing 
pressure to bear on the Turks would be futile. 2 
A few days later, having cast doubts upon the strategy to be 
adopted in the event of a Turkish attack, Cavan wrote to Trenchard 
concerning the question of command if combined military and air 
operations proved necessary. He proposed that the GOC designate of 
the Indian Division comprising Echelon B should go at once to Iraq 
to confer with the AOC and to make such recommendations as he might 
think necessary. The letter continued: 
I am sure you must see that it Is only 
reasonable that a man who may have to 
take command in a serious military 
operation on land should have an 
opportunity of a preliminary discussion 3 and reconnaissance with the AOC on the spot. 
Two days later the proposal was put formally in a memo to the COS. 
4 
Trenchard gave vent to his feelings in a minute to his 
Minister. He resented very strongly, he told him, the way in which 
the WO and General Staff were continually criticising all the work 
the Air Ministry were doing in carrying out their important and 
extremely difficult task in Iraq. The note continued: 
The Air Ministry have shouldered the 
responsibility of accepting some risk 
and for over three years they have 
saved millions with this risk ever 
hanging over them. From the day the 
present scheme was proposed, the WO 
and General Staff have opposed with 
1. Cab 2+/176, Note by CIGS, contained in 
" CP 513(25), 2 December 1925. 
2. Air 8/34, Folio 27, Part 11/6, Air Staff 
Note, 2 December 1925. 
3. Ibid., Part 11/7, CIGS to CAS, 5 December 1925. 
4. Cab 53/12, COS Paper 31,7 December 1925. 
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great bitterness our taking control, 
and ever since they have been making 
the greatest efforts to resume control. ' 
What the Army really wanted, claimed Trenchard, was. to take over 
control from the Air Ministry, in spite of the fact that the air 
scheme had proved to be a great success. Thus they felt it their 
duty to alarm the Cabinet and the CID about the situation in Iraq. 
On the question of command, Trenchard put it to his Minister, Sir 
Samuel Hoare, that there would be sufficient time for this matter 
to be resolved when the second Echelon was asked for. It would 
take six weeks to arrive and this would enable the new commander 
to be in Iraq a month before his troops arrived in order to 
"clear up the alleged muddle". 2 
At a meeting of the COS the following day, both Service 
Chiefs expanded their arguments, discussion being centred mainly 
around the question of command once it had been decided that the 
second Echelon of Indian reinforcements was required. Lord Cavan 
wanted it resolved there and then that on the demand for the 
second Echelon the command in Iraq would automatically be trans- 
ferred to the GOC Indian Division and the ministerial control* 
of the operations to the WO. He argued that by the time this 
Echelon had arrived in Iraq, the conditions required for military 
command would ipso facto have been fulfilled. In the interests of 
efficiency, it was essential to decide the issue at once. 
1. Air 8/34+, Folio 27, Part II/10, Minute by CAS to 
Secretary of State for Air, 10 December 1925. 
2. Ibid. Three days earlier, on the day the General 
Staff Memo had been written, Trenchard had penned 
an even stronger note, but this does not appear 
to have been sent to Hoare. One paragraph reads: 
I must say that this continual attacking by 
the General Staff and the questioning of 
the responsibility of the Air Ministry to 
carry out operations has already done untold 
harm, brought about increased friction 
between the staffs and, instead of one big 
Department receiving the full and 
sympathetic help of another Department, they 
have received nothing but a series of 
unhelpful suggestions, criticisms and 
alarmist papers. 
Ibid., Note by CAS, 7 December 1925. 
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Trenchard, on the other hand, held that, even when the 
second Echelon had arrived, it might well be used in a supporting 
role. The Committee was not justified, therefore, in taking a 
decision which would tend to reduce the powers of the AOC and to 
impair-the confidence of the Iraqi Government and people in the 
present defence arrangements. The necessity for the despatch of 
the second Echelon might never arise, but if it did, then there 
would be ample time to decide the question of command and the 
decision could then be taken with the full knowledge of the type 
of operation which was developing. 
' 
- 
The debate was continued at a meeting of the CID held on the 
same day. Hoare said that the AOC was in a difficult position and 
his job was not being made easier by the present controversy. Any 
decision to transfer responsibility from the Air Ministry to the 
WO was bound to leak out and would be seen to suggest that the 
Government had no confidence in the Air Force. Furthermore, the 
arrival of a Lt. General in Iraq would be followed by the despatch 
of masses of troops and the danger of being irresistibly drawn 
into a conflict with the Turkish Empire. The War Minister, Sir 
Laming Worthington-Evans, regarded such a suggestion as 
"fantastic". In his view, forces equivalent to one division 
should pass under the control of a GOC. Churchill, however, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, felt that numbers had nothing to do 
with the matter. The arrival of more troops did not necessarily 
change the operations from air to land. The tactics contemplated 
were the retirement of ground troops combined with vigorous 
offensive from the air. In his opinion a force of eight air 
squadrons was incomparably greater as a striking force than a 
force of one division employed largely on lines of communication. 
The arguments advanced by the Air Ministry won the day. It 
was decided that the first reinforcements should be under the 
control of the AOC and that the decision as to whether a C-in-C 
should be appointed would be resolved before subsequent 
2 reinforcements were despatched. The Colonial Secretary, L. S. 
1. Cab 53/1, COS 26th Meeting, 11 December 1925. 
2. Cab 2/4, CID 207th Meeting, 11 December 1925. 
146 
Amery, was in Geneva at the time of the meeting, but made his 
attitude plain in d telegram to Sir Samuel Wilson a few days 
later. He was, he said, absolutely opposed to WO control in Iraq 
under any circumstances. ' Trenchard wrote to AVM Sir Edward 
Ellington at the end of, December: 
I have had a tremendous time at home, 
with the General Staff attacking me 
all the time with regard to our 
command in Iraq and everything 
connected with it. You will be glad to 
hear that .. I kept my end up and we have not handed over the command of 
Iraq to the WO, which they wanted and 
still want; and Higgins has not been 
superseded by an Army General as the 
WO also wanted.; we have not mobilised 
divisions to fight Turkey; and we have 2 not run the Empire into a state of disaster. 
In the New Year the international situation improved and, 
as a consequence, much of the heat was taken out of the dispute 
between the two services. In June, a friendly agreement was 
signed at Angora by the British, Turkish and Iraqi Governments, 
and war with Turkey ceased to be a serious possibility. 
... 0.0.00.. 0 .0.. . 00.0.. 0 0.0.. .. 00 
No sooner had relations in Iraq become more restrained, 
however, than the two services came into conflict over the 
control of the garrison at Aden. As early as May 1922, Trenchard 
had seen the possibility of reducing this garrison by one 
battalion, as envisaged at the Cairo Conference. He had written 
to Ellington, then AOC Middle East, "It seems to me that the 
garrison could come down to two battalions .. as a first step. I 
have always believed and hoped that in due course Aden will 
become an air controlled station just like Iraq. "3 
1. Air 8/311, Folio 27, Part 11/16, Amery to 
Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 14 December 1925. 
2. Trenchard Papers, II/27/63/2, Trenchard to 
Ellington, 29 December 1925. Ellington was 
then AOC India, and AVM Sir John Higgins 
was AOC Iraq. 
3. Trenchard Papers, II/27/63/1, Trenchard, to 
Ellington, 29 May 1922. 
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It was not until late 1926, however, when troubles broke out 
with the forces of the neighbouring Imam of Yemen, that the Air 
Ministry was given its first real opportunity to push for an 
increase in RAF strength within the colony. At a meeting of the 
COS Sub-Committee in November, Trenchard claimed that a squadron 
of bombers would be able to prevent further encroachments by the 
Imam, provided that there were a certain number of local levies 
commanded by British officers to protect advanced landing grounds. 
The Colonial Office favoured the plan. The Army, faced with the 
alternative of bringing in-Indian forces at a cost of 13 million, 
raised no objection, though Major General K. Stewart, GOC Aden, 
warned that the raising of levies would take a long time. However, 
if the Air Force were authorised to operate across the frontier, 
he considered that the plan might be successful. 
' 
The following month, however, the Cabinet, bent on reducing 
the cost of the garrison, asked the COS whether this might be 
achieved by withdrawing one of the British infantry battalions 
once the increase had been made in the bomber force. 2 This 
suggestion brought an immediate objection from the CIGS. The Imam, 
he pointed out to the COS Committee, had an army of 2,500 men and 
three or four batteries of artillery available for operations on 
the Aden border, together with an indefinite number of tribesmen. 
The General Staff had agreed to the employment of more bombers on 
this front, but should offensive action be decided upon, the 
possibility of an attack on Aden itself had to be borne in mind. 
Furthermore, a reduction of one battalion would not permit the 
protection of sufficient hinterland to ensure the safety of Aden 
harbour. There was, too, the pressing problem of internal security 
and the possibility of having to send reinforcements to Perim and 
Somaliland. It was recognised policy to have a British garrison 
at an important naval base, but it was particularly desirable at 
Aden, where the population was extremely mixed. 
3 
1. Cab 53/1, -COS 37th Meeting, 3 November 1926. 
2. Cab 53/13, COS Paper 58, Extract from 
Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting 66(26), 
16 December 1926. 
3. Ibid., COS Paper 65, Memo by CIGS, 
7 January 1927. 
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At the next meeting of the COS, the CIGS, General Sir George 
Milne, took the war into the enemy's camp, and tempers were lost. 
' 
The disbandment of the British battalion, he told Trenchard, was 
a matter for the Army Council and he was not prepared to discuss 
it. Such a question could not be considered from the narrow 
standpoint of Aden, but had to be examined in the light of the 
Army's strategic distribution. He had never dreamt that the 
increase in bombers would be used as a "lever" to reduce the 
infantry garrison. The CAS retorted that, in his view, the 
possibility of a land attack upon the Colony was slight at that 
time, and that the disbandment of the battalion could not be 
delayed. 2 
In a memo a few days later, Trenchard set out the Air Staff's 
case. The present garrison, he claimed, had been unable to with- 
stand encroachment. It would be more efficient and economical to 
retain the RAF squadron combined with irregular levies and to 
re-employ the British battalion elsewhere. A squadron of aircraft 
was "ample insurance" against further attacks, and aerial 
reconnaissance would provide plenty of warning against the 
approach of an enemy by sea. As far as internal security was 
concerned, the CAS minimised the dangers amidst "a populace 
hitherto tranquil and of widely varying sympathies". Furthermore, 
an increased number of aircraft would enable rapid reinforcement 
tobe sent to outlying areas, such as Somaliland, and, in addition, 
would permit British influence to be extended by air demonstration 
and visits. Lastly, on the question of comparative cost, he 
estimated that an annual saving of £100,000 would be achieved, 
this being mainly due to the fact that the location of a squadron 
at Aden did not involve an increase in the total strength of the 
1. Trenchard wrote to Hoare two days after the 
meeting, "I had a terrific wrangle yesterday (sic) 
with Beatty and Milne on the subject of Aden and 
South Africa. " See Trenchard Papers, 11/27/85, 
Trenchard to Hoare, 27 January 1927, The 
controversy over South African defence is 
referred to later in this work. 
Trenchard was promoted MRAF 1 January 1927. 
2. Cab 53/1, COS 143rd Meeting, 25 January 1927. 
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RAF and thus entailed no initial cost. ' 
Later that month the CIGS renewed his opposition, this time 
in a memo to Hankey. It was false economy, he argued, to 
substitute inferior and unreliable natives for British troops in 
a place of such importance. Nor could aircraft defend the 
frontier. The hill tribes did not advance in massed formations, 
nor did they attack in daylight. The results of air operations on 
the North West Frontier of India did not encourage much faith in 
the ability of aircraft in such terrain. He agreed that 
reinforcement by air could be quickly carried out from Egypt and 
that it would be much cheaper than sending troops by sea. It 
seemed wiser and more logical, therefore, to leave infantry on 
the spot - the surest form of close defence - and to reinforce it 
when necessary by the arm which could reach there most quickly 
and economically. Greater mobility and range had their advantages, 
but they were not essential to a sure defence. Turning to the 
matter of cost, he claimed that the permanent location of a 
squadron at Aden meant a loss of a squadron from home defence and 
that the replacement of this unit would certainly involve capital 
expenditure. Nor had account been taken of the cost of extra 
aerodromes. 2 
Another stormy meeting of the COS followed in March at which 
Beatty supported the CIGS. Milne held that air action could not 
prevent tribesmen from crossing the frontier. The best results 
would be achieved by cooperation between the two services. If 
the garrison were reduced by a battalion there would be 
insufficient troops to ensure that cooperation and the port would 
not be secure. Later, when Trenchard cited the cases of Colombo, 
Trincomalee and Sierra Leone as examples of important naval bases 
which were without British garrisons, Milne argued that this in 
no way affected the case; indeed, it pointed to the need to 
consider whether British garrisons should not be stationed at 
these points. Trenchard stuck to his guns. He saw a time in the 
not too distant future, he said, when the garrison would be 
1. Cab 53/13, COS Paper 66,3 February 1927. 
2. Ibid., COS Paper 67, Minute from CAS to 
Secretary, 25 February 1927. 
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reduced to one squadron RAF, half a troop of cavalry, 'and some 
500 levies. He supported the view recently expressed by Mr. 
Churchill and Mr. Amery that the Middle East territories should 
be considered as one military sphere for aircraft in imperial 
defence. ' 
The argument was continued at CID level, and here Trenchard 
found a staunch ally in the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The 
General Staff, declared Churchill, exaggerated the danger from 
sea attack. He had already made a cut of £100,000 in the Middle 
East vote in anticipation of substantial economies. Air control 
had proved itself in Somaliland and Iraq, and large savings could 
be effected by handing Aden over to the Air Force. The advice of 
the General Staff should be discarded. Amery also felt that a 
large British garrison was out of place. For the Army, Lt. General 
Sir Thomas Scott, formerly GOC Aden Brigade, deprecated the 
employment of local levies. These, he pointed out, would have to 
come from the Yemen, a country eaten up with jealousy and 
fanaticism. 
Having studied the arguments put forward by the Chiefs of 
Staff, the Committee agreed that the question of the Aden 
garrison should be considered by the Cabinet and that an expert 
committee should be appointed to examine the relative costs of 
the various proposals. 
2 After some delay, the Cabinet gave their 
ruling in October, pronouncing in favour of the RAF taking over 
command of Aden and its surrounding territories. Under the air 
control scheme the existing garrison was to be replaced by one 
RAF squadron, three armoured car companies, and tribal forces 
numbering 4,000 to 5,000.3 
The following February the defence of Aden and its hinter- 
land was placed under the command of Group Captain W. G. S. 
Mitchell. His leadership and the air control scheme as a whole 
were put to the test almost at once. Following the capture by the 
1. Cab 53/2, COS 14th Meeting, 14 March 1927. 
Churchill and Amery were speaking at the 
221st Meeting of the CID held on 25 February 
1927. See Cab 2/5. 
2. Cab 2/5, CID 226th Meeting, 5 May 1927. 
3. Cab 23/55, Cabinet Meeting 52(27), 26 October 1927. 
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Imam of two sheiks under British protection, air operations were 
directed against his frontier garrisons. In a little over a month 
the Imam was returning his captives and suing for peace. A 
delighted Trenchard wrote to Mitchell in mid-April: 
.. you may be glad to know that everybody thinks it perfectly marvellous what the 
air force did ... and it has had the 
greatest possible effect on important 
political persons at home. Though it will 
not appear in the papers, I am continually 
telling all that twelve officers under a 
good squadron leader have ended a five 
year squabble in five weeks. ' 
Such outstanding success gave the General Staff little 
opportunity to attempt to change a situation which they had 
tried so hard to avert. Indeed, such an occasion did not present 
itself until the latter part of 1935 when, on account of the 
Abyssinian crisis, reinforcements were despatched to Aden in the 
form of ground troops. In a letter dated 15th November, Wing 
Commander G. C. Pirie, a member of the DOI, warned the DCAS, AVM 
C. L. Courtney, that the General Staff were anxious to reopen the 
question of command at Aden. He reported that the Army officer in 
charge of troops there, Lt. Colonel N. M. McLeod, was 
complaining to the WO that, as Aden was a fortress and thus 
governed by the provisions of the Coast Defence Manual, his 
position was not inferior to but co-equal with the AOC. 
2 
Commenting upon this matter in a memo to the DCAS the same day, 
Group Captain R. H. Peck, the DDOI, pointed out that McLeod had 
been nursing such grievances for some months. The note added: 
I dare say the climate has got to his head 
a bit. I think it is not good for 
cooperation between the two services that 
soldiers should resent ever having to work 
under the RAF and we ought not to give3in 
meekly to any approaches of this kind. 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/131, Trenchard to 
Mitchell, 16 April 1928. 
2. Air 2/1294, Item 30A, Pirie to Courtney, 
15 November 1935. 
3. Ibid., Item 30A/2, Peck to Courtney, 
15 November 1935. 
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Later that month the DD Plans informed the DCAS that, in his 
view, the real aim behind the agitation was to have McLeod made 
Fortress Commander so that he could refer his disagreement, as 
well as anything else he pleased, direct to the WO. 
' 
Early in December the matter was officially raised in a 
letter from the CIGS to the CAS, ACM Sir Edward Ellington. The. 
General Staff, stated FM Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, 
was anxious that a more senior officer should assume the 
appointment of OC troops at Aden as a temporary measure during 
the emergency. He also suggested that all land forces - including 
Aden's levies and ärmoured cars - should be placed under this 
officer's command. 
2 This letter provoked a strong attack on the 
WO from the DDOI, Group Captain A. Harris. This has been written 
by Hutton, " he told Pirie. "It was to be expected, and is a 
continuation of his efforts which throughout the present 
circumstances have been directed towards increasing the Army hold 
and decreasing the Air Force hold on Commands in the various 
territories in the Middle East. " Harris contended that now that 
Aden was becoming rapidly important as a fortress, the Army was 
aiming to take over control and leave the AOC simply responsible 
for operations in the Protectorate. However, as there were only 
two 9.2 and 6 inch guns at Aden, it could be argued that the main 
armament of the fortress was the Air Force. In fact, Aden was an 
example of a fortress where the aeroplane and not the gun was the 
primary defence weapon. The Army's proposals, he warned again, 
were the "thin end of the wedge", aimed at depriving the Air 
Ministry of all effective control in Aden. 
3 
In a minute to the CAS, Mr. C. G. Evans, an Assistant 
Secretary at the Air Ministry, echoed the same fears. If the 
Air Force were to accept the WO theory that all "troops" should 
be put under the senior military. officer, he cautioned, then it 
would not be very long before the Army were claiming that it 
1. Air 2/1294, Item 30A/7, DD Plans to DCAS, 
26 November 1935. 
2. Ibid., Item l+6A, CIGS to CAS, December 1935. 
3. Ibid., Item 34, Harris to Pirie, 
10 December 1935. Colonel T. J. Hutton was then 
General Staff Officer at the WO. 
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would be much more suitable for the whole command to be a 
military one with the air unit operating under an Air Force 
officer who was subordinate to the military commander. ' In his 
reply, Ellington informed the CIGS that whilst he raised no 
objection to a more senior Army officer being appointed at Aden, 
he was opposed to the suggestion that this officer should have 
command of all land forces. The levies and armoured cars, he 
pointed out, were normally used for the defence of RAF bases and 
landing grounds, and they also formed a central reserve. As such 
2 they should remain under the direct control of the AOC. 
The Army made one more attempt. The CIGS replied the 
following day suggesting two alternatives: the AOC to be. in 
supreme command but with all land forces grouped under the senior 
military officer, or, otherwise, all the Services to command 
their own forces, as practised in Singapore, with the AOC, as 
the fortress commander, being responsible for coordination, and 
assuming supreme command in the case of extreme danger. 
3 After 
consulting with Air Commodore C. F. A. Portal, who had just 
returned from the command of Aden, the CAS made it clear to the 
CIGS that he remained opposed to the idea of interposing new 
headquarters with "all its paraphernalia" between the land 
forces and the AOC. Even with additional reinforcements, Aden 
remained a small command wherein the major problem was the 
defence of the Protectorate. It could not be compared with 
Singapore, where the main concern was defence against all forms 
of attack. 
' 
Five days later Montgomery-Massingberd reluctantly agreed 
that his Army officer in Aden would only be responsible for 
Army units and would remain under the command of the AOC, but 
he made it clear that he was far from satisfied with that 
5 
arrangement. 
..... .0........ ...... .. .6.. .. 0.. 
1. Air 2/1294, Item 37, Evans to Ellington, 
18 December 1935. 
2. Ibid., Item l+6A, CAS to CIGS, 19 December 1935. 
3. Ibid., CIGS to CAS, 20 December 1935. 
k. Ibid., CAS to CIGS, 16 January 1936. 
5. Ibid., CIGS to CAS, 21 January 1936. 
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Such attempts by the General Staff to seize back some if 
not all of the authority once vested in them in Aden were 
symptomatic of the continued determination of the Army to regain 
the power and prestige which had been slowly eroded by airpower 
over the years. No opportunity, however meagre, was lost in an 
attempt to recover lost ground or challenge new claims by the 
Air Staff. Indeed, this determined opposition was also to be seen 
at work in the Sudan, where the threat of fanatical tribalism 
offered yet another opportunity for the Air Ministry to spread 
their wings. 
It was in July 1926, during a review of imperial defence by 
the CID, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "Sir 
Austen Chamberlain, suggested that a small committee consisting 
of representatives from the Foreign Office, Air Ministry and 
WO should be set up to consider the best means of dealing with 
any future outbreaks of Mahdism in the territory. At this 
meeting the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Churchill, favoured 
the employment of a squadron of aircraft and felt sure that 
airpower would prove as successful as it had done in Iraq. 
' 
The deliberations of this select committee revealed once 
again the deep gulf dividing the WO and Air Ministry on the 
question of imperial policing. The Air Staff argued that the 
existing flight'of aircraft at Khartoum was insufficient. If this 
force were increased to a squadron, however, the garrison could 
be reduced by one British infantry battalion without danger to 
the security of the country. The lines of communication from Port 
Sudan were remote from the danger areas to the south and west of 
Khartoum and it therefore seemed unnecessary to retain a British 
infantry battalion permanently in the Sudan with the main purpose 
of protecting these lines in the unlikely event of an outbreak of 
Mahdism. The General Staff again proved reluctant to reduce 
ground forces in such an area. They were not prepared to recommend 
a reduction beyond the present number of battalions. Comparison 
with Iraq was not fully justified. The Sudan was more than six 
times larger than Iraq and there were less than half the number 
1. Cab 2/4, CID 215th Meeting, 22 July 1926. 
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of troops to guard it. ' 
The Committee's recommendation that air strength should be 
increased to one squadron but that, in the first instance, there 
should be no reduction in British Army units, was not generally 
favoured when the CID discussed the matter in February 1927. The 
recommendation was allowed to stand, but Sir Austen Chamberlain 
felt it extremely improbable that the Sudan would be able to bear 
the additional cost. Churchill again came out strongly in support 
of the Air Force. He confessed that he could not understand the 
opposition to control by air. It had clearly proved itself in 
Iraq, where 40,000 troops had been replaced by a few squadrons of 
aeroplanes. The General Staff's case was outlined by the War 
Minister, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans. He argued that one 
battalion was needed for the security of Khartoum itself, and 
another to defend lines of communication. In Iraq at that time, 
he pointed out, there was a garrison of some 16,500 men. In the 
Sudan, on the other hand, it was impossible to rely entirely upon 
local troops. 2 
This view was later supported by Sir John Maffey, Governor 
General of the Sudan. In a letter to Lord Lloyd in April, he 
claimed that an increase in air strength was not necessary and 
that the cost to the Sudan - based on the difference between the 
cost of a squadron's maintenance at home and at Khartoum - was not 
justified. Latent possibilities of trouble could not be countered 
or "in any way appreciably affected by the spectacle of aeroplanes 
flying overhead". In this, he noted, he was supported by Major 
General H. J. Huddleston, Commandant of the Sudan Defence Force, 
and by Lord Lloyd himself. 3 Such an attitude towards air control, 
retorted the Air Staff in a memo to the CID, was due in fact to 
the misuse of airpower. The flight in the Sudan had never been 
given an opportunity to prove its worth. Aircraft had been 
restricted to a much narrower range of duties than that undertaken 
in similar conditions by air units in other Middle East 
1. Cab 4/16, CID Paper 751-B, 10 November 1926. 
2. Cab 2/4, CID 220th Meeting, 15 February 1927. 
3. Cab 1+/16, CID Paper 802-B, Enclosure 1, Maffey 
to Lloyd, 12 April 1927. Lord Lloyd was High 
Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, 1925-1929. 
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territories and along the North West Frontier. The memo 
continued: 
If aircraft were more fully employed 
and in larger numbers, the constant 
reminder which they would afford to 
the tribesmen of the ubiquity and 
power of the forces behind the 
Administration should be of as much 
value in the Sudan as in Iraq. ' 
In view of the Governor General's opinion and the extra cost 
involved in maintaining a flight detached from its parent 
squadron, the Air Staff recommended that the flight be withdrawn 
and returned to Egypt. 2 
When the matter was again discussed by the CID in July, 
both Lloyd and Maffey added further support to the WO case. The 
latter was particularly forthright. As the proposal to increase 
the Air Force was bound to bring up the question of removing one 
of the British battalions, he considered that it was best to 
leave the matter well alone. The Sudan was satisfied with the 
existing situation. Unlike some areas, such as the North West 
Frontier of India, distances were great, population was very 
sparse, and there was no possibility of surprise. Furthermore, 
aeroplanes would be out of touch with local information and would 
not have the same ease in establishing contact. In the North West 
Frontier, where tribes lived in compact and well known areas, 
aeroplanes could be used. to great effect. 
3 
Maffey's opinion of air control on the Indian frontier was 
certainly not shared by most Army personnel in India itself, 
' 
and shows the muddled thinking abroad at this time as to the 
efficacy of aircraft in imperial policing. The Air Minister, Sir 
Samuel Hoare, expressed surprise that he should consider 
-- - mountainous country as suitable for air action and appeared to 
ignore the success of airpower in dealing with the scattered 
tribes in the flat areas of Iraq. He supported the Air Staff in 
1. Cab 4/16, CID Paper 809-B, Note by Air 
Staff, 22 June 1927. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Cab 2/5, CID 228th Meeting, 7 July 1927. - 4. See this work, Chapter 6. 
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calling for the flight to be withdrawn. Trenchard again 
complained about the misuse of airpower in the Sudan. He claimed 
that the flight had not been given any work to do beyond taking 
up Army officers and others to give them air experience. Mr. 
Churchill confessed that he had listened to the views of Sir 
John Maffey with "surprise and pain". Airpower had proved 
itself in Iraq in spite of the solemn warnings of the General 
Staff. He favoured the full squadron and, in the last resort, 
would sooner see the required £30,000 paid out of the Imperial 
Exchequer than that a "wrong and reactionary turn should be 
given to our methods of defence". Support for this view came from 
both Amery and Sir Austen Chamberlain, and it was eventually 
recommended that the air force be increased to one squadron, 
leaving the size of the garrison to be re-examined in a year's 
time. I Maffey gladly accepted this proposal and later that month 
the Cabinet decided that "the efficacy of air forces in relation 
to the defence requirements of the Sudan should be given a fair 
and thorough trial". 2 Some negotiation did follow concerning the 
additional cost involved, but this was quickly and amicably 
settled between the Home and Sudanese Governments. 
3 By the 
beginning of November, Trenchard could report that a full 
squadron was stationed at Khartoum. ' 
But opposition to any reduction in the military garrison 
was continued. The following March a report on operations during 
the-previous three months-was submitted to the CID by Lord Lloyd. 
Accounts therein by two Army officers who had taken part in 
expeditions against certain sections of the Nuer tribe came 
firmly to the conclusion that the number of ground troops could 
not be reduced by the employment of the air arm. Both officers 
agreed that the moral effect of aircraft was immense and served 
1. Cab 2/5, CID 228th Meeting, Item 3, 
7 July 1927. 
2. Cab 4/16, CID Paper 825-B, Enclosure, 
extract from conclusions of Cabinet 
Meeting 40(27), 13 July 1927. 
3. Ibid., CID Paper 838-B, Lord Lloyd to 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, 17 October 1927. 
4. Cab 2/5, CID 230th Meeting, 1 November 1927. 
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to shorten the length of the operations but, in the words of 
Captain J. R. Chidlaw-Roberts, "in operations of this nature 
covering a very extensive area, the RAF, although greatly 
assisting the troops, would not by their own action bring the 
operations to a successful conclusion". The officer commanding 
the air units, on the other hand, complained that once the ground 
force had been considerably increased, "the strong desire for a 
battle or some military objective at once came to the fore and 
definitely militated against full use being made of aircraft". ' 
Despite this report, however, by July Maffey was taking a 
less dogmatic attitude. Whilst regarding ground troops as of 
paramount importance in backward areas, he considered that, as 
soon as the Sudan could be regarded as secure, an adequate 
garrison would be one British battalion and one squadron RAF .2 
Meanwhile the Air Staff, anxious to gain independent command, 
emphasised the expertise required in air control schemes such as 
those in operation in Iraq and Aden. In October a memo to the 
CID stated: 
The salient lesson which that experience 
has taught is that the control of air 
operations in such circumstances is a 
highly specialised affair, and that the 
air arm is a weapon whose keen edge is 
all too easily blunted by misuse. 3 
Thus while the Army stuck doggedly to well-worn ways of 
isolated patrols and punitive expeditions, and the Air Force 
created an air of professional mystique around independent air 
control, the development of true cooperation between air and 
ground forces fell sadly by the wayside. 
Later in October it was the turn of the WO to refurbish 
their case. The Secretary of State for War declared that he was 
1. Cab 4/18, CID Paper 903-B, Operations in the 
Sudan, December 1927 to February 1928. Despatch 
from the High Commissioner for Egypt and the 
Sudan enclosing a report by the Governor General 
of the Sudan dated 22 March 1928. 
2. Ibid., CID Paper' 901+-B, Despatch by Lord Lloyd 
concerning memo by Sir John Maffey, 6 July 1928. 
3. Ibid., CID Paper 911-B, Memos by Air Ministry 
and Air Staff, 11 October 1928. 
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by no means convinced thatthe presence of aircraft constituted 
any real safeguard against outbreaks amongst fanatical and 
ignorant people. Furthermore, there were certain areas of forest 
and thick bush where aircraft could not locate the enemy and 
where recognition of offenders could only be done on the ground. ' 
Then at a meeting of the CID in December, Milne stressed again 
the importance of retaining an infantry garrison of at least li 
battalions. It was agreed inter aZia that the two British 
battalions should be retained for a further period of six months 
and the situation then reviewed. 2 By the end of that period the 
question of permanent accommodation for the RAF squadron at 
Khartoum had become a matter of some urgency. In late June 
Trenchard complained to the CID that the air force personnel had 
been living in hutted accommodation for almost two years and that 
he was unable to propose a scheme for barracks until he knew 
whether the Army units were to be withdrawn. Milne explained that 
it was impossible to put up firm proposals until the strength 
and position of the garrison had been decided. 3 
By November, however, the international. situation had 
radically changed. Troubles in Palestine and uncertainties in 
the political situation between the Sudan and Egypt lent weight 
to the Army's concern for security at ground level. At a meeting 
of the CID the WO and Air Ministry found themselves in agreement 
for once over the retention of the full British garrison in the 
Colony "in view of unforeseen circumstances". 
4 
But this agreement as to the size of the garrison did not 
put an end to controversy. In May 1936 the Air Staff were still 
complaining that the GOC had not used aircraft in accordance 
with the undertaking made in July 1927. The DDOps cited a number 
1. Cab 4/18, CID Paper 915-B, 29 October 1928. 
2. Cab 2/5, CID 239th Meeting, 13 December 1928. 
Milne was appointed FM 30 January 1928. 
3. Ibid., CID 243rd Meeting, 27 June 1929. 
4+. Ibid., CID 245th Meeting, 14+ November 1929. 
In fact a reduction was made in ground troops 
in July 1930. A company of infantry was sent 
to Cyprus in order to ease the accommodation 
problems.. See Cab 1/20, CID Paper 1010-B, 
Report by Secretary, 31 July 1930. 
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of incidents in which he alleged that aircraft had been wrongly 
or inefficiently employed. The solution, he claimed, was to 
remove the squadron from Army control. ' 
................................ 
But if the troubles in Palestine in 1929 helped to forge a 
measure of agreement between the two services in the Sudan, they 
served only to embitter relations within the Mandate itself. The 
Air Force control, initiated in 1922, had long rankled with the 
WO, and the ensuing commission of enquiry afforded them a welcome 
opportunity to reopen the issue. 
For the Air Force, AVM H. C. T. Dowding, sent out to command 
the forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan soon after the 
disturbances had begun, argued that the two infantry battalions 
which had been drafted in were required purely because of 
"abnormal conditions". The first priority was to make the police 
force sufficiently strong and efficient to deal with the normal 
duties of law and order. The Army spokesman, on the other hand, 
Brigadier W. G. S. Dobbie, claimed that Palestine had an external 
as well as an internal problem. For that reason alone the defence 
of the country should be entrusted to the Army rather than to 
the RAF. Indeed, he contended, aircraft were not suited to the 
duties required in Palestine. He told the Enquiry: 
Aeroplanes are really bluff. The only 
thing they can do is to drop bombs or 
to shoot with-their machine guns and 
their action is extremely 
indiscriminate and the people of this 
country, I am sure, have now taken 
their measure, they now realise that 
they are bluff. 2 
In his view the normal garrison should be two British infantry 
battalions stationed at Haifa and Jerusalem, and a number of 
armoured cars. 
3 
The Air Staff dubbed such comment "erroneous and 
1. Air 9/49, Folio 18, Note by DDOps on Status 
of the RAF in the Sudan, May 1936. 
2. Cab 53/20, COS Paper 212,12 December 1929, 
Annexure 1. 
3. Ibid. Dobbie was then Commander, Cairo Brigade. 
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prejudiced". ' The Commission, however, whilst not ruling on the 
thorny question of which service should be in command, concluded 
that for the duties of checking widespread disturbances and 
restoring order in Palestine, it had been clearly established 
that infantry were more effective than either aeroplanes or 
armoured cars. 2 
The following month Trenchard wrote to Dowding warning him 
that efforts were being made to make out that the Air Staff were 
"the villains of the piece" for the conditions then existing in 
Palestine. A great-number of soldiers, as well as civilians, he -" 
complained, were making out that the Air Staff had persuaded 
Lord Plumer against his better judgment to scrap all the ground 
forces and run the whole show by air, thus paving the way for 
the recent riots. He continued: 
.. that lie .. would be broadcast in the press all over the world and do 
us a lot of harm and we should never 
be able to catch up ... the denial 
would never get the publicity that 
the accusation had got. 3 
The truth of the matter, he reminded Dowding, was that although 
the Air Staff had been pressed for reductions, they had always 
insisted that some ground forces should be retained. It had been 
Lord Plumer who had gone out to Palestine and recommended their 
complete withdrawal. ' 
This explanation is open to question, however. In April 
1925, for example, following a decision to reorganise the 
security forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Sir Herbert 
Samuel, High. Commissioner for Palestine, had warned Mr. Amery, 
the Colonial Secretary, concerning the operational limitations 
of aircraft and armoured cars when used in a country such as 
1. Air 9/12, Item 33, Air Staff Note, 
28 May 1930. 
2. Cab 5/7, CID Paper 348-C, para. 4, 
27 June 1930. 
3. Trenchard Papers, II/27/60, Trenchard 
to Dowding, 21 November 1929. 
4. Ibid. Lord Plumer was High Commissioner 
for Palestine, 1925-1928. 
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Palestine. He had advised that, on the withdrawal of the last 
remaining regular army unit -a cavalry regiment -a small 
British military force, preferably of two companies of infantry, 
should again be stationed in the Mandate. This suggestion had 
been rejected by the Air Ministry. ' In 1929, too, at the time of 
the troubles, Slessor recorded an interview with Trenchard in 
which the CAS admitted that the Air Staff had dropped their 
previous policy "too quickly and with insufficient protest". One 
of the reasons for this was that Lord Plumer was a Field Marshal 
and "one was never allowed to forget it". Had the Air Staff 
opposed Plumer's recommendations, then he would have threatened 
to resign, and this would have created an impossible position for 
the local Air Commodore. 2 
The New Year brought little comfort for the Air Staff. The 
High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir John Chancellor, pronounced 
in favour of retaining the two British battalions as part of the 
permanent garrison and advocated that the responsibility for 
public security be transferred from the Air Ministry to the WO. 3 
This was followed by a letter from the Army Council complaining 
of a system by which they were asked to provide military 
reinforcements in a country for which they bore no responsibility. 
It was not, they contended, an arrangement which lent itself to 
"smooth working in practice". In the circumstances, they 
considered that the control of operations should be vested in the 
hands of a military commander under the direction of the WO. 
4 
1. Cab 5/7, CID Paper 348-C, Enclosure 5, Samuel to Amery, 
19 April 1925, and Air Ministry to Samuel, 19 May 1925. 
2. Air 9/19, Folio 11,4 September 1929. These reductions 
brought large savings in expenditure, see graph opposite. 
According to Major General Sir Frederick Maurice, 
however, these savings were more than offset by the cost 
of sending ships and soldiers to restore order. See 
article entitled "Independence and its Limitations", 
The Times, 16 April 1930, and the Hollinghurst Papers, 
AC 73/23/33- 
3. Cab 5/7, CID Paper 31+8-C, Enclosure 1, Despatch dated 
17 January 1930. Chancellor was High Commissioner for 
Palestine 1928-1931. 
Ii. Ibid., Enclosure 7, Letter from WO to Colonial Office, 
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In replying to this argument in a letter to The Times, the 
former Air Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, was quick to point out 
that the responsibility for Palestine had been imposed upon the 
Air Ministry by the Cairo Conference of 1921, it being felt 
difficult in practice to separate the defence of the Trans-Jordan 
frontier, essentially an Air Force responsibility, from the 
garrison problems of Palestine itself. 
' Lord Trenchard, writing 
to the same newspaper later that month, claimed that the RAF had 
always accepted the fact that some ground forces would have to be 
kept in Palestine in view of "the special conditions obtaining 
there". 2 
At the beginning of May both services were able to air their 
grievances at the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on 
Palestine. Lord Thomson, the Air Minister, saw the chief danger 
as the influx of Arabs over the Trans-Jordan border for the 
purpose of murdering Jews. The only effective way of stopping 
ingress was by means of the air force in Trans-Jordan. To defend 
the frontier with troops would be a very large commitment. Up to 
date all attempts at invasion had been effectively and cheaply 
dealt with by the Air Force. As for Palestine itself, it was bad 
from the military point of view to use soldiers for maintaining 
internal order. He admitted that airpower could not keep order in 
towns, but saw the answer as an efficient police force. If 
responsibility for security in Palestine were transferred to the 
WO, either two headquarters would have to be maintained or the WO 
would have to take over the defence of the Trans-Jordan frontier, 
a task which was purely an air proposition. The War Minister, 
Shaw, could see no reason why the limited air force in Trans- 
Jordan should not be under the military command in Palestine, 
just as the AOC was now commanding two battalions in the Mandate. 
He argued that so long as the troops were in Palestine the 
natural centre of control appeared to be the military HQ in Egypt. 
3 
1. The Times, 17 April 1930. See Air 9/62, Folio 5. 
2. Ibid., 23 April 1930. See also Hollinghurst Papers, 
AC 73/23/33. Trenchard had been elected to the 
peerage in the New Year's Honours List. 
3. Cab 5/7, CID Paper 3148-C, Enclosure 1, Minutes of 
1st Meeting, Palestine Cabinet Committee, 1 May. 1930. 
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Faced with such conflicting evidence, the Committee eventually 
agreed to refer this vexed question of military responsibility 
to the CID and recommended, in the meantime, that the existing 
garrison should be retained. ' 
At the meeting of the CID the following month the argument 
was resumed. On the wider theme, Lord Thomson pointed out that 
the Air Ministry had a definite air scheme for the whole of the 
Middle East. If some of their forces were now to be taken away, 
then his Ministry would have to reconsider the whole question of 
airpower in that part of the world. Shaw, on the other hand, saw 
future troubles in Palestine developing from within, thus making 
it essential for armed military forces outside the competence 
of the RAF. 2 
The Cabinet decision, announced later that month, resorted 
to the inevitable compromise. The strength and composition of the 
garrison was to be reviewed annually by the CID. Concerning 
control and command, it was decided that for defence against 
external attack the High Commissioner's principal advisor was to 
be the AOC, with all armed forces at his disposal. Whilst the AOC 
remained responsible for the employment of all armed forces, 
however, whether for external defence or support of the civil 
powers, the senior military officer was to be given the formal 
right of direct access to the High Commissioner on the question 
of internal security. It was to be understood, however, that all 
arrangements made as a result of such access were subject to 
consultation with the AOC. Major questions of administration were 
to be for the Air Ministry to settle in consultation with the WO, 
but for inspection and administration purposes, the military 
units were to be under the orders of the GOC British troops in 
Egypt. 3 
This fragile compromise managed to survive a further period 
of disorder in 1933, but proved inadequate during the more serious 
outbreaks of violence three years later. Unlike earlier troubles, 
1. Cab 5/7, CID Paper 318-C, Report of the Cabinet 
Sub-Committee, 27 June 1930. 
2. Cab 2/5, CID 249th Meeting, 14 July 1930. 
3. Cabinet Meeting 30 July 1930. See Cab 5/7, CID 
Paper 353-C, Note by Secretary, 31 July 1930. 
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which had been primarily anti-Jewish in origin, the riots of 
1936 were directed mainly against the Government and established 
authority. ' As such they necessitated substantial Army 
reinforcements and made inevitable the transfer of military 
power from the Air Ministry to the WO. In view of the steadily 
increasing number of soldiers in the Mandate - the equivalent of 
almost two divisions by early September - it is hardly surprising 
that the two departments had no difficulty in agreeing to this 
transfer "until such time as a return to normal conditions 
allowed a reconsideration of the future defence arrangements in 
Palestine". 2 Lt. General J. G. Dill assumed command of all British 
forces on the 15th September, just two days after his arrival. 
It is worthy of note that three months before this date, at 
a time when the need for sizeable army reinforcements had not 
become too obvious, the AOC, AVM R. E. C. Peirse, one of the first 
graduates of the Imperial Defence College, had formed a Combined 
Staff with Colonel J. F. Evetts, OC British Troops, as his Chief 
of Staff. It could be argued that, in the circumstances then 
prevailing, Peirse saw this move as a means of retaining Air 
Force command of the garrison should matters not seriously worsen. 
It must be said, however, that this novel organisation was adopted 
with the entire agreement of the WO and was welcomed by the High 
Commissioner in"the interests of continuity of command and 
experience. Furthermore, this experiment - introduced with the 
declared aim of making the best possible use of land and air 
forces - worked well and achieved something of a landmark in the 
somewhat barren field of inter-service cooperation. 
3 From June 
onwards,, mobile ground forces were organised at military centres 
with the express purpose of cooperating with an Air Striking 
Force. With the aid of radio vehicles, combined air and ground 
1. WO 32/4177, Despatch by AVM R. E. C. Peirse on 
Disturbances in Palestine, 19 April to 14 
September 1936. Letter to Air Ministry dated 
15 October 1936. 
2. AVM E. L. Gossage, The Royal Air Force, p. 85. 
3. Air 9119, Folio 53, Air Staff Note issued to 
press section, 11 September 1936. The Combined 
Staff was established on 7 June 1936. 
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attack was rapidly brought to bear upon guerrilla bands operating 
in the hill country. Such cooperation, in which the role of the 
aircraft was to locate and pin down the enemy until the infantry 
were ready to engage, reached a high standard of efficiency by 
the time that order had been restored in late October. ' 
Following this open rebellion, Air Force control of 
Palestine and Trans-Jordan was never restored. Air Commodore R. 
Hill, who was despatched to the Middle East earlier in the year 
to replace Peirse as the overall commander, found himself demoted 
en route. On arrival at Jerusalem he served as a supernumary 
until the departure of Peirse, when he assumed command of the 
RAF in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. His sister writes: 
So having started his journey as a 
General Officer C-in-C, he ended it 
with no job at all. 2 
The crisis of 1936 illustrated once again the ability of 
the two services to work closely together when the situation so 
demanded. It is somewhat ironic, however, that such cooperation 
should be achieved in a country where - as both departments 
agreed - the opportunities for close tactical coordination were 
severely limited. Furthermore, when the need did arise for such 
joint action, the two services were found to be sadly lacking 
in the specialised techniques of combined operations and were 
obliged to improvise. Indeed, it was not until the closing 
months of that very year that the first serious attempt was 
made to rectify this situation. It was made not in the hill 
country of Palestine, but in India, amid the more rugged 
terrain of the North West Frontier. 
1. WO 32/4177, Peirse to Air Ministry, 
15 October 1936. Air Commodore C. F. A. 
Portal, speaking at the RUSI in the 
New Year (17 February 1937), referred 
to the "high state of perfection" 
reached during these operations. Speech 
reported in The Aeroplane, Vol. LII, 
24 February 1937, P-219- 
2. Prudence Hill, To Know the Sky, p. 142. 
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In November 1918 there were only two squadrons of aircraft 
in India and these, owing to the prior requirements of the Western 
Front, were equipped with obsolescent, if not obsolete, aircraft. 
Up to that time the employment of air forces in cooperation with 
the Army had never really been considered. In the spring of 1919, 
however, four additional squadrons were despatched to India and 
considerable use was made of aircraft during the period of internal 
disturbances which culminated in the troubles at Amritsar. ' 
The first realisation of how valuable aircraft could be in 
military operations came in May, however, with the outbreak of 
the 3rd Afghan War. Although most air action was confined to 
reconnaissance, several bombing attacks were made on military 
concentrations. Towards the end of the month Kabul itself was 
bombed and, in the opinion of the C-in-C India, General Sir Charles 
Monro, proved an important factor in producing a desire for peace 
on the part of the Afghan government. 2 No sooner had the war come 
to an end than hostilities in Waziristan gave further opportunity 
for aircraft to prove their worth. Little bombing was carried out 
in these operations, but much was achieved by way of close 
reconnaissance work. In December, a memo from the Brigadier General, 
Waziristan Force, to the OC 52nd Wing RAF read: 
It will be of satisfaction to your pilots 
and observers to know that their bold and 
dashing work has been a matter of general 
remark by the Infantry they are assisting 
and enheartening, and that the final 
defeat of the enemy will be due largely' 
to the excellence of their work. 3 
Despite this increasing realisation of the value of aircraft 
for operational purposes on the part of Army commanders, however, 
the importance of the new arm was not as yet fully appreciated 
by the Government of India. During the remaining months of 1920 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/71/2, Memo, CAS to 
Secretary of State for Air, entitled "The 
Progress of the Development of Air Power 
in India", July 1925. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Hollinghurst Papers, AC 73/23/32, 
Appendix C, December 1919. 
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and for the first half of 1921, India and the frontiers were in a 
comparatively peaceful state and the air force was seldom called 
upon to assist the military forces in any operations. As a result, 
severe cuts were made in the Air Force budget and, during the 
summer of 1921, the RAF in India began to deteriorate steadily. 
In addition, bad accounting and a failure on the part of the 
Indian Government to appreciate the importance of maintaining 
adequate reserves led to an embargo being placed on all spares 
and a proposal to reduce the number of squadrons in the country. 
Towards the end of 1921 the RAF in India had almost ceased to 
exist as a fighting service. Liddell Hart wrote of this period: 
... the slender air force of the Army in India was allowed to decay until by 
1922 there were scarcely any serviceable 
machines and the personnel were rotting 
through discouragement and lack of 
practice. ' 
Such conditions notwithstanding, the Air Force continued to 
be confident of the potential of airpower on the Frontier. Amid 
renewed fears of a further conflict with Afghanistan, an Air 
Staff paper contended that if war did break out, operations using 
airpower as the primary arm would be sufficient to make the Amir 
sue for peace .2 General Lord Rawlinson, Monro's successor as 
C-in-C India,. was strongly critical of such a policy in the event 
of a rupture with Afghanistan. He wrote to Trenchard: 
I am opposed to any isolated baby 
bombing of this nature unless it is 
accompanied by definite military 
operations on the ground, and I 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 10/1930/100, Air Control 
in Practice, Part. II, 24 May 1930. Relations 
between the personnel of the two services had 
also become strained. In general the airmen were 
young and lacked experience of the peace time 
manners and customs of the older services. "The 
result, " wrote one observer, "was that the RAP 
became extremely unpopular with the Old Army in 
India, and was barred from service clubs and 
social functions. " See The Aeroplane, Editorial, 
Vol. XXIII, 6 September. 1922, 'p. 181. 
2. Air 9/25, November 1921. 
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have expressed these views to his 
Excellency the Viceroy. ' 
He informed Trenchard that he could see no reason at that time 
for increasing the establishment of the Air Force by two 
squadrons. The finances of India were in such a parlous state 
that he could not spend money on the Air Force unless the 
situation became critical. 
2 
The CAS was not happy with the reference to "baby bombing" 
and told the C-in-C so in a letter dated 8th December. Aircraft 
alone, he claimed; could bring a war with Afghanistan to an end 
without the moving of one soldier, at half the cost, and without 
casualties. He continued: 
... but I'm afraid you and the Army 
will never admit this, so I mean to 
move heaven and earth to try to get 
the air in India put on such a 
footing that we may have a chance of 
showing what we can do without being 
handicapped. 3 
If every big city in Afghanistan were attacked, maintained 
Trenchard, the whole of Afghanistan would accept peace well 
within the time that the C-in-C would take to mobilise his army, 
or at any rate within a few months of it. The appalling cost of 
two divisions from home to reinforce India in case of war with 
Afghanistan would be unnecessary if he were willing to pay the 
cost of the two squadrons. 
4 
In the opinion of the Air Staff at this time, the misuse 
and abuse of airpower stemmed from the Air Force's lack of 
status in Indian affairs. That same month the Secretary of State 
for Air, Captain Guest, complained to Edwin Montagu, Secretary 
of State for India, that the Army was continually cutting down 
Air funds whenever they were short of money. He suggested that 
a senior officer be sent to India to report on the state of 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/139, Rawlinson 
to Trenchard, 15 November 1921. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., Trenchard to Rawlinson, 
8 December 1921. 
4. Ibid. 
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affairs. ' Meanwhile, at a meeting of the Sub-Committee on 
Indian military requirements, Trenchard pointed out that the AOC 
India had no right of direct access to the Indian Government 
and claimed that, as a result, the interests of the air service 
over the past three years had been sacrificed to military needs 
in a way which had proved seriously prejudicial both to the 
organisation and to the morale of the Air Force in India. He 
urged that the AOC be given the status of a Secretary to the 
Government of India, a post which would carry with it the right 
to direct access to the Viceroy on air matters. 2 
Such a suggestion brought an immediate rebuff from the 
General Staff. Wilson wrote to Rawlinson: 
... I attach a delightful paper drawn 
up by the air people in which you will 
see they don't propose any longer to 
take orders from so an inferior person 
as yourself. 3 
In his reply, Rawlinson described Trenchard's proposal as 
"absolute nonsense". Then, anticipating that the Geddes 
Committee would abolish the independent Air Force, he added, 
"that will shut his mouth and prevent further action on his 
part". 
4 To Trenchard he was no less blunt. The suggestion, he 
informed him, was "grotesque and quite impossible". He had not 
the slightest-objection to Webb-Bowen going straight to the 
Viceroy, but seeing that the Viceroy knew absolutely nothing 
about anything to do with the Air, he would not take much 
5 
interest in "Webb's conundrums". 
But the C-in-C India was not unsympathetic to the Air 
1. Air 8/1+0, Part II, Folio 1, Secretary 
of State for Air to India Office, 
2I December 1921. 
2. Trenchard Papers, CII/1/61, CID, IMR 
28, Status of the RAF in India, 
8 December 1921. 
3. Wilson Papers, 13f/20, Wilson to 
Rawlinson, 10 December 1921. 
fit. Ibid., 13f/32, Rawlinson to Wilson, 
4+ January 1922. 
5. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/139, Rawlinson to 
Trenchard, 5 January 1922. Air Commodore 
T. I. Webb-Bowen was then AOC Indian Group.. 
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Staff's cause. ' In the same letter he informed the CAS of his 
fight to save the Air Force in India. Then two weeks later, in 
a letter to Wilson, he explained how he had flatly refused to 
agree to the abolition of the air service and had "threatened 
to hand in my cap and jacket". He feared, however, that the 
two bomber squadrons would be abolished unless the COS and CID 
could prevent it. 2 
Meanwhile, Trenchard continued to press for an increase in 
air force strength. He informed a meeting of the Indian Military 
Requirements Committee that an addition of two bomber squadrons 
in India would be sufficient to enable an intensive bombing 
campaign to be carried out against Kabul and the other principal 
towns of Afghanistan, "on the assumption that the Army would 
not be moved across the frontier". 3 In that same month, however, 
a Sub-Committee chaired by the CIGS, whilst recommending that 
the RAF should be increased by two bomber squadrons, came down 
strongly against any reduction in ground forces. The Air Staff 
representatives felt obliged to issue a minority report 
maintaining that a very slight reduction in army units would be 
quite possible in order to allow for the maintenance of two 
additional squadrons. 
' Rawlinson supported the Committee's main 
findings. The frontier tribes, he stated in a letter to Wilson, 
1. This view was not shared by air enthusiasts. 
One wrote later that year: 
The C-in-C in India, General Rawlinson, 
has apparently about as much understanding 
of the needs and uses of an Air Force as 
has the average Naval officer ... 
See The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XXIII, 
6 September 1922, p. 181. 
2. Wilson Papers, 13f/36, Rawlinson to Wilson, 
18 January 1922. It is pertinent that during 
the Great War Rawlinson, as Commander of the 
Fourth Army, reported most favourably upon the 
action of both fighters and bombers at the 
battle of Amiens. See Salmond Papers, AC 73/4, 
Memo on the Battle of Amiens. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/1/67, Note by CAS 
entitled Aerial Action against Afghanistan, 
CID IMR 52, January 1922. 
14. Air 8/40, Part 1, Folio 19. The Sub-Committee 
met at the WO on 12 and 24 January 1922. 
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scattered as they were over inaccessible mountains and with no 
permanent habitation except for dispersed and isolated mud 
villages, were not open to serious attack from the air. I In a 
letter a few days later he wrote: 
Hot air for Afghanistan and the tribes 
is no more use than a sick headache 
whatever good it may do in the flat 
open plains of Mesopotamia, and I shall 
oppose it tooth and nail. 2 
Lt. General Sir Walter Braithwaite, GOC-in-C Western Command, 
India, was no less scathing. He wrote to General Sir Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd in April: 
I don't know what these Air people are 
at. Their schemes really sound so mad 
that either those responsible for them 
are mad, or else all the rest of us 
are entirely wrong and unable to 
appreciate the present possibilities 
of the air. 3 
By this time, however, there was little Air Force left to 
criticise. Trenchard told the Indian Requirements Committee at 
this juncture that the Air Force in India had only two weeks' 
power of operation. ' 
A more general appreciation of the Army's attitude towards 
airpower on the North West Frontier was afforded the following 
month when AVM Sir John Salmond, accompanied by Group Captain 
J. A. Chamier and Wing Commander F. E. T. Hewlett, was sent out to 
investigate and make recommendations upon the use of airpower 
in India. The mission was viewed with some apprehension by the 
General Staff even before it had departed. Cavan wrote to 
Trenchard early in May: 
1. Wilson Papers, 131/39, Rawlinson to 
Wilson, 1 February 1922. 
2. Ibid., 13g/2, Rawlinson to Wilson, 
12 February 1922. 
3. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 153, 
Braithwaite to Montgomery-Massingberd, 
24 April 1922. Montgomery-Massingberd 
was then GOC 53rd (The Welsh Division) TA. 
4. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/l39, Letter 
Trenchard to Rawlinson 4 April 1922 refers. 
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We are very anxious that they should 
not convey any sort of censure on 
the C-in-C or any officer now on the 
frontier' 
But the need for education, not censure, appears to have been 
uppermost in Salmond's mind. As Laffin points out, he saw his 
mission as "a crusade to educate the Army about proper 
cooperation with the air service and the intelligent use of its 
capabilities". 2 On arrival in India, Salmond reported that the 
need for such education was very real indeed. He informed 
Trenchard that Rawlinson was thoroughly opposed to giving the 
3 RAF more freedom of action. In a later letter he complained: 
He is such a weathercock and so unreliable 
.. He will say something on the spur of the moment and at the back of his mind is 
the constant thought that an increase in It the RAF will mean a decrease in the Army. 
He advised Trenchard that he was shortly to stay with the 
Viceroy and would prepare him against "the bitter and 
uncompromising attitude" being adopted by the C-in-C and his 
staff. 
5 Later in the month he warned that everyone from 
Rawlinson downwards was prepared to resist most strenuously 
any further cuts. All appeared blind to the enormous power that 
the Air Force could wield on the frontier and beyond. His 
letter continued: 
... we can of course demonstrate the 
cheapness of aircraft in action.. I 
cannot however shut my eyes to the 
fact that we must expect the most 
1. Air 8/40, Part 2, Folio 3, Cavan to 
Trenchard, 5 May 1922. 
2. Laffin, op. cit., p. 153. In his autobiography, 
Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris states 
that the moment it was known that S almond 
was being sent out to investigate, the attitude 
of the Army High Command changed completely. 
"They obviously panicked, " he wrote. See 
Bomber offensive, p. 20. 
3. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/143/2, Salmond 
to Trenchard, 2 June 1922. 
4. Ibid., 2 July 1922. 
5. Ibid. 
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uncompromising hostility from the 
Army authorities to proposals 
which can only be carried out at 
their expense. ' 
Inconsistent though he might appear to have been, however, 
Rawlinson's basic argument remained constant. He maintained 
that any success so far gained by the Air Force in Mesopotamia 
or elsewhere was no promise of like success in India. Indeed, 
he questioned the success of air control in Mesopotamia itself, 
seeing the comparatively peaceful conditions in that country 
as the direct result of the "hammering" which the Army had given 
the rebels in 1920.2 Furthermore, the Army's attitude to the 
Air Force was doubtless coloured at this stage by the tendency 
of the Air Ministry to overplay their hand. Dyed-in-the-wool 
Generals were highly sceptical of theoretical schemes, 
especially when they were put forward by Salmond with such naive 
confidence. The potentiality of airpower was appreciated by the 
military in command, at least in part, but they were very wary 
lest they be dazzled by the bright hopes entertained by 
enthusiastic airmen. After meeting Salmond at a conference in 
Quetta in July, for example, Braithwaite wrote to Montgomery- 
Massingberd: 
... we must be very careful not to discourage the RAF. There are such 
enormous possibilities in it. On the 
other hand we have got to stick out, 
tooth and nail, against wild cat 
theories, founded on insufficient 
data, which are advanced in all 
seriousness by the Air People and on 
which, taking their theories for 
proven facts, they want us to reduce 
the strength of the army in India 
and, no doubt, elsewhere. 3 
On the other hand, Salmond found some Army officers singularly 
lacking in any appreciation of airpower. After meeting Colonel 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/11+3/2, Salmond 
to Trenchard, 21 July 1922. 
2. Ibid., Letter, Salmond to Trenchard, 
3 July 1922, refers. 
3. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 153, Braithwaite 
to Montgomery-Massingberd, 1 July 1922. 
177 
Beddy and Colonel Brisket at Kohat in July, he wrote in his 
diary: 
From neither could I get an intelligent 
expression of their opinion regarding 
Air Action. They seemed unable to 
attempt to grasp an idea beyond their 
own particular horizons. ' 
By the beginning of August Salmond was writing up his 
report, well aware that the Army, having already suffered 
large reductions, would "fight like demons to retain every unit". 2 
Rawlinson wanted to see more of what the Air Force could 
accomplish in Iraq before agreeing to any fundamental change 
in policy on the North West Frontier. The report, published 
later that month, recommended that the air service be given a 
definite and exhaustive trial as a punitive agent for the 
control of the border tribes. Salmond outlined a scheme whereby 
an air force of eight squadrons would take over control of a 
part of the frontier in supersession of ground troops". He 
argued that the present two schools of thought with regard to 
frontier policy were both expensive. The first was cheap in 
peace time, but necessitated an endless series of costly 
punitive expeditions when troubles broke out; the second 
entailed a very considerable outlay on the construction of 
roads, fortified posts and military stations. On the other hand, 
if the entire air force in India were employed against a 
frontier tribe, no more than 3,000 men would be involved. In 
such terrain, it had been suggested, targets would be impossible 
to obtain, but the key to the air scheme lay not in the 
destruction of people and material, but in the moral effect that 
could be obtained by sheer dislocation of living conditions. 
3 
1. Salmond Papers. AC 73/1+, Entry for 
12 July 1922. 
2. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/1143/2, Salmond to 
Trenchard, 8 August 1922. By this date the Indian 
Army had had its pre-war strength reduced by 1 
British and 11+ Indian cavalry regiments, 6 British 
and 17 Indian infantry battalions, 7 batteries 
and 1 pioneer battalion. Ibid., Salmond to 
Trenchard, 21 July 1922. 
3. Salmond Papers, AC 73/14/6, August 1922. 
-9 
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Opposition to the scheme was varied and strong. ' Major 
General L. R. Vaughan, Commandant of the Staff College, Quetta, 
was in favour of combined operations. He considered that the 
moral effect of bombing would decrease with use and that, as a 
follow up to air operations, the ground forces then existing in 
India would be the minimum required. Major General T. G. Matheson, 
GOC Waziristan, was likewise sceptical and argued that his 
district offered no comparison with Somaliland. He considered 
that air action on his border had been useful but not decisive. 
The GOC-in-C, Western Command, Lt. General Sir Walter Braithwaite, "" 
like Rawlinson, was strongly opposed to the reduction of one 
soldier in India until the efficacy of air control had been 
proved in Iraq. As far as Afghanistan was concerned, he argued 
that a popular war in a semi-civilised country was not brought 
to an end by merely causing the fall of the government by means 
of bombing. The destruction of the enemy's forces was the 
"natural and visible signs of the defeat of a nation". In his 
view the damage caused by bombing would bring no good or lasting 
results. 
One commander was willing, however, to reduce army units in 
exchange for greater air support in order to give Salmond's 
scheme a trial. General Sir William Birdwood, C-in-C Northern 
Command, was prepared to withdraw one British and four Indian 
battalions from his forward area in 'exchange for two good RAF 
squadrons. This gesture was over-ruled by the C-in-C, but it 
showed willingness on the part of one military mind to allow 
the experiment of some other method. 2 
In his official comment on the report, Rawlinson held 
strongly to the view that the moment for any drastic change had 
not yet arrived. After very careful consideration of the 
potentialities and limitations of aircraft during the Great War 
in northern Russia and India, he was unable to accept the 
optimistic predictions set out in the report. Operations in 
support of these theories were suspect. In Somaliland, 
1. Salmond Papers, AC 73/14/6, Appendix VI, 
Opinions and Criticisms on the Scheme.. 
2. Ibid. 
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independent air action had lasted but three days and had 
resulted in the dispersal of the Mullah's forces. It was left 
to the Camel Corps to pursue the enemy and achieve the final 
disintegration of his forces. In Iraq, too, air control was in 
the experimental stage and it-would not be for another year or 
eighteen months before conclusions could be drawn as to the 
value of the scheme. ' 
Private comment was not so restrained. According to Colonel 
J. D. Coleridge at HQ India, Salmond's recommendations were "the 
narrow utterances, of a narrow man writing to order". They meant 
that the Air Force would do all that was required whilst the 
Army, suitably reduced, sat on the defensive. Such a one-sided 
report was unacceptable. What was required was cooperation. Air 
forces and ground troops would always win a war provided they 
were properly handled; ground troops alone would win but their 
success would take longer; air forces alone would never win. 2 
Such, indeed, may be regarded as the general consensus of 
opinion among the senior military staff in India at this time. 
Whilst commanders were strongly in favour of the Air Force and 
full of praise for the work it achieved, there was a widespread 
feeling that the report had to be "reduced within the realms of 
common sense". 
3 In November, Rawlinson wrote again to Trenchard. 
Nothing would please him more, he explained, than if Salmond 
could demonstrate beyond doubt the power of the air force to 
preserve India's frontiers, for this would save a great deal of 
money and "our progress on the road to ruin will thereby be 
stayed". As it was, he could not afford to take unlimited risks. 
It was necessary to proceed with caution. ' 
In fact, this "progress on the road to ruin" was spelt out 
by Rawlinson in a letter to Lord Derby early in the New Year. 
He pointed out that nearly 50% of India's central revenues was 
1. Air 9/27, Section 2, Memo by Lord Rawlinson 
on Sir John Salmond's Report. Undated. 
2. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 153, Coleridge 
to Montgomery-Massingberd, 3 September 1922. 
3. Ibid., 22 November 1922. 
4. Trenchard Papers, CII/27/139, Rawlinson 
to Trenchard, 13 November 1922. 
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spent on defence and that in the last four years expenditure 4 
had exceeded income by f80 million. This meant that "big military 
retrenchments" were necessary if bankruptcy were to be avoided. 
Opposition to the scheme on tactical grounds was also 
understandable to some extent. Slessor, always ready to see the 
other man's point of view, later agreed that in 1922 the Army 
commanders in India were being asked to take a great deal on 
trust. They had had a lifetime of experience of traditional 
warfare, most of which had never seen airpower in action. 2 Thus 
when the Government of India agreed to the addition of two 
bomber squadrons, as recommended by Salmond, on the under- 
standing that a reduction was made in the 4th Field Army 
Division, Rawlinson would have none of it. 3 This conviction 
that the land forces should in no way be reduced was further 
strengthened by the failure of the Lausanne Conference and the 
continued threat of internal Moslem disorders. 
But if Salmond failed to obtain a trial for his air scheme 
in Waziristan, his report did restore to efficiency the six RAF 
squadrons in India. The embargo on spares was lifted and the air 
service was gradually returned to fighting form. 
' Lt. General 
Sir John Shea, GOC Central Provinces District, wrote in 
November: 
Great efforts are being made to get 
the Air Force back to a state of 
efficiency; all indents have been 
placed, stores have commenced to 
arrive, and with any luck Webb-Bowen 
hopes to have two complete squadrons 
by December ist and the whole six 
squadrons by the end of the financial 
year. 5 
The policy as to their employment, however, remained the same, 
1. Derby Papers, WO 137/3, Rawlinson to 
Derby, 11 January 1923. 
2. Slessor, op. cit., p. 36. 
3. Air 5/413, Folio 22a, Air Staff Note, April 1926. 
4. Trenchard Papers, II/27171/1, Memo entitled 
The Progress of the Development of Air Power 
in India, para. 5b. 
5. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 153, Shea 
to Montgomery-Massingberd, 15 November. 1922. 
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despite protest from the Air Staff that combined action tended 
to "belittle air action" and so lessen its effectiveness. 
' In 
January 1923, Major General W. D. Bird warned the readers of the 
Army Quarterly that it had yet to be proved that airmen could 
end a contest mainly by their-unseconded exertions. It remained 
doubtful, too, whether they alone could defend a frontier 
against tribesmen or effectively garrison a dependency without 
military support. 2 Towards the end of the month the AOC India, 
AVM P. W. Game, gave "an indication of the general view" in a 
letter to Trenchard. He wrote: 
... it seems to me that soldiers are 
for 
peaceful penetration, generally speaking, 
by road making and gradual occupation; 
that they are meanwhile prepared to try 
what the RAF can do but will require a 
good deal of ginger to make them go all 
out and that in their hearts they 
honestly believe we can never keep order 
for a long period on the border without 
ground expeditions to supplement our 
efforts. 3 
Bombing by the air force, Coleridge informed Montgomery- 
Massingberd the following month, was doing nothing miraculous 
but did "kill a cow or a sheep now and then". 
' On the same date 
a note from Game read: 
The policy of the Air Staff for the use 
of air forces against frontier tribesmen 
is not generally understood by the 
General Staff in India. 5 
It was in combination with ground forces that the Army saw 
the Air Force's real value. The GOC Wazirforce reported in May 
1. Trenchard Papers, CII/2/108, Air Staff Note 
on the Employment of the RAF on the North 
West Frontier, 1 January 1923. 
2. Army Quarterly, Vol. V, January 1923, Article 
entitled "One Air Force or Three", p. 352. 
3. Trenchard Papers, II/27/71/1, Game to 
Trenchard, 25 January 1923. 
1l. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 153, Coleridge 
to Montgomery-Massingberd, 7 February 1923. 
5. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/71/1, Notes on Air 
-Operations in Waziristan 1922-1923 by AOC 
India, 7 February 1923. 
1 
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that the air force was a "very valuable adjunct" to his forces. 
When combined with active ground operations, the enemy realised 
that destruction from the air might shortly be followed by ground 
attack. ' This view was reinforced by General Sir Claud Jacob, the 
CGS, later in the year. Under present conditions, he reported, 
and for an indefinite period in the future, aircraft should be 
considered as a most valuable and necessary adjunct to land 
forces rather than as the principal ann to which land forces 
would be auxiliaries. There was, too, he pointed out, a section 
of public opinion at home which denounced air operations against 
tribesmen. This opinion had to be taken into account when 
considering the feasibility and advisability of adopting such 
methods. He concluded: 
Even the staunchest adherents of an 
independent Air Force will recognise that 
withdrawal or undue weakening of the 
regular land forces in Waziristan would 
tend to consolidate tribal opposition 
against us .. the withdrawal of troops 
would be exaggerated into a tribal triumph, 
which would enhearten the Mahsuds to 
withstand to the utmost any coercion from 
the air. 2 
In the opinion of the Air Staff in India, however, such 
statements belied the facts. Group Captain J. A. Chamier, a member 
of HQ Staff, advised Trenchard that "the responsible authorities" 
were steadily coming to recognise that the RAF was the only 
solution to the frontier problems short of complete occupation. 
There was a constant demand for air action but, he added, "we 
cannot perhaps expect Army HQ to admit officially on paper our 
powers so long as that admission may result in loss of battalions 
- however much their practice is an open confession of the 
3 
correctness of our claims. " 
The opportunity for the RAF to prove their worth as an 
1. Air 5/2+8, Note by Major General Sir Torquhil 
Matheson, GOC Wazirforce, 10 May 1923. 
2. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 140/3, General 
Staff Note on Waziristan, para. 18, 
17 September 1923. 
3. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/63/2, Chamier to 
Trenchard, 31 July 1924. 
i 
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independent force came the following Spring. The AOC, AVM Sir 
Edward Ellington, was assigned the task of subduing four tribes 
in revolt. This-he did without the use of ground troops in 
operations lasting six weeks. At the end of this period the 
tribes came in, amongst those who submitted being several 
sections who had previously never entered into relations with 
the Government. Total expenditure was £ 75,000 compared with 
Army operations costing £900,000 during the period 1923-24. ' So 
successful did he consider these operations to be, that 
Ellington wrote to his Chief: 
I have just seen the C-in-C who seems 
very pleased with the results of the 
operations .. we seem to have at last 
convinced the Powers that Be that we 
can do what we claimed... The C-in-C 
is prepared to press strongly for the 
provision of the two additional 
squadrons and is considering what 
savings he can effect towards their Cost. 
The following month Trenchard wrote to congratulate Jacob on 
his support. "It occurs to me, " he wrote, "that in our 
discussions in the old days, although you did not perhaps 
altogether go as far as I did in my claims for the air, yet 
you often used to see greater possibilities in their use than 
others at that time ... " 
3 
But such euphoria on the part of the Air Force was short- 
lived. Just a few days later Ellington was warning Trenchard 
that, in view of the growing Bolshevik menace, Jacob was 
determined not to reduce the Array. 4 Then a few days later the 
1. Trenchard Papers, II/27/71/2, Memo: The 
Progress of the Development of Air Power in 
India, paras. 7 and 9, July 1925. 
2. Ibid., 11/27/63/2, Ellington to Trenchard, 
5 May 1925. In fact it was not until 
February 1927 that the Viceroy's Council 
finally agreed to increase the Air Force 
by two squadrons. See Air 5/1413, Folio 50A, 
Chamier to CAS, 10 February 1927. 
3. Ibid., 11/27/102, Trenchard to Jacob, 11 
June 1925. General Sir Claud Jacob was 
appointed C-in-C India 3 April 1925. 
k. Ibid., I1/27/63/2, Ellington to Trenchard, 
16 June 1925. See also Air 5/413, Folio 16A. 
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Air Staff's hopes were dealt a serious blow with the publication 
of Jacob's report on the independent air operations. Whilst 
praising the work of the air service, the C-in-C came down 
heavily against the future use of such tactics. He wrote: 
Satisfactory though the results of these 
operations have been, I am of the opinion 
that a combination of land and air action 
would have brought about the desired 
result in a shorter space of time, and 
next time action is to be taken, I trust 
that it will be possible to employ the 
two forces in combination. I 
The CAS was angered by this report and later that year used the 
deliberations of the Colwyn Committee to make a bitter reprisal. 
Referring to this report, he told the Committee: 
There you have the bias of a soldier's 
mind which believes that the proper 
place for aircraft is merely for 
spotting and reconnaissance and keeping 
the air clear from attacks against the 
soldiers on the ground. 2 
Meanwhile, at the request of the Secretary of State for 
India, Lord Birkenhead, the Air Ministry prepared a scheme of air 
control for the North West Frontier. In a covering letter Sir 
Samuel Hoare was at pains to point out that the Air Ministry had 
no desire to "edge the WO out of their responsibilities". On the 
other hand, in view of the experience gained in air control both 
in Iraq and on the North West Frontier over the past three years, 
it was essential that the Air Force's case be reviewed. 
3 
Trenchard anticipated that the scheme would create "a great 
deal of controversy with the Army and the CI GS" . 
to He was right. 
The following May the proposals came in for severe criticism 
1. Trenchard Papers, 11/27/18, Extract from Despatch 
on RAF Operations in India, March to April 1925, 
Enclosure 1, Letter from General Sir Claud Jacob, 
C-in-C India, 29 June 1925. 
2. Ibid., 11/22, Chapter V, CAS to Colwyn Comittee, 
Evidence and Report, 1925-1926. 
3. Ibid., 11/27/39, Hoare to Birkenhead, 9 July 1925. 
1. Air 5/413, Folio 10, CAS to Secretary of State 
for Air, 3 July 1925. 
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from the DCGS, Major General Walter Kirke. Referring to the 
Air Force's independent action of April-May 1925, he argued 
that these operations afforded no reliable guide with which to 
estimate the effect of air action when the tribes as a whole 
meant business. The policy in India was one of pacification, 
not punishment. No reliance could be placed on local levies 
unless regular troops were within supporting distance. Further- 
more, it was extremely difficult to find landing grounds and, 
in the event of hostilities, these would be useless unless 
regular troops could be moved up to protect them. Thus without 
the use of good roads and columns, the air scheme would become 
"a modern and possibly improved variation of the old policy of 
'burn and scuttle' which the Government of India has abandoned". 
By such schemes the field army was being deprived of "the vital 
assistance of air cooperation". I Nor was Kirke convinced of the 
deterrent value of airpower. In a private letter the following 
month he wrote: 
In fact Waziristan has never been so 
quiet and the RAF have the sublime 
impertinence to try and claim all 
the credit because they squashed a 
few villages and inflicted eleven 
casualties .. 
2 
Once again Chamier sent home words of comfort. Kirke, he 
explained to the DOI, Air Commodore C. L. N. Newall, was a 
reactionary of the deepest blue. He was ignorant of the 
Frontier except for one "Cook's tour". Their "nice little 
war" last year had shown that the Air Force had the power to 
coerce tribes who were thoroughly accustomed to bombing. The 
Frontier was quieter than ever before and both the Chief 
Commissioner and the Resident in Waziristan attributed this 
mildness in great part to the fear of the aeroplane. The letter 
concluded: 
1. Air 5/413, Folio 21A, Note by DCGS India 
on proposals for air control of the 
North West Frontier, 16 May 1926. 
2. Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, 155, 
Kirke to Montgomery-Massingberd, 
10 June 1926. 
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You need not think that Kirke's 
views are those of the Government 
of India; it is very much the 
opposite and we are their blue- 
eyed boys at the moment; I 
Chamier's criticism of Kirke was not wholly justified. It is 
certainly true that the DCGS was opposed to so-called 
"independent air action" - that type of operation in which the 
air force bombed vital targets while the ground forces remained 
tamely on the defensive - but he had frequently made it clear 
that he was fully in favour of closer tactical cooperation 
between the two arms. 
The possibility of obtaining such cooperation came nearer 
to fulfilment the following spring when, once again, there were 
renewed fears that the Soviet Union was about to invade 
Afghanistan. Contingency plans revealed not only an unusual 
divergence of opinion between the British and Indian General 
Staffs, but an equally unusual degree of agreement between the 
CIGS and the CAS as to the tactics to be adopted. In the 
deliberations of the Defence of India Sub-Committee, established 
by the CID in March 1927 to consider the integrity of Afghanistan 
and the means of countering Russian aggression, 2 a proposed plan 
of campaign, compiled jointly by the two Service Chiefs, was 
remarkable both for the closeness of the cooperation it 
prescribed and for the advanced nature of the tactics it 
proposed. 
In presenting this combined plan to the Committee in April, 
Milne explained that on the northern line, around the vicinity 
of Kabul, action was to be confined to "a continuous offensive 
by the RAF supported and exploited by Afghan military forces". 
On the southern line, however, where the aim was to drive the 
1. Air 5/413, Folio 38A, Chamier to Newall, 
30 November 1926. 
2. Cab 2/5, CID 223rd Meeting, 17 March 1927. 
3. This plan was based on "An Appreciation of 
the Military Situation in the event of a war 
with Russia in Central Asia", compiled jointly 
by the CIGS and CAS. See Cab 16/83, DI 3 and 
DI 3a, 25 March and 21 April 1927 respectively. 




















Russians back by means of a vigorous offensive, operations were 
to be carried out "by a force of bombing aircraft adequately 
supported by a mechanised force". Trenchard, speaking at the same 
meeting, maintained that in the northern sector aircraft had the 
initial part to play in heading the Russians off Kabul, whilst in 
the south the proposed air action would stop the Russians from 
"digging themselves in" and, in addition, would give a great moral 
boost to the Afghans themselves. On the other hand, he readily 
conceded that aircraft alone could not expel the Russians from 
northern Afghanistan. Air action could prevent the Russians from 
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developing their communications and creating bases, but their 
actual expulsion could only be effected by the army. 
' 
The plan, approved by the Committee the following month, 2 
ran counter to the views of the General and Air Staffs in India. 
The CGS, Lt. General Sir Andrew Skeen, argued that because of the 
physical features along the frontier, the full integrity of 
Afghanistan was not essential for the defence of India. Further- 
more, his staff considered that it was impossible to avert 
Russian control and development of the northern provinces. The 
Afghans should be assisted to hold Kabul, but any attempt to 
expel the Russians would impose very serious strains on the 
endurance of both Britain and India. In this he was supported 
by the Indian Air Staff, who claimed that in maintaining the 
integrity of India's frontiers it was only necessary to retain 
the southern portions of Afghanistan, 3 
This schism between the Staffs at home and in India - the 
result of what Lord Birkenhead termed "an extraordinary 
disparity"4 - makes the close liaison achieved between the CAS 
and CIGS the more remarkable. The fact that neither service 
had the necessary equipment nor the necessary training to put 
their combined plan into effect, cannot detract from the signal 
measure of unanimity reached between the two departments! But 
the paper promises of a more constructive approach to combined 
operations along the North West Frontier were not to be 
translated into practical terms once the major threat - that 
posed by the Soviet Union - had subsided. 
6 
1. Cab 16/83, CID Defence of India Sub- Committee, 
Minutes of 3rd Meeting, 26 April 1927. 
2. Ibid., 7th Meeting, 24 May 1927. 
3. Ibid., 5th Meeting, 10 May 1927. For a fuller report 
of this dispute see Gibbs, op. cit., pp. 826-27. 
4. Cab 16/83,7th Meeting, 24 May 1927. 
5. In April 1927 the Indian Field Army amounted to 4 divisions and 4 cavalry brigades, plus 6 RAF 
squadrons in the throes of reorganisation. Estimated 
Soviet strength was 25,000 sabres, 75,000 rifles, 
and 400 guns. Ibid., 3rd Meeting, 26 April 1927. 
6. Russian influence in Afghanistan was severely 
weakened in 1928 by the overthrow of Amir Amanullah 
and his replacement by the pro-British Nadir Shah. 
The relations between the two services. in India in 
the 1930s are dealt with in Chapter 7 of this work. 
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Further south in Asia, the threat to the British Empire 
was of a different kind. Here the likely enemy was seen as 
Japan, and the major fear was of a sudden seaborne attack upon 
the naval base at Singapore. 
The part that aircraft could play in the defence of such 
bases had exercised the minds of the CID and COS'Sub-Committee 
from the early 1920s. A weak compromise solution as to which 
service should command a defended port was agreed in December 
1923, as noted earlier, 
' but the relative importance of airpower 
in the protection-of such bases could not be so easily shelved, 
and became the subject of a long and bitter air-versus-gun 
controversy centred on the defence of Singapore. 
The main lines of argument in this dispute have been well 
traced and documented elsewhere. 2 Certain aspects of this 
controversy, however, are particularly pertinent to this present 
work in that they serve to illustrate the fact that the 
controversy was not merely or primarily a disagreement between 
the Naval and Air Staffs over the protection of A naval base. 
The Army, the service responsible for the island's main 
armament, was deeply involved in the dispute and, indeed, was 
often the leading protagonist against the claims of the Air 
Staff. Lord Beatty's lament to his wife in January 1924, that 
the "infernal name of Singapore" would be for ever engraved on 
his heart, 3 was a cri de coeur which could well have been 
uttered by Cavan and Milne. Throughout the long dispute their 
opposition was certainly as forthright and persistent as that 
of the Chief of Naval Staff. 
At a meeting of the COS in July 1925, for example, the 
GIGS, General Lord Cavan, reminded his colleagues that the 
ultimate defence of Singapore was a military responsibility. 
1. Cab 53/1, COS 4th Meeting, 4+ December 1923. 
2. See in particular Major General S. Woodburn Kirby, 
Singapore, Chain of Disaster; Stephen Roskill, 
Naval Policy Between the Wars, Vol. I, p. 289 ff; 
and article by W. David McIntyre, "The Strategic 
Significance of Singapore", journal of southeast 
Asian History, Vo1.10, No. l, March 1969, p. 69. 
3. Boyle, op. cit., p. 551. Admiral of the Fleet Earl 
Beatty was First Sea Lord 1919-1927. 
l 
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Once a landing had been established and the base was in enemy 
hands, the situation could only be dealt with by "military 
measures", I A year later it was his successor, General Sir 
George Milne, who took the lead in proposing a modus vivendi. 
He suggested that the provision of defensive measures should be 
divided into three stages with a review of the situation at the 
end of the first stage. If by that time, he pointed out, the 
development of the air scheme had become sufficiently convincing, 
then the CID would be free to adopt it with little financial 
loss involved. 2 At, this juncture, Trenchard would not accept 
such a proposal, but at the next meeting, presided over by 
Premier Baldwin, he did agree to this suggestion provided that 
certain provisions were met. 3 
The agreement, formally acknowledged by the COS and CID 
the following month, 4 was provisional by nature and only served 
to postpone the settlement of the basic issue dividing the 
Service Chiefs. At the end of 1928 the controversy - which had 
been simmering throughout the intervening period 5- boiled over 
once again, with the Army and Air Force as the major protagonists. 
This fresh outbreak was centred around gunnery trials which had 
1. Cab 53/1, COS 21st Meeting, 3 July 1925. 
2. Ibid., COS 3l th. Meeting, 22 June 1926. 
3. Ibid., COS 35th Meeting, 6 July 1926. Trenchard, 
unable to produce a tenable air scheme at this 
stage, conceded his case in a letter to Beatty 
dated 6 July 1926. See Trenchard Papers, 11/27/16. 
ii. Cab 5/6, Report by COS, CID Paper 273-C, 9 July 
1926, and Cab 2/4, CID 215th Meeting, 22 July 1926. 
5. During 1927, for example, a similar air-versus- 
gun controversy had emerged over the provision of 
coastal defence in South Africa. Here, the Air 
Staff claimed that apart from aircraft being more 
efficient and economical for coastal defence, 
they could also be of value for internal security. 
The matter was deferred indefinitely. For a summary 
of the arguments advanced by the Air Ministry and 
WO, see Cab 53/14, COS Paper 116, Memo by CAS 
(Enclosure 2) dated 29 November 1927, and Memo by 
CIGS (Enclosure 4) dated 15 November 1927. An 
account of this particular controversy is given 
in the unpublished thesis by H. G. Welch, The 
Origins and Development of-the COS Sub-Committee 
of the CID, 1923-1939, University of London, 1973, 
pp. 87-89. 
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been conducted by the WO at Malta and Portsmouth earlier in the 
year. At a meeting of the CID in December, the Secretary of State 
for War, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, frankly admitted that hits 
by the 9.2 inch batteries had been "few and far between", and 
suggested that the installation of these guns at Singapore, and 
that of the 15 inch, should be postponed pending further trials. 
Trenchard, encouraged by this admission, asked that the Air 
Ministry be supplied with a copy of the report on the trials. 
This Milne bluntly refused to do. The report, he pointed out, was 
not fit for circulation because the WO had not yet ascertained 
whether the fault of the coastal defences lay with the operators, 
the guns, or the observation. Pressed further by the Air Minister, 
who reminded the CIGS that aircraft had taken part in the trials, 
Milne literally "stuck to his guns". He argued that an 
investigation was to be conducted by the Master General of 
Ordnance and that this would probably take a year to complete. 
Hoare retorted that, in his opinion, the Air Ministry was 
entitled to see a copy of the report. In this he was supported 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, who was 
strongly opposed to the COS keeping "tactical secrets" from each 
other. 
' 
In fact, a summary of the reports of these trials was made 
available to the COS when they met in the New Year. 
2 At this 
meeting Trenchard claimed that all the arguments he had raised 
four or five years ago in connection with the employment of 
aircraft in coastal defence had been clearly borne out by the 
trials. Milne, however, reminded the CAS of his undertaking not 
to reopen the air-versus-gun controversy until the second stage 
of the Singapore programme was up for consideration. The 
experiments at Malta and Portsmouth, he insisted, had not been 
ordered in connection with that question and had only been meant 
as "preliminary trials". If he had thought that these trials 
would be "seized upon" and their results used in the air-versus- 
gun controversy, he would never have allowed them to be held 
with untried instruments and inferior personnel. Owing to the 
1. Cab 2/5, CID 239th Meeting, 13 December 1928. 
2. Cab 53/17, COS Paper 182,3 January 1929. 
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very severe conditions in which they had taken place, these 
trials contained no argument that could be used in connection 
with that controversy. ' 
In June, at a long meeting of the COS presided over by the 
Prime Minister, Trenchard expounded at length the case in favour 
of the aerial torpedo and the bomb. He maintained that these 
weapons could hit their targets more frequently than guns at ten 
times the range. For his part, Milne complained that the CAS had 
merely confined himself to pulling to pieces a very able and 
perfectly fair statement of fact in regard to the performance 
of coastal defence guns. When, he asked, was the CAS going to 
prove what air action could do? If the Air Force could make out 
a better case, it was not for the WO to decide between the two. 
In the meantime the Army would continue its experiments. 
2 
By this time, however, the completion of the defence works 
had been postponed to 1930,3 and in November of that year were 
further postponed until 1936.4 As Hankey pointed out, the 
inability to reach a settlement on this question reacted upon 
the defences of all other bases. 
5 In May 1932 a report by a CID 
Sub-Committee, appointed the previous December to examine the 
whole coast defence situation, found that whilst there was 
agreement between the three services as to the value of aircraft 
in coastal defence, beyond that point there was "a great 
divergence of opinion". The Committee, chaired by Baldwin, felt 
unable to recommend the substitution of aircraft for medium and 
heavy guns in view of "the many uncertain factors in the 
problem". In the opinion of its members, the solution lay 
elsewhere: 
We consider that if a change should 
become desirable on technical grounds 
it is far more likely to be brought 
about as a result of mutual cooperation 
1. Cab 53/3, COS 76th Meeting, 14 January 1929. 
2. Ibid., 78th Meeting, 11 June 1929. 
3. The postponement was approved by the Cabinet 
19 December 1928. See Cab 5/7, CID Paper 
346-C, 4 June 1930. 
4. Cab 55/5, JP 51,12 November 1930. 
5. Cab 53/3, COS 97th Meeting, 26 January 1931. 
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than by controversial methods. ' 
But these "controversial methods" continued to be advanced. 
In October 1933, for example, a draft copy of an Air Staff 
paper on the employment of aircraft in coastal defence angered 
the CIGS, General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd. He 
complained to Hankey that it only gave one side of the picture. 
He was trying his best, he wrote, to keep the peace with the 
Air Force, but he was being sorely tried. The letter concluded: 
It seems to me that in these critical 
times for the three services it is 
little short of criminal not to work 
together, but if documents of this 
sort are issued to officers of one of 
the services in the face of the 
cabinet decision, real cooperation 
is hopeless. 2 
It was to be expected, however, that the Air Staff would 
find it difficult to accept the enforced arrangement of June 
1932. Joubert - at this time Commandant of the Staff College - 
later complained that, as a result of this compromise, the 
major portion of the money available was sunk in guns and 
concrete and only a pittance allowed for the aircraft needed 
to defend Singapore. 3 Such indeed was the case. Furthermore, 
once installed, the guns which had generated so much heated 
controversy in time of peace, fell to the Japanese without 
firing a shot in time of war. Slessor, however, takes a more 
realistic view. He points out that such a compromise was as 
inevitable as it was unsatisfactory. Without a gilt-edged 
guarantee from the Air Ministry that aircraft would be 
available at Singapore in time of need, it was not unreasonable 
on the part of the WO and the Admiralty to oppose Trenchard's 
flexible air scheme, irrespective of their total lack of faith 
1. Cab 5/7, CID Paper 370-C, Report of 
Sub-Committee on Coastal Defence, 
24 May 1932. Baldwin was then Lord 
President of the Council. 
2. Cab 21/359, Montgomery-Massingberd 
to Hankey, 20 October 1933. 
3. Joubert, op. cit., p. 114. 
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in aircraft as a viable substitute for coastal gun defences. 
On this latter point, too, Lord Templewood himself concedes 
that, in this particular instance, the Air Force of that day 
had-not the aircraft in sufficient number or power to 
substitute air for ground forces. It was hardly surprising, 
he admits, that his colleagues on the CID "refused to depend 
on faith without visible works". 
2 
1. Slessor, op. cit., p. 75" 
2. Templewood, op. cit., p. 265. 
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PART II 
THE ROLE OF AIRCRAFT IN IMPERIAL POLICING AND DEFENCE 
Chapter 7 
The Effect of Trenchard's "Last Will and Testament" 
on the Substitution Issue 
November 1929 - September 1939 
11 
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The dispute over substitution in both the Middle and Far 
East was seriously exacerbated in November 1929 with the 
publication of Trenchard's Cabinet paper on the employment of 
airpower in Imperial Defence. It was hardly a propitious moment 
in which to advocate formally the "systematic and progressive 
extension of air control" in the North West Frontier of India, 
the Sudan, British Africa, *. and coastal defence. ' Such proposals, 
so resolutely advanced, served only to heighten the tension 
which already existed between the two services over their 
respective roles in Empire defence and policing. At this 
particular juncture - as already noted - the Army was busily 
engaged in trying to regain command in Iraq and Aden; opposing 
an increase of airpower in India and the Sudan; condemning the 
system of air control in Palestine; and defending their role 
in the defence of Singapore .2 Amid such a welter of controversy 
the WO saw the Cabinet paper as yet another attempt, both 
direct and deliberate, to bring about a reduction of their 
overall strength and commitment. 
In his. own paper to the Cabinet, the War Minister 
announced that his military advisors were in complete 
disagreement with the proposals, particularly in view of the 
recent failure of air control in Palestine. As to the question 
of economy, he was of the opinion that substantial savings 
1. Air 8/1+5, Part I, Item 6, CP 332(29) 
November 1929. For resume and discussion of 
this paper see Slessor, op. cit., pp. 70-75. 
For a spirited apologia of air control see 
Slessor's article, "Air Control: The Other 
Point of View", Slessor Papers, VD, May 1931. 
2. At this time, too, a proposal by the Air Ministry 
to mechanise part of the Trans-Jordan Frontier 
Force sparked off a short but lively dispute 
over the mechanisation of native units. The WO 
contended that this was against long-standing 
policy and would react unfavourably upon other- 
areas of the Empire, particularly India. and 
Egypt. No firm decision was reached. For 
principal details see Cab 53/3, COS 84th Meeting, 
4 November 1929; Cab 2/5 CID 245th Meeting, 
14 November 1929; and Cab 23/62, Cabinet Meeting, 
51(29), 3 December 1929. 
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could be made without loss of efficiency by reconsidering the 
constitution of the RAF as a separate service. 
I This reference 
to their independent status evoked a swift and lengthy reply 
from the Air Ministry. If this old sore were to be perpetually 
reopened whenever national problems of defence were being 
discussed, the Secretary of State for Air complained, then no 
progress could ever be made along the lines laid down by the 
Geddes and Colwyn reports. He urged his colleagues to keep any 
enquiry free from what he termed "the embittering echoes of an 
an irrelevant and exploded controversy". 2 
Within his own staff, however, Trenchard's "Last Will and 
Testament" was not viewed favourably by all. There was, too, 
some divergence of opinion as to the best means of putting the 
proposed measures into practice. Slessor, who had assisted in 
the drafting of the paper, was later to admit that he had 
entertained doubts as to the wisdom of such a move, arguing 
that so important had the air arm become in these areas that an 
extension of airpower and the introduction of some, form of air 
control might well have come about in the natural course of 
events. 3 In a note to the CAS, Mr. C. Bullock, the Air Minister's 
private secretary, warned that the setting up of an enquiry 
might well enable to two senior services to reopen. the question 
of a separate Air Ministry. The WO, he advised, might even try 
to reclaim Iraq and Aden, let alone Palestine. He continued: 
.. the Admiralty and WO will be-able to drag in countless red herrings and 
so enlarge the field and fog the 
committee that, as has happened before, 
they might give up the task in despair 
and we should have made no progress 
whatever. 4 
1. Air 8/45, Part I, Item 7, CP 356(29), 
7 December 1929. The Admiralty took a 
similar line. Ibid., Item 10,20 December 1929. 
2. Ibid., Item 9, CP 365(29), 16 December 1929. 
3. Slessor, op. cit., p. 74, and Liddell Hart 
Papers, 1/644, Slessor to Liddell Hart, 
18 July 1965. 
4. Air 8/45, Part I. Item 11, Bullock to CAS, 
21 December 1929. 
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In a similar note to the Secretary of State for Air, Bullock 
warned that "the friction would be appalling". He suggested 
that the Air Ministry should emphasise that they were merely 
giving effect to the recommendations of the Geddes and Colwyn 
Committees and were not "throwing in an apple of discord of 
I 
our own quarrelsome initiative". 
Assistant Secretary C. G. Evans, on the other hand, was not 
in favour of using the Geddes and Colwyn Committees as a 
platform. He felt this might enable the WO and Admiralty to 
"turn our flank". by suggesting that greater economy could be 
gained under a dual rather than a triple system of 
administration. 2 Meanwhile, on the question of priority, a memo 
by Squadron Leader J. C. Slessor advised that in the first 
instance the Air Staff claims should be confined to two areas: 
the North West Frontier of India and British East-Africa. In 
the former he felt that the saving of no less than f2 million a 
year made the Air Ministry's case "unanswerable"; in the latter, 
he argued that as "pro-rationalisation" was a live issue in 
that area, it was an appropriate time in which to advocate a 
defence scheme based on air control. 3 
As far as the matter of command was concerned, however, 
there was no dissension within the Air Staff. A memo by 
Trenchard just before he gave up office had made it clear that 
in any extension of air control the Air Ministry had to retain 
full responsibility: 
It must be observed that each successive 
scheme of air control has been inaugurated 
1. Air 8/45, Part II, Item 3A, Bullock to 
Secretary of State for Air, 31 December 1929. 
2. Ibid., Evans to CAS, 9 January 1930. 
3. Ibid., Note by Slessor, then on staff of DOI, 
30 December 1929. Early in the New Year, however, 
in a letter to the new CAS, Trenchard advised 
against advocating India as one of the first 
areas for. substitution on the grounds that it 
would be particularly difficult to obtain a 
reduction in ground forces along the North 
West Frontier. Ibid., Trenchard to Salmond, 
8 January 1930. 
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in spite of the gravest misgivings 
and the strenuous opposition of the 
great majority of Army Staff 
officers and commanders concerned; 
the forecasts of failure and 
disaster have been frequent. It may 
well be asked whether this is the 
school of thought from which the 
commanders for these schemes are 
to be chosen. 1 
By March the row over the substitution paper had resolved 
itself into a renewed struggle as to the part to be played by 
airpower along the'North West Frontier of India. At a meeting 
of the Cabinet at the beginning of the month, the Prime Minister 
ruled that it would be a mistake to reopen ab initio the question 
of a separate Air Ministry, but he did agree that an enquiry 
should be held into substitution on agreed terms of reference. 2 
By the end of the month such agreement had been reached and a 
CID Sub-Committee appointed "to examine and report in the light 
of experience in Iraq and other theatres on the practicability 
of the extended use of air control in substitution for other arms 
in Indian defence". 3 
In the meantime the controversy had been debated in the 
House of Lords, where the former CIGS, Lord Cavan, took Lord 
Trenchard to task for having submitted his proposals direct to 
the Cabinet. He argued that the matter of substitution was a 
question of pure strategy and, as such, should have first been 
submitted to the CID and then referred to the-COS Sub-Committee. 
Furthermore, he called for an enquiry into bombing. In his view 
this was an indiscriminate weapon which affected the innocent 
and guilty alike. Viscount Plumer, a Field Marshal and former 
High Commissioner for Palestine, endorsed these views. The air 
arm, he claimed, was an essentially offensive and "mischievous 
power" and could not possibly provide the civilising influence 
which was required in many parts of the Empire. More was needed 
1. Air 8/x+5, Part I, Item 12,30 December 1929. 
2. Cab 23/63, Cabinet Meeting 13(30), Conclusion 
4,5 March 1930. 
3. Air 8/45, Part II, Hankey to Secretary of 
State for Air, 31 March 1930, refers. ' 
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than merely passive acquiescence to authority based on threat. 
He concluded: 
It is false economy to incur any 
expenditure for the maintenance of 
public security unless it is quite 
certain, humanly speaking, that 
the measures adopted would be such 
as to ensure permanent pacification 
or at any rate a basis for it' 
Lord Lloyd, a former Governor of Bombay, opposed the proposals 
as they affected the North West Frontier. In this area, he 
maintained, British occupation and peaceful penetration had put 
a stop to all raiding. To advocate the substitution of what 
inevitably must mean "an impersonal and inhumane agency" whose 
only weapon was intimidation and punishment would have the most 
damaging effect upon Britain's reputation throughout the East. 2 
Such views were not shared, however, by the military 
correspondent of The Daily Telegraph, Captain Liddell Hart. In 
a series of three articles he clearly favoured substitution. 
For the soldier and sailor, he prophesied, the future was "a 
narrowing horizon". A possible answer lay in some form of 
combined General Staff. 
3 
Meanwhile, in India itself, the Army was preparing to fight 
for its future. In a letter to his brother, the CAS, in May, 
AM Sir Geoffrey Salmond, AOC India, warned that, pending the 
enquiry, the military were "wary over everything dealing with 
the frontier". Later that month he complained that the position 
of the Air Force in India was "little short of a scandal". He 
had informed the CGS that the whole of the Army on the Frontier 
was "pre-air" and that no modification in the distribution of 
troops had been made as a result of the advent of airpower. 4 
1. Debate in House of Lords, Hansard, Vol-77, 
Cols. 31-1+1+, 9 April 1930. See also Air 
9/62, Folio 2; The Times, 10 April 1930, 
and Hollinghurst Papers, AC 73/23/33- 
2. Ibid. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 10/1930/99-101, 
23,21 and 27 May 1930. 
4. Air 9/27, AOC India to CAS, 17 and 30 May 1930. 
ACM Sir John Salmond was appointed CAS 
1 January 1930. 
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The following month, Milne used the enquiry to launch an 
all-out denunciation of substitution, not only as it affected 
India, but across the whole spectrum of imperial defence. ' His 
most scathing criticism was directed against the Air Ministry's 
first air control scheme in Iraq. Such a system, he declared, 
had not been achieved without the presence and help of an 
appreciable body of ground troops which, until the last year or 
two, had never fallen below 17,000 to 18,000 men. 2 Indeed, the 
Air Force had been the "lucky heirs" to, and not the creators of, 
a vastly improved political and military situation which had 
made economies possible. In the political sphere, the Cairo 
Conference had initiated a looser form of political control by 
which the Iraqis had been given a king of their choosing and a 
real share in the government of the country. 3 On the military 
side, the lessons of the 1920 rebellion had been severe and were 
not likely to be forgotten. Thus the Air Ministry had succeeded 
to a situation which bore no relation whatsoever to that which 
had existed two years previously. The Air-Staff had staked their 
garrison on a gamble and, fortunately for them, the Iraqis had 
not yet called their bluff. In effect, the aeroplane simply 
provided a more rapid, efficient and less vulnerable form 
of communication than had hitherto been possible. 
As far as-Palestine was concerned, he confessed to "a 
feeling of undisguised astonishment" that anyone could seriously 
suggest that infantry were unsuited to deal with disorder in 
1. Air 8/121, Memoranda and Minutes of the 
Defence of India (Air Power) Sub-Committee, 
DI (AP) 2. Memo by GIGS, 4+ June 1930. 
2. See diagram over. This was submitted to 
the Defence of India (Air Power) Sub- 
Committee by Milne at a later date, and 
purports to show that under air control in 
Iraq there had been no great reduction, in 
the total number of ground troops. For 
diagram see Air 8/121, DI(AP) 9, Memo by 
CIGS, 20 July 1931, Appendix II. 
3. Klieman asserts that by 1921 Bolshevik and 
Turkish revolutionary activity had begun to 
recede and that, in the Arab World itself, 
the use of force and the demand for 
independence were on the wane. Aaron S. 
Klieman, Foundations of British Policy In 
the Arab World, pp . 21+0-1. 
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congested areas. In Aden, too, he still maintained that the 
garrison was inadequate for the security of the base. Here again, 
air control rested on the assumption that no serious trouble 
would arise. Certainly no such assumption could be made to 
justify the introduction of the system along the North West 
Frontier of India. As the General Staff had foreseen in 1921, 
argued Milne, the formation of a separate Air Ministry and Air 
Force had tended to drive the fighting services further apart, 
whereas the dictates of economy and strategy required the 
closest cooperation. He continued: 
The Air Staff have tended to become 
more and more absorbed with its own 
problems and by undertaking 
responsibilities for administration 
in a wide field, have relegated 
cooperation with the military and 
naval forces, which should be its 
essential function, to a secondary role. 
Milne maintained that out of 33 regular squadrons in Great 
Britain, 5 only were allotted to Army cooperation, whilst out of 
a total of 57 squadrons throughout the Empire, only 15 were 
definitely earmarked for close service with the Army. The 
attitude of the Air Staff, which in some respects was 
antagonistic towards the Army, was encouraging the formation of 
a. barrier between the two services where none should exist. So 
long as the human race was fundamentally pedestrian, it would 
continue to be influenced by happenings on the ground. It was 
to be noted that whilst the cooperation of aircraft with 
military forces was an important feature at every stage of Army 
training, the Air Force gave no instruction to its cadets or 
officers to qualify them to handle military forces. He continued: 
The doctrine which the Air Staff 
endeavour to inculcate that the 
operation of air forces can'be 
intelligently directed only by an 
officer who holds a pilot's 
-certificate is, in my opinion, 
both false and dangerous. ' 
1. Air 8/121, Memoranda and Minutes of Defence of 
India (AP) Sub-Committee, DI(AP)2,1 June 1930. 
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This bitter attack was renewed by the War-Minister when the CID 
Sub-Committee on the Defence of India held its first meeting. 
If Trenchard's proposals were adopted, he warned, it would 
inevitably lead to "an interminable and probably unprofitable 
controversy". ' 
A response to these "sweeping denunciations`came in a memo 
in July. The Air Staff, it claimed, were fully entitled to regard 
the comparative tranquillity enjoyed in Iraq as "the fruits of 
air control", not as an inheritance from a former regime. Ground 
troops were certainly needed, but the primary role in defence 
was taken by aircraft and the economies realised were due to the 
employment of aircraft as the primary striking force. 
2 In the 
case of India, it was undesirable that the present proposals 
should be exposed to the veto of a General Staff who were unable 
to examine the problems with the requisite detachment from 
departmental views. There was no "mystery" about the employment 
of aircraft, but one was still on the threshold of knowledge as 
to the capabilities of airpower and it was unlikely that a 
military commander would be found capable of fully understanding 
the intricacies of another service apart from his own. As 
regards the allocation of squadrons to Army cooperation, the 
paper considered it regrettable that a complaint of this nature 
should be suddenly produced before the Committee instead of 
being dealt with via the proper channels. 
3 
That same month, however, two articles in the Army 
Quarterly strongly criticised certain features of air control. 
The first, an Editorial, argued that it was impossible to 
control a disorderly population from the air. The ultimate 
safety of any region within the Empire had to depend upon the 
presence of an adequate ground force. 
4 The second, an article 
entitled "Mechanisation of the Desert" by Major Lionel Dimmock, 
RA, contended that air control in Iraq was limited due to the 
1. Air 8/121, DI(AP), 1st Meeting, 26 June 1930. 
2: For chart showing reduction in the cost of the 
British garrison in Iraq see opposite. Figures 
quoted in Churchill, op. cit., p. 465- 
3. Air 8/121, DI(AP)l, 17 July 1930. 
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difficulty of locating raiding parties in the wide desert 
expanses. 
' The following month, too, a deep penetration of 
Afridi tribesmen in the vicinity of Peshawar brought strong 
condemnation of air control in the press. Articles in 
influential newspapers, notably The Daily Telegraph and The 
Times, argued trenchantly that the efficiency of airpower in 
imperial defence had been grossly exaggerated. 
2 Indeed, two 
articles suggested that, on the contrary, the employment of 
aircraft had acted as a spur to resentment and audacity. 3 An 
article in Truth later in the month referred to "the failure 
of frightfulness" and continued: 
If the operations on the North West 
Frontier serve to reduce to their proper 
proportions the relations between air 
warfare and ground warfare, they will 
have effected one good purpose. The two 
are interdependent and to pretend that 
one can ever supplant the other is 
merely foolish. ' 
Not all newspapers were critical, however. The Sunday 
FzctoriaZ complained of the professional jealousy apparent in 
the senior ranks of the Army and elsewhere. The "bow and arrow 
gentlemen", claimed the paper, were surreptitiously engaged in 
an unscrupulous attempt to discredit the Air Force, to minimise 
its efficiency, and to limit its expansion. Such reactionary 
intrigue must be exposed and summarily checked. Referring to 
the matter of substitution, the article continued: 
The Army mandarins resolved at all 
costs to stifle inquiry. Accordingly 
it was whispered by the military 
experts writing for the press that 
claims of the Air Force were much 
exaggerated and that cold water 
1. Army Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 2, July 1930, p. 359. 
2. See The Daily Telegraph, 8,11, and 16 August;, 
The Sunday Times, 10 August; The Times, 11 
August; and The Manchester Guardian, 28 August 
1930. All contained in Air 9/62, commencing 
Folio 19. 
3. Articles in The Daily Telegraph, 11 and 16 
August 1930. 
4. Truth, 27 August 1930. See Air 9/62, Folio 28. 
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should be thrown on them"as much as 
possible. Accordingly, again with 
remarkable unanimity, articles are 
appearing in many newspapers to the 
effect that events on the Indian 
frontier have proved the "definite 
failure of aircraft". ' 
Such antagonism, concluded the writer, was symptomatic of the 
"ever recurrent clash between youth and senility". It was time 
the old gentlemen were "pensioned off". The CAS, writing to 2 
Sir Geoffrey Salmond in India, likewise saw the press articles 
as the work of the "usual Army propaganda". In fact, he 
claimed, had it not been for the work of the Air Force, a first 
class tribal war would have ensued. If the part played by 
aircraft were fully acknowledged, then the battle for 
substitution would be three-quarters won. 3 
" At the end of the month the Air Staff replied officially 
to such criticism. The Cabinet should know, stated a memo, that 
four days prior to the Afridi reaching Peshawar, air forces were 
obliged to watch lashkars advancing down the Bara valley. In 
fact, air attack was not sanctioned until late on the night 
before the tribesmen reached the vicinity of Peshawar itself. 
Such an advance would not have been possible if air attack had 
not been "crippled by mishandling". 4 
Notwithstanding such explanation, further press criticism 
1. Air 9162, Folio 23, the Sunday Pictorial, 
24+ August 1930, article by F. Britten Austin 
entitled "Give Our Youth Its Wings". 
2. Ibid. 
3. Air 9/27, CAS to AOC India, Air Marshal Sir 
Geoffrey Salmond, 5 September 1930. 
11. Air 8/122, Part III, 30 September 1930. The 
Air Force appear to be justified in their 
complaint. On 13 May, referring to reports 
received from India, the CAS had written 
to his Minister: 
.. these telegrams seem to show that delays 
are ensuing in the taking of prompt air action 
to prevent the further spreading of unrest, 
and that the action itself, when taken, is 
being fettered: and that in this way a very 
serious situation is being allowed to develop. 
Ibid., Part II, Item 7. Author's underlining. 
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was made of air control towards the end of the year. As far as 
the role of the Air Force in India was concerned, the strongest 
denunciation came in two articles in The Daily Telegraph written 
by journalist L. S. Ashmead-Bartlett. Basing his arguments on 
first hand experience, he maintained that all the real donkey 
work along the North West Frontier fell upon the Army, as it 
was bound to do in all operations carried out in mountainous 
country. Over such terrain aircraft were "almost innocuous" 
once the tribesmen had learnt a few elementary lessons in self 
defence. The writer attacked, too, the system of dual control, 
arguing that this had led to many muddles, some of which had 
enabled the Afridis to penetrate to the gates of Peshawar twice 
during the summer. Both cooperation and efficiency were 
impossible when there were two separate staffs taking independent 
instructions from the civil authorities for operations against a 
common enemy. ' A few days later an article in The Sunday Times 
took up the same theme. 2 
Senior soldiers also expressed their views at this time. 
In private, Ironside strongly criticised air control in a letter 
to Liddell Hart. Referring to Iraq, he claimed that the system 
meant that those operating it never came into contact with the 
people they were controlling. The Empire had been built up by 
Frontier men; it could not be maintained by the remote action 
of air control. 
3 In public, the Indian General Staff took a 
similar line. Lt. General Sir Cyril Deverell, the CGS, stated 
that an air force based in places like Bannu, Tank, Kohat and 
Peshawar could make no contribution towards the betterment of 
tribal conditions. People could not be civilised by flying over 
them or dropping bombs upon their villages. Ethical 
considerations aside, experience had shown that lashkars and 
hostile gangs had clearly learnt the lessons of dispersion, 
concealment and night movement in order to avoid losses from 
1. Air 9/62, Folios 32 and 33, The Daily 
Telegraph, 10 and 12 December 1930. 
2. Ibid., Folio 37, Leader in The Sunday 
Times, 17 December 1930. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/101, Ironside to 
Liddell Hart, 5 January 1931. 
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air action. The Air Force could never playa solo part. Only by 
"rewelding" the two services together would the maximum safety, 
efficiency and economy be achieved. The withdrawal of regular 
garrisons from Tochi, Razmak and Wana would mean that the vital 
road construction and the development of hospitals, schools and 
agriculture would be seriously affected. 
' In a later memo, 
Deverell claimed that air control in practice meant the complete 
abandonment of the only justifiable attitude that a civilised 
Power could adopt towards its own backward subjects. 2 
In the New Year the AOC India, undeterred by such 
opposition, published the reductions in ground forces 
contemplated in a proposed air control scheme for Waziristan, 
3 
maintaining that the savings made by such reductions would not 
only cover the initial capital outlay for the air scheme, but 
also the recurring costs of the increased air requirements. 
Aircraft, properly handled and with the assistance of regular 
forces, could effectively control tribal territory at a minimum 
cost in lives and money. In a sentence: the column was 
provocative, air control was preventive. 
' 
A few weeks later the Air Staff's case was supported in 
principle by the findings of the Tribal Control and Defence 
Committee. Set up by the Indian Government in September 1930 
to examine and review the policy of frontier defence, the 
Committee reported that during the disturbances of the previous 
year, the value of the air weapon and of airpower generally 
had been clearly demonstrated. Aircraft, it claimed, had acted 
1. Air 8/121, DI(AP)13, Memo by the General 
Staff, India, 30 October 1930. 
2. Ibid., DI(AP)14,20 January 1931. 
3. These were 1 British infantry battalion, 5 Indian 
infantry battalions, 1 Indian cavalry regiment, 
3 field batteries, 2 light or medium batteries, 
and one section of medium artillery. See Air 9/63, 
Folio 13, Policy for the Control of Waziristan, by 
AOC India, January 1931. For India as a whole, the 
Air Ministry proposed the release of 1 British 
battalion, 24+ Indian battalions, 1 cavalry regiment 
and 121 batteries. See Air 8/121, DI(AP)10, Memo 
by the Secretary of State for Air, 15 September 1931. 
4. Air 9/63, Folio 13, Policy for the Control of 
Waziristan, by AOC India, January 1931. 
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as a deterrent against the occurence of trouble and had checked 
it spreading. Whilst it recommended no reduction in ground 
forces along the frontier itself, it felt that reductions could 
be made in those forces of the field army which were only 
mobilised and brought into action at the later stages of an 
operation. I 
Despite these findings, a number of military witnesses 
called by the Committee had spoken out forcefully against air 
control, arguing that, quite apart from having no civilising 
influence, it made the Army's task more difficult by dispersing 
the enemy. Deserving of special mention are the comments made 
by Captain Blacker. He considered that the development of the 
technical means of cooperation between ground forces and 
aircraft had been much neglected. There was, as. he put it, a 
"distinct hiatus" between aircraft and forward troops. 2 
In the CID Sub-Committee, however, the conflict between 
the two departments continued unabated until the beginning of 
1932.3 By this time more pressing problems, not least of which 
was the growing political unrest within India itself, cut short 
the Committee's deliberations. Towards the end of January the 
Chairman of the Committee, the Secretary of State for India, 
announced that conditions both at home and in India made 
further discussion of this "intricate and contentious question" 
inopportune. 4 His postponement of the controversy until 
conditions were more fävourable meant that the issue was not 
seriously raised again within the period under review. 
In India itself, it would appear that by 1935 the 
relations between the two services at command level had become 
1. Air 9/63, Folio 23, Report of the Tribal Control 
and Defence Committee, 26 March 1931. 
2. Ibid., Folio 23, Minute 10. This aspect is 
considered further in Chapter 10 of this work. 
3. See Air 8/121, DI(AP)9, Memo by Secretary of 
State for War on substitution generally, 20 
July 1931, and ibid., DI(AP)10 and DI(AP)16, 
Memos by Secretary of State for Air, 15 
September and 18 December 1931. 
4. Ibid., Note by Secretary of State for India, 




surprisingly harmonious. Writing to the C-in-C India, FM Sir 
Philip Chetwode, in June of that year, the AOC India, AM Sir 
Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, showed a most conciliatory attitude. His 
letter deserves to be quoted at length: 
I am not here to compete with the Army on 
any ground whatever, but simply to 
cooperate on the best of terms under your 
orders. I have seen so much of the 
dangerous tendencies of inter-service 
jealousy and suspicion that I fully 
realise the necessity of subordinating so- 
called service interests to the 
requirements of national defence as a 
whole. For years at the Staff College and 
at the Air Ministry I did everything I 
could to eradicate the ridiculous but 
intense suspicion which exists in my 
service to the attitude and motives of the 
General Staff towards the RAF. I believe 
that one of the causes of anti-Air Force 
feeling out here is fear of substitution. 
Perhaps it would help to promote a better 
understanding if it were known that I am 
entirely opposed to the reduction of a 
single British soldier in India. I 
In his reply, Chetwode likewise blamed some of the 
misunderstanding upon Trenchard's "ill-advised Cabinet paper 
on substitution". This, he claimed, had intensified the fears 
of many soldiers concerning the possibility of large-scale 
reductions in the Amy .2 
On the purely tactical front, too, attempts were made at 
this time to improve cooperation between forward troops and 
supporting aircraft. Wing Commander J. C. Slessor in particular 
carried out exercises with this in mind towards the end of 1936.3 
In the New Year, however, when further troubles broke out in 
Waziristan, there was renewed friction between the two services. 
By May the Army were heavily engaged and three brigades of the 
Field Army had been called in to assist the normal covering 
troops. Commenting upon these operations in a memo to the CGS, 
1. Bartholomew Papers, 2/1/13, Ludlow-Hewitt 
to Chetwode, 28 June 1935. 
2. Ibid., 2/1/1), Chetwode to Ludlow-Hewitt, 30 June, 1935. 
3. See this work, pp. 292-li. 
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Slessor complained that the role of the air forces had been 
"cooperation in the narrowest sense". Such disturbances, he 
argued, could not be controlled by a combination of road making 
and a policy of "burn and scuttle" by army columns. Airpower, 
used properly with the normal garrison, could have localised 
the troubles and avoided a large and costly military operation. ' 
Despite this disagreement, however, when ACM Sir Cyril 
Newall was appointed CAS a few months later, he was clearly 
anxious to avoid such open friction. Although concerned about 
the status of the. Air Force in India, he counselled caution when 
writing to his Minister: 
.. I suggest it would be wiser for you 
not to open this subject with the 
Secretary of State for War at present, 
particularly as it is undesirable for 
me to embark on a serious disagreement 
with the WO on a matter which they have 
very much at heart during the first 
month of my period of office. 2 
When writing to Deverell a few days later, therefore, Newall 
assured him that he had no intention of raising "the old and 
bitter controversy of substitution". He wished only to point out 
the inadequacy of the air force in strength, type and 
organisation to meet India's requirements, and the fact that 
airpower had not always been employed to the best advantage. 3 
Within the Air Force itself, however, feelings ran much 
higher. An Air Ministry directive that same month assured the 
AOC India that the unsatisfactory position of the RAF was fully 
appreciated. One of the solutions it advanced was the 
establishment of an RAF Army Cooperation Wing, paid and 
administered by the Air Force, but allocated for service with 
the Indian Defence Forces. The AOC was warned, however, not to 
give any indication that this change of policy was being 
contemplated. 
' Likewise some notes written at this time by a 
1. Air 9/11, Folio 60, Slessor to Vesey, July 1937. 
2. Air 8/529, RAF India, North West Frontier Policy, 
Newall to Viscount Swinton, 16 September 1937. 
3. Ibid., Newall to Deverell, 20 September 1937. 
4+. Ibid., Directive for AOC India, September 1937. 
\1 
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member of the Indian Air Staff revealed deep dissatisfaction 
both with policy and equipment. In recent years, the writer 
complained, the air arm had only been employed as "a weapon 
of the last resort". Furthermore, any hope of rapid employment 
was "crippled" by the slow machinery of governmental control. 
He continued: 
There is no doubt that the General Staff 
do not intend to use the air in any 
manner which might prejudice the 
continued use, unfettered, of the land 
forces in tribal territory. I 
Air forces in India, he stated, would never be voluntarily 
used by the Army authorities except on a very small scale and 
with the minimum of information about their contribution 
afterwards. For a long time air activity would continue to be 
hampered by delays and objections on one score or another. In 
the meantime, the RAF could no longer press for substitution; 
there was far too much to be done at home to embark upon "an 
acrimonious controversy". On the matter of equipment, he 
complained that five out of eight squadrons were obsolete and 
that the Air Staff were not obtaining their fair share of 
defence funds. He noted: 
The Army leopard cannot suddenly be 
expected to change its spots, 
particularly if he is a hill leopard 
born and bred. All requests for money 
for defence are submitted to and 
conducted by a Principal Staff 
Officers' committee, virtually an 
Army Council to which the AOC is 
attached.. 2 
Annoyance over the allocation of defence funds was also 
voiced by Newall. At the same time as he was writing to the 
CGS, General Sir Ivor Vesey, 3assuring him that the policy of 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1933/90, Some Notes 
on Frontier Policy as Affecting Imperial 
Defence, Air Staff, India, 4+ January 1938. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Air 8/529, Letter from Peck to Newall, 
16 October 1937, refers. Air Commodore R. H. 
Peck was then Senior Air Staff Officer, HQ India. 
\1 
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cooperation of recent years would be continued, the CAS was 
complaining bitterly to his Minister about the stranglehold 
which the Army had upon defence expenditure. He pointed out that 
out of £15 million recently acquired by the Army authorities for 
the rearmament of the forces, only some £3J million had been 
earmarked for the Air Force. Furthermore, in arriving at that 
figure, the AOC's opinion had not been sought, despite the fact 
that the branches of Army HQ were officially obliged to consult 
the RAF on any matter which might concern. it. On similar lines, 
Newall complained that the Air authorities had not been informed 
about a sum of £600,000 which had been provided by the Treasury 
for the re-equipment of four cavalry regiments and the formation 
of certain machine gun battalions. This allocation had been 
agreed between the WO, the India Office and the Treasury. It was 
clear that the time had come for a full examination into the 
country's defence responsibilities and commitments. 
' 
The Government shared this view. In March the CID, acting 
on the authority of the Prime Minister, set up an inter- 
departmental committee between the WO, India Office and the Air 
Ministry "to consider the future organisation and composition of 
both the Army and RAF in India". 
z A note by Plans Branch, 
written three weeks earlier, had already outlined the Air 
Ministry's case. The Air Staff, conceded the Director, Group 
Captain Slessor, were no longer interested in substitution in 
India, nor in the methods of control along the Frontier, but 
they could no longer tolerate the continuation of a virtual 
"Army Air Arm" whereby eight valuable squadrons were 
inefficiently administered and equipped. Nothing could be put 
right, however, until the defence of India ceased to be 
regarded as a "closed preserve" and, instead, was dealt with as 
part of an overall scheme for Imperial Defence. $ 
1. Air 8/529, Newall to Swinton, 29 January 1938. 
Such inter-departmental negotiations were 
described as "catch as catch can" by a member 
of the Indian Air Staff. See Liddell Hart Papers, 
11/1933/90, Air Staff Note, 4+ January 1938. 
2. Cab 2/7, CID 313th Meeting, 17 March 1938. 
3. Slessor Papers, VIIIA, Note by Plans Branch, 
26 February 1938. 
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Newall adopted this line of argument when the discussions 
began. The air force in India, he claimed at one of the meetings, 
was "equipped with obsolete aircraft and trained in an obsolete 
framework". The Air Ministry could no longer continue to permit 
personnel who had been trained in the latest classes of aircraft 
and equipment to have to revert to obsolescent equipment and 
methods when serving in India. Vesey did his best to reassure 
the CAS that the C-in-C was seriously concerned over the 
position of the air force in India and, indeed, had formed a 
COS Committee to improve coordination. He was not prepared to 
comment, however, upon a new Air Staff suggestion that the air 
force in India should be run on an agency basis to avoid the 
lengthy delays caused by the existing procedure. 
' 
The conclusions reached by the Inter-Departmental Committee 
under the chairmanship of the DMOI, Major General H. R. Pownall, 
went a long way towards recognising the Air Staff's major 
grievances. The Committee's report highlighted, for example, 
the disparity existing between the amounts allotted to the two 
fighting services. The 1938-9 budget was cited, wherein 93% 
had been allocated to the Army and less than 5% to the RAF. The 
report also concluded that in matters of Indian defence the Air 
Force had not been properly represented in the past. 
2 Not 
surprisingly, these findings proved basically acceptable to the 
Air Staff. Newall was able to inform the CIGS, General Viscount 
Gort, that so far as the broad issues were concerned, the 
conclusions and recommendations were unanimous and showed that 
the interests of both services were parallel. 
3 
Slessor notes that the Pownall Committee was an amicable 
affair and that the representatives from India were cooperative 
and understanding. 
' Such agreement was to be short-lived however. 
In June another short but sharp row broke out at the tactical 
1. Air 8/529, Note on Inter-Departmental Meeting 
held at the Air Ministry, 28 April 1938. 
2. Ibid., Newall to Sir Kingsley Wood, Resume 
of events, 2 June 1938. For full report see 
Annex-2 to COS Paper 737, Cab 53/39. 
3. Air 8/529, Newall to Gort, 16 May 1938. 
4. Slessor, op. cit., p. 199. 
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level. Complaints made in person by Newall, including one 
alleging that the air forces were not adequately employed simply 
because local Army commanders wanted a share in the action, 
were roundly dismissed by the CGS. On making enquiries into 
these allegations, Vesey had been assured by his Deputy that 
Peck had been fully consulted during the recent operations and 
that the air force had been given as free a run as possible. ' 
In his reply to the Air Ministry, therefore, Vesey claimed 
that, being distant from the realities of the situation, Newall 
had received a distorted view of the matter. Misuse of aircraft 
had doubtless occurred in the past, but every effort was being 
made to minimise the risk of this happening again. To suggest 
that Army commanders gave their troops a "run for their money" 
at the expense of the RAF was "absolute bunkum". 
2 In his 
answer, Newall did not press this last point, but he continued 
to maintain that the Army was not using the air force according 
to agreed practice. In matters, of frontier defence, he retorted, 
quoting none too convincingly from Moliere, it was much more 
honourable to fail according to rule than to succeed by 
innovation. 3 
The same month also saw a deterioration in interservice 
cooperation at Staff level. Following a decision by the 
Chancellor to search for economies in Indian defence, the Air 
Staff, contrary to stated policy, resurrected the idea of 
substitution. Newall wrote to his Minister: 
I have not put this aspect of the 
subject before during the present 
discussion as I was most anxious 
not to introduce an element of 
certain discord into our 
proceedings. ' 
It was now clear, however, Newall contended, that the possibility 
of making economies by extending the use of airpower along the 
1. Air 8/529, Auchinleck to Vesey, 24 June 
1938. Major General C. J. E. Auchinleck 
was Director of Staff Duties. 
2. Ibid., Vesey to Newall, 6 July 1938. 
3. Ibid., Newall to Vesey, 20 July 1938. 
4. Ibid., Newall to Wood, 19 July 1938: 
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Frontier would be raised, and he thought it only right to 
suggest "an exploitation of this field". ' 
An opportunity to raise the question of substitution came 
later that year with the setting up of the Chatfield Commission, 
charged with the task of investigating the whole question of 
Indian defence. 2 The Air Staff were prepared to-join battle. 
Air Commodore R. H. Peck, Senior Air Staff Officer, HQ India, 
writing to Slessor at this time, agreed that controversial 
issues could not and should not be avoided. "Sharp differences 
of view" were inevitable in attempting to ensure that airpower 
were used properly in the future. 3 Thus in giving evidence 
before the Commission in October, Slessor, then DDOI, "maintained 
that "drastic economies" could be made in Indian defence by a 
more frequent use of aircraft on the Frontier. The Air Staff 
were convinced that substantial savings were possible by 
extending the use of the air method or, where this was not 
appropriate, by employing air and land forces on a properly 
coordinated plan. ' 
The recommendations of the Chatfield Commission, broadly 
similar though they were to those of the Pownall Committee, 
were not wholly acceptable to the Air Ministry's representative, 
AM C. L. Courtney. In a proviso to the report, he maintained that 
the Commission'had taken too sanguine a view of Army-Air Force 
cooperation along the North West Frontier. Though this had 
improved in recent years, he held that the best use of airpower 
would not be achieved without some change in the "present 
machinery". 5 But such matters were not to be given the attention 
they surely deserved. Shortly after the recommendations had been 
accepted by the Cabinet, war broke out and the Government had 
more pressing matters to consider. 
1. Air 8/529, Newall to Wood, 19 July 1938. 
2. Cab 24/278, CP 171(38), 1 July 1938. 
3 Air 8/529, Peck to Slessor, Undated. 
40 Ibid., Note by Air Staff enclosed. in letter 
from Newall to Ludlow-Hewitt, 17 October 1938. 
5. The report is contained in Cab 24/287, CP 
133(39). For a comprehensive review of Indian 
Defence for this period see Gibbs, op. cit., 
Appendix II, p. 830. 
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The competence of airpower in the control and defence of 
imperial possessions in the Middle and Far East is difficult 
to evaluate. Detailed research would be necessary before any 
valid judgment could be given. In broad terms it can certainly 
be said that in the areas where air control was employed there 
was a substantial saving in both money and manpower. On the 
other hand, the value of its contribution at the tactical level 
must be open to question, if only because it served to divorce 
rather than combine the tactics of Britain's air and land 
forces. As a result, a spirit of competition rather than 
cooperation was engendered and a wedge driven between the two 
fighting services. 
Nor was this divergence of role confined to trouble spots 
along the distant frontiers of Empire. Throughout most of the 
1930s political and military attention had been shifting with 
increasing urgency towards the worsening situation in Europe 
and here, as in the diverse territories of the Empire, the Air 
Ministry's claims to an independent role were threatening the 
very existence of the Army as a viable fighting force. 
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Important though the struggle for power was in the 
scattered and diverse possessions of the British Empire, the 
substitution of the Air Force for the Army was by no means 
confined to the sphere of imperial policing and defence. A 
paper by Trenchard in May 1928, produced eighteen months before 
the issue of his controversial "last will and testament", left 
his COS colleagues in no doubt as to the Air Staff's abiding 
faith in strategic bombing as a war-winning weapon in a 
European conflict. In outlining the war objectives of his 
Department, Trenchard made it abundantly clear that the Air 
Force's primary aim was "to paralyse from the very outset the 
enemy's production centres and munitions of war of every sort 
and to stop war communications and transportation". Instead of 
attacking the rifle and machine gun in the trenches, where 
the losses would be heavy and the gains would be small, air 
attack would be directed at the factory where these weapons 
were made. This was to be the new method of attaining the old 
objective: the defeat of the enemy nation. Whilst conceding 
that there would be some air requirement for ground forces 
when the enemy's army was being attacked, he maintained that 
to attack the enemy's armed forces was to strike at his 
strongest point. It was by attacking the sources from which 
these armed forces were maintained that the greatest effect 
both materially and morally could be obtained. No longer 
could the horrors and suffering of war be confined to the 
battlefield. Trenchard, clearly convinced that an enemy would 
adopt the same strategy, concluded: 
I would therefore urge most strongly that 
we accept this fact and face it. That we 
do not bury our heads in the sand like 
ostriches, but that we train our officers 
and men and organise our services so that 
we may be prepared to meet and to counter 
these inevitable air attacks. 1 
The GIGS, General Sir George Milne, 2 lost no time in 
challenging this paper. Such a policy, he warned, amounted to 
1. Cab 53/14, COS Paper 147,2 May 1928. 
2. Milne was appointed CIGS 19 February 1926. 
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the indiscriminate bombing and killing of unarmed civilians. It 
was ridiculous to contend that the dropping of bombs had reached 
such a state of accuracy as to ensure that bombs would hit only 
the so-called "military targets". Furthermore, -he could not 
agree that in any future war the opposing forces would continue 
to attack each other's economic and vital centres whilst purely 
military objectives were "relegated to a secondary category of 
importance". He could not see why, in the end, the issue in the 
air would not be determined by the superiority of one force over 
another, as was the case in ground fighting. In addition, like 
any innovation on the battlefield, it was reasonable to argue 
that as the air menace grew, measures would be developed by 
which it could be combatted. 
Milne pointed out, too, that in the matter of long-range 
bombing, Britain was at a distinct geographical disadvantage. 
London, the country's administrative and commercial centre, was 
highly vulnerable, whereas Paris lay 170 miles from the English 
coast and Berlin a great deal further. With this in mind, he 
argued that, so far as the employment of our air forces was 
concerned, it was clearly to our advantage to keep within the 
accepted codes of conduct of war. Instead, we were publishing to 
the world at large that we intended to employ such methods from 
the outset of hostilities. 
Turning to the effectiveness of strategic bombing, the GIGS 
maintained that the claims made by the CAS were open to question, 
particularly in the respect of war with Russia, our most likely 
adversary at that time. He cautioned: 
It is necessary .. to consider whether our probable resources in aircraft alone could 
bring about decisive results or even 
achieve the object to attain which, in the 
opinion of the CAS, they should be employed 
He reminded his colleagues that there was no precedent to show 
that any enemy could be paralysed by the policy of long-range 
1. Cab 53/16, COS Paper 155,16 May 1928. 
The First Sea Lord held a similar view. 
See Cab 53/16, COS Paper 156,21 May 1928. 
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bombing. ' He could think of no occasion in the last war when 
military concentrations had been brought to a standstill by air 
action alone, or when railways on either side had been materially 
affected by air bombardment. Dunkirk, despite-systematic bombing 
throughout the war, had continued to fulfil its function, whilst 
our own air efforts against enemy submarine bases in Belgium had 
had no lasting effect on the German underwater campaign. Nor had 
the air raids on London, although unpleasant, produced any 
deterrent effect, indeed, they had only served to stiffen the 
nation's will to. fight. Improvements there had been in aircraft 
since that time, but counter air action had also reached an 
equally increased standard of efficiency. In urging the COS Sub- 
Committee to accept what practically amounted to an independent 
form of strategy by the RAF, the CAS had failed to put the 
problems involved into their proper perspective. The memo 
concluded: 
In war, concentration of effort alone can 
bring about success, and my main anxiety 
after studying the Air Staff memo is lest 
the acceptance of views advanced may lead 
us into exactly the opposite direction. 2 
At a meeting of the COS at the end of May, Milne took the 
matter further, complaining that the policy outlined by the CAS 
appeared to suggest a war objective which was completely 
divorced from the efforts of the other fighting services. So 
long as there was an element in the Air Force which had been 
brought up in "the atmosphere of the Army", he had no great 
fears, but it was unwise to spell out any doctrine which at some 
future date, when there was no longer an Army element within the 
Air Force, might lead to a wide divergence of views between the 
1. Hankey was also of this opinion. Sent a 
copy of the paper before it was circulated, 
he wrote to Trenchard, "I cannot but feel 
the gravest doubt as to whether you do not 
exaggerate the power of the Air Force. " 
Hankey felt that it was only by a combination 
of all three fighting services that a really 
determined enemy could be overthrown. See 
Cab 21/31+, letter dated 28 April 1928. 
2. Cab 53/16, COS Paper 155,16 May 1928. 
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two staffs. Faced with similar opposition from the First Sea 
Lord, Trenchard denied any intention of pursuing an independent 
war aim for his Department, and agreed to draw up a formula in 
keeping with the wishes of his colleagues. ' This he did, and a 
few days later the COS Sub-Committee agreed to a format which 
placed greater emphasis upon air strategy "in concert with the 
Navy and Army". 2 
In fact, such a formula served only to paper over the 
cracks. Towards the end of the year a short, sharp exchange of 
letters between Trenchard and Milne revealed only too clearly 
the deep feelings of mistrust which lurked just below the 
surface. Following a visit to the Army's Staff College at 
Camberley, Trenchard wrote to Milne to complain that the Air 
Force officer on the directing staff was giving no instruction 
in the more advanced principles of air operations. He considered 
that the limitation in the type of instruction given was 
"imposed at the express request of the WO, since they objected 
to teaching the students what I call 'the Air Force faith' and 
preferred to confine instruction to the details of army 
cooperation pure and simple". 
3 Milne's reply was to the point: 
So far as we are concerned there is not 
now, nor as far as we can trace has there 
ever been, any restrictions as regards 
the scope of the instruction to be given 
by this officer. 
If such a restriction had been in force at any time, the GIGS 
concluded, then it had been imposed by the Air Ministry and not 
by the WO. 4 
1. Cab 53/2, COS 70th Meeting, 30 May 1928. 
2. Cab 53/17, COS Paper 162,11 June 1928. 
3. Air 5/280, ]45a, Trenchard to Milne, 
10 December 1928. 
Ii 
. Ibid., 
46a, Milne to Trenchard, 14 December 
1928. In this connection it is noteworthy 
that Slessor later complained that all the time 
he was lecturing at Camberley (1931-3+) the 
Commandant, Major General Dill, would not permit 
him to give the students the RAF case about air 
control on the North West Frontier of India. 
See Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1937/99, lunch with 
Group Captain Slessor, 25 November 1937. 
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The following year, the collapse of Wall Street plunged 
the world into deep economic depression. This, together with 
the optimism engendered by the Locarno Treaties and the wishful 
thinking which attended the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the 
Stresemann period, turned the attention of the Western World 
towards hopes of international disarmament. There was, as 
Lt. General Sir John Burnett-Stuart pointed out, a lack of public 
interest in the state of the fighting services and no interest 
in defence save as an obstacle to complete disarmament. ' Thus 
despite constant, warnings by the COS as to the country's state 
of unpreparedness, the programme of air expansion initiated in 
1923 ground gradually to a halt, slowed down by the Government 
both as a measure of economy and as a gesture towards 
disarmament. In the years 1932 and 1933 not a single squadron 
was added to the strength of the RAF, which remained ten 
squadrons below the target of 52 set in the early 1920s. 2 "The 
result of this, " Lord Swinton later recalled, "was not merely 
stagnation but retrogression. "3 
The Army fared no better. Its attempts at mechanisation 
had been less than half-hearted despite the promises held out 
by the CIGS in 1927. Like the proverbial month of March, the 
Milne administration had come in like a lion and appeared all 
set to go out like a lamb. As early as October 1929, according 
to Sir Samuel Hoare, Milne had become an old man, mentally and 
physically. Major General Sir Edmund Ironside wrote the 
following June: 
We the Generals are beginning to go down 
the drain in the opinion of the public. 
We are old and crusty and don't reform. 
The new Air Marshals are now prepared to 
do anything and assume any responsibility. 
It is in my mind wrong to let things lie 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/1932/12, Burnett-Stuart 
to Liddell Hart, 14 October 1932. Burnett- 
Stuart was then GOC British Troops in Egypt. 
2. Denis Richards, The Royal Air Force 1939-45, 
Vol. I, p. 8. 
3. Lord Swinton, op. cit., p. 101. 
4. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1929/18, talk with 
Liddell Hart, 31 October 1929. 
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and to pretend that there is now 
agreement between the Services. I 
Liddell Hart agreed. The Army, he declared, remained that 
"rusty machine that got stuck in the trenches, ". The public 
naturally regarded it with distrust. 
2 
As the purse strings tightened further on service 
expenditure, the relations between the services became more 
embittered. Addressing the Imperial Defence College on the 
matter of service cooperation in December 1930, the CAS, ACM 
Sir John Salmond, referred to the different views held by the 
new arm and the "older order". He warned against the danger of 
"hardening our minds and slogging at each other". 
3 But Salmond 
and Milne were never on good terms; his advice went unheeded. 
The following May Ironside informed Liddell Hart that "the 
struggle between the Air Force and the Army continues heatedly" .4 
The friction generating the most heat at this time was 
that concerning the efficacy of strategic bombing. Here, the 
claims of the Air Staff did not go unchallenged. Commenting 
upon the Air Exercises held in the years 1929 to 1931, one 
military observer maintained that the "all bomber theory" had 
been discredited. He called for more fighters and for the 
development of special low flying aircraft for tactical use. 
The public, he argued, had been persuaded by the Air Council 
that if war came London would soon be "dust and ashes". In fact, 
the conception of aerial defencelessness had no support from 
war experience or from peace time exercises. No less critical 
was an RAF officer. Writing in the RUSI Journal, he contended 
that, because the offensive was so attractive as a general 
principle, the interception of raiding aircraft was depicted 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/401, Ironside to 
Liddell Hart, 7 June 1930. Ironside was 
Commander, Meerut District, India, 1928-31. 
2. Ibid., 1/132/10, Liddell Hart to Burnett- 
Stuart, 7 October 1932. In 1931 the regular 
Expeditionary Force comprised five infantry 
divisions, one of which was incomplete, and 
a cavalry division. See Peter Dennis, op. cit., 
p. 26. 
3. Air 9/1, Folio 9, December 1930. 
4. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/401,22 May 1931. 
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as a kind of "high speed blindman's bluff", despite the fact 
that the defensive role of aircraft had not yet been shown to 
be undesirable or impracticable. Furthermore, in the case of 
England, the policy of countering air bombardment by air 
bombardment might involve the risk of delivering blows in a 
comparative void and receiving them in a vital spot. Such was 
hardly a profitable undertaking. 
' But the Air Staff found 
staunch support in the columns of The Aeroplane. The idea of a 
defensive aircraft, declared the Editor, was "merely silly". 
The only sort of defence which was any good was one which struck 
hard and kept on striking hard until the enemy had had enough. 
The bomber was the weapon which "wins wars and keeps them won". 2 
In May 1932 Colonel Sir Frederick Pile entered the lists, 
roundly condemning such a policy. The Air Ministry, he 
complained, was trying to preserve bombing despite the fact that 
all stood to gain from a ban on bombers. 3 A few months later, 
however, the doctrine of-strategic bombing received influential 
support from the publication of Liddell Hart's The British Way 
in Warfare, a work which placed emphasis upon the indirect 
approach in the strategic sphere and which contained the 
controversial seeds of limited liability. Lt. General Sir John 
Burnett-Stuart, whilst supporting such a policy, emphasised 
the need for a unified command structure. He wrote later that 
year: 
1. Articles on Air Exercises by Major Oliver 
Stewart, Army Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No. 2, 
January 1929, p. 262; Vol. XXI, No. 1, 
October 1930, p. 87; and Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 
October 1931, p. 109. Later, however, as 
Air Correspondent of The Morning Post, 
Stewart emphasised the difficulty of finding 
enemy aircraft from the air. See his work, 
The Strategy and Tactics of Air Fighting. 
Squadron Leader J. O. Andrews, "The strategic 
role of Air Forces", RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXVI, 
1931, P. M. 
2. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XL, 21i June 
1931, p. 1178. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1932/15, talk with 
Pile, 6 May 1932. Pile was then Assistant 
Director of Mechanisation at the WO. 
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The RAF has always overcalled its hand 
and is still overcalling it.. The Army 
does not want to eat up the Air Force 
- it wants to combine with them, and 
share with them its responsibilities. 
That is the only solution - one staff 
and one selected list for the higher 
commands. Then the pendulum would have 
a chance of swinging true and the 
adjustments between the air and ground 
would follow naturally. To use the RAF 
as a rod to beat the Army with .. does the Air no good and the Army much harm. 
With the invasion of Manchuria by Japan, the emergence of 
militant Nazism in Germany, and the withdrawal of both these 
countries from the League of Nations, attempts at disarmament 
were reluctantly abandoned. Demand grew for an increase in air 
strength. Lt. Colonel Pownall noted in his diary: 
It certainly seems that educated opinion 
is beginning to realise that we have gone 
too far in setting an example in reduction 
of armaments and must now retrace the path. 2 
When the British Government did begin its first painful 
review of its defence requirements in 1934, it soon became clear 
that the doctrine of strategic bombing had survived the lean 
years of collective security in the mid 1920s and the attempts 
at disarmament in the early 1930s. In the words of one observer, 
the Air Force had emerged as "the spearhead of every attack"; 
3 
in the words of another, the Prime Minister himself, the bomber 
would "always get through". 4 Indeed, the publicity afforded 
airpower during the long, abortive attempts at international 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/132/7, Burnett-Stuart 
to Liddell Hart, 14+ September 1932. 
2. Brian Bond (Ed), Chief of Staff: The Diaries 
of Lt. General Sir Henry Pownall, Vol. I, 30 
November 1933, p. 26. The Ten Year Rule had 
been cancelled earlier that month. See Cab 
23/77, Cabinet 62nd Meeting, Conc. 5,15 
November 1933. 
3. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XLIII, 20 July 
1932, p. 131. 
4. Hansard, (HC5s), Vol-270, Col. 632,10 November 
1932. Spoken just prior to presenting Britain's 
disarmament plan to the Geneva Conference on the 
reduction and limitation of armaments. 
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disarmament had served only to highlight the potential danger 
of the bomber as a war weapon. Grey wrote: 
The Disarmament Conference has at any 
rate done one good thing - it has'given 
the Air Force the finest advertisement 
it has ever had. If nothing had been 
said at Geneva about abolishing bombing 
and prohibiting air attack, and all that 
other nonsense, the ordinary Englishman 
would never have awakened to the fact 
that the Air Force is in danger. ' 
Pownall noted this growing support for airpower and sounded 
a warning note. The public cry, he wrote, was all for the Air 
Force. It was time that there was propaganda to the effect that 
the air arm can only to a small degree be substituted for the 
older services. It was "a new and expensive complication 
superimposed on the older methods of attack and defence". 
2 Gort's 
biographer makes the same point. At this period, he later wrote, 
the Army felt "neglected and aggrieved". 3 Later in the year, 
however, the publication of Groves' Behind the Smoke Screen 
added considerable weight to the case made out by the advocates 
of strategic bombing, predicting as it did that the Expeditionary 
Force would be "almost certainly" paralysed even before it 
reached the battlefield. 
4 The military mind, he held, had all 
along failed to understand what airpower was all about. 
It was intuitive faith such as this in the bomber's 
potential which accounted for much of the Army's opposition to 
the Air Ministry at this period. Pownall noted that Colonel T. 
Hutton and Lt. General W. N. Bartholomew were strongly anti-Air 
Force and that they proposed "to obstruct the Air Ministry 
1. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XLV, 18 October 
1933, p. 660. It was in response to this "danger" 
that Mr. Baldwin was later to assure the House of 
Commons that in air strength and airpower, "this 
country shall no longer be in a position inferior 
to any country in striking distance of our shores". 
Hansard, (HC5s), Vol. 286, Col-2078,8 March 1934. 
See also Air 9/8, Folio 53. 
2. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 13 March 1934, p-38- 
3. J. R. Colville, Man of Valour, p. 68. 
4. Brigadier General P. R. C. Groves, Behind. the 
Smoke Screen, p. 219. 
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right or wrong in every possible way". It was sufficient, wrote 
Pownall, for the Air Ministry to say that black was black for 
the WO to protest that it was white. Not, he added, that the 
Air Ministry refrained from edging in various ways to improve 
their own position. 
' By this time, Liddell Hart noted, the 
General Staff had replaced the Admiralty as the most bitter 
opponent of the Air Force. 
2 
So negative an attitude on the part of the WO can in no way 
be condoned, but a weighty measure of opposition is at least 
understandable. Air Staff notes of this period, whilst conceding 
that aircraft had some part to play in a purely defensive role, 
regarded the counter offensive as "the backbone of air defence". 
3 
In theory, the targets of such an offensive were to be of purely 
military importance, but, in practice, such a policy amounted to 
an attack on the civilian population in an attempt to force a 
surrender. This was a concept which, as Liddell Hart was later 
to point out, had been inherent in RAF doctrine almost from the 
beginning. 4 As one contemporary writer put it: 
The only defence is in offence, which means 
you have got to kill more women and children 
quicker (sic) than the enemy if you want to 
save yourselves. 5 
Thus when the first meeting of the Defence Requirements 
Sub-Committee got under way in November 1933, the divergent 
strategies of the two services re-emerged. The CAS, ACM Sir 
Edward Ellington, 6 anxiously maintained that, the first 
requirement to be met was to bring the Home Defence Air Force up 
to its proper scale of 52 squadrons.? Indeed, so preoccupied was 
he with air defence, that at a subsequent meeting he had to be 
1. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 28 September 1933, 
p. 21. Bartholomew was then DMOI, and Hutton 
was working in the Department of the CIGS. 
2. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1933/40, Notes on 
Milne's Regime as CIGS, Undated. 
3. Air 9/8, Folio 147a, October 1933. 
1. Letter to RUSI Journal dated 9 April 1962. 
See Vol. CVII, p. 156. 
5. Eugene M. Emme, The Impact of Air Power, p. 52. 
6. Appointed 22 May 1933. 
7. Cab 16/109, DRC 1st Meeting, 14 November 1933. 
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pointedly reminded of the 19. squadrons required by the Field 
Force if it were despatched to the Continent. Pownall, 
referring to this occasion in his diary, noted: 
Air Staff had taken no account of this 
at all, had not even agreed to the 
number of Army Cooperation squadrons 
required. ' 
On the other hand, for the CIGS, General Sir Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd, deeply concerned as he was with the 
Army's unpreparedness, the needs of Home Defence took third 
place to the protection of imperial outposts in the Far East 
and the provision of a force for the Continent. 
2 In justifying 
this order of priority, the CIGS contended that the Air Force 
made too much of the German air menace. Whilst agreeing that 
Germany could, if she so desired, concentrate all her air 
resources in an attack on Britain, he argued that it was 
impossible to expect absolute safety in all conditions. 
3 Even 
Liddell Hart, who had played so prominent a part in broadcasting 
the war potential of the bomber, now alleged that fears 
concerning aviation were being inflated by a quantity of "hot 
air". Writing in The New York Times, he maintained: 
So far as the civilian masses are 
concerned, their present danger is 
undoubtedly-being exaggerated .. the air forces of Europe today are 
not large-enough to carry out the 
universal devastation that is 
popularly imagined. ' 
It is to be noted, however, that Ellington was not opposed 
in principle to sending a Field Force to the Continent. As a 
1. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 23 January 1934, 
p. 34. See also letter from Hankey to Ellington 
wherein Hankey refers to this omission, Cab 
21/434,28 February 1934. 
2. Cab 16/109, DRC 3rd Meeting, 4 December 1933. 
3. Ibid., 7th Meeting, 25 January 1934. 
4. Liddell Hart Papers, 10/1934/7a, 28 January 
1934. Brian Bond notes that by the late 1930s 
Liddell Hart had given up his "brief flirtation" 
with the theory of strategic bombing. See Liddell 
Hart: A Study of his Military Thought, p. 109. 
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former gunner, he laid stress upon the moral effect of such 
action. Indeed, according to Group Captain R. H. Peck, he took 
a soldier's attitude towards such matters rather than "the 
modern air view". I This was certainly the case at the beginning 
of March when Hankey, fearing opposition to a continental 
commitment from some quarters, informed Sir Robert Vansittart, 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that 
he could depend upon Ellington's support. 
2 By this time, too, 
the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, which included the COS, 
had come down heavily in favour of a well-equipped Expeditionary 
Force for the Continent. 3 Then in May the COS reported to the 
Sub-Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements: 
So long as we hold the Low Countries not 
only do we gain warning of attack but 
our own counter offensives start nearer 
their objectives than do the German 
attacks on England, in fact, we should 
have superiority of position. 
To limit our assistance to sea and air forces, they claimed, 
would be interpreted by our allies as equivalent to abandoning 
them to their fate. 4 
This is not to suggest, however, that Ellington's support 
was unqualified. Indeed, this was far from the case. The report 
of the Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee itself 
refers to a serious and unresolved discrepancy between the two 
Staffs over the character of German rearmament and Germany's 
strategical intentions. 5 This disagreement had been heatedly 
aired at a meeting of the COS at the beginning of May. On that 
occasion Montgomery-Massingberd had claimed that according to 
the Military Attache in Berlin, the German Air Force would be 
used in close cooperation with their land forces and that 
"there would be no bombing outside the zone of the armies 
until success on land had been assured". If such were the case, 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1935/113, Talk with 
Peck (then DDOI), 12 December 1935. 
2. Cab 21/4+3+, Hankey to Vansittart, 8 March 1934. 
3. Cab 16/109, DRC 14+, para. 25,28 February 1934. 
4. Cab 16/123, DPR(DR) 5,8 May 1934. 
5. Ibid. 
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he had argued, it followed that, as in 1914, the role of the 
Expeditionary Force would be to attack the German flank in 
order to prevent an enemy occupation of bases in the Low 
Countries. In this connection air action by itself could not 
end a war. 
' 
For his part, Ellington had questioned the validity of 
the General Staff's appreciation. His information, on the 
contrary, tended to show that, because the French defences were 
so powerful, the Germans were determined to put all their 
supplementary efforts into their air forces. 2 In any case, he 
had reminded his colleagues, the Channel ports might be 
rendered untenable, thus preventing the despatch of the 
Expeditionary Force. It might not be possible to use Calais, 
Dunkirk, Antwerp and Boulogne and, with the increasing range 
of aircraft, Le Havre might not be usable , in ten years' time. 
He had considered that a heavy attack once a day on these ports 
would be sufficient. Furthermore, "fairly accurate bombing" was 
also possible at night by means of flares. Such predictions 
brought a counter charge of exaggeration. The whole-air threat, 
stated the CIGS, was problematical and had to be put into 
perspective. There were those, he conceded, who maintained 
that the next war would begin with bombing by day and night and 
that this scale of attack would continue indefinitely. 
Personally he could not accept that any arm of the services 
could sustain such a pace. 3 
Meanwhile in the Ministerial Committee on Disarmament, 
charged with the task of reviewing the findings of the Defence 
Requirements Sub-Committee, the Secretary of State for War, 
Lord Hailsham, was fighting a long rearguard action against 
Chamberlain and Sir John Simon in what was to prove a vain 
1. Cab 53/4, COS 125th Meeting, 1 May 1934. 
2. In a memo two months later, Ellington 
argued that owing to the exposed position 
of London it was reasonable to assume 
that initially Germany would send two- 
thirds of her total bomber force against 
this country. Cab 53/24, COS Paper 34+4, 
11 July 1934. 
3. Cab 53/4, COS 125th Meeting, 4 May 1934. 
I 
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attempt to retain a continental commitment based on a more 
balanced concept of defence spending. Was the Government 
prepared to say, he asked, that indiscriminate bombing was 
acceptable and that, no matter what happened to the Low 
Countries, no Expeditionary Force would be employed in their 
defence? ' The Army, he pointed out, had been short of f30 
million when Milne had retired as CIGS the previous year, yet 
the vote proposed for the expansion of the Army over the next 
five years had been reduced from f40 to 119 million. If it 
were considered that Germany would not be in a position to wage 
war for five years, -then why were the Air Force requirements 
to be met and, indeed, increased? The Army, in fact, -was 
necessary in order that Belgium should be available as an air 
base for Britain and not as an air base for Germany .2 The War 
Minister stressed, too, the size of the German army - then 
estimated at 21 divisions - and the serious decline in the 
strength of the British ground forces. Whilst he did not 
dispute the need for a strong Air Force, he was not convinced, 
he told the Committee, that the provision of a large air force 
would be an effective deterrent against Germany. 3 
Such arguments proved of no avail against a Foreign 
Office and a Treasury who were determined, on the contrary, to 
regard a strong air force as the only workable deterrent. The 
Army, argued Chamberlain, was not a deterrent. It only came 
into action if the deterrent failed and, as such, it had to be 
regarded as "the second line of defence". The defence of the 
Low Countries was important, but as it was impossible to make 
provision for both the Army and the Air Force over the short 
term, then it was only right that the Air Force, the chief 
deterrent, should be dealt with first. 4 As an Editorial in 
The Aeroplane put it: 
1. Cab 16/110, Cabinet Committee on Disarmament, 
10 May 1934. Chamberlain was then Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and Simon the Foreign Secretary. 
2. Ibid., 26 June 1934. 
3. Ibid., 12 July 1934. 
4. Ibid. The following month the Government approved 
the first of 13 air expansion programmes. See 
Montgomery Hyde, op. cit., p. 318. 
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The function of the Army is to hold 
ground which the enemy has abandoned 
because of air action. ' 
Amid such a climate it is hardly surprising that a Times 
article in May of that year, pressing for a combined staff and 
proposing that the Army should be given its own air service 
on the lines of the Fleet Air Arm, should fall on stony ground 
in Whitehall. 2 The ground in Kingsway proved even less fertile. 
Despite assurance to the contrary by the leader writer, the Air 
Staff clearly saw the article as a subtle means of reopening 
the whole question of the independence of the Air Ministry. 
That such fears were still harboured by the Air Force 
became evident towards the end of that year. A suggestion by 
the GIGS that the Staff Colleges of the three services should 
be amalgamated to assist inter-service cooperation3 served to 
rekindle the embers of animosity and mistrust which had 
continued to smoulder since the findings of the Colwyn Committee 
early in 1926. The DCAS, AM Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, for example, 
advised against having anything to do with a one-sided argument 
which would tend to confirm the view, expressed so often in the 
writings of both soldiers and sailors, that the Air Force, like 
the Army, had only to deal with the enemy on land, and that the 
two services could therefore be unified in one form or another. 
He admitted, however, that it was never desirable nor 
practicable to "refuse to play when the CIGS suggests improving 
the machinery of cooperation". For his part, he suggested a 
temporary interchange of staff officers, and then added, 
revealingly: 
I do not believe that this does very 
much good, but it is a way of creating 
the impression that the services are 
doing their utmost to become mutually 
acquainted. 4 
1. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XLVII, 
l July 1931, P-15. 
2. Article entitled "A Combined Staff", 
21 May 1934. See also Air 9/5, Folio 32. 
3. Air 2/717, CAS to DO, 10 October 1931+, refers. 
4+. Ibid., Ludlow-Hewitt to CAS, 19 October 1934. 
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Equally partisan motives for supporting officer exchange 
had been put forward only two days earlier. A letter from the 
DO to the CAS alluding to the difficulties of placing Army 
officers in suitable posts, had pointed out that the Inland 
Area was ruled out for fear that the WO, presuming that their 
staff officers were essential in the Command which controlled 
the Army Cooperation Squadrons, might press for a separate air 
arm. ' On the same day, a supplementary Air Staff note had 
stated that such exchanges were considered to be the best means 
of preventing the Army from "drifting into an attitude of 
hostility towards the RAF and endeavouring to create a new 
Fleet Air Arm problem". 2 
Commenting upon the Army's proposal a few days later,. the 
DDOI, Group Captain R. H. Peck, warned that the suggestion was 
clearly intended to bring the Air Force under the Army as-"a 
younger brother". It was simply another method of achieving the 
old aim. In effect, such a suggestion was prejudicial to the 
full development of airpower not only for imperial defence, but 
also as a new means of bringing pressure to bear upon the enemy. 
Good relations with the Army were to be encouraged in practical 
ways, but such a proposal was a retrograde step. He continued: 
I have great fear that the CNS will find 
himself unable to fall in with the CIGS 
proposals and that, when he has stepped 
out, the CIGS will then press for at any 
rate an Army and Air combination which, 
of course, would be housed at Camberley. 
I think this would be a proposal 
dangerous in the extreme. 3 
Many senior Army officers, he advised, still felt strongly 
that there was no such thing as an air strategy and no means by 
which air action could overcome the enemy's will to wage war. 
On this point, therefore, there was still "a fundamental 
difference of doctrine" between the two services. He thus felt 
that it would assist a great deal if the General Staff were to 
1. Air 2/717, DO to CAS, 17 October 1934. 
2. Ibid., Notes on the interchange of 
Staff Officers, 17 October 1934. 
3. Ibid., DDOI to DCAS, 19 and 25 October 1934. 
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be given a greater understanding than they had at present of 
the problems of air defence. 
' 
A note by the Commandant of the RAF Staff College, AVM 
W. R. Freeman, was no less forthright. He considered that the 
atmosphere of a combined college might "stifle progressive 
thought and new ideas". It was of the utmost importance to the 
RAF that its junior officers should not be restricted by the 
conservatism of the older services. The tenets of the Army and 
Navy were not fully applicable to a service which worked in a 
new element and under new conditions. What was required was 
not an amalgamation of the services, but an improvement in 
their relationship and cooperation. 2 The following month the 
AMP, AVM F. W. Bowhill, came out strongly against even an 
exchange of staff officers. The Air Staff had quite enough to 
do, he argued, without being hampered by having an officer of 
another service in place of a "proper RAF officer". 
3 Ten days 
later Air Commodore C. L. Courtney, the DSD, warned that if the 
Navy did not participate in a combined staff college, the Air 
Force would be in a decided minority and was likely to be 
"swamped". 4 Likewise the DCAS, AVM Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, 
when informing Ellington of this strong opposition, advised 
that: 
the strong military atmosphere of 
Aldershot, Farnborough and Camberley 
would tend to sap the service spirit 
of the RAF-Staff'College and possibly 
bias its outlook. 5 
At the root of this ill feeling between the two services 
1. Air 2/717, DDOI to DCAS, 19 and 25 October 1934. 
2. Ibid., Note by AVM W. R. Freeman, 29 October 1934. 
3. Ibid., AMP to DCAS, 9 November 1934. 
4. Ibid., DSD to DCAS, 19 November 1934. 
5. Ibid., DCAS to CAS, 30 November 1934. It is 
ironic that the idea of a combined staff 
college appears to have been initiated on 
this, occasion by Wing Commander A. W. H. 
James, the NP for the Wellingborough Division 
of Northants, in a debate in the House of Cocoons, 
15 March 1934, Hansard, (HC5s), Vol. 287, Col. 6614. 
See Army Quarterly, Editorial, Vol. XXVIII, 
2 July 1934, pp"195-6. 
S 
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lay anxieties in both departments as to the other's war 
objectives. Just as the WO feared that the Air Ministry were 
planning an independent war policy based on wholesale strategic 
bombing, so, in their turn, the Air Ministry feared that the WO 
was working towards an open-ended continental commitment on a 
1914-18 scale. Under the positive pressures of. German rearmament 
the fundamental differences in strategy which had given rise to 
the paper polemics of the 1920s now began to reassert themselves 
in more realistic terms. 
The COS had two problems to handle, noted Pownall in 
September 1934. One was the redirection of the nation's defence 
plans; the other was the greater coordination of staff training 
and liaison between the services, especially between the Army 
and the RAF. ' The following month an exchange of letters between 
Wing Commander Slessor and AVM Freeman showed this to be clearly 
the case. A suggestion by Freeman, Commandant of the RAF Staff 
College, that the country should never again support a 
continental ally with land forces save for a small contingent 
to defend air bases was welcomed by Slessor. A "National Army", 
he agreed, was impossible. Never again could the nation stand 
the strain of trying to go full out for naval, air and military 
measures. The General Staff themselves, he contended, were 
definitely moving towards this point of view, but they still 
had some way to go against the forces of reaction and it would 
be a mistake on the part of the Air Staff to try to "supercharge 
the Mills of God". He continued: 
... one's got to remember that the chaps 
at the head of the Army, who have 
immense influence, social and otherwise, 
in this country, were my age before the 
aeroplane was thought of as a weapon of 
war and to my mind the marvel is, 
considering how badly on the whole the 
RAF was handled in the war, that they 
have come so far to meet our point of 
view. 
He advised Freeman to discuss the matter with Major General 
R. H. Haining, then DDMOI, "a very experienced, a very 
1. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 24 September 1934, p. 50. 
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intelligent and a very progressive and broad-minded soldier". 
1 
A much less charitable view of the General Staff's 
intentions was taken by Peck. Writing to the DCAS that month, 
he alleged that the Army's apparent concern to protect the Low 
Countries as a means of increasing home protection against air 
attack was, in fact, a cover for ulterior motives. He wrote: 
The security measures aspect of it will 
I feel sure be glossed over and it will 
be as the months go on turned into the 
first step towards the great military 
offensive on which they pin their faith 
as the offensive measure best calculated 
to secure victory. 
Despite the fact that, in his view, the Great War had 
conclusively shown the supremacy of the defensive and that no 
innovation had changed this situation, the reliance on a land 
offensive was "an article of faith to many of the best military 
minds". There was thus a serious danger of taking it for 
granted that our conduct of a future war must depend upon 
large central land offensives. In a clear reference to 
strategic bombing - though the phrase itself was studiously 
avoided - Peck added: 
I am most anxious that this tendency 
should not be acquiesced in until 
there has been a comprehensive 
examination of the various measures 
we can apply to bring pressure upon 
the enemy. 2 
Freeman's reply to Slessor the following month likewise 
questioned the Army's motives. "Are you quite sure, " he asked, 
"that the General Staff do not visualise for us a large 
continental army? "3 
1. Slessor Papers, VIIIA, Freeman to Slessor, 
8 October 1934, and Slessor to Freeman, 11 
October 1934. At this time Haining was very 
much. opposed to the concept of limited 
liability. See Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1936/99, 
talk with Deverell and Haining, 13 November 1936. 
2. Air 9/8,. Folio 51, DDOI to DCAS, October 1934. 
3. Slessor Papers, VIIIA, Freeman to Slessor, 
6 November 1934. 
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Two weeks later, as though to add substance to the fears 
of both Peck and Freeman, Montgomery-Massingberd once again 
accused Ellington of over emphasising the air threat. He claimed 
that the expansion of the German Army was as notable as that of 
the German Air Force. Indeed, the latter only seemed greater 
because it had started ab initio. The German Army, on the other 
hand, had begun from a basis of 100,000 men and expansion was 
taking place to a "formidable degree". I Then in the New Year 
he bluntly told the CAS that the power of the Knock Out Blow 
was being exaggerated. He was unable to believe that any big 
scale air attack could so paralyse the nation that it would be 
unable to continue the war. Ellington still maintained, however, 
that a country seizing the initiative in this way might gain a 
big advantage and might deal the attacked nation a blow "from. 
which it might not be able to recover". 
2 Contemporary comment 
was less prosaic. Charlton wrote, for example: 
... there will be an undisciplined flight from London. .. Of those who 
remain, either by choice or constraint, 
some will have their sanity strained 
to the limit. 3 
In fact, the fears of both departments as to the war plans 
of the other were to prove fully justified. As far as the Army 
was concerned, such fears were clearly vindicated just three 
months later. The Abyssinian crisis which broke out in September 
revealed those very dangers inherent in divided control which 
had been spelled out by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig when the 
Air Force was first formed, and which had been echoed down the 
years by members of the General Staff. As recently as October 
1934, the CIGS had voiced concern over the lack of cooperation 
and common doctrine between the higher staff officers. If the 
relations between the two departments could not be improved, 
he had warned, then the two services were bound to drift further 
apart, a state of affairs which, in the event of a land war, 
1. Cab 53/4, COS 135th Meeting, 20 November 1934. 
2. Cab 2/6, CID 268th Meeting, 21 February 1935. 
3. Air Commodore L. E. O. Charlton, op. cit., 
pp. 172-3. First published Spring 1935. 
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would result in the Government receiving conflicting advice 
from its Air and Army Chiefs. ' 
Such indeed proved to be the case when the COS came to 
examine the recommendations of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee 
concerning the crisis in Abyssinia. 
2 Ellington insisted that 
his forces would best be employed in bombing Italian sources of 
aircraft production in northern Italy. This in his view was the 
surest and most effective means of crushing the Italian air 
effort. Montgomery-Massingberd, on the other hand, argued that 
the offensive against Italian aircraft production should be 
carried out by France, leaving the RAF free to concentrate 
their efforts in support of sea and land forces in the Central 
Mediterranean, Egypt and the Red Sea. Chatfield, the First Sea 
Lord, supported the CIGS. Italy had aircraft ready, he pointed 
out. It was not very satisfactory to leave these alone and to 
tell their victims that their replacements were being attacked. 
Ellington was not in favour, however, of leaving the entire air 
, offensive 
to the French. He felt that, at the least, they would 
require "a slight backing from the British air forces". 
3 
This controversy over the precise part to be played by the 
RAF caused a "pretty flap"' when a meeting of the COS Sub- 
Committee was hastily called at the beginning of December. On 
being informed that the Air Staff were proposing to send 12 
to 13 squadrons to assist the French in their missions against 
northern Italy, the CIGS accused the Air Ministry of conducting 
a "private war of their own". 5 He had understood, he complained, 
that the British air contingent was to be a token force merely 
to keep the French up to the mark. He did not consider that 
the sending of so large a force had been authorised. The 
matter required further examination so that the views of the 
other services could be taken into account. 
1. Cab 53/5, COS 133rd Meeting, 9 October 1934. 
2. Fora broader appreciation of this crisis see 
Gibbs, op. cit., Chapter VI, p. 187; and L. R. 
Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez, Britain's 
Mediterranean Crisis 1936-1939. 
3. Cab 53/5, COS 119th Meeting, 6 September 1935. 
4. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 4 December 1935, P"90. 
5. Ibid. 
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Ellington, however, maintained that the word "contingent" 
adequately covered the proposal to send such a force. The 
correct strategy was to concentrate the maximum air force 
available against the decisive point, namely the aircraft 
factories, depots and aerodromes in northern Italy. Any 
deviation from this policy would be tantamount-to weakening 
the main theatre in order to strengthen a subsidiary one. The 
CIGS deprecated what he considered to be a proposal to wage 
war on two fronts. He could not see that an attack on the 
Italian aircraft industry would have any immediate value to 
the battlefield. The Italian air force was not concentrated 
in the North. ' Indeed, so forcefully did he express-himself 
on this matter that later that day Montgomery-Massingberd felt 
obliged to send an apology to the Prime Minister for "the heat 
with which I spoke at today's meeting". He had been angry, he 
explained, at the way in which the CAS had gone back on what 
the Committee had-previously decided. 2 
One can sympathise with the CIGS. It is clear that the 
Air Staff were determined to prove the value of independent 
air action and were prepared to resort to sharp practice in 
an attempt to achieve their aim. As anticipated by the General 
and Naval Staffs over a number of years, at the first sign of 
major conflict, the air requirements of sea and ground forces 
were readily subordinated, if not sacrificed, to the needs of 
strategic bombing. 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the Air Staff's case 
was not without substance. Ellington could plead that air 
support for the Mediterranean area had not gone by default. At 
a meeting of the COS in December 1935 he claimed that 16 
squadrons had been despatched to the Middle East, bringing 
the total strength of the. RAF in this area to 26. -This was the 
maximum number that could be mustered without recourse to 
mobilisation, and it equalled the strength of the Italian air 
forces in'the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Further- 
1. Cab 53/5, COS 157th Meeting, 5. December 1935. 
2. Cab 21/1+20, Montgomery-Massingberd to Hankey 
6 (sic) December 1935. 
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more, he claimed that air attacks upon aircraft factories in 
the area of Genoa, Milan and Turin, quite apart from their 
immediate effect on production, would force the Italians to 
withdraw aircraft from the battle zone in the south. ' 
For their part, the General Staff in no way minimised 
the value of airpower in the overall strategy. 'What they , 
objected to was not the use but what was, in their view, the 
misuse of airpower. Montgomery-Massingberd argued that air 
resources should be earmarked for the more immediate and local 
task of dealing-with likely problems in the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean. 2 Here the major threat was seen tobe against 
Malta and the Fleet, but air attacks upon Egypt were considered 
likely, and the possibility of a land invasion was not ruled 
out. By September the GOC Egypt was drawing up plans for the 
defence of an advanced airfield near Sollum to enable the'RAF 
to strike at bomber bases deep inside Libya, and by December 
the possibility of an invasion of Libya was being considered. 
In addition, it was thought that aircraft would be needed to 
attack Italian forces in Italian Somaliland and Eritrea, and 
to counter possible border incursions into the Sudan, Aden and 
Kenya. As far as the defence of communications was concerned, 
air support was deemed vital for the protection of the Suez 
Canal and Red Sea. 
3 
Underlying the Army's opposition to air attacks upon 
northern Italy was the fear that air action. of this nature 
would bring no immediate benefit. In addition, the General 
Staff argued that even if the claims made by the Air Staff were 
well-founded, such attacks were unlikely to be sanctioned for 
fear that innocent civilians would be killed. Indeed, the COS 
themselves had made it clear that attacks upon areas of 
civilian population were to be avoided and that, in the event 
of the Italians taking such action, the RAF would not retaliate 
1. Cab 53/5, COS 157th Meeting, 5 December 1935. 
2. Ibid., COS 119th Meeting, 6 September 1935. 
3. Air 8/189, DPR 21, Memo by COS Sub-Committee 
on a single-handed war with Italy, 16 September 
1935, and Cab 53/26, COS Paper 1421(JP. ), 
19 December 1935. 
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unless "specified approval is given from Home". ' 
But the Air Staff continued to place their faith in the 
decisive powers of a strategic force. The policy of the Air 
Force, contended a junior military officer at this time, was 
epitomised in one word - bombing. It was to effect such a 
policy that the Air Force was organised, equipped and trained. 
Of the 91 squadrons possessed by the RAF only ten were Army 
cooperation squadrons and these, with the exception of a few 
seconded Army officers in the junior ranks, were officered and 
manned by the RAF. 2 A warning note was sounded, too, by an 
anonymous contributor to the RAF Quarterly. The air had an 
important part to play but one must be careful, he cautioned, 
not to be swept off one's feet. Aeroplane enthusiasts should 
not make the mistake of overrating the value of aircraft, 
either in peace or war. It should not be forgotten that in the 
past people had lived through unforgettable artillery 
bombardment and air attack. 3 
Such warnings went unheeded. The next three years were 
to provide ample evidence of this excessive belief in the 
ability and striking power of the strategic bomber. 
1. Cab 53/26, COS Paper 1+17,10 December 1935. 
2. Captain I. O'B MacGregor, "The-Army and the 
Air", RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXX, 1935, PP-500-502- 
3. Quis, "The Universal Arm", RAF Quarterly, 
Vol. 6,1935, p. 129. 
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For the General Staff, the Abyssinian crisis of late 
1935 was a vindication of their fears, so often expressed, 
that in the event of an emergency there would be divided 
counsel from the Army and Air Chiefs as to the best strategy 
to be adopted. As far as the Air Staff were concerned, however, 
the crisis served only to justify the adoption-of a firm stand 
against what they considered to be the outmoded attitude of 
the two senior services, both of which continued to ignore the 
major, perhaps decisive, role that airpower could play when 
used as an independent force beyond the immediate battlefield. 
Indeed, in January 1936 an Air Staff memo came out firmly 
in favour of the doctrine of limited liability, a doctrine 
which had been temptingly offered up by Liddell Hart the 
previous November, I and which was rapidly gaining support in 
government circles. The country, argued the memo, in order to 
survive, could not afford to be weak either at sea or in the 
air. If we were defeated in either of these spheres, then all 
would be lost, whereas the defeat and even the annihilation 
of our army on the continent would not necessarily encompass 
our defeat as a nation or as an Empire. Thus the nation's 
strategy should be based on exploiting the advantages of our 
insular position. With the exception of the "backsliding in 
1914-18", this had been our traditional policy. 
Even the need to defend the Low Countries with ground 
forces was of "rapidly diminishing signficance" due to the 
enormous increase in the speed and ranges obtained and 
anticipated by modern aircraft. In fact, the air was now the 
sphere where the offensive could be developed to the fullest 
extent. The striking power and consequently the deterrent 
power of land forces had "vanished". Indeed, to provide land 
forces in excess of those. required for internal security 
throughout the Empire and for the defence of communications 
1. 'The Times, 25 November 1935. For close studies 
of the doctrine of limited liability see 
Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment, Chapter 
5, p. 96; Gibbs, op. cit., Chapter XII, p. 4l+1, and 
Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military 
Thought, Chapter 4, p. 88. 
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and bases essential for sea and air forces, would be "courting 
disaster". Quite apart from the burden of attempting to compete 
with our continental enemies in all three spheres, the 
requirements of a large army on the Continent, would demand a 
vast quantity of shipping and would seriously reduce the number 
of aircraft available for that offensive air action upon which 
adequate air defence alone depended. In short: 
Its demands on the national resources 
in manpower, material, money and 
industrial capacity would be inimical 
to the maintenance of sea and air 
power which is vital. Its operations, 
even if successful, would avail us 
nothing if we were defeated in the 
air or at sea. 
In any Far Eastern conflict, the memo contended, land 
forces would play a small and purely defensive role; in a war 
against Italy they would only be used for ancillary tasks in 
support of the other services. As for the integrity of the Low 
Countries and the maintenance of Afghanistan as a buffer state 
against Russia, these were "two bogeys employed to stampede us 
into maintaining the intention and the cadre of a future 
national army". In the case of the Low Countries, British 
intervention could not save this area if the Germans were 
determined to I nvade them. In Afghanistan, the Khyber Pass 
prohibited either us or the Russians from operating in strength 
on the far side of such'an obstruction. Air attack had made 
such bottlenecks insuperable obtacles to future land campaign. 
The country did not require, nor could it possibly afford: 
an army designed and primarily intended 
as a cadre upon which to build up a 
national conscript force for continental 
adventure on a continental land war scale. ' 
The Government clearly shared this view. In presenting 
the second White Paper on Defence early in March, the Prime 
Minister announced that the Army had three functions: to 
maintain its imperial garrisons, to fulfil its role in home 
defence, and "lastly", in dire emergency or war,. to provide a 
1. Air 9/8, Folio 59,15 January 1936. 
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properly equipped force for overseas service wherever it might 
be required. The prime function of the Air Force, on the other 
hand, he declared, was "to provide an effective deterrent 
against any attack upon the vital interests of the nation at 
home or overseas". ' 
The implications of such a policy were speedily challenged. 
At a meeting of the COS later that month, the CIGS doubted that 
a time would come when the increased range and performance of 
aircraft would make the need for a Field Force unnecessary. He 
pointed out, with some logic, that whatever increase might take 
place in airpower, the occupation of the Low Countries would 
reduce the scale of attack which might be brought to bear upon 
this country, whilst increasing the scale of attack which could 
be launched against Germany. 2 
Doubts were also cast at this time upon the validity of 
the German air menace. FM Sir Philip Chetwode wrote to Lt. 
General Sir William Bartholomew, CGS India: 
At present her air force is nothing like 
what it is cracked up to be as a war 
proposition. I never see Astor .. or Geoffrey Dawson without telling him (sic) 
what a danger Liddell Hart is. I think 
they see now that he is a mistake. 3 
The following month Lt. General J. G. Dill, the DMOI, complained 
that the "Air" were the blue-eyed boys. What Ministers would 
like to do would be to. turn the whole regular Army into AA guns 
and searchlights. ' 
A more rigorous denunciation of limited liability came 
later that month in a paper described by Hankey as "magnificent". 5 
Written by Colonel H. R. Pownall, Deputy Secretary, CID, it 
stressed the moral as well as the military importance of 
supporting France on land in the event of a war with Germany. 
1. Air 9/8, Folio 51,3 March 1936. 
2. Cab 53/5, COS 169th Meeting, 25 March 1936. 
3. Bartholomew Papers, 2/3/19, Chetwode to 
Bartholomew, 3 May 1936. 
4+. Ibid., 2/J4/14, Dill to Bartholomew, 9 June 1936. 
5. Cab 21/509, Hankey to Sir Warren Fisher, 
16 June 1936. 
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Occupation of the Low Countries, it pointed out, quite apart 
from reducing the intensity of air attack upon this country, 
would provide a most valuable warning system east of the 
Channel. 
On the question of airpower, Pownall argued that if air 
action was likely to be as severe in its results as some of the 
"alarmists" averred, then German troop movements themselves 
would be very seriously handicapped. Limited liability was 
certainly an easy course to take, but it was "full of danger". 
The worst crime was to be "half-hearted in war". Britain could 
simply not afford to lose a major war and thus a maximum 
national effort would be required. In making this effort, the 
Army could call upon a large residuum of manpower and material 
over and above the needs of the Navy and Air Force. In his view, 
in any future conflict the occupation of territory would 
continue to be decisive. The war in Abyssinia had proved that 
the air menace was an additional danger and not a substitute 
for the danger of land attack; both had to be guarded against. 
' 
The following month an article in the Army Quarterly 
likewise called attention to the effects of what it termed 
"the doctrine of central shock". If the Air Staff were to adopt 
such a doctrine, it warned, the air supply departments would be 
less able to fulfil the technical requirements of the other two 
services. The programme of design and production required for 
such a strategy was quite unsuited to the production and 
development of specialised aircraft-for the Army and Navy. 
2 
Earlier comment by the Editor had also reinforced the General 
Staff's opposition to any suggestion which limited its role to 
imperial policing and defence. It read: 
Attractive though this suggestion sounds, 
especially for the taxpayer of this 
country, it is difficult to see how an 
air offensive unsupported by ground troops 
could be really effective in preventing 
1. Cab 21/509, Role of the Army in a Major 
Continental War, June 1936. 
2. Major Oliver Stewart, "The Air Doctrine of Central 
Shock and its Effect upon Supply", Army Quarterly, 
Vol. XXDQI, July 1936, p. 282. 
249 
the advance of an invading army 
equipped with modern armament and 
with air support. ' 
Liddell Hart brushed aside such arguments. The WO, he 
alleged, were reluctant to accept a policy of limited liability 
because, regardless of the risks involved, they. did not "feel 
quite a proper army unless they were preparing for the 
Continent". 2 In fact, however, the Army's case was based on 
sterner stuff. A few days later both the CIGS, FM Sir Cyril 
Deverell, and the DMOI, Major General R. H. Haining, argued that 
the Air Force and the Navy were not in a position to force a 
decision by themselves. It was for this reason, they-told 
Liddell Hart, that a large army was required for the Continent. 
Furthermore, they maintained that there was sufficient manpower 
for such a force. When the needs of the other two services had 
been met, there would still be five million men available for 
service in the Army. 3 In December the Secretary of State for 
War, Mr. Duff Cooper, warned: 
. e. the simplest and gravest emergency 
which can be envisaged is an attack by 
Germany on France and Belgium; It has 
been the view of successive Chiefs of 
Staff and Secretaries of State for War 
that in that eventuality we should be 
prepared to send a land force to 
Belgium or France. 
The presence of four British divisions in Flanders in August 
1914, he claimed, apart from the psychological and political 
aspects, had probably had a determining effect on the history 
of the war. 
" 
Cogent though these arguments might appear today, the role 
of the British Army was not to be so easily determined within 
so short a distance from the Great War. The Government, ever 
1. Army Quarterly, Editorial, Vol. XXXI, 
No. 2, January 1936, pp. 201-2. 
2. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/132/22, Liddell 
Hart to Burnett-Stuart, 6 November 1936. 
3. Ibid., '11/1936/99, talk with Deverell 
and Haining, 13 November 1936. 
4. Cab 53/30, Memo by Secretary of State for 
War on Role of the British Army, 14 December 1936. 
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mindful of the need to avoid a repetition of the bloody battles 
of the Western Front, relentlessly pursued a policy which, in the 
space of a few months, was to complete that revolution in Army- 
Air Force relations which had been slowly taking place over two 
decades. In 1918 it had been the Air Force which had been 
generally regarded as an auxiliary arm of the senior services 
and which had had to struggle to carve out a viable role for 
itself; by the beginning of 1938, however, with the Government's 
official acceptance of limited liability, it was the Army which 
had become an auxiliary arm, obliged to struggle for an 
independent part . to play in the major war which then threatened 
the peace of Europe. I 
Playing no small part in this revolution was the-growing 
belief in the superiority of the defence in any future land 
battle. Writing in The Times in September 1937, Liddell Hart 
argued that, based on a study of Army exercises over fourteen 
years, to organise and train an army primarily for the offensive 
2 was to stake the nation's fortunes on "a very dark horse". 
Charlton wrote: 
Gone at one fell swoop is the necessity 
for military and naval action on the 
former scale of operation. They are now 
superfluous, themselves as vulnerable 
to a stroke from above as the populace 
in the mass whom they formerly defended. 3 
Nevertheless, throughout the bitter and prolonged 
deliberations on the role of the British Army which took up so 
much of their time during the late 1930s, the COS continued to 
show a united front - outwardly at least - both in their refusal 
to compare the deterrent value of land and air forces, and in 
their insistence upon the establishment of a field force 
capable of assisting in the defence of the Low Countries. Indeed, 
following further articles-by Liddell Hart on the merits of 
1. For the pattern of Service Estimates for 
the years 1921-1938, seen as a percentage 
of the 1920 vote, see overleäff 
2. Liddell Hart Papers, 10/1937/73, published 
21i September 1937. 
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limited liability, ' a COS paper rejected the policy outright, 
arguing that any idea of leaving to our continental allies the 
burden of providing all the land forces was out of the question 
for political reasons. They asserted that only by making a 
land contribution made up of the regular Field Force and 
supported by the TA would France be willing to support the 
Belgian army. Difficulties there might be in despatching such 
a force to the Continent, but the German air forces had many 
alternative objectives and these might well prove more 
attractive. In the meantime, concluded the COS, they viewed the 
delay in reaching a decision on the role of the British Army 
with "the gravest concern". 2 
Despite such protestation, however, Air Staff opposition 
was never wholehearted. Despite formal agreement with his 
colleagues, Ellington continued to cast some doubts upon the 
advisability and the feasibility of sending a field force to 
the Continent. In an address to the RAF Staff College in 
December 1936, for example, he had been at pains to point out 
that whilst it was accepted policy that the Field Force must 
be organised and equipped for rapid despatch overseas wherever 
and whenever required, it was not correct to assume that the 
Government would immediately despatch such a force to the 
Continent* in the event of a war with Germany. Quite apart from 
the diminishing value of the Low Countries from the air point 
of view, if Germany were to turn the full weight of her airpower 
against Britain at the outset of the war, all available ground 
forces, including the Field Force, would probably be required 
for internal security duties in aid of the civil powers. There 
was, he had emphasised, no definite commitment and no definite 
intention to send a force to the Continent at any given moment, 
it was simply a possible contingency for which the country had 
to be prepared. 
3 
This underlying divergence in strategic thinking between 
1. The Times, 30 October and 2 November 1936. 
2. Cab 53/30, COS Paper 550,28 January 1937. 
For fuller account of COS attitude, see 
Welch, op. cit., Chapter 6. 
3. Air 9/39, Folio 31,16 December 1936. 
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the two services became more apparent when the COS met the 
following month. Ellington, pointing to the inherent danger of 
being obliged to increase our contribution once a field force 
had been committed, argued that this might force the nation to 
outrun its resources, particularly as industrial production was 
certain to be seriously affected by air attack in any future 
war. He felt that France had to be clearly informed that Britain 
proposed to limit its military effort on land. Deverell, 
reiterating the Pownall line of argument, claimed that if the 
nation were to avoid defeat, it had to be prepared to make an 
all-out effort. If an attempt were made to limit our commitment 
in this way, then France might well "throw in the sponge". The 
fact had to be faced that we might be driven to military 
cooperation "to the limit of our resources". 
I 
A few days later Colonel G le Q Martel added weight to 
Deverell's argument during a lecture on mechanisation. Speaking 
at the RUSI, he pointed out that all military nations were 
building great armies as well as powerful airforces. The power 
to resist aggression on land in some future war might well prove 
"our most urgent necessity". Indeed, the nation's security might 
depend upon the ability to gain military control over enemy 
territory, for it was only by such means that absolute safety 
against the effects of enemy air bombardment could be obtained. 2 
General Sir Edmund Ironside, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, was more 
forthright. He told Liddell Hart that counter-bombing was a 
1. Cab 53/6, COS 192nd Meeting, 12 January 1937. 
At this time the regular army was nearly 40,000 
short of the 1914 figure of 186,000. See Amery, 
op. cit., Vol. III, p. 198. 
2.20 January 1937. See RUST Journal, Vol. LXXXII, 
1937, p. 281. In a report by the Sub-Committee 
on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries, 
the strength of the German Army on the 1st 
January 1937 was put at 36 infantry divisions, 
three armoured divisions, and two independent 
brigades. The report stated, "It is clear moreover 
that Germany is aiming at producing a national 
army considerably stronger in every way than 
that of 1914, with the whole nation organised 
for war behind it. " See Cab 4/25, CID Paper 
1303-B, 6 February 1937. 
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"stupid strategy" simply because the Air Force did not have the 
targets offered to them that we offered to the enemy. 
I A few 
weeks later the WO questioned the efficacy of bombing itself. 
The recent attack on Guernica, they argued, had drawn attention 
to. the limitations of aerial warfare. It had not affected 
materially the course of the war and it had so shocked world 
opinion that such action was not likely to be'repeated. 
2 
In the Army's struggle to retain a field force for the 
continent, however, Slessor's support proved more apparent than 
real. His prize-winning essay for the RUSI in 1936, in which he 
advocated a small Field Force "as a stiffener, moral and 
material, to our allies on land", turned out to be a mental 
exercise, written "with tongue slightly in cheek". The essay, 
he later admitted to Trenchard, was not "an honest expression 
of opinion". He believed, in fact, that the country could not 
afford again to intervene on land in a European campaign. He 
told Trenchard: 
... I can't help feeling that our wealth 
and our overseas trade are such vitally 
important weapons in our armoury that we 
should not weaken them by spending 
millions more than we need on an army of 
a nature which is not really vital to 
our existence as an Empire. 3 
At the same time, however, Slessor, then DDOI, entertained 
doubts as to the wisdom of a strategy based primarily upon 
*strategic bombing. He wrote to Air Commodore R. H. Peck a few 
weeks later: 
I think to a certain extent we have 
ourselves to blame in that we have 
overcalled our hand a bit in the 
past and we have, I think, overdone 
"the bomber will always get through" 
attitude. " 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/401, Ironside to 
Liddell Hart, 9 March 1937. 
2. Cab 21/509, WO to Inskip, 25 May 1937. 
3. Slessor Papers, VIIIA, Slessor to 
Trenchard, 22 June 1937. 
4. Ibid., IA, Slessor to Peck (Senior Air 
Staff Officer, HQ India) 16 August 1937. 
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There was also a difference of opinion between the two 
Staffs over the proposed strength of the Army. Ellington agreed 
that the regular forces should not be reduced below five 
divisions, but he felt that it was difficult to justify a TA 
force of 12 divisions. Deverell, on the other hand, considered 
that that number was small enough, especially as some of these 
divisions might have to be allotted to AA defence. He found it 
hard to believe that whilst, in the Great War, we had manpower 
sufficient for an army of five million, we could not now 
maintain 12 TA divisions. And what, he asked, if Germany were 
to propose the abolition of aerial bombing? This would pose a 
"very awkward dilemma". Either we would be powerless to go to 
the aid of France and Belgium in any war whatsoever or, 
alternatively, we would have to bear the odium of being the 
first to violate the convention prohibiting bombing. ' 
If this last argument can be considered somewhat 
unrealistic in the light of Germany's massive air expansion, 
Ellington's reasoning at this time has even less to commend it. 
Whilst opposing in principle the strategy of limited liability, 
the CAS advocated a restriction of the Field Force on the 
continent, a proposal which in practical terms was as untenable 
politically if not militarily, as the policy of limited 
liability itself. As Major General C. G. Liddell warned in a 
letter to Liddell Hart, the possibility of sending an 
Expeditionary Force to the continent and of expanding it when 
it had reached there had to be faced. The size and composition 
of that force, he advised, should be decided and provided. 2 
Early the next year the two services were engaged in yet 
another controversy, this time over the question of home 
defence. This was a subject in which, as already observed, the 
Air Force had little faith and the Army little interest. In 
1934, for example, the quality of equipment then provided by 
the WO had been called into question by the Editor of Flight 
1. Cab 53/6, COS 192nd Meeting, 12 January 1937. 
2. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/446, Liddell to Liddell 
Hart, 28 August 1937. Liddell was then 
Commander, 4th Division. He was appointed 
Adjutant General to the Forces in December. 
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Magazine. The guns, searchlights and sound locators, he had 
complained, were all antiquated. 
That Department (the WO) is not going 
to stint its tanks and mechanised 
formations of one spanner or one' 
gallon of petrol in order to provide 
new lorries to units which work with 
the RAF and not with the Army. We 
cannot altogether blame the WO .. It is a pernicious I system and must lead to disaster. 
Indeed, at a later date the Army itself had become divided 
over the relative importance of home defence. As Minney points 
out, the older generation of soldiers considered this matter to 
be outside their accustomed sphere. 2 In 1937 the Secretary of 
State for War, Mr. Hore Belisha, had complained that Deverell's 
opinion that AA defence was secondary to the needs of the 
Field Force amounted to "criminal lunacy". 3 Not that the Air 
Force had shown itself to be wholly convinced of the need for 
extensive home defence units. No less a person than the AOC 
No. 11 Fighter Group, AVM E. L. Gossage, speaking at London 
University early in 1937, had argued that air defence in its 
literal sense was unreliable. Absolute security against air 
bombardment was not practicable. Thus the bomb remained the 
chief instrument of airpower and the principal means by which 
one's aims might be obtained in war. 
4 
Despite such misgivings in Air Force circles, however, the 
WO came under severe attack at a meeting of-the CID in March 
1938 following the Government's decision to give AA defence 
1. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XXVI, 12 July 
193+, pp. 699-700. This and future editorial comment 
referred to in this thesis was the work of the new 
Editor, Mr. C. M. Poulsen. Appointed in 1934 after 
many years on the staff as a technical advisor, he 
made a valuable contribution in matters concerned 
with Army-Air Force relations. See in particular 
this work, pp. 273-6. 
2. R. J. -Minney, The Private Papers of Hore Belisha, 
p. 62. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/HB, 1937/58b, Hore 
Belisha to Liddell Hart, 19 October 1937. 
4. Speech reported in The Aeroplane, Vol. LII, 
3 March 1937, p. 2149. 
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priority over all other forms of war material. The Secretary 
of State for Air, Lord Swinton, complained that whilst the Air 
Ministry would be in a position to provide the 38 fighter 
squadrons required for home defence by the following year, there 
would be neither the necessary number of searchlights nor guns 
to cooperate with them. It would be clearly valueless, he 
pointed out, for the Air Ministry to provide aircraft if the 
concomitant ground defences were not forthcoming from the WO. 
Hore Belisha retorted that if further industrial capacity were 
to be allocated to the production of AA guns, the completion of 
the Field Force would be "indefinitely delayed". Furthermore, 
production was only one side of the matter. The Air Ministry, 
by increasing their own programme for air defence, imposed 
demands upon the Army over which the WO had no effective control. 
As a result, it was very difficult for the WO to keep any sort 
of balance in their overall planning. To drive home this point, 
the CIGS, General Viscount Gort, informed the Committee that 
the Field Force had no guns which could compare with those of 
foreign armies. Those in current use were of the 1905 pattern 
and had ranges well below those of modern design. In such 
circumstances it would be "murder" to send the Field Force 
overseas to fight against a first class power. 
' Ironside 
shared this view. "Our wretched little corps of two divisions 
and a mobile division, " he noted in his diary, "is unthinkable 
as a contribution to an. Army in France. " The ADGB was absorbing 
all the money intended for the Expeditionary'Force. 
2 
In April, when a proposal to extend searchlight and AA 
coverage was under discussion, the War Minister, Hore Belisha, 
again warned that if home defence were to be given absolute 
priority, there would have to be a very drastic reduction in 
the equipment for the Field Force. Lord Swinton, however, agreed 
with the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, that the needs of 
home defence should take precedence over those of the Field 
3 Force, and the proposal was adopted. 
1. Cab 2/7, CID 313th Meeting, 17 March 1938. - 
2. The Ironside Diaries, 3 and 5 February 1938, p. l7. 
3. Cab 2/7, CID 318th Meeting, 7 April 1938. 
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A few months later the Air Ministry returned to their 
assertion that, in the event of an all-out German air attack, 
the allocation of army units for the maintenance of law and 
order should take precedence over the provision of an 
Expeditionary Force. Sir Kingsley Wood, the new Secretary of 
State for Air, ' warned that the problem of internal security 
would not be confined to London; other large centres of 
population would also require a military presence. Hore Belisha 
strongly opposed such an idea, regarding it as "most wasteful" 
to use his service as a police force. The Army, he claimed, 
was made up of organised units. It could indeed be used in aid 
of the civil power in an emergency, but this was not its 
primary function; it was required for other purposes. 2 
In fact, as the General Staff had contended for many years, 
the German air menace had been seriously exaggerated by the Air 
Ministry. Only the previous month a paper initiated by Plans 
Branch on the subject of the bombing potential of the German 
air force had reported that the Heinkell 111 had a maximum 
range of only some 700 miles and that, based on "very good 
authority", it could not carry more than half of its bomb load 
of 4,400 lbs given full tanks and a normal take off. The range 
of the DO 17, too, was put at no more than 765 miles. As for 
the JU 86, this did have a range of 830 miles, but only a few 
of these aircraft were still in service. The paper questioned, 
1. He succeeded Lord Swinton, 16 May 1938. 
2. Cab 2/8, CID 332nd Meeting, 15 September 1938. 
Duff Cooper had taken the same view when in 
office. See Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1936/40, 
dinner party, 14 February 1936. 
During the Munich crisis, Ironside noted in his 
diary: "I am told that all the authorities have 
insisted upon the parcelling out of troops all 
over London during air raids. They want the 
sight of uniforms to quieten the people. " 
The Ironside Diaries, 19 September 1938. 
It is significant that in this dispute over matters 
of home defence no serious disagreement was voiced 
over-the system of dual control. Indeed, Inskip, 
speaking in October 1937, could state that according 
to the CIGS in June 1936, there had been no friction 
between the two Departments and. none was anticipated. 
See COS 219th Meeting, 19 October 1937, Cab 53/8. 
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too, the Air Staff's hallowed theory of the Knock Out Blow, 
claiming that even with bases in the Low Countries, only 
Germany's long range bombers were capable of attacking Britain 
and that, in any event, a concentrated attack'of that nature 
would be "highly improbable whilst war is in progress against 
Czechoslovakia and France". The report continued: 
However much we may suspect that Field 
Marshal Goring would like to exploit 
the knock out blow theory, the fact is 
that the responsibility for war strategy 
rests at present upon General Keitel 
who is a soldier and is believed to have 
the soldier's idea that the German Air 
Force exists primarily to enable the 
Army by direct support to gain land, 
i. e. Czechoslovakia. 1 
There was no doubt whatsoever, concluded the paper, that the 
German Army Command believed in the potency of airpower in land 
operations. 
2 
Only a few days later, an Air Staff memo addressed to the 
DCAS, AVM R. E. C. Peirse, reported that on the basis of two- 
thirds of the German air effort being directed against Britain, 
the maximum number of German bomber sorties worked out at 480 
compared with the 1,000 envisaged earlier by the Air Ministry. 
Roughly speaking, therefore, if war broke out with Germany 
within the next two months, the country would have to face a 
scale of attack equal to approximately half that upon which the 
1. Air 9/90, Enclosure JA, 24+ August 1938. 
The Germans did try to'develop a heavy 
bomber, the HE 177, but it came up 
against "technical hitches" and was 
never available in large numbers. See 
Liddell Hart Papers, 1/6+8, letter from 
Dr. J. M. Spaight, 12 May 1944. See also 
Edward Jablonski, Terror from the Sky, 
p. 13. According to this writer, the long 
range four-engined bombers, the Dornier 19 
and Junkers 89, were ready for flight trials 
late in 1936 but, with the death of Walther 
Wever, the Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, their 
development was cancelled. His successor, 
Albert Kesselring, concentrated on medium 
dive bombers. 
2. Air 9/90, Enclosure JA, 24 August 1938. 
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requirement of 688 fighters had been calculated. 
' 
Such disclosures were not confined to the strength and 
nature of the German air menace. During the same period the 
ability of the RAF to carry out large scale long range bombing, 
an ability upon which the Government's policy of limited 
liability was firmly based, was seriously undermined. 
2 The first 
meeting of, the Bombing Policy Sub-Committee, held in March, 
questioned whether present bombing techniques were "on the right 
lines" with regard to methods, training and equipment, and 
alluded to the considerable effort that would be required for 
the destruction of certain targets under war-time conditions. It 
was felt that Bomber Command should hold exercises more 
frequently in the task of locating unfamiliar targets in order 
to rectify "the large bombing errors recorded in long distance 
flights". The C-in-C Bomber Command himself remarked that the 
results recorded at training camps bore no relation to bombing 
under war-time conditions and advocated that a definite effort 
be made to obtain data as to the war possibilities of bombing. 
The Committee concluded that there was a "crying need" for a 
Bombing Development Establishment which would concentrate on 
the necessary experiments. 
3 
This lack of navigational skills was the subject of an 
article by a junior Air Force officer later that year. The Air 
Force, he claimed, would soon be the best in Europe, but it 
remained deficient in one vital requirement:. the ability to 
1. Air 9/90,29 August 1938. Only the previous June. 
Newall had estimated that Germany was capable of 
delivering 3,500 tons of bombs against Britain 
in the first 211 hours of a war, followed by a 
daily average of 600 tons during the ensuing two 
or three weeks. See Cab 2/8, CID 325th Meeting, 
2 June 1938. 
2. Serious doubts as to the actual striking power of 
the RAF had been publicly aired three years earlier 
in an article by Squadron Leader H. V. Rowley 
entitled "The Striking Power of the RAF". The RAF, 
he had contended, was "a broken reed which, under 
the fierce wind of war, will not only break but 
will be blown away altogether". RUST Journal, 
Vol. LXXX, 1935, p"144. 
3. Air 9/92, Archive 31/2,1st Meeting, Bombing Policy 
Sub-Committee of the Bombing Committee, 22 March 1938. 
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navigate astronomically. 
I According to ACM Sir Basil Embry, 
the Air Force showed "a light hearted. approach" towards 
navigation up until the late 1930s. 
2 
Earlier, too, serious doubts had been cast upon the ability 
of an air force to bomb accurately around the clock, .a contention 
often made by the Air Staff in support of their assertion that 
ports on the eastern and southern coasts would be unusable from 
the outbreak of war. Ellington had stated in May 1934, for 
example, that "fairly accurate bombing" was possible at night by 
means of parachute flares. 
3 Yet in October 1937, more than three 
years later, a report on sector and combined training, sent to 
the Air Ministry by the C-in-C Bomber Command, ACM Sir Edgar 
Ludlow-Hewitt, had complained bitterly of the poor results 
obtained during night bombing. One part read: 
... until, if ever, we can produce equipment 
suitable for the purpose, we must recognise 
that precision bombing at night especially 
with high speed aircraft against 
unilluminated targets, i. e. in war conditions, 
remains a matter of very great difficulty. 
This, the report revealed, was not the first time that this 
lesson had been clearly demonstrated. Exactly the same failing 
had been shown in the ADGB exercises held in July 1935 and during 
the winter of 1936. On the specific use of flares, Ludlow-Hewitt 
reported that experiments held in September 1937 with 4 inch 
parachute flares dropped-in pairs had been unsuccessful because 
it had been found impossible to attach the flares securely to the 
aircraft. The report concluded: 
The time has now come when the limitations 
in the efficacy of precision bombing by 
1. Squadron Leader F. J. Fressanges, "Air Navigation 
and Modern Aircraft", RAF Quarterly, Vol. 9, April 
1938, p. 135. 
2. ACM Sir Basil Embry, Mission Completed, p. 89. 
See also article by N. W. Emmott, a navigator 
during the Second World War, entitled 
"Bombing Navigation: the blind led the blind", 
Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Vol-95, 
May 1969, pp. 35-1+9. 
3. Cab 53/4, COS 125th Meeting, 4 May 19314. 
See this work, p. 232. 
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heavy bomber aircraft at night in war 
must be squarely faced.... It is for 
serious consideration whether under 
present conditions bombing at night 
will not have to be regarded as in. 
terms of area bombing. ' 
Ironside'was likewise sceptical. After visiting an RAF training 
establishment a few months earlier, he had described the bombing 
practice as "primitive". Air bombardment, he had maintained, was 
only at the same stage as artillery had been before the South 
African War. 2 
Worse was to follow. In September 1938 the crisis over 
Czechoslovakia highlighted the fact that Britain was deficient 
in long range bomber aircraft -a deficiency which seriously 
impaired that very means of retaliation which, in the words of 
the Air Staff, provided "the backbone of air defence". 3 A paper 
by the Joint Planning Committee confirmed that the majority of 
the country's strike force consisted of bombers of comparatively 
short range which, if the neutrality of the Low Countries were 
observed, could only penetrate a very limited distance into 
Germany when operating from home bases. 4 A few weeks later 
Group Captain L. L. Maclean told Liddell Hart that in the event 
of a war, it was unlikely that the day attacks by Blenheims and 
Battles would reach their objectives. Whilst the maximum range 
of the Blenheim was 700 miles, if its speed 'had to be increased 
to avoid attack, its radius could be reduced to some 250 miles .5 
At the beginning of October, Sir Warren'Fisher, Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, wrote to the Prime Minister 
complaining of the Air Staff's "lack of imagination and fore- 
sight", and claiming that this had been fully equalled by "their 
incompetence in all practical matters including strategic policy". 
Nor, he added, could they be acquitted of disingenuousness in 
1. Air 9/64+, Folio 7, Report on Sector and 
Combined Training, 25 October 1937. 
2. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/401, Talk with 
Ironside, 6 May 1937. 
3. See this work, p. 229. 
4. Cab 55/11+, JP 317,24 September 1938. 
5. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1938/121, 
MacLean to Liddell Hart, 16 November 108. 
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the information they had supplied to the Government. ' Meanwhile, 
as far as the CIGS, General Lord Gort, was concerned, the crisis 
over Czechoslovakia had served only to illustrate the limitations 
of airpower. Why, if the German Air Force were capable of doing 
anything, he asked, in a letter to a colleague, was it necessary 
to mobilise over 30 divisions to march into Czechoslovakia? He 
continued: 
I am not writing this because our 
relations with the RAF are bad because 
the exact opposite is the case, but 
because it is time the nation as a 
whole came to realise that they must 
take a practical outlook on war and 
not just a sentimental one. 2 
Yet despite such adverse findings and the criticism they 
aroused, the Air Ministry and Air Staff continued to show an 
inordinate belief in the contemporary power of the strategic 
bomber, both as a threat and a deterrent. As late as August 1939 
the CAS, ACM Sir Cyril Newall, 3 was denying vital assistance to 
the Fleet Air Arm on the grounds that the Munich crisis and 
subsequent crises had revealed a real fear of air attack upon 
this country. To meet such an attack, he argued, the nation had 
to have a strong bomber force which could "tackle the trouble 
at its source". 4 Nor was the Navy the only service to suffer. 
Air Staff obsession with the creation of a bomber force 
directly obstructed the WO in their endeavours to build a viable 
and, as events were to prove, much needed Expeditionary Force. 
The CAS continued to favour a limited land commitment to the 
Continent and, at times, came very close indeed to a total 
acceptance of limited liability, a policy to which the 
Government obstinately clung until the early months of 1939. 
1. Cab 21/902, Fisher to PM, 1 October 1938. 
2. Inskip Papers, INP 1/3, Gort to Brigadier 
R. D. Inskip (then Commander 1st Infantry 
Brigade, India), 12 November 1938. 
3. Appointed CAS 1 September 1937. 
4. Cab 53/11, COS 310th Meeting, 2 August 1939. 
In 1939 the Air Staff advised that 750,000- 
hospital beds would be required to cope with 
air raid casualties. See Wing Commander H. R. 
Allen, The Legacy of Trenchard, p. 63. 
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The attitude of the Air Ministry was no less obstructive, 
as shown early in November 1938. Following the Czechoslovakian 
crisis and the revision of Scheme 'L', the Air Force's latest 
expansion programme, the General Staff made a. further bid for 
greater recognition. In October they warned the Government that, 
in the light of. events in Czechoslovakia, it was "impossible to 
discount altogether the contingency of having to send military 
forces to the Continent at some stage of the war and perhaps at 
its very outset". The marked desire of the French for British 
assistance on land, and the decision of the Government to 
guarantee the future borders of Czechoslovakia, meant that 
measures to check a German invasion of Western Europe. could 
rightly be regarded as a matter of home defence. 
' The following 
day, however, at a meeting of the Committee on Defence 
Programmes and Acceleration, WO proposals which sought to 
provide, inter alia, a Field Force of two fully equipped mobile 
divisions and four infantry divisions for a European campaign 
were opposed by the Air Minister, Sir Kingsley Wood. He 
questioned whether such proposals were relevant to the Committee's 
task. Since the United Kingdom could not be equally strong all 
round, it followed logically that the Committee ought to 
"concentrate on first priorities". This argument received the 
support of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon, who 
saw in the WO memo an attempt to "revolutionise the existing 
fundamental conception of the Army's task". 
2 
Then at a meeting of the COS later that month, the CAS 
again picked up the threads of limited liability. He went so 
far as to suggest that all would not be lost if the Germans 
occupied the Channel ports. He admitted that the situation 
would be "very serious", and that the Port of London would not 
be usable, but considered that if trade were diverted to 
western and northern ports, the country would be able to carry 
1. Cab 21/510, Appendix 1 to Memo by Secretary 
of State for War on The Role of the Army in 
the light of the Czechoslovakian Crisis, 
31 October 1938. 
2. Ibid., Meeting of-the Committee on Defence 
Programmes and Acceleration, 1 November 1938. 
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on with difficulty. He greatly feared that once a force were 
sent to the Continent the nation would be committed to 
unlimited land warfare. It was for this reason, too, that he 
opposed the equipping of the TA divisions for war. Gort, making 
what proved to be a more realistic appreciation of the military 
situation, reminded his colleagues that war with Germany would 
be "a life and death struggle" in which much would depend upon 
the extent of the German penetration into the Low Countries 
and France. If we made a definite promise to the French to send 
an Expeditionary. Force as soon as possible, he thought the 
French would respond by assisting the Belgians and thus make 
possible the retention of the Channel ports. However much the 
Government might desire to limit its contribution on land, 
stern necessity might force the nation to undertake heavy 
commitments on the Continent. It should not be forgotten that 
the "keystone of the enemy's arch is Germany and until Germany 
is held we cannot consider any other action". I 
An article in the RUSI Journal that month showed support 
for this point of view at the grass roots. Written by an 
Infantry officer, it considered that it would be most 
unfortunate if, when the necessity arose to expand the Army, 
the public were to believe that men were being drafted into it 
"only because obtuse Generals had not yet realised that the war 
could be won by air action alone". Some wars could doubtless 
be won by such means, but the most dangerous could not be. 
Unfortunately, a country had to make war as it had to and not 
as it would like to. 
2 Even Liddell Hart admitted that the 
Munich crisis had weakened the chances of avoiding a commitment 
of land forces to the Continent. The possibility of having to 
supplement the French land defences had now to be considered. 
3 
The French certainly thought so. Sir Eric Phipps, British 
Ambassador in Paris, reported that the French viewed an 
1. Cab 53/10, COS 265th Meeting, 21 November 1938. 
2. Captain H. M. Curteis, "The Doctrine of 
Limited Liability", RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXXIII, 
1938, P. 701. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1938/123, Speech at 
private luncheon, 30 November 1938. 
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Expeditionary Force of 70,000 men as inadequate. No Frenchman, 
he had been told by M. Beranger, the President of the Senate 
Commission for Foreign Affairs, would understand why so small a 
force should be provided when he himself was'one among three 
million of his fellow countrymen. mobilised for land warfare. 
The French appreciated the valuable contribution to be made by 
the British Navy and Air Force, but pointed out that they also 
had a Navy and a not inconsiderable Air Force. This in no way 
affected the disparity between the number of Frenchmen and 
Englishmen risking their lives on land. ' At bottom, noted 
Pownall early in the New Year, Newall's opposition to the 
expansion of the Army was financial. If extra money were 
available, then he wanted it for his Air Force. "As though, " he 
added, "he hadn't had the moon already. " 
2 
Two weeks later Newall again came out strongly against a 
continental land commitment on the grounds that once sent, it 
would be impossible to "turn off the tap". Despite the reports 
from the British Embassy in Paris, he felt that there was a 
danger of being "stampeded into an unsound long-term policy by 
outcries such as the supposed effect on contemporary French 
public opinion or the hopes of the French General Staff". 
Taking into account the financial resources of Britain and 
France,. the needs of home defence, and the probable necessity 
for a considerable body of troops to maintain order and morale, 
he held that we could not provide a full continental commitment 
on land in addition to the maintenance of a Navy and Air Force. 
It might be necessary, as an interim policy, to have a force 
ready for the Continent, but it was important to educate the 
French to realise that we were not obliged to give such 
assistance. 
In reply, Gort admitted that strategic mobility as opposed 
to continental commitment was a very attractive idea politically 
and one which had been feasible in the days of sail when it had 
been possible to transport and land an army more rapidly than 
1. Cab 21/510, Phipps to Viscount Halifax, 
7 December 1938. 
2. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 2 January 1939, p. 179" 
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a defending army could march to oppose it. Today, however, it. 
was a question of steamer versus locomotive, and the latter 
always won. As far as the French were concerned, he argued, it 
was inconceivable that the Maginot Line, however strong, could 
be held in passive defence for an indefinite period. Sooner or 
later a break was bound to occur. If we did not promise aid 
from the outset, the French could accuse us of "sitting on the 
fence" and could rightly question our good faith. Win or lose, 
we had to throw everything into the battle. ' The Chief of the 
Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse, supported these views. 
Indeed, so strongly did he do so that, according to Pownall, 
Newall felt obliged to put aside his own misgivings concerning 
a continental land commitment. In his account of the meeting 
Pownall wrote: 
The CAS was a very doubtful factor at first 
but came round well in the end. I fancy not 
so much because he really believes in it - 
or likes it - as because Backhouse came down 
so strongly on our side. 2 
Thus the Sub-Committee's recommendations, set out in a 
paper a week later, came out strongly in favour of increasing 
the strength of the Field Force in order that it might intervene 
in a Continental conflict. It warned: 
If France were overrun and forced to her 
knees not only would the further 
prosecution'of the war be compromised, 
but we should have already failed in one 
of the main objects for which we entered 
the war, namely the defence of France.. 
The Army, argued the COS, should not be limited to "a scale 
suitable for a Second Class theatre of operations". In addition 
to a colonial force for imperial duties, a Field Force with full 
equipment and reserves should be ready on the outbreak of war, 
and four TA divisions, likewise battle-worthy, should be 
available four months later. 
3 
1. Cab 53/10, COS 268th Meeting, 18 January. 1939. 
2. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 23 January 1939, 
p. 1814. 
3. Cab 4/29, CID Paper 1532-B, 25 January 1939. 
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The next day, at a meeting of the CID, Hore Belisha, the 
War Minister who only a year previously had thrust the policy 
of limited liability down the throats of a protesting General 
Staff, proposed that the doctrine should be revoked. It was now 
clear, he admitted, that any future war would be "a struggle 
for our very existence". 
I The following month, at a meeting of 
Ministers, the Prime Minister himself, faced with the prospect 
of France denying aid to Belgium if Britain refused to make a 
land contribution, belatedly recognised that such a 
contribution might be necessary. He anticipated that such a 
force would comprise two regular divisions and one mobile 
division for immediate despatch, and two regular and-four TA 
divisions for reinforcement at a later date. 2 The doctrine of 
limited liability was dead. 
For the General Staff it was, in the words of Pownall, 
"a great victory". 3 Whilst it is true that the COS had managed 
to speak with one voice in their opposition to limited 
liability, nevertheless, within the Sub-Committee itself, 
support from the CAS had often been grudgingly given. Despite 
his pro-Army leanings, Ellington had made much, too much it 
might be claimed, of the difficulties involved in sending a 
force to the continent, whilst his successor had clearly shown 
a great deal of sympathy with the fundamentals. of limited 
liability. Indeed, in the case of Newall, it is debatable 
whether his undisguised opposition to a continental commitment 
might not have resulted in deadlock within the COS Sub- 
Committee had it not been for the staunch support given to the 
CIGS by Admiral Lord Chatfield and Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse. 
In the CID, too, Lord Swinton and Sir Kingsley Wood had given 
scant support to the Army's case, determined for the most part, 
it would seem, to confine. the Army's role to the ancillary 
duties associated with home defence and aid to the civil power. 
On the broader issues involved, it is likewise arguable 
that if, towards the end of 1937, the Air Ministry had provided 
1. Cab 2/8, CID 345th Meeting, 26 January 1939. 
2. Cab 21/511, Ministerial Meeting, 17 February 1939. 
3. Pownall Diaries, op. cit., 20 February 1939, P"189. 
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the Government with a more balanced, accurate appreciation of 
their potential as an independent bomber force - as, indeed, 
they produced for themselves a year later 
l- the doctrine of 
limited liability itself would have been considered less 
tenable. Indeed, it might well have affected the Government's 
basic attitude to a continental commitment had it been known 
earlier that Britain's air striking force -a major part of 
Britain's contribution to the allied cause and one expressly 
provided in lieu of ground forces - was decidedly suspect both 
as to performance. and efficiency. As two writers later put it 
- not without a measure of overstatement: 
If the spiritual home of the appeasers 
was at Cliveden, their happiest working 
hours were spent in the Air Ministry. 
From here poured forth the facts and 
figures that made war seem impossible; 
the true opiate of the appeasers. 2 
What is beyond contention is that the doctrine of limited 
liability, concentrating as it did upon the strength of our 
naval and air forces, deprived the Army of valuable funds 
during sixteen crucial months from December 1937, when the 
policy was formally recognised, until April 1939 when, 
following Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Cabinet 
officially untied the purse strings and approved a Field Force 
of no less than 32 divisions. 3 Throughout most of that period 
the Army's Field Force was geared down to the level of colonial 
warfare and "equipped for an Eastern theatre". ' 
In April 1939 all this was changed. Postan writes: 
Henceforth the WO could plan on the 
assumption that in the defence of the 
country and in the general conduct of 
the war the Army's share would be as 
full as that of the two other services. 5 
What the WO could not assume, however, was that the belated 
1. This work, pp. 260-62. 
2. Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, 
p. 323. 
3. Cab 23/98, Cabinet Meeting, 21(39), 19 April 1939. 
4. Cab 23/92, Cabinet Meeting, 5(38), 16 February 1938. 
5. M. M. Postan, British War Production, p. 72. 
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decision over the precise role of the British Army would put 
an end once and for all to their long and oft-times bitter 
dispute with the Air Ministry. On the contrary, the scramble 
for the fruits of a limited armament production was to ensure 
that the two departments remained on terms of mutual suspicion 
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With the belated decision to commit a land force to the 
Continent, taken reluctantly by the Cabinet in the Spring of 
1939, the dissension between the two services over the precise 
role of the Army gave way to a bitter dispute over the strength 
and composition of the air component allotted to the Field 
Force and the means by which this component was to be 
operationally controlled. These controversies, neither of which 
was to be successfully resolved before the outbreak of war, 
revealed a long-standing deficiency both in the strength and 
the quality of tactical air support for the Army. 
By the beginning of 1939 a satisfactory settlement of the 
Army's air requirements was long over-due. The supply of 
aircraft to the Field Force beyond that provided for within the 
Army Cooperation Squadrons had been. discussed informally soon 
after General Sir George Milne was appointed CIGS in February 
1926. In a letter to Trenchard at that time, Milne had readily 
conceded, too readily perhaps, that the Government could not be 
expected to provide sufficient funds to furnish the aircraft 
required for both home defence and an expeditionary force. He 
had agreed, therefore, that the air needs of the Field Force 
should be met from squadrons allocated to home defence, if and 
when they were available. At the same time, he had insisted that 
if a force were sent overseas, it had to take with it the 
required air support*' For his part, Trenchard had undertaken to 
put ten Home Defence squadrons on a mobile basis as the nucleus 
of an air contingent for the Field Force. In addition, he had 
assured the GIGS that the scheme of training for the Home Defence 
squadrons would take into account their possible employment with 
the Army - though there is little evidence to suggest that this 
specialised need was ever met. 
2 
This informal understanding between the two departments 
was most unsatisfactory and was not without its critics. 
Commenting upon the appointment of ACM Sir John Salmond as CAS 
in January-1930, the Editor of Flight Magazine took the 
1. Air 9/30, Folio 13, Milne to Trenchard, 
19 April 1926. 
2. Ibid., Trenchard to Milne, 28 April 1926. 
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opportunity of warning him of the serious problems he faced. 
On the question of Army air requirements he had this to say: 
The present arrangements for the supply 
of air units to the Army and Navy bear 
in every way the stamp of temporary 
expedients... it cannot be a matter of 
no concern to the Air Council that the 
number of squadrons allotted to work 
with the. Army is totally inadequate to 
the needs of the Army in war, and that 
the Army shows no disposition to 
shoulder part of the expense. If the WO 
fondly imagines that in time of war the 
Army will be able to borrow air 
squadrons from the Air Defence of GB, 
this fond hope should be firmly dispelled. " 
Later that year the magazine returned. to this subject. The WO, 
it complained, seemed content to accept on permanent or 
temporary loan whatever squadrons the Air Ministry could Afford 
to provide, its only concern, apparently, being to avoid 
payment for such a service. It was important that both the Army 
and the Navy. should have complete control of the strength, 
operation and cost of its own air arm. 2 
The matter was not seriously considered again until 1935, 
when the Army manoeuvres of that year revealed a serious 
shortage of air cover both in cooperation work and close 
support. Flight Magazine reminded its readers that the Army had 
no "lien" on any fighters or bombers. When the Government 
brought the Army up to fighting strength, declared the Editor, 
it would be necessary to equip it with its own fighters and 
bombers, in addition to increasing the number of reconnaissance 
aircraft. 3 
A junior officer in the Royal Artillery, writing on Army 
air requirements at this time, took a more pessimistic view. 
There was little doubt, he-asserted, that as the aerial demands 
of the Army became more exacting, the willingness and ability 
of the Air Force to meet them would tend to decrease. The Air 
Force, he feared, regarded aerial operations with the Army as 
1. Flight Magazine, Vol. XXII, 3 January 1930, p. 2. 
2. Ibid., 11 August 1930, -p. 110. 
3. Ibid.,. Vol. XXVIII, 26 September 1935, P"32)4. 
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"sidelines" which only served to divert them from the main 
policy. As such, they were not likely to be encouraged. ' 
His fears were proved justified the following month when, 
in order to meet the requirements of the Western Plan, then in 
the course of preparation, the two departments met to review 
the Army's air needs. The WO, obviously anxious to obtain a 
more definite undertaking, asked for seven bomber and five 
fighter squadrons to accompany the first Army contingent, and a 
further six bomber and four fighter squadrons for each of the 
three subsequent TA contingents. They asked in vain. Whilst the 
meeting agreed that air bombardment was "an essential part of 
the operations of the Field Force", the Air Ministry ipsisted 
that the limited number of bomber squadrons available made it 
impossible to comply with the WO's wishes. An advanced 
allocation of any number of squadrons to the Field Force, 
however small, was impracticable. It would have to be decided 
in the light of the situation prevailing at the time as to 
whether such squadrons could be provided and, if so, whether 
they should be placed under military command or regarded as a 
detachment of the AASF working in support of the Army. It was 
finally decided that, whilst the five fighter squadrons could 
be allocated, only two bomber squadrons could be considered as 
earmarked for the first contingent, the provision of a further 
six being dependent upon their availability on the outbreak of 
war. As far as the allotment of bomber and fighter squadrons 
to subsequent contingents was concerned, this'was to be resolved 
after mobi Ii sati on. 2 
Once again, it was hardly a satisfactory solution for the 
Army and, as the threat of a European conflict grew, further 
doubts were cast upon the system. The Editor of Flight magazine 
drew attention once more to the seriousness of the situation. 
1. -Captain I. O'B MacGregor, "Second Line Aircraft: 
their utility in the Army", RUST Journal, 
Vol. L)=, November 1935, p. 765. -. 2. Meeting held 11 December 1935. Reference in 
Cab 53/50, COS Paper 924+, and Air 2/2895. 
The number of Army Cooperation Squadrons for 
the regular Field Force was set at sevep, but 
no provision was made for air transport. 
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He pointed out that, quite apart from doubts over the number of 
Army Cooperation Squadrons, it was clear that the aircraft 
from these squadrons would not be able to do all the air work 
required by the Army. They were merely "eyes. in the air". They 
were not designed to carry out ground attacks and their 
employment as bombers was limited. If the Army were not to 
obtain specialised aircraft for this purpose, then a very 
serious situation would be created and one which might well 
result in the defeat of the Army. ' 
The Air Ministry did not see these matters in the same 
light. A paper by Plans Branch, drafted by Group Captain Slessor 
later that month, made clear where their priorities lay: 
One of the traditional and primary roles 
of the Army surely is to act as a goal- 
keeper for the Navy and the Air Force, 
not only at home but abroad. It is 
suggested that, until this role has been 
met on the approved scale, we are not 
justified in expending money or manpower 
on 10 or 12 Territorial Divisions which 
may never be wanted - particularly if by 
so doing we are absorbing resources which 
are required more urgently for Naval and 
Air defence. 2 
Nor did the General Staff make any headway over the matter of 
command. Despite their opposition to a system which was later 
to be described as "spasmodic allocation on request", 
3 
additional requirements to those provided by the air component 
of the Field Force remained firmly in the hands of the Air 
Ministry. At a meeting of the COS in May 1937, the Air Staff 
again insisted that in many tactical situations the relationship 
between the two services should be one of cooperation under 
separate commands. 4 Faced with such an attitude, ' General Sir 
Edmund Ironside remained pessimistic. The nation, he complained, 
had no combined training between its services and this meant 
1. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XXXIII, 
10 February 1938, p. 122. 
2. Slessor Papers, VIIIA, Note by Air Staff, 
26 February 1938. 
3. Cab 21/903, Memo by Hore Belisha to Land 
Forces Committee, LF 39/19,25 October 1939. 
I. Cab 53/7, COS 206th Meeting, 18 May 1937. 
276 
that in any future conflict we would be defeated by countries 
which had evolved a "common direction". 
' 
Thus at the beginning of 1939 the question of tactical 
command remained unsolved. In February of that year one 
authority noted, with commendable prescience: 
One can imagine the wrangling that would 
go on in the COS Committee, the CIGS 
protesting that the war could not be won 
unless the Army attacked such and such a 
point, whilst the CAS might object that 
he could not possibly spare a single 
fighter squadron for fear that London 
might be badly damaged by enemy bombers, 
and that all his bomber squadrons were 
none too many for his counter attack 
We should not envy the members of the 
Cabinet, who are all laymen in military 
matters, in having to decide between 
the disagreeing experts. 
The only solution to the problem, he urged, was to plan ahead 
in peace time, allotting so many fighter and bomber squadrons 
for permanent service with the Army. This done, the Air Council 
should plan the air defence of the country on the understanding 
that it would not be able to use the special Army squadrons 
without the WO's express permission. 
2 
Such, then, was the unsatisfactory state of affairs when 
the Army Council wrote to the Air Ministry the following month 
requesting that, on the basis of the allocation arrived at in 
December 1935, five additional Army Cooperation Squadrons 
should be provided to meet the immediate needs of the much 
enlarged Field Force. 
3 Shortly afterwards, Gort raised the 
question of close support, giving notice to Hankey that he 
1. The Ironside Diaries, 21 April 1938, p. 56. 
Ironside had, in fact, witnessed an impressive 
example of this "common direction" during 
a visit to Germany six months previously. 
During army manoeuvres he had watched a combined 
attack by 800 tanks and 400 aircraft. Ibid., 
26 October 193T, p. 28. Ironside was GOC-in-C 
Eastern Command 1936-1938. 
2. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XXXV, 
9 February 1939, p. 125. 
3. Dated 31 March 1939. Copy attached to 
COS Paper 881, Cab 53/48. 
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wished the CID to discuss the possibility of increasing the 
number of bombers allotted to the Field Force. ' 
But when the COS Sub-Committee came to discuss the 
structure of the higher command in France, Newall clearly 
showed that he was anxious to retain complete control over the 
bomber elements of his Force. He firmly reminded his colleagues 
that the AASF was an integral part of Bomber Command and that, 
as such, it should remain under the control of that Command. 
This would ensure that at any given moment the entire resources 
of the RAF could. be employed at the decisive point, this point 
being agreed upon by the COS themselves. The Air Staff would 
continue to give the highest priority to attacks on German 
industrial centres, but he assured his colleagues that in the 
case of a sudden break-through by enemy land forces, the head 
of the British mission serving with the French Commander 
would be given authority to employ the whole of the AASF to 
stem the advance. Such an arrangement, he maintained, would 
make possible the highest form of cooperation between the RAF 
and the other services and would dispel, he felt sure, any 
idea that the Air Staff wished to "run a private war of their 
own" . 
At this juncture, the CIGS accepted such an arrangement, 
cumbersome though it appeared to be, but two weeks later, 
following the Government's formal approval of the 32 division 
programme, he declared that the matter of air force allocation 
to the Field Force had been "thrown into the melting pot". 
1. Cab 21/521, Gort to Secretary CID, 17 
April 1939, circulated as COS 881. At 
this stage the air component consisted 
of 2 bomber reconnaissance squadrons, 
6 Army Cooperation Squadrons, 4 fighter 
squadrons, and 2 flights of communication 
aircraft. See David Divine, The Broken 
Wing, p. 209. 
2. Cab 53/11, COS 290th Meeting, 19 April 
1939. A few weeks after the commencement 
of war, Ismay wrote, "It almost seems as 
though the Air Staff would prefer their 
forces under Beezlebub rather than anyone 
connected with the Army. " See The Memoirs 
of Lord Ismay, p. 10l+. 
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Casting aside the Air Staff proposals, he now sought provision 
of a small striking force of bombers as an intrinsic component 
of the Field Force, a force that would be available for the 
day-to-day tasks associated with the bombing'of close targets. 
He considered that the aircraft for these duties should be of 
a different and smaller type than those of the main striking 
force, and that they should be allocated on a permanent basis. ' 
As was to be expected, Newall strongly opposed these 
proposals. He again warned that the dissipation of bomber 
requirements into "small packets" over a wide front would 
preclude the concentration of maximum effort at the decisive 
point. Furthermore, following the same line of argument, he 
considered that fighter support should be used to strengthen 
the general defences of the Allied air front in France rather 
than be employed for the close protection of the relatively 
small portion of the Allied army represented by the British 
Field Force. 2 
The matter was not pursued further at that stage, the 
question of the Army's air requirements being postponed until 
such time as both departments had considered the matter more 
closely. The following month, however, an article in The Sunday 
Times gave public airing to some of the more pressing problems 
related to Army-Air Force relations, and served notice thereby 
of those issues which were to divide the two services in the 
coming months. The article, written by the newspaper's Air 
Correspondent, W. MacLanachan, warned that the threat of vast 
armies of bombers had tended to "mask" other equally important 
war-like uses of the aeroplane. The aircraft accompanying the 
Expeditionary Force, for example, unlike those of Bomber 
Command, would be employed in attacking targets of more 
immediate and tactical value to the Army, a task which was 
1. Gort had expressed similar views to Liddell 
Hart. a year earlier, advocating a slow but 
manoeuvrable aircraft. See Liddell Hart Papers, 
11/1938/56,20 May 1938. On this subject see 
also Colonel M. Everett, "Fire Support from 
the Air", RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXXIII, 1938, p. 587. 
2. Cab 53/11, COS 292nd Meeting, 1 May 1939. 
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entirely different from that of the fighter and bomber employed 
elsewhere. Yet, under present arrangements, the Army would not 
have complete control over such aircraft, despite the fact that 
the purpose for which they were to be used was so closely 
related to counterparts in the Army - such as long range 
artillery and reconnaissance vehicles - as to make them 
inseparable from them. The article continued: 
One of the tenets of the RAF was that 
their machines operate in a different 
element; but flying itself is not a 
separate, specialised service, it is 
merely a means to an end - that of 
placing the pilot, observer or bomb 
aimer in the correct position to 
perform his function. With the Army 
that function is purely military. 
In addition, the writer called for specialised training for 
crews of aircraft working with the Army, and maintained that the 
personnel concerned should belong to the service in which they 
were fighting. Only then, he argued, would they acquire "a 
thorough knowledge of the tactical considerations of the 
engagements in which they are to take part". Nor should these 
military air operations go unprotected. The wars in Spain and 
China had shown that bombers required fighter protection. The 
IAF, he claimed, not the RFC or the RNAS, was the parent of the 
RAF; its strategy and traditions had been strictly adhered to 
and, as a consequence, the Navy and Army had been relegated to 
positions of minor importance. I 
Fittingly enough, the next day the WO submitted a long memo 
to the COS Sub-Committee on the services they required from the 
RAF. 2 A demand for 1,440 first-line aircraft included an increase 
in the number of Army Cooperation Squadrons; the provision of 
, inter-communication aircraft on the scale of one squadron per two 
corps; the allotment of transport aircraft for the-conveyance of 
troops and supplies; and an increase in fighter squadrons 
commensurate with the growing demand for air protection in base 
1. The Sunday Times, 11 June 1939. See Air 19/53. 
2. Cab 21/521,12 June 1939. Circulated as COS 
921,14 June 1939, Cab 53/50. 
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as well as forward areas. The largest demands, however, 
concerned the supply of close support aircraft and short-range 
bombers for a purely tactical role. The memo argued that during 
the last four years there had been a marked development abroad 
in the assistance afforded by aircraft to armies. The wars in 
Spain and, to a lesser degree, in Abyssinia and China, had 
shown the value of aircraft operating in an offensive role in 
close support of ground forces. 
' Indeed, a number of countries, 
such as France, Italy, Japan and the United States had 
specifically designed reconnaissance and bomber aircraft for 
this purpose, and Germany, whilst having no specialised units, 
had constructed some of their aircraft with this role in mind. 
Such aircraft, maintained the General Staff, were essential to 
augment artillery fire and to maintain the momentum of the 
attack once it had advanced beyond the range of the field guns. 
Of the control of such units, the paper asserted: 
The Amy cannot be dependent for such support 
on the uncertain possibility that the requisite 
aircraft can be'spared from their normal duties. 
For this role, moreover, the closest tactical 
cooperation is essential and this entails 
special training. A definite and permanent 
allotment of aircraft is therefore required 
as an integral part of the Field Force. 2 
The type of aircraft required for this purpose, continued the 
memo, need not be specially designed. It was likely that 
certain obsolete bombers and fighters could-be employed 
provided that they were easy to handle and capable of operating 
from temporary landing grounds. Nor, the paper declared, did 
the WO consider that an Army air arm analogous to the Fleet Air 
Arm was necessary. They thought that an organisation would be 
preferable in which the Army, as the "user" Service, would 
1. Spaight, a moderate among air prophets, had 
written earlier, "The role which the air arm 
fulfilled throughout the Abyssinian campaign 
was one ancillary to that of the armies. 
There was little work of an entirely 
independent nature. " See J. M. Spaight, Air 
Power in the Next War, PP. 75-6. 
2. Cab 21/521,12 June 1939. Circulated äs COS 924. 
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exercise general control, whilst the RAF, as the "provider" 
Service, would continue to be responsible for technical training, 
the administration of units, and for the provision and 
maintenance of aircraft and other equipment. In order to provide 
the necessary structure for such an-organisation, it was 
suggested that the present RAF component of the Field Force 
might be expanded into an Army Command, RAF. 
The paper claimed, too, that the Army had a part to play in 
the long distance bombing of military targets. Whilst conceding 
that such attacks would still be best carried out by aircraft 
under the control of the AASF, it felt that the C-in-C in the 
field should have a call upon the AASF for the fulfilment of 
this role. At the present time, pointed out the General Staff, 
no provision was made for any form of offensive support or for 
the supply of transport by air, although the RAF was prepared 
to make aircraft and sometimes units available for experimental 
purposes. ' Furthermore, the Army had no established right to 
assistance in war from any-RAF resources other than the air 
component of the Field Force. The memo alleged: 
Not only is there no certainty that the 
necessary aircraft will be available in 
war, but the types of aircraft available 
may be unsuitable and the personnel 
deficient in training for the tasks 
which the Array may require. 2 
Understandably perhaps, the Air Staff were somewhat taken 
aback by the extent as well as the size of the WO demands. As 
1. An article in August 1935 had pointed out 
that where air transport had been provided 
for the Army, its use had been dictated by 
purely temporary considerations; it had 
not been part of a deliberate policy. See 
Major J. T. Godfrey, "Winged Armies", RUSI 
Journal, Vol. LXXX, 1935, p. l+86. 
2. Cab 21/521,12 June 1939. Circulated as COS 
921v, 14 June 1939, Cab 53/50. The supply of 
dive bombers for the Army did not become an 
inter-service issue until after the Polish 
campaign at the beginning of the war. The 
Air Ministry did conduct some limited 
experiments in dive bombing, however, -during 
the interwar years. See Air 2/642 and Air 2/1068. 
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Slessor was later to point out, until a few weeks earlier there 
had been no policy for the employment of the Army in a 
continental role, and precious little Army to employ. 
' At a 
meeting convened by the CAS that same day, his senior officers 
showed little sympathy with the suggestion that the Army should 
have tactical control over a larger number of aircraft. On the 
other hand, there was some support for a specialised bomber for 
work with ground forces. The ACAS, AVM W. Sholto Douglas, freely 
admitted that future types of bombers, as then contemplated, 
were not very suitable for many of the bombing tasks required 
by the Army. He favoured the development of a medium bomber 
which could be employed both for tactical and strategic bombing. 
The DCAS, AVM R. E. C. Peirse, went further, suggesting the 
creation of a special tactical bomber force of small, handy 
aircraft which would work with the Army but remain under Air 
Ministry control. The Director of Plans, on the other hand, 
Group Captain J. C. Slessor, was altogether less sympathetic 
towards the WO demands. There was no need, he felt, to make a 
distinction between the two types of bombing. Tactical bombing, 
which was principally involved in isolating the battlefield, 
could be accomplished equally as well by an independent force. 2 
A few days later Newall wrote to Gort suggesting that 
before such important and complex issues were raised at the COS 
Sub-Committee, they should be discussed in the "broadest terms" 
at an inter-departmental conference. He felt that such a 
conference could reach agreement on general principles, and that 
separate committees could then be appointed to study in detail 
the three components of the Army's requirements, namely the 
provision of bombers, fighters and cooperation aircraft. 3 Gort 
agreed to this, and an inter-departmental meeting was arranged 
for the end of the month. 
4. 
In the meantime, Slessor took the opportunity to spell out 
his opposition in greater detail. Writing to his Chief, he took 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/64+, Slessor to 
Liddell Hart, 13 May 1949. 
2. Air 2/4130, Conference held 12 June 1939. 
3. Cab 21/521, Newall to Gort, 19 June 1939. 
4. Ibid., Gort to Newall, 20 June 1939. 
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the General Staff to task on three major counts. Firstly, he 
complained that they had 
opened their mouth as wide as 
possible quite regardless of 
practical considerations and, 
indeed, of tactical requirements. 
They showed little idea, too, of the implications of their 
demands which, with the best will in the world, were quite 
impossible to meet within a reasonable time. Quoting their 
requirements for the first six months - 18 Army cooperation 
squadrons, 4 long-distance reconnaissance squadrons, 9 "support" 
squadrons, and 6 fighter squadrons - he stated that it was 
impossible to raise nine more cooperation squadrons in two 
months, and that the remainder could only be found by "milking" 
home defence and the Metropolitan air force. Furthermore, the 
chances of raising their full programme - some 90 squadrons - 
by the autumn of 1940 were nil. 
Secondly, he complained that the WO proposals had not been 
carefully thought out on a tactical basis. Their demands for 
Army cooperation squadrons amounted to more than twice what had 
been considered necessary in 1918. In modern terms, they wanted 
about three and a half times the proportion of cooperation 
aircraft per corps or division than the Germans considered 
necessary and, compared with the French, the allotment was even 
more lavish. 
Slessor's major criticism, however, centred around his 
third major complaint. The General Staff's proposals, he 
maintained, were based on a misconception of the strategic 
employment of Bomber Command and "an obsolete conception of 
the employment of airpower in conjunction with'land forces". 
It was clear that they had learnt nothing from the lessons of 
the 1914-18 war and drawn the wrong conclusions from the recent 
campaigns in Spain and China. The RAF did not intend to use 
their main. air striking force independently, as the General 
Staff alleged, but to employ it as that point where it would be 
of the most decisive importance. It was "nonsense" to suggest 
that the Army had no established right to assistance. from any 
RAF resources. What was the COS Committee for if it were not to 
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ensure the proper allocation of sea, land and air forces in the 
light of varying strategic situations? To allocate aircraft 
permanently to the Field Force was a negation of the principles 
of flexibility, concentration and centralised control which were 
essential if the best use were to be made of the country's air 
resources. He added: 
This is a regrettable revival of the old 
idea which there has been some reason to 
think was dead, that when the soldier 
talks about cooperation between the Air 
Force and the Army he really means the 
subordination of the Air Force to the 
Army. It should be strenuously resisted. 
The WO, observed Slessor, disclaimed any idea of 
establishing an Army Air Arm and, at the same time, proposed an 
organisation which would reduce the responsibilities of the Air 
Force to matters of production, supply and technical training. 
In fact, he alleged, the RAF were to be "the manufacturers, 
garage proprietors and chauffeurs for the Army". 
On the vexed question of tactical air support, the Director 
of Plans argued that the bomber was not a battlefield weapon. 
It was wasteful, uneconomical and inefficient to allocate 
bombers in "penny packets" under the orders of Army Commanders. 
Why, he asked, was it necessary to use aircraft to attack enemy 
batteries in advance when they could be attacked by tanks, and 
when the power of movement conferred by mechanisation could be 
used to move forward the artillery? The bomber's task was to 
isolate the battlefield, thus stopping enemy reserves and 
reinforcements from moving in to hold up the attack. ' 
It is ironic and not a little unfortunate that this harsh 
commentary upon the WO paper on air requirements should have 
come from the author of Airpower and Armies, from the one man 
who had done more than any other serving officer to promote a 
1. Air-2/2895, Note by Director of Plans, 29 June 
1939. These views on tactical air support had 
formed the basis of Slessor's book, Airpower 
and Armies, published three years earlier. 
This study had been based on a series of 
lectures on this subject given by him when 
he was an instructor at Camberley, 1931-lt. 
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better understanding at operational level between the two 
fighting forces of air and land. What is certain is that, 
apart from Slessor's own contribution, I the development of 
Army-Air cooperation at the tactical level had been woefully 
meagre. As observed earlier, 
2 the idea of close support 
aircraft had been frowned upon by the Air Ministry since the 
early 1920s and, in the United Kingdom at least, no serious 
attempt had been made to evolve tactics in this type of warfare. 3 
Indeed, Army efforts to introduce low flying tactics into the 
exercises of Army Cooperation Squadrons had been positively 
discouraged. In a letter to Liddell Hart in 1966, Lt. General 
Sir Charles Broad recalled how he had visited an RAF practice 
camp in the late 1920s and persuaded some of the pilots to 
give a demonstration of ground straffing. Shortly afterwards, 
he added, the WO "got a raspberry" for allowing their officers 
to encourage young pilots to act "against official Air Ministry 
policy". 4 The Army Cooperation Report of 1928 likewise warned 
that the employment of fighter squadrons in close cooperation 
with ground forces could only be considered as "experimental" 
as it was by no means certain that in time of war squadrons of 
this type would always be available for such a purpose. 5 The 
Report for 1930 was even more critical. It warned: 
The original motive for the employment 
of fighters in peace training to attack 
ground targets was to accustom troops 
1. See this work, pp. 292-1+. 
2. This work, p. 122. 
3. Some intensive cooperation between aircraft 
and tanks did take place, however, during 
the two years' existence of the Armoured Force, 
1927-8. See Wing Commander T. L. Leigh-Mallory, 
"Air Cooperation with Mechanised Forces", 
RUST Journal, Vol. LXXV, 1930, p. 568. 
4+. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/108, Broad to Liddell 
Hart, 7 January 1966. 
5. Air Publication 1372. This and Täter reports 
are available at Adastral Library, Adastral 
House, London. This warning was repeated in 
the Report for 1935, Air Publication 1313. 
It read: "The occasion on which it may be, 
possible to make aircraft available for low 
flying attacks .. will be limited. " ' 
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to practising AA measures. There is 
a danger that this motive may be 
lost sight of and that fighters may 
be employed in an unrealistic and 
impractical manner. ' 
Clinging to First World War cliches, the Air Ministry argued 
that successful results from such tactics could only be 
expected when fighters were used to "harass a retreating 
force". Under such conditions they might help to "turn a retreat 
into a rout". 2 
In February of that year a junior officer in the Royal Tank 
Corps posed a number of pertinent questions on this subject and 
revealed thereby those things which still appeared tobe left 
undone. Was proper attention being given, he asked, to the use 
of aircraft in support of mechanised forces? What number of 
aircraft was needed and what should be their precise role? Was 
a special form of training required? Had, in fact, the lessons 
of 1918 been forgotten? 3 A more senior officer took up the same 
theme later that year. Brigadier A. P. Wavell, Commander of the 
6th Infantry Brigade, maintained that the strategic combination 
of aircraft with the older arms had yet to be solved. The 
closest cooperation between air and land forces was essential, 
and such cooperation was undoubtedly easier where the air 
squadrons formed an integral part of the land forces, as in 
most continental armies. 
' In the same month, too, a retired Air 
Commodore conceded that-the aeroplane as a means of attacking 
ground troops required far more serious consideration than 
seemed to be accorded it at that time. 5 
1. Air Publication 1412. 
2. Ibid. It is significant that the Air Ministry 
presumably expected the enemy to undertake low 
flying attacks and prepared defensive measures 
against them, yet they discouraged low flying 
tactics by their own aircraft. It is another' 
indication of the extent to which the Air 
Staff had put their faith in strategic bombing. 
3. Captain R. G. -Lewis, "Armoured Cars and the 
RAF", RUST Journal, Vol. LXXV, 1930, p. 137. 
4+. Ibid., Brigadier A. P. Wavell, "The Army and. 
the Prophets", p. 665- 
5. Ibid., (November), Air Commodore C. R. Samson 
(Retd), "Aeroplanes and Armies", p. 676. 
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I 
These misgivings were borne out in 1933 when Liddell Hart, 
commenting upon Army manoeuvres, criticised the way in which 
air attacks had been conducted. ' A year later Ellington 
admitted to the COS Sub-Committee that although the Army kept 
in close touch with their Cooperation Squadrons, "their contact 
with bomber and fighter units only took place at certain times 
during higher training exercises". 2 
The strongest blow against effective tactical cooperation, 
however, came early in 1935. Following the receipt of 
information on the development of ground attack aircraft in the 
United States and Italy, Plans Branch reported that, whilst a 
large scale "land forces" war would certainly furnish excellent 
and frequent targets for this form of attack, it was felt that 
neither in the role of the RAF in war, nor in its imperial 
policing duties was sufficient scope afforded for the economic 
employment of a specialised type of aircraft. The report 
considered that existing fighters and light bombers could be 
used if such a role were needed, though it did recommend that 
"some direction" was necessary as to the importance to be 
attached to a limited amount of training in these ground attack 
methods. 3 
A few months after this note was produced, the Spanish 
Civil War broke out and, over the next three years, was to 
afford ample opportunity of studying close support tactics under 
battle conditions. However, despite the successful employment 
of aircraft in combination with ground forces and the undoubted 
success of low flying attacks on troops and lines of 
communication - evidence fully reported to the COS by the Joint 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 10/1933/33, 
1 September 1933. 
2. Cab 53/5, COS 134th Meeting, 1 November 1934. 
AVM A. J. Capel, interviewed by the author in 
April 1977, stated that when he was Commandant 
of the School of Army Cooperation, Old Sarum, 
1936-8, there was very little if any instruction 
in close support tactics. Nor did he recall any 
pressure. being brought to bear by the Air Ministry 
or by the War Office for the provision of such 
instruction. 
3. Air 9/6, Note by Plans, 28 February 1935. 
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Intelligence Sub-Committee in late 19371 - Newall remained 
unconvinced. Whilst he accepted the demoralising effect of 
such attacks, he continued to regard such methods as "a gross 
misuse of air forces". 2 He could claim, with some justification, 
that such attacks had been made in the face of little AA 
defence and that, in the majority of cases, they had been 
carried out against inexperienced and untrained troops. 
An Air Staff paper at this time took up the same theme. 
Save in exceptional circumstances, it alleged, the results of 
close support attack during the Great War had been meagre 
compared with the losses sustained. As regards air operations 
in Spain, it could not be too strongly emphasised that these 
had to be viewed in the light of the air situation obtaining 
there. In any case, even against shaken troops, air attack 
could not approach artillery fire in accuracy, volume and 
duration. For aircraft, more profitable targets were to be found 
"farther back". 3 Gort took up the opposite view. He complained 
that the Air Staff were so obsessed with their independent role 
that they had forgotten that their real task was that of long 
range artillery. As a result, the Field Force was seriously 
lacking in air support. 
4 The following year, however, an article 
in a military journal advocating the development of specialised 
aircraft for close support tactics was promptly refuted by an 
anonymous contributor. The supply of aircraft and crews was 
limited, it was pointed out, and the wise commander would be 
unlikely to use this weapon on tasks which his artillery could 
do as well if not better, thereby leaving unattacked targets 
beyond the range of his guns. 5 
Although caution as to the efficacy of aircraft in close 
support of ground forces was understandable and, to some extent, 
1. Cab 53/33, COS Paper 624(JIC), 6 October 1937. 
2. Cab 53/8, COS 219th Meeting, 19 October 1937. 
3. Air 9/137, Air Attack in Direct Support of 
the Field Force, Undated. 
4. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/322, Gort to Liddell 
Hart, 31 October 1937. 
5. RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXXIII, 1938, "Fire 
Support from the Air", by Colonel M. 
, Everett, p. 587, and by "Hawai Jehaz", p. 71+0. 
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justifiable, the Air Staff's almost total rejection of this 
tactic must be open to question. Their preoccupation with 
strategic bombing, itself of questionable validity, made them 
blind, it would appear, to the true potential of aircraft on the 
battlefield. In studying the employment of aircraft in the 
Spanish Civil War and other localised conflicts, they failed to 
appreciate to any significant degree the closer coordination 
which was evolving between air and land forces. 
' Later, when 
they were obliged to recognise the need for direct support 
aircraft, they likewise failed to grasp the essential 
differences in the type of machine and method of control which 
such tactics demanded. Only a few months before the outbreak of 
the Second World War,. the ACAS, AVM W. Sholto Douglas, was 
claiming that close support tactics required no specialised 
training. He told a meeting of the two departments that, 
fundamentally, all bomber training was the same and that the 
nature of the objectives had little effect on the methods 
employed. 2 
Nor did the work of the Army Cooperation Squadrons 
themselves escape criticism. This had been voiced as early as 
the mid 1920s. In an article published in October 1925, a Major 
in the Royal Artillery had complained that out of the 17 
stations in the Air Force's Inland Area, all but two - 
Salisbury Plain and Farnborough - were completely out of touch 
with Army units. There were only four squadrons definitely 
allotted to Army cooperation and even in these units the pilots 
were not permanently assigned to this type of work. Courses in 
3 
1. Apart from official reports on air operations 
in Spain, articles by Captain Didier Poulain 
of the French Army Aviation Reserve particularly 
emphasised the use of aircraft in ground battles, 
concluding that an air force should include a 
number of squadrons specially designed for this 
type of support. Attacking near the ground, he 
claimed, was usually easy and fruitful. RUSI 
Journal, Vol. LXXXIII, 1938, pp. 362 and 581. 
2. Air 2/2895, Joint Committee on Air Requirements 
for the Field Force, 30 June 1939. 
3. Squadron No.. 2 at Manston; 1 at South Farnborough; 
13 at Andover; and 16 at Old Sarum. See Flight 
Magazine, Vol. XIX, 10 March 1927, p. 135" 
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cooperation were held in certain centres, but part at least of 
Air Force teaching centred around the belief that airpower 
would be the predominant factor in the next war. ' 
As to the type of machine required for cooperation work, 
one authority saw no need for a specialised aeroplane. He 
argued that, except for its equipment, such an aircraft need 
not be inherently different from the high speed day bomber. 2 
This view was not shared by all. In 1934, for example, a band 
of enthusiastic officers, dissatisfied with the type of 
aircraft then employed, formed the Royal Artillery Flying Club 
at Larkhill for the sole purpose of developing their own 
techniques. Within a few years their experiments, using light 
aircraft and based on the conception of an air observation 
post, had gained a large measure of success. 3 
The sternest criticism, however, came in 1936. In July of 
that year a WO memo informed a Parliamentary deputation 
concerned with officer secondment that, in the Army's view, 
these units were lacking in efficiency. It complained that 
normally Air Force officers only spent a short time in these 
squadrons, the yearly turnover being about 70%. Efficiency 
could be much improved, it maintained, if the number of Army 
officers serving in these units were increased to 75% of the 
officer strength. 
' 
1. Major R. G.. Cherry, "The RAF and Army 
Cooperation", Journal of the USI of India, 
Vol. LV, October 1925, P"32. 
2. The Aeroplane, Editorial, Vol. XXXIV, 
23 May 1928, p. 722. 
3. For a full account of this development, 
see Major General H. J. Parham and E. M. G. 
Belfield, Unarmed into Battle: The Story 
of the Air Observation Post, and Colonel 
S. M. W. Hickey, "The Evolution of British 
Army Aviation", RUSI Journal, Vol. 120, 
December 1975, P"15. 
4. Air 9/8, WO Memo, 28 July 1936. The Air 
Ministry were opposed to such a scheme 
and countered with a proposal that Army 
officers should be available for service 
with other than Army Cooperation Squadrons, 
a suggestion which the WO, in their turn, 
felt unable to accept. Ibid., Folio 60, para. 269. 
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The above is not to suggest that the Army authorities 
were without trace of blame. Whilst they did attempt in the 
last year of peace to make good the deficiencies in the air 
requirements of, a modern army, they too, over a number of years, 
had been slow to grasp the true significance of airpower as it 
affected the land battle. Fuller himself, pioneer extraordinary 
in mechanised warfare, failed to appreciate the full importance 
of the integrated role to be played by aircraft in ground 
attack. His lectures on FSR III, his first detailed study of 
battle tactics, were criticised by Liddell Hart for failing to 
understand in depth the value of synchronising overhead blows 
with the "tank punch". ' It is also significant that the 28 page 
booklet on the lessons of the Great War, produced by the WO in 
April 1934 and containing over 10,000 words, had but one 
sentence on the subject of close air support for ground forces, 
despite the enormous contribution that tactical airpower had 
made in the closing stages of the war. The sentence read: 
The addition of low flying assault 
fighters as maintained by some foreign 2 countries is also worthy of consideration. 
In manoeuvres the following year, too, the WO showed little 
real interest or understanding in the use*of aircraft. Based 
as these exercises were on the military lessons of the Great 
War, aeroplanes were only used in a proportion of 8 squadrons 
to a total force"of 50,000 all arms. According to one observer, 
the regulations governing air operations, as laid down by the 
WO, were based on the avoidance of undue risk to pilots and 
ground forces. Means of indicating low flying attacks were 
provided - the firing of blank ammunition and the use of wing- 
tip flares - but so inadequate were these methods that this 
type of attack was not put to the test throughout the 
3 
manoeuvres. 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1932/49,1932. 
2. WO 32/3115 and 3116, Notes on Certain Lessons 
of the Great War, WO, April 1934, p. 12. 
3. C. M. McAlery, "The Air Arm in the Army 
Manoeuvres", The Aeroplane, Vol. XLIX, 
25 September 1935, p. 377. 
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Wrote the Editor of Flight Magazine some years later: 
To the outside observer it appears that 
since the Armistice the WO has given 
far too little thought to the question 
of the air. Its attention has been 
concentrated almost entirely on the 
problems of mechanization and one cannot 
say that this preoccupation was wrong. 
The WO has been content to accept the 
small number of cooperation squadrons 
which the Air Ministry has placed at its 
disposal and when manoeuvres were held 
it has borrowed a few squadrons of 
fighters and bombers "for the duration". ' 
General Sir Edmund Ironside, writing as the CIGS soon after 
the war had begun, complained that successive Army Chiefs 
had "funked" tackling the Air Ministry on the question of a 
separate air arm. Many had preferred a quiet life, he claimed, 
to a struggle which would have taken years to complete. 2 
Such criticism is valid. As noted earlier, however, in 
the early 1920s the WO had shown a postive interest in the 
tactics of close support aircraft and had met with little 
encouragement from an Air Force intent on independent action 
both at home and overseas. Nor must it be forgotten that it was 
the Air Ministry which during these interwar years remained 
responsible for the science of aerial warfare. As such, they 
must be held principally to blame for this serious omission 
concerning the development of airpower as a fighting force 
in conjunction with ground forces. Slessor later admitted that 
this subject was almost entirely ignored between the wars. His 
own detailed study of such tactics, he pointed out, published 
in book form in 1936 under the title Air Power and Armies, had 
received "polite but not very serious attention". 
3 
Yet some progress was made in this field. Slessor himself, 
despite his firmly-held view that the aeroplane was not a 
1. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. XXXIII, 
10 February 1938, pp. 121-2. 
2. The Ironside Diaries, 13 October 1939, p. 142. 
3. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/64+4, Some Personal 
Reflections by Sir John Slessor, September' 
1964, p. 7. 
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battlefield weapon, carried out some valuable research into the 
employment of aircraft in direct support of infantry when 
stationed on. the North West Frontier of India at the end of 
1936. Exercises in such tactics, carried out with No. 2 Infantry 
Brigade, Khanpur Area, revealed a number of pressing problems, 
not least among which was the need for a more reliable means of 
direct contact between aircraft and the frontline troops. ' Also 
in need of improvement were the liaison arrangements between 
the air and land commanders. In his report on the exercises, 
Slessor concluded: 
.. with further combined training .. close support in mountain warfare may 
be very effective in helping to over- 
come opposition, in reducing 
casualties to our own troops, and in 
helping to speed up their movement. 
And the crux of the whole matter is 
effective communications. 2 
These experiments were important for two reasons. Firstly, 
they appear to constitute the only detailed study of such 
tactics carried out in the field by British forces during the 
interwar years. Secondly, they highlighted those operational 
problems associated with the reversal of air and land roles 
when such tactics are employed. As Slessor later explained: 
.. from experience on the Indian frontier in the 30s I know that in that sort of 
terrain it is usually a matter not of the 
airman telling the man on the ground where 
the enemy is, but the other way round - 
the soldier saying where the enemy 
shooting at him is, and getting the 
1. This particular problem was partly overcome 
during the early stages of the war by a 
communication network connecting forward 
light-armoured cars with a control centre 
manned by Army and Air Staff Officers. 
See unpublished work by Charles Carrington 
entitled Chairborne Soldier, Prologue. 
2. Slessor Papers VD, Combined Report on Air 
Cooperation Training, 17-25 November 1936. 
Exercises in tactical cooperation were also 
held in Waziristan, 21t November to 15 January 
1937. The Commanding Officer of 2 Infantry 
Brigade at this time was Brigadier C. N. Noyes. 
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airman to do something about it. ' 
It is evident that at this time the lessons learnt from 
these exercises were not considered of more than localised 
value. This is hardly surprising. Tactics employed on the North 
West Frontier of India were not likely to be considered 
applicable to the situation at home, where the Army's role-was 
being kept deliberately vague, and where the nation's first 
line of defence rested to a large extent upon an independent 
bomber force. In fact, however, events were to prove that 
these tactics and the major problems associated with them were 
in no way peculiar to a particular type of terrain. 2 
Such, then, was the background to the nature and extent 
of tactical cooperation when the joint WO and Air Ministry 
Committee met on the last day of June 1939. As was to be 
expected, the meeting got off to a cautious start. The DCAS, 
AVM R. E. C. Peirse, felt that, despite some differences of 
opinion, the two departments were thinking along "parallel 
, lines". The Air Staff, he announced,, were already working on 
the specifications for a light, comparatively short range 
bomber for tactical support. What they were anxious to avoid, 
however, was the locking up of air forces. on a number of 
"domestic" tasks by a too rigid allocation. 
For the Army, the DCIGS, Lt. General Sir Ronald Adam, 
explained that the requirements sought were on the "broadest 
possible lines". 'The General Staff had thought it wise to put 
before the Air Staff the fullest requirements they could 
visualise. As previously agreed, the Committee then appointed 
sub-committees to deal with the three major aspects of the 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, -1/644, Some Personal 
Reflections by Sir John Slessor, September 
1964, p. 11. For a favourable appreciation of 
these combined tactics see Ennbry, op. cit., p. 80. 
2. Slessor himself was to recall that some of 
the. conclusions reached bore a close resemblance 
to some of the principles of land-air warfare 
which crystallized in the desert fighting of 
1942 and 1943, and served so well in the' later 
campaigns-in Italy, France and Germany. See 
op. cit., p. 128. 
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problem: fighters, bombers and Army cooperation aircraft. In 
fact, only the work of the last named was completed before the 
outbreak of war. ' 
The inter-departmental committee of June 1939 acknowledged 
at long last the Army's basic air needs, but, as the DO, AVM 
R. H. Peck, later admitted to the ACAS, AVM W. Sholto Douglas, 
it "skirted the fringes of some very controversial issues". 
2 
Not least among these were the problems associated with the 
strength and command structure of the proposed bomber force, 
and the type of aircraft most'suitable for the task of close 
support. When these questions came to be discussed, the nation 
was already at war, and they thus provided the subject matter 
for the first major inter-service dispute to be faced by the 
War Cabinet, just a few weeks after the commencement of 
hostilities. 
1. Air 2/2895, Joint WO/Air Ministry Committee, 
30 June 1939. 
2. Air 2/2896, Peck to Douglas, 31 July 1939. 
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CONCLUSION 
For both extent and intensity in the matter of inter- 
service rivalry, there is unlikely to be a more extreme 
example than that afforded by the relations between the British 
Army and Air Force in the interwar years. Even the controversy 
over British naval aviation during the same period - as 
prolonged and bitter as it proved to be - cannot compare with 
the width and depth of the succession of disputes which 
bedevilled and divided the WO and Air Ministry during the 
twenty years of'troubled peace. There was hardly an area of 
contact between the two departments throughout this period 
where there was not, at best, friction, or, at worst, open 
hostility. 
Clashes between the two departments following "the 
integration of a junior and cocky service into the British 
defence structure"I were inevitable; that these clashes need 
have been so violent and so extensive is by no means as 
certain. Nor, as some would have us believe, can this rivalry 
be summarily dismissed as a clash between "bigoted 
conservatives" and "enthusiastic radicals"? A dispute of such 
proportions cannot be explained away so easily. 
It was a clash, moreover, in which the new arm was not at 
a total disadvantage. Despite the fact that in the immediate 
postwar years the Air Force was reduced to a shadow of its 
former self and came close to extinction on a number of 
occasions, it had, in its struggle for survival, some decided 
advantages in countering the attacks of its more senior 
partner. Unlike the Army, for example, which had emerged from 
the Great War besmirched and discredited by the blood-letting 
on the Western Front, the Air Force, operating high above the 
land battle, had gained by the end of the war a reputation and 
a prestige not shared by its down-to-earth partner. In 
addition, the desperate need for economy which, at the end of 
1. "Johnson, op. cit., p. 172. 
2. Captain McA. Hogg, "Aeroplanes in Future Warfare", 
Army Quarterly, Vol-M, No. 1, October 1921, 'p. 98. 
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the war, had worked against the new arm, was to prove its 
salvation by the early 1920s. The promise of imperial policing 
"on the cheap" was to provide a most opportune raison d'eetre 
for an independent air service until such time as its more 
specialised and fundamental role as a deterrent force took 
shape under the exaggerated air threat from France. 
In this imperial role, too, the Air Staff assiduously 
cultivated-an air of mystique around its various operations. 
Mystery, as Spaight points out, accounted for half the new 
arm's strength.. ' Airpower, as a totally new science, argued 
the airman, required for its development the guidance of minds 
which were not preoccupied with the problems of land and sea 
warfare. Given such claims to exclusiveness, the Army's view 
that the aeroplane was but another weapon on the battlefield, 
albeit in a third dimension, was never taken seriously. An 
advantage was also to be had in the concept of strategic 
bombing. Here, in what proved to be the Air Force's unique and 
enduring role, the airman was assisted by the indecisive 
nature of the limited amount of such bombing which had taken 
place in the final year of the war. Powers alleges that the 
RAF leaders "rued their lost opportunities for concrete 
performance". 2 They might well have done so, but in fact it 
was this'very lack of conclusive evidence as to the efficacy 
of strategic bombing which worked in favour of an independent 
air striking force. Had the operations of the Independent Air 
Force been more extensive in the First World War, a larger 
question might well have been posed as to the'feasibility 
and efficiency of the strategic bomber. As it was, the 
inconclusive nature of the evidence meant that imagination 
could be given free rein, thus generating the very stuff upon 
which the air enthusiast. could base his wild assumptions, and 
the fears and doubts of the nervous politician could be 
sustained. 
It is because of these advantages, together with the 
popular esteem gained by the RAF in later years, that the 
1. J. M. Spaight, Air Power and the Cities, p. 227. 
2. Powers, op. cit., p. 159. 
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Army's case has largely gone by default. This-is particularly 
so in the field of imperial policing and defence, where the 
Air Force has acquired over the years a fame and reputation 
not wholly deserved. The Army's case against air control, for 
instance, dismissed as pure obstruction by many observers, 
was not entirely without foundation. In Iraq, for example, 
where the Army can rightly be accused of dragging their feet 
during the transference of power, a reasonable concern was 
nonetheless shown over the security of ground forces under the 
air control scheme. The Air Staff's insistence on stationing 
the bulk of their ground forces at Baghdad aroused genuine 
fears as to the safety of these troops in the event-of a 
general uprising on the scale of 1920. Furthermore, the defence 
of the Mandate from external attack - for which, it must not 
be forgotten, the Army remained responsible - was seriously 
threatened during the opening years of the scheme by a hostile 
Turkey to the north. Even Trenchard himself had expressed grave 
misgivings as to the ability of the air scheme to cope with the 
possibility of a war in Mosul and the threat to internal 
security that this would pose. 
There were fears too on the part of many soldiers as to 
the long term effects of the methods employed in air control. 
Some denounced bombing as a means of coercion, whilst others 
argued that the scheme as a whole was too remote from the 
people it governed, and provided none of the civilising 
influences which were a feature of the Army's forward policy 
in India. In the opinion of Ironside, the methods employed by 
air control were a return to the tactics employed during the 
Roman occupation of Britain. I Such criticisms may not have 
been valid, in full or in part, but they cannot be considered 
unreasonable in the light of the conditions then prevailing. 
The wider question as to the efficacy of air control as 
a method of imperial policing is likewise debateable. A valid 
appreciation of this question is not possible without a more 
detailed study of this particular aspect, but what can be 
1. W. E. Ironside, High Road to Command, p. 193'. 
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said with some certainty is that, in the long-term, such 
methods of substitution, easier though they undoubtedly were 
upon the national purse, were to produce one serious casualty 
- interservice cooperation at the tactical level. "At last, " 
wrote Harris concerning the introduction of air control in 
Iraq, "we were able to plan our action so that the air weapon 
worked in complete independence of the ground. "' This "lust 
for regional control" 2 drove a wedge between the two fighting 
services and led to a running battle between the two 
departments in every Middle East dependency save that of 
Egypt. Thus in those very areas where a working relationship 
could have been developed, the opportunity for tactical 
cooperation and coordination was strictly limited or 
completely denied. Replaced as quickly as possible by local 
native levies, British ground forces had little or no chance 
of working with their own air force. Milne wrote in 1930: 
.. in the attempt to build up a separate 
air strategy the essence of cooperation 
is rapidly becoming lost, and we cannot 
be sure of getting the best value from 
either the military or the air forces .3 
On the North West Frontier of India, too, Joubert was 
later to admit that a really intelligent cooperation might 
well have produced the best results, with the air providing 
the striking force and the ground troops "the backers up 
with limited objectives". '4 That this did not come about 
cannot be laid solely at the door of the General Staff. 
Indeed, this study would suggest that the Army authorities in 
India were well aware of the importance of the air arm in land 
operations and that, for the most part, they were anxious to 
establish a closer liaison between air and ground forces. 
Furthermore, it would appear that a certain measure of useful 
cooperation between the two arms might well have developed if 
1. Harris, op. cit., p. 23. 
2. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/132, General Sir John 
Burnett-Stewart to Liddell Hart, 14 October 1932. 
3. Air 8/121, DI(AP)2, Memo by CIGS, 
4+ June 1930, para. 16. 
I. Philip Joubert, The Fated Sky, p. 111. 
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the Air Staff had not constantly raised the bogey of 
substitution, together with the reduction in land forces that 
this made inevitable. As one writer put it in 1931, the system 
along the North West Frontier confined development to 
"watertight compartments and interservice competition", a state 
of affairs which, in war time, would lead to friction and thus 
endanger the common cause. ' 
Thus while the Air Force placed their faith in the bomber 
as a means of bringing to heel the recalcitrant tribesman, the 
Army remained convinced that their infantry were "the chief 
offensive agent". 2 As Portal was later to point out, the two 
services were thus pulling in opposite directions. The air 
method drove the tribesmen away, and the Army's punitive 
expeditions made them stand and fight. The two policies just 
did not mix. 
3 What was needed, in fact, was a new, 
coordinated strategy. Such a strategy was indeed evolved along 
the North West Frontier towards the end of 1936, but the 
lessons learnt were not thought to be applicable outside of 
that rugged terrain. Thus Slessor himself, the instigator of 
these exercises and the leading protagonist of land-air 
cooperation, tended to see air support on a European 
battlefield as simply strategic bombing writ small. His main 
concern was to isolate the battlefield, not to bring air 
support to the battle itself. 
These experiments. notwithstanding, Ironside insists that 
the Air Staff themselves made no effort to join in any war 
doctrine, much less a doctrine in tactics with either the Army 
or Navy. 
' In this view he was supported by a senior Air Force 
officer, AVM E. R. Ludlow-Hewitt. He wrote in 1931: 
1. Major R. H. L. Fink, "Regional Control and the 
Coordination of Air'and Land Forces", 
RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXVI, February 1931, p. 26. 
2. Major General Sir Charles Gwynn, Imperial 
Policing, p. 29. 
3. Lecture given by Air Commodore C. F. A. Portal, 
17 February 1937. See The Aeroplane, Vol. LII, 
24 February 1937, p. 221. 
4. The Ironside Diaries, Appendix, Paper addressed 
by Ironside to CIGS, 4 December 1937., 
301 
our object is not to devise means 
by which the Air Force can do without 
the cooperation of the other services. 
This baneful influence insinuates its 
chill presence between the Services 
and lays its cold hand on every honest 
effort to advance the interest of 
interservice cooperation. .. Do not let us take the attitude that the Air 
Force never requires and can never 
benefit by the assistance of the 
other services. ' 
In effect, as the General Staff were not slow to point 
out, Army-Air cooperation was regarded by the Air Force as 
"a professional backwater". 2 RAF officers were not appointed 
permanently to Army-Air Cooperation Squadrons and no tactics 
were developed other than those associated with artillery 
spotting and reconnaissance. As one critic observed, the 
provision of specialised services for the Army and Navy was 
regarded as "a prostitution of the Air Force". 3 
It must be asked, too, whether, if the Army had been 
allowed to have its own air arm, the results achieved in the 
matter of tactical cooperation might not have been more 
satisfactory. It can be argued, as Roskill does, that given 
such an opportunity, the senior services would not have 
devoted a large proportion of their funds to their air arms. 
' 
This might be so, but it is difficult to believe that results 
achieved by the Army would have been worse - could have been 
worse - than those obtained by the two services pulling in 
opposite directions. In the case of the WO, too, it would 
certainly appear that more time and energy would have been 
devoted to this aspect of training. It would seem likely, 
for example, that commanders in the field would have encouraged 
the development of a tactical method of closer cooperation, 
regarding the aircraft as an integral part of. the weapon system 
1. Air 9/12, Ludlow-Hewitt (AOC Iraq Command) 
to Squadron Leader G. C. Pirie, 6 July 1931. 
2. Carrington, op. cit., Prologue. 
3. Bernard Fergusson (Ed), The Business of War: 
The War Narrative of Major General Sir John 
Kennedy, p. 7. 
1+. Roskill, op. cit., p. 237. 
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at their disposal. The field commanders in India in the early 
1920s, whilst hostile towards the claims for independent air 
action advanced by Salmond, were all in favour, however, of a 
greater degree of cooperation and coordination between air and 
land forces. Nor is there any reason to suppose that some form 
of combined operations - even though limited in scale - would 
not have been forthcoming had the Army remained in control in 
Iraq. Indeed, a year before the introduction of air control in 
that country, Major General G. M. Lindsay, as a commander of an 
armoured car group, had organised a series of experiments 
culminating in what came to be known as "the Ramadi 
Reconnaissance", an operation whereby a mechanised force 
operating in the desert was directed by wireless and maintained 
by air supply for nearly three weeks. 
' Writing to Liddell Hart 
in 1925, he advised: 
The war will be won or lost as far as 
military operations go, by a mechanised 
force in the air, and on the ground, 
working in combination. 2 
Joubert himself noted later that whilst the middle 
ranks of the Army gradually abandoned their efforts to obtain 
their own air arm, the senior officers never gave up. 3 In 
fact, the Air Staff's insistence on independent air action in 
imperial policing and defence meant, as Brancker pointed out, 
that the staffs of the Army and Navy, instead of being 
increasingly permeated with a knowledge in'the use of aircraft 
as a weapon of war, were unable to develop such knowledge 
because they were denied the training and control of air 
c forces. 
The actual extent to which land-air cooperation would 
have developed under Army control is, of course, highly 
problematical, but, again, a number of Army officers, notably 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/448, Obituary by Liddell 
Hart on Major General G. M. Lindsay, 29 November 
1956. 2. Ibid., Lindsay to Liddell Hart, 1925. 
3. Philip Joubert, The Third Service, p. 81. 
14. Sir Sefton Brancker, "British Air Power", 
Quarterly Review, July 1926, pp. 25-26. 
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Ironside, Gort and Pile, all senior officers at the outbreak 
of war, clearly saw the aeroplane as a direct means of 
supporting the battle forces. Furthermore, it can be argued 
that the general attitude shown by Army commanders towards the 
use of aircraft in frontier operations and tactical exercises 
provides no valid criterion, for it was doubtless coloured by 
their lack of permanent control over what, in their eyes, 
was a battlefield weapon. Group Captain Haslam, it is true, 
recalls that when in command of the Signal Cooperation Flight, 
1922 to 1924, the request for air support was usually couched 
in the most casual terms, such as "We are holding an exercise, 
you can send an aeroplane if you like". I But this attitude, 
reprehensible though it certainly was, must be seen against a 
background of Air Force control wherein the Army commander 
was always obliged to seek the assistance of another and much 
junior service, a service, moreover, which at Staff level 
showed a marked lack of interest in the use of aircraft in a 
tactical role. This fact might well account for much of the 
Army's reluctance to use airpower to its fullest extent. Even 
Captain Guest who, as Air Minister in 1921 and 1922, had faced 
the full brunt of the Army's opposition to a third service, 
was later to advocate that the two senior services should be 
given their own air arms. He stated in 1936: 
I believe it would have the effect of 
making the whole of the three forces 
air minded simultaneously which I 
think is vital in the present 
circumstances of today. 2 
In the matter of strategic bombing, too, the attitude 
of airman and politician alike was the product of the heart, 
not the head. As far as the politician was concerned, reliance 
on strategic bombing as a-deterrent was clearly a form of 
escapism -a means of avoiding the static, costly land battles 
of the First World War. It would appear that most politicians 
did not enquire too closely into the facts and figures 
1. Interviewed by author 15 March 1977. See fn. 3, 
p. 124 of this work. 
2. Speaking July 1936. See Air 9/8, Folio 60. 
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supporting such a policy lest they found them to be untenable. 
But responsibility for these "facts and figures" and for the 
policy they supported, was that of the Air Staff. Charged with 
the task of providing the Government with unbiassed and 
dispassionate information concerning air matters, it was they 
who saw the next war as an isolated battle of bombers, and they 
who clung obstinately to this contention even after their own 
research had thrown serious doubt upon the feasibility and 
efficiency of strategic bombing. As a result, this "bomb-the- 
other-fellow-is-the-only-way" school1 took some years to 
discredit. As Howard points out, there was to be no short cut 
to victory via airpower. 
2 In the event, however, it_was only 
at the last hour that the air expansion programme was switched 
to provide the fighter protection which helped to save Britain 
in 1940. As late as February 1939, ACM Sir Hugh Dowding, AOC 
Fighter Command, was virtually a lone voice when asserting that 
a bomber attack upon this country would be brought to a stand- 
still within a month "owing to the moral effect of the terrific 
casualties such a force would suffer when they were intercepted". 3 
As a direct result of this obsession with such bombing 
methods, other facets of airpower were virtually ignored. 
Throughout the period under review the General Staff - 
struggling for much of the time to retain a viable role in any 
future continental war - made a number of unsuccessful attempts 
to obtain a permanent assignment of close support aircraft for 
the Field Force. The Air Ministry opposed specialised aircraft 
for intervention on the battlefield, arguing that, in the 
unlikely event of such tactics being required, they would be 
carried out by bomber aircraft from the Metropolitan Force, if 
and when they could be spared. Nor, despite earlier 
undertakings to provide both senior services with their 
particular air needs, was any serious thought given to the 
science of tactical cooperation and the specialised training 
it required. Strategic bombing - as the Abyssinian crisis so 
1. Ashmore, op. cit., p. 1l7. 
2. Michael Howard, "Bombing and the Bomb", 
Encounter, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, April 1962, p. 22. 
3. Air 16/261, Dowding to CAS, 24 February 1939. 
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clearly revealed - remained the be all and the end all of Air 
Staff doctrine, and any air threat to this country, be it 
from France or Germany, was adroitly exploited to encourage 
the development of this bomber theory. Slessor, whilst agreeing 
that Trenchard went in for a "certain amount of overstatement", 
saw such exaggeration as a means of countering the incessant 
opposition of the senior services to the new arm. 
' There is 
doubtless some truth in this, but as early as January 1918 
Flight Magazine was warning its readers against "the habit of 
exaggerating which leads even the best balanced minds to think 
that nothing else matters but its own immediate interests". 
2 
In fact, the Army authorities - although not experts in 
the field - made a more realistic appraisal of the effects 
of bombing than did the Air Ministry itself. At both the 
COS and CID levels, the WO and General Staff played the 
leading part in opposing the bland assumptions of the Air 
Force as to the weight of air attack which could be launched 
against this country and the viability of our own bomber force 
as a credible deterrent. They questioned, too, the very basis 
of the theory of bomber deterrence, pointing out that London, 
in the words of Churchill, was "a tremendous fat cow tied up 
to attract the beasts of prey". 
3Ironside commented drily that 
the country-was at such a disadvantage in the theory of 
strategic bombing that only a "Ministry of no talents" could 
have enunciated it. 4 
Thus it was that within a few years from the end of the 
Great War, the tactical and strategic doctrines of both 
fighting services were firmly set upon widely diverging 
courses. The period up to 1926 witnessed the development of 
an air doctrine based almost entirely upon independent bombing 
action both at home and overseas. By the early 1930s, 
following the collapse of collective security and the abortive 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/64+4+, Slessor to Liddell 
Hart, 18 July 1965. 
2. Flight Magazine, Editorial, Vol. X, 3 January 1918, p. 2. 
3. Quoted-by Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World, p. 289. 
4. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/401, Ironside to Liddell 
Hart, 29 March 1931. 
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attempts at international disarmament, this Air Force doctrine 
had re-emerged confirmed and strengthened. 
In the matter of imperial policing and defence, such an 
article of faith - reducing or threatening to reduce as it did 
the strength of ground forces - was to make tactical 
cooperation impossible or impracticable. Its effects at home 
were to be even more drastic. Here, the theory of strategic 
bombing made militarily possible the concept of limited 
liability. Based though this strategy was on false assumptions 
both as to the strength of the German bomber force and the 
efficacy of bombing itself, it gave credence to a doctrine 
which rendered the Army virtually impotent at a time when huge 
land forces were preparing for war on the continent. Ironside 
noted in his diary just one year before Britain became 
involved in that war: 
No army, no tactical doctrine, and no 
cooperation with the RAF, no material, 
and hopeless confusion as to the AA 
defence in England., 
Furthermore, whilst formally supporting the 
recommendations of the COS Sub-Committee concerning the need 
for a continental land commitment, in the discussion itself, 
the Air Staff persistently discouraged the use of the Field 
Force for this purpose and, at times, openly opposed any form 
of land commitment. In the CID, too, successive Air Ministers 
would lend no support to WO pleas for a more realistic 
appraisal of the Army's role and consequent needs. As early as 
1934, as Uri Bialer points out, the Air Staff were supporting 
the basic tenets of limited liability; and they continued to 
do so long after their own research had revealed both the 
inadequacy of their bomber force as a viable deterrent, and 
the incompetence of the German bomber force to wreak the havoc 
and destruction so confidently forecast but a few months 
earlier. As Blair writes: 
1. The Ironside Diaries, 3 September 1938, p. 60. 
2. Uri Bialer, "The British Chiefs of Staff and 
the Limited Liability Formula of 1938", 
Military Affairs, Vol. XII, No. 2, April 1978, p"93. 
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They (the-Air Staff) had conceived the 
idea of strategic bombing as a 
defensive reprisal deterrent. They 
could see no other, not even when they 
could not carry it out. ' 
Even if one were to accept as feasible'the basic tenets 
of limited liability - and this in itself is difficult - it 
is clear that by the late 1930s the Air Force possessed 
nothing like the strength necessary to defend Britain and, at 
the same time, provide France with a sufficient air armada to 
compensate for the loss of a British Expeditionary Force in 
Flanders. Indeed, when the fighting did break out, the French 
were soon denied aircraft because home defence forces were 
clearly and dangerously inadequate. 
The Army's persistent attacks upon the policy of limited 
liability and the theory of strategic bombing which underpinned 
it, together with their insistence upon the need for a land 
commitment in support of France and the Low Countries, must. be 
regarded as both justifiable and laudable. However, had the 
weaknesses inherent in the theory of strategic bombing at this 
time been acknowledged earlier, and the policy of limited 
liability thereby undermined sooner, the effect upon the Army's 
role is difficult to gauge. There would doubtless have remained 
-gas Gibbs points out -a deep-seated reluctance on the part of 
the British Government to provide a large ground force for the 
continent. 2 Nevertheless, it can be argued that, with the 
prospect of a limited land contribution to. placate the French 
and thus secure the defence of Belgium, more serious 
consideration would have been given to the vital matter of 
tactical cooperation between air and land forces. As it was, 
when the policy of limited liability collapsed around the ears 
of airman and politician early in 1939, the country was left 
with a small, poorly-equipped Army, destined for an Eastern 
theatre, and almost totally devoid of any experience in land- 
air cooperation. Indeed, such cooperation was not perfected 
1. P. E. Blair, "Airpower and Appeasement" in Essays 
to Michael Roberts (Edited by John Bossy and Peter 
Jupp), P. M. 
2. Gibbs, op. cit., p. 318. 
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until the closing stages of the Second World War - and 
British ground forces suffered severely as a consequence. 
In emphasising the shortcomings of the Air Staff's 
doctrine in the interwar years, and pointing out their 
consequences upon Army-Air Force relations, it is in no way 
intended to put all the blame for interservice rivalry upon 
the shoulders of the RAF. Indeed, in this work no conscious 
attempt has been made to minimise the intemperate and often 
unjustified'hostility shown by soldiers towards the advent of 
the air arm. There can be no, denying that there were Army 
officers who possessed two-dimensional minds and feet of 
Flanders clay. It would be surprising, in fact, if one were 
not to find minds which were unreceptive to new ideas in an 
institution as conservative as that of the British Army. It is 
clear, for example, that the General Staff, greatly fearing 
the effects of a third service upon their dwindling 
establishments, often attempted to deny airpower its proper 
and rightful place in Britain's defence system. There is 
little doubt, too, that in the field of imperial policing and 
defence, military commanders were not always as prepared to 
provide an opportunity for close cooperation as their public 
utterances would lead one to believe. Liddell Hart recalls 
that he found a "veiled spitefulness and palpable prejudice" 
among soldiers when they discussed the Air Force. ' 
Nevertheless, this research would suggest that the 
attitude and motives of the Army towards airpower were not as 
"bigoted" and "conservative" as some observers have claimed, 
2 
and that a new and fairer balance needs to be struck between 
the arguments which served to divide these two departments. 
The Army's case had much to commend it and anticipated many 
of the serious problems which were to confront the Service 
Chiefs and members of the Government when the coordination 
of the two arms was put to the ultimate test amid the rigours 
of war. Furthermore, if the Army can be accused of living in the 
1. Liddell Hart Papers, 1/132, Liddell Hart to 
Burnett-Stuart, 17 September 1932. 
2. Captain McA. Hogg, "Aeroplanes in Future Warfare", 
Army Quarterly,. Vo1. IX, No. 1, October 1924, p. 98. 
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past, then the Air Staff can be accused of living in the 
future. It was not, in fact, until the 1950s, with the doctrine 
of Massive Retaliation, that the theories on strategic bombing 
advanced so confidently by Trenchard and his, successors in the 
1920s and 1930s caught up with reality. Trenchard might well 
have anticipated the doctrine of the ultimate deterrent, as 
Wykeham suggests, ' but unfortunately for Britain and the world 
at large, the tactics of blitzkrieg came in between. As Falls 
has rightly commented, looking too far ahead can be as great 
a disadvantage in strategy and tactics as living in the past. 2 
Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig wrote in 1917, following 
the recommendations of the Smuts Committee: 
I desire to point out the grave danger 
of an Air Ministry, charged with such 
powers as the committee recommends, 
assuming control with a belief in 
theories which are not in accordance 
with practical evidence. 3 
This comment would appear to be a fitting epitaph for 
the relations between the Army and Air Force in those 
eventful and turbulent years between the two world wars. 
1. Peter Wykeham, Fighter Command, p. 28. 
2. Cyril Falls, A Hundred Years of War, p. 291. 
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